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The principle of complementarity is a tool used to punish the commission of core 
international crimes. A concerted approach is required to combat war crimes, 
genocide, crimes against humanity and aggression. The Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court needs to fully appreciate the express and implied discretionary powers 
of states to ensure all possible accountability mechanisms are explored. Failure by the 
Prosecutor to do so results in missed opportunities to capitalise on various options 
related to the proper application of complementarity. Therefore, there is a need for 
consultations to establish that the International Criminal Court and prosecutions can 
no longer exist without competing alternatives preferred by states. The current 
misunderstandings on the application of complementarity are rooted in unresolved 
state and prosecutorial discretions. The endangering of state discretion threatens the 
integrity and credibility of the International Criminal Court. The unaddressed question 
of state discretion is also at the centre of disputes between the African Union and the 
International Criminal Court. Grey areas in the application of complementarity are 
clearly visible through the inconsistency and diversity of the International Criminal 
Court decisions and frequent prosecutorial policy proclamations. As a result, 
prosecutorial discretion needs to be checked. Prosecutorial discretion is checked at 
the United Nations, International Criminal Court and state levels. The checks at 
regional level and by non-prosecutorial options need to be explored. The call is for the 
International Criminal Court not to neglect the legal-political environment which the 
Court operates in. The environment is essential in demarcating the exercise of 
discretions. The Kenyatta case is illustrative of the need to invent an interpretation that 
reflects the evolving theory to practice reality. The development or amendment of a 
prosecutorial policy is desirable to give guidance on the value, circumstances and 
priority accorded to justice. The policy should be comprehensive enough to 
accommodate mechanisms which advocate for strengthened state discretion. For 
instance, African Union instruments and treaties reveal that the respect of state 
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OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Introductory remarks 
The International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) is a permanent international court 
created to investigate and prosecute international crimes, namely, the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crime of aggression.1 In terms of 
the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute), the crime of genocide is committed with 
intent to eliminate a particular group; crimes against humanity are committed against 
a civilian population in a widespread or systematic manner, while war crimes are 
committed during armed conflicts, mainly as part of a plan or policy of an armed force 
or group.2 On the other hand, the Rome Statute defines the crime of aggression within 
the context of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter). The crime is committed 
when a state attacks another.3 
The main objectives of the ICC are to end impunity and contribute to the prevention of 
international crimes.4 The Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘impunity’ as exemption or 
protection from penalty or punishment.5 The use of the word ῾contribute᾿ denotes that 
the ICC does not act in isolation in dealing with international crimes. Other mechanisms 
or actors play their part as well in this cause. The word also indicates that the Court 
should welcome any mechanism that leads to the prevention of international crimes. 
Beyond the frontline objectives of ending impunity and advocacy for international 
criminal justice, the Rome Statute is mindful of the need to preserve cohesion among 
states.6 Thus, the Court is designed to operate in an international relations arena. The 
arena is governed by fundamental theories, namely, the realist, institutionalist, 
liberalist, constructivist and legalist theories.7 
 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) arts 1 & 5. 
2 n 1 above, arts 6(1), 7(1) & 8(1). 
3 n 1 above, art 8bis & Preamble para 7. 
4 n 1 above, Preamble para 5. 
5 Black’s Law Dictionary 891. 
6 n 1 above, Preamble paras 1 & 7. 
7 K Abbot ‘International relations theory, international law and the regime governing atrocities in internal 
conflict᾽ (1999) 93(2) American Journal of International Law 364 - 367. 
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Realism is conservative of state sovereignty.8 Institutionalism advocates for a co-
ordinated approach to international law.9 Liberalism creates space for individuals and 
private actors to contribute to international politics.10 Constructivism provides for a 
normative approach to create checks and balances for states in light of existing rights 
and duties.11 Legalism puts an emphasis on the separation of law and politics.12 Each 
theory has a distinct function in explaining issues of primacy and discretion, 
international co-operation, interface between law and politics, and minimum 
requirements for the enforcement of international justice. The theories are referred to 
in some portions of this study, as they contribute to literature and understanding of 
complementarity. 
The ICC is triune in as far as it is an independent institution, complements national 
jurisdictions and operates within the United Nations (UN) system.13 As an independent 
institution, the Court strives to thwart political or other interference in its proceedings.14 
It is relegated to a supporting role in view of the primacy and obligation of states to 
address international crimes.15 Further, the Rome Statute embraces the need to 
prevent serious crimes, as these result in global instability and insecurity.16 The Court 
refrains from substituting the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on politically 
inspired interventions.17 
The inclusion of both the UNSC and states in the operations of the Court supports the 
inseparability of law and politics.18 It is on this basis that other political actors, such as 
regional organisations, may demonstrate that the UN system incorporates them. It is 
also on this basis that states may resort to other means that are not necessarily legal 
in nature to address international crimes. The use of state discretion is vital in 
preserving the primacy of states and in facilitating the intervention of a secondary forum 
 
8 J Asin ‘Pursing Al Bashir in South Africa: between apology and utopia’ in HJ van der Merwe & G Kemp 
(eds) International criminal justice in Africa: issues, challenges and prospects (2016) 9 -10.  
9 CJ Alvarez International organizations as law-makers (2005) 25; Asin (n 8 above) 10. 
10 Abbot (n 7 above) 366. 
11 Asin (n 8 above) 10. 
12 J Maogoto War crimes and realpolitik: international justice from World War I to the 21st century (2004) 
10 - 11. 
13 n 1 above, Preamble paras 7 -10. 
14 n 1 above, arts 40 & 42. 
15 n 1 above, Preamble paras 4 & 6. 
16 n 1 above, Preamble paras 3 & 5. 
17 n 1 above, art 15bis (6) & Preamble paras 7 - 9. 
18 J Shklar Legalism: law, morals and political trials (1986) 123. 
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considering competing jurisdictional or decision-making actors. Of interest in this study 
is the rationale for resorting to alternative forms of justice other than prosecutions and 
the preference of regional mechanisms ahead of the ICC. 
The longevity and sustainability of the Court will largely depend on its ability to balance 
the sovereign rights of states and its duty to intervene. An overemphasis on ending 
impunity and failure to satisfactorily operate in a legal-political environment may limit 
the Court’s effectiveness in playing an auxiliary role to states. The Court is a creation 
of a political compromise and it would be naive for it to divorce itself from political 
considerations.19 To be a success, the Court should extend its reach beyond states 
and the UN and incorporate regional organisations such as the African Union (AU). 
Such organisations have the capacity to bring added value on issues of referrals or 
deferrals, co-operation and prosecution or resolution of international crimes. The 
Court’s success will be attained when increased state ownership of international 
crimes allows states to cede ownership to any forum of choice. 
Anchoring the ICC is the principle of complementarity, a principle that prefers 
prosecution by national jurisdictions.20 The practice differs from earlier international 
criminal tribunals that exercised primacy over national courts.21 The unwillingness or 
inability,22 or inaction,23 of states with jurisdiction triggers the intervention of the ICC. 
Put another way, the primary role of investigating and prosecuting international crimes 
is vested in states and the ICC intervenes as a court of last resort. The ICC plays a 
secondary role when states neglect their primary role.24 The principle therefore defines 
and demarcates the ICC-states relationship.25  
In almost every attempt or actual creation of international criminal tribunals – whether 
permanent or ad hoc – the desire among states had been the existence of a 
 
19 MM El Zeidy ‘The principle of complementarity: a new machinery to implement international criminal 
lawʾ (2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 906.  
20 n 1 above, Preamble para 10, arts 1 &17. 
21 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (Statute of the ICTY); 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Statute of the ICTR); Statute of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (Statute of the SCSL). 
22 n 1 above, art 17(1); El Zeidy (n 19 above) 869. 
23 NN Jurdi International criminal courts and national courts: a contentious relationship (2011) 37. 
24 JK Kleffner ῾Complementarity as a catalyst for compliance’ in JK Kleffner & G Kor (eds) 
Complementary views on complementarity (2006) 79 - 80.  
25 MC Bassiouni ‘Policy perspectives favoring the establishment of the International Criminal Court’ 
(1999) 52 Journal of International Affairs 798. 
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complementary system. The main question had been on who enjoys primacy between 
states and an international forum. At least from the fifteenth century, the creators of 
international forums envisaged a states-international forum relationship,26 as well as a 
states-international forum-regional forum relationship.27 This historically multifaceted 
appearance of complementarity shows that the principle is not rigid but dynamic both 
in its description and application. Owing to its technicalities, the term ‘complementarity’ 
had to wait until the Rome Conference established the ICC to be expressly mentioned 
in an international criminal tribunal statute. The Rome Statute itself provides for a 
descriptive rather than a definitive mention of the term.28 
Complementarity heavily depends on the exercise of discretion by three triggering 
actors, namely, states, ICC Prosecutor (the Prosecutor) and the UNSC. Ordinarily, the 
first exercise of discretion is given to states with jurisdiction. States exercise 
jurisdictions prior to and after the intervention of the Court. Before the Court intervenes, 
states can either institute national proceedings or authorise the intervention of the 
ICC.29 After the intervention of the ICC, states may, inter alia, request the Court to 
defer the investigation to their jurisdiction.30 The Prosecutor has the discretion to 
accede to or decline such a request based on admissibility, interests of justice or 
reasonableness.31 
The UNSC may refer or request deferral of situations or cases from both state and 
non-state parties based on the preservation of international peace and security.32 The 
UNSC may also provide guidance to the ICC when there is non-compliance with 
requests for co-operation by a state.33 The UN is involved in the operations of the Court 
because of the international nature of crimes under the Rome Statute. Since the same 
crimes are of serious concern to regions where they occur, it is not ambitious to involve 
regional organisations in the operations of the ICC. 
 
26 CM Bassiouni ‘International criminal justice in historical perspective: the tension between states’ 
interests and the pursuit for justice’ in A Cassese (ed) The Oxford Companion to International Criminal 
Justice (2009) 132. 
27 Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) art 52. 
28 El Zeidy (n 19 above) 896. 
29 n 1 above, art 14. 
30 n 1 above, art 18(2). 
31 n 1 above, arts 15(3) & 53(1). 
32 n 1 above, arts 13(b) & 16. 
33 n 1 above, art 87(7). 
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The Preamble to the Rome Statute strongly entrenches the relationship between the 
Court and national and international systems. The complementary role of the Court is 
reflected in both the letter and spirit of the Rome Statute. The letter is easily extracted 
from the Preamble as well as in articles 1 and 17 which clearly make the Court 
secondary to national jurisdictions. The purposes, principles and the system of the UN 
on complementarity are easy to understand in the Rome Statute.34 This study seeks 
to show that the Court has limited its practice to express provisions of the Rome 
Statute, hence its failure to fully appreciate innovative efforts of states such as the use 
of regional mechanisms and the invocation of alternative forms of justice in matters of 
international crimes. The Court justifies its disregard of directives from regional 
mechanisms on the grounds of preventing political interference in its work. 
The UN works with states and regional institutions for purposes of international peace 
and security.35 Regional organisations and other agencies often complement states 
and the UNSC to enhance the achievement of the ideals of the UN Charter, hence the 
submission for states and the UNSC to make referrals to regional organisations, where 
appropriate.36 As a matter of principle, the UN Charter encourages states to utilise 
existing regional mechanisms before they refer disputes to the UNSC.37 The stance is 
inspired by the realisation that regional institutions are in positions to better understand 
the context and culture of their member states.38 
A continent such as Africa, which has a long history of external aggression and 
imperialism, and which continues to raise allegations of neo-imperialism and accuses 
the UN of bias, will most likely be comfortable using regional efforts before it requests 
international intervention. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR 
or African Charter), the main instrument on human rights in the continent, explicitly 
requires a conceptualisation of human rights that reflects African values.39 Therefore, 
the Court should look beyond the Rome Statute and invite regional organisations for 
partnership in areas of mutual benefit. 
 
34 n 1 above, Preamble. 
35 n 27 above, art 1. 
36 n 27 above, art 52. 
37 n 27 above, art 52(2). 
38 GW Mugwanya ῾Realizing universal human rights norms through regional human rights mechanisms: 
reinvigorating the African system᾽ (1999) 10 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 42. 
39 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (African Charter) Preamble paras 3 - 4. 
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The Rome Statute demonstrates a deficiency when it partly relies on the UNSC to 
enforce international criminal justice, thereby enabling permanent members with veto 
powers to derail investigations and prosecutions to protect their interests. This 
politicisation of justice has been one of the causes of bias in the prosecution of 
international crimes for over a century. For instance, after World War I, the Allies or 
Allied powers prevented the prosecution of Turkish officials, as they considered Turkey 
to be a strategic partner.40 
Since the UN system is susceptible to politically motivated referrals to the ICC,41 
regional organisations may act as a buffer against unwarranted intrusion into the affairs 
of states. The AU allows participatory processes to ensure that the voice of affected 
states is heard. 
The Court may have to accept a political compromise in future, since African states 
intend to give an AU mechanism jurisdiction over international crimes. Many scholars 
have written on the AU’s existing and proposed mechanisms as alternatives to the ICC. 
Proponents argue that the AU has a right to intervene in member states’ affairs under 
the Constitutive Act of the AU (the Constitutive Act),42 the precedent created by the 
Extraordinary African Chambers (Extraordinary Chambers),43 and opportunities 
presented by the proposed Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (the Malabo Protocol).44 
The Constitutive Act allows the AU to flex its political muscles to preserve regional 
peace and security,45 just like the Rome Statute allows the UNSC to intervene to 
preserve peace and security at a global scale.46 The establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers and the Malabo Protocol illustrate an African approach to prosecutions. 
Some scholars are convinced that the Extraordinary Chambers demonstrated the 
capability of the AU to prosecute international crimes when it empowered Senegal to 
 
40 MC Bassiouni ‘From Versailles to Rwanda in seventy-five years: the need to establish a permanent 
international criminal court’ (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 17. 
41 WA Schabas ‘United States hostility to the International Criminal Court: it’s all about the Security 
Council’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 715. 
42 D Kuwali ‘Humanitarian rights: enforcement of international humanitarian law by the African Court of 
Human Rights’ (2011) African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law 169. 
43 B Nthahiraja ‘The present and future of universal jurisdiction in Africa: lessons from the Hissène Habré 
case’ in van der Merwe & Kemp (n 8 above) 23. 
44 Nthahiraja (n 43 above) 9. 
45 Constitutive Act of the African Union (Constitutive Act) art 4(h). 
46 n 1 above, art 13. 
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try Habré on its behalf.47 A complementary relationship existed between Senegal and 
the AU because the latter preferred the former as a forum of adjudication. Prior to the 
establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, three options were considered: Senegal 
or Chad jurisdiction; an ad hoc Africa criminal tribunal; or an African state jurisdiction.48 
The Extraordinary Chambers and the Malabo Protocol are hints on Africa’s future 
approach in the prosecution of international crimes. 
Some scholars have visualised the complementary relationship an African judicial 
mechanism will have with the ICC.49 Undoubtedly, literature has laid a foundation on 
the rationale of alternative forums to fight impunity. However, literature does not 
propose adequate procedural steps to annex these forums to the ICC complementarity 
system. 
Ideally, a system that operates on discretion and interstate politics should be backed 
not only by a legally binding mechanism but also by a strong policy. A policy will 
translate complementarity as understood at the international level into regional and 
contextual realities, thereby creating a better understanding of obligations, powers and 
authority between the ICC and states. Although the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has 
made great strides in developing a prosecutorial policy, this study seeks to 
demonstrate that the existing policy needs to be revised. Alternatively, this study will 
seek to show the need for the development of a new policy to strengthen and cure 
defects. The study seeks to demonstrate that the policy should be comprehensive, to 
allow states to incorporate as many partners and approaches as possible in the 
advancement of the complementarity project. Some of the partners already operate in 
some form of complementarity with states. On the other hand, alternative forms of 
justice have been used successfully in some post-conflict societies.50 
In their discretion, African states can make the envisaged participation of the AU in the 
ICC prosecution processes a reality. This study outlines that state discretion should 
not only be limited to the power to adjudicate or not to adjudicate over ICC crimes but 
 
47 See for example Nthahiraja (n 43 above). 
48 AU ῾Report of the Committee of eminent African jurists on the case of Hissène Habré’ (July 2006) 5.  
49 See for example M du Plessis  ͑ Implications of the AU decision to give the African Court jurisdiction 
over international crimes᾽ June 2012 http://www.issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper235-
AfricaCourt.pdf (accessed 15 March 2018).  
50 SA Williams & WA Schabas ‘Article 17 issues of admissibility’ in O Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2008).  
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also that discretion should empower states to decide on the best approaches to 
tackling international crimes. The OTP policy should reflect innovative abilities of states 
to contribute to the complementarity project. The ICC should operate in subordination 
to the discretion of states in a genuinely complementary system. The UNSC must also 
be regionally sensitive by allowing the AU to exhaust its remedies before triggering the 
UNSC referrals to the ICC. 
A comprehensive policy will minimise tensions between the ICC and states. The 
existing policy intends to assist states to conduct proceedings themselves after 
evaluating their performance and potential. A revised or new policy should outline that 
the assistance rendered to states extends to partners identified by states in the case 
of regional mechanisms. This study addresses the question of state discretion in two 
forms. First, it demonstrates how states can use their discretion to give effect to an 
interpretation and application of complementarity that is broader than the interpretation 
and application of the ICC. Secondly, the study shows how states can play a catalytic 
role to ensure the incorporation of regional mechanisms as an alternative to the ICC. 
The study uses the Kenyan situation, particularly the Kenyatta case, as a case study 
because the case raises several issues that need attention considering the continuous 
evolution of the principle of complementarity. Regarding the Kenyan situation, the ICC 
missed an opportunity to reaffirm the desirability of an approach that encompasses the 
spirit of the Rome Statute. 
To date, the Court has applied the principle of complementarity mainly in line with the 
letter of the Rome Statute. This study unpacks the spirit of the Rome Statute derived 
from the UN Charter and argues that such encompasses the desire among states for 
collective and harmonised decisions to balance the interests of peace, security and 
justice. These interests are among the objectives of the Rome Statute. The study 
shows that there is a ῾silent or implied᾽ jurisdiction of international and regional 
mechanisms under the Rome Statute. The current scholarship is not sufficient for the 
implied jurisdiction. The Kenyan situation also raises issues of discretionary powers, 
different approaches to justice and the incorporation of regional mechanisms in 
international criminal justice. 
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This study recommends frequent use of alternative forms of justice and the inclusion 
of regional mechanisms to widen the scope of state discretion. It is recommended that 
after giving states primacy, the Rome Statute should leave it to states to identify crimes 
to be prosecuted, necessary forms of justice within the circumstances and partners 
needed to assist the states to execute their duties. The discretion will enable states to 
involve regional mechanisms in the prosecution of international crimes and to adopt 
approaches that suit national interests and security. Since the Preamble to the Rome 
Statute favours an interpretation that conforms to the UN Charter, international peace 
and security, as well as cohesion among nations, are paramount. To achieve these, 
there is a need for a consolidated effort of the UN, regional organisations and states. 
Given that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention) 
obligates the Court to adopt the aforesaid interpretation, the Court should consider the 
context and the broader objectives of the Rome Statute.51 The involvement of regional 
organisations in the creation phase of the ICC is a motivation for their involvement in 
the operational and prosecutorial aspects of the Court’s work.52 Arguably, the Court 
acknowledges the importance of a collective and harmonised voice when developing 
international criminal justice.53 However, an official recognition of regional 
organisations as competent forums in the administration of justice is outstanding. 
The Court operates an international law system and is accordingly prone to challenges 
of enforcement, co-operation and implementation.54 This study advances proposals on 
how the Court, in recognition of state discretion, can utilise the growing strength of 
regional mechanisms, specifically in Africa, and embrace state preferences on 
complementarity to strengthen the enforcement mechanisms of international criminal 




51 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) art 31(1). 
52 M du Plessis ‘A critical appraisal to Africa’s response to the world’s first permanent international 
criminal court’ PhD thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2011 79. 
53 n 1 above, art 87. 
54 D Fleck ‘Enforcement of international humanitarian law’ in D Fleck (ed) The handbook of international 
humanitarian law (2008) 675. 
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1.2 Contextual background 
The creation of the ICC was welcomed with enthusiasm and great expectation. The 
creation was seen as a positive step towards universal human rights and rule of law.55 
The Court became the first permanent international criminal tribunal,56 and thus 
marked a departure from the practice of ad hoc tribunals started at Nuremberg.57 It 
realised a century-long ambition for a permanent criminal judicial mechanism and 
ignited hopes for the end of impunity.58 With complementarity as one of its most 
identifiable features, the Court was closely scrutinised from the onset. 
In early years, the Prosecutor set a yardstick to measure the success of the Court. The 
Prosecutor’s view was that a strong capability of national jurisdictions to prosecute 
international crimes was a crucial indicator of the success of the Court.59 Although 
positive complementarity was a later addition to the ICC prosecutorial policy, the first 
Prosecutor set the tone for the policy at the Court’s infancy. Positive complementarity 
is meant to encourage and strengthen national jurisdictions to retain primacy in 
international crimes.60 The policy aims to facilitate technical assistance to states.61 
To date, 22 cases from nine states have been brought before the ICC.62 Four state 
parties to the Rome Statute, namely, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), the Central Africa Republic (CAR) and Mali have referred cases to the Court, 
while the situations in Darfur (Sudan) and Libya were referred to the Court by the 
UNSC.63 The Prosecutor was also granted authorisation to investigate crimes 
committed in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire on own initiative.64 From this point, this section 
 
55 UN ῾Statement of the Secretary-General says establishment of the International Criminal Court is a 
major step in march towards universal human rights, rule of law᾿ 20 July 1998 
http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980720.l2890.html (accessed 15 March 2018). 
56 n 1 above, art 1. 
57 BS Brown ‘Primacy or complementarity: reconciling the jurisdiction of national courts and international 
criminal tribunals᾿ (1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law 426. 
58 n 55 above. 
59 OTP ‘Statement made at the ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor᾽ 16 June 
2003 http://www.icc-cpi.int (accessed 15 March 2018). 
60 WW Burke-White ‘Proactive complementarity: the International Criminal Court and national courts in 
the Rome system of justice’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Journal 54. 
61 NN Jurdi ‘Some lessons on complementarity of the International Criminal Court Review Conference’ 
(2010) 34 South African Yearbook of International Law 30. 
62 http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN (accessed 15 March 2018). 
63 n 62 above. 
64 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (31 March 2010) 01/09-19-Corr. ICC; Situation in the Republic of 
Côte d’Ivoire (3 October 2011) 02/11 ICC. 
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presents an overview of Kenya and ICC following a disputed presidential election in 
2007. 
Kenya ratified the Rome Statute in 2005.65 After the 2007 presidential elections, 
violence erupted in Kenya.66 An independent body, the Commission of Inquiry on Post-
Election Violence (the Waki Commission or CIPEV), investigated the post-election 
violence.67 The Waki Commission drew a list of suspects alleged to have 
masterminded the violence68 and proposed the establishment of a special domestic 
tribunal to punish the wrongdoing.69 
To expedite the creation of a special tribunal, the Kenyan Parliament debated the 
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill in February 200970 and rejected the Bill on two 
occasions.71 The rejection of the Bill left no accountability mechanism, hence Kofi 
Annan, who was at the time the chairman of the AU Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities, recommended the intervention of the ICC.72 
The Prosecutor began a preliminary examination for Kenya in February 2008.73 
Notably, this was before the failed attempt to establish a special tribunal. After a year, 
the Prosecutor justified the initiation of an investigation.74 The Prosecutor pointed out 
the Kenyan government’s inactivity.75 In 2009, the Prosecutor informed the ICC 
President of an intention to initiate proceedings in Kenya.76 On 31 March 2010, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC (PTC) authorised the Prosecutor to commence formal 
investigations in Kenya.77 
 
65 http://www.treaties.un.org (accessed10 February 2017). 
66 See Crisis Group Africa report ῾Kenya in crisis᾿ 21 February 2008; ‘Commission of Enquiry into Post-
Election Violence᾽ 15 October 2008. 
67 International Center for Transitional Justice ῾The Kenyan Commission of inquiry into post-election 
violence᾿ 17 December 2008 http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-Dialogue-Inquiry-2008-
English.pdf (accessed 10 February 2017). 
68 http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/PEV%20Report.pdf (accessed 10 February 2017). 
69 n 68 above, 484.  
70 TO Hansen ‘The policy requirement in crimes against humanity: lessons from and for the case of 
Kenya (2011) 43 George Washington International Law Review 1 - 3. 
71 Hansen (n 70 above). 
72 X Rice ῾Annan hands ICC list of perpetrators of post-election violence in Kenya᾿ 9 July 2009 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/09/international-criminal-court-kofi-annan (accessed 15 
March 2018). 
73 http://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_08645.pdf (accessed 31 March 2018). 
74 n 73 above. 
75 n 73 above. 
76 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (26 November 2009) 01/09-3 EO PT ICC 4. 
77 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (31 March 2010) 01/09 ICC para 18. 
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The PTC concurred with the Prosecutor on the admissibility of the Kenyan situation.78 
The PTC stated that there were no national proceedings in Kenya or a third state.79 
Kenya launched an admissibility challenge before the Appeals Chamber of the ICC 
(AC), pursuant to article 19(2)(b) of the Rome Statute,80 which empowers a state to 
challenge admissibility based on past or existing national action. Kenya argued in its 
appeal that it fulfilled article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, as it was willing and able to 
investigate and prosecute. 
The AC confirmed the PTC decision81 through the use of the same person and same 
conduct test.82 The test demands that national courts prosecute persons identified by 
the ICC who substantially committed the type of crimes identified by the ICC.83 The 
second part of the test makes it difficult for national courts to claim admissibility over a 
case when they intend to proceed with a crime not mentioned in the Rome Statute. 
The Court also dismissed the Kenyatta case due to the failure of Kenya to prove the 
existence of investigative steps at the national level.84 The Court held that state 
inaction rendered the case automatically admissible before the Court.85 However, the 
Court overlooked that the proposed special tribunal was not the only mechanism 
available to Kenya at national level. The Court also failed to consider the evolutionary 
nature of investigations. To safeguard the primacy of national proceedings under the 
complementarity regime, the Court should give states more discretionary powers on 
the choice of forum and institution of proceedings. Regarding investigations, the list of 
state efforts could range from preparation to the actual investigation of cases.86 Only 
after exploring the lack of adequate effort can the ICC ideally declare inactivity.87 
Difficulties associated with the determination of investigations by a state, particularly 
at the initiation stages, were acknowledged by the AC.88 The AC stated that the 
genuineness of an investigation was not an issue in the admissibility determination 
 
78 n 77 above, para 80.  
79 n 77 above, para 185. 
80 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (30 August 2011) 01/09-02/11 OA ICC. 
81 n 80 above, para 123. 
82 n 80 above, para 46. 
83 n 80 above. 
84 n 80 above, para 40. 
85 Prosecutor v Muthaura et al (30 May 2011) 01/09/11 ICC. 
86 CC Jalloh ‘Kenya vs the ICC Prosecutor’ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal 243. 
87 Jalloh (n 86 above) 236. 
88 n 80 above, para 38. 
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under consideration.89 States should be allowed more discretion and independence to 
craft timelines and strategies in the earlier phases of an investigation.90 The 
intervention of the Court may be premature if the Court starts a concurrent investigation 
when the state is in the process of setting systems to initiate its own investigation.91 
The situation in Kenya showed a determination by the Prosecutor to take over 
proceedings from the Kenyan authorities.92 Expressed differently, the Prosecutor was 
‘too eager᾽ to investigate and prosecute instead of encouraging and supporting the 
efforts of the state to investigate the situation. As such, the Prosecutor intervened 
prematurely before the exhaustion of national efforts.93 
States need more discretion than the Prosecutor to decide on cases under their 
jurisdiction.94 The Court missed an opportunity to embrace positive complementarity 
by ignoring overtures from a state which welcomed assistance from it to investigate 
the alleged violations.95 Instead, the Court treated co-operation and admissibility as 
separate matters.96 Consultations between the Court and the state may include the 
provision of assistance on information requested by a state.97 The Court and the state 
can resolve complementarity conflicts when co-operation and requests are granted by 
either party when appropriate.98 
Considering that the Kenyatta case began admissibility challenges by states, a lenient 
and patient approach was required in the determination of the PTC.99 The PTC should 
have shown flexibility in accepting documents filed late.100 The condonation could have 
given Kenya more time to make oral hearings and file additional documents.101 
Complementarity obliges the ICC to promote national proceedings than to derail such 
 
89 n 80 above, para 40. 
90 Kleffner (n 24 above). 
91 Kleffner (n 24 above).  
92 J Spilman ‘Complementarity or competition: the effect of the ICC’s decision in Kenya on 
complementarity and the article 17(1) inquiry’ (2013) 10 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 
Online 14. 
93 n 1 above, arts 1 & 5. 
94 Kleffner (n 24 above). 
95 Burke-White (n 60 above) 53 - 108. 
96 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (30 May 2011) 01/09-02/11 ICC paras 28 - 38. 
97 n 1 above, art 93(10). 
98 C Stahn ‘Libya, the International Criminal Court and complementarity: a test of shared responsibility 
(2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 325. 
99 Spilman (n 92 above). 
100 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Uṧacka (30 September 2011) 01/09-02/11 OA ICC para 25.  
101 Spilman (n 92 above). 
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processes.102 A thorough assessment of national efforts is important before a decision 
to deactivate state primacy is made. 
The use of discretion by Kenya received support at AU and sub-regional level. The AU 
criticised the Court for endangering peace and security prospects in Kenya through the 
Court’s assumed jurisdiction over the Kenyan situation.103 The AU recommended the 
use of national or regional mechanisms to resolve the post-election violence.104 The 
Kenyan debate is one of the contributors to the current attempts by the AU to empower 
the African Court on Human and Peoples᾽ Rights (the African Court) with jurisdiction 
over international crimes.105 Another notable attempt to take the Kenyan situation from 
the ICC was the resolution of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), a wing of 
the East African Community (EAC). The EALA resolution of 28 April 2012 proposed 
the transfer of Kenyan cases from the ICC to the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), 
supposedly in the interests of justice.106 The EALA was so determined that it called for 
an amendment to the EAC Treaty to give the EACJ jurisdiction over the Kenyan 
cases.107 The EALA believed that the cases before the ICC were also a contravention 
of the EAC Treaty.108 
1.3 Problem statement 
Notwithstanding the controversy on its proper application, complementarity is 
indispensable to the operations of the Court.109 The challenges faced by the ICC when 
it applies the principle in practice call for scholarly research in the pursuit of a 
universally (hopefully) accepted approach.110 Since new issues continue to arise on 
admissibility, the jurisprudence of the Court needs to develop to meet these demands. 
The Court decisions prior to the Kenyatta case failed to give clear guidance on the 
 
102 Spilman (n 92 above).  
103 AU Assembly ῾Sixteenth Ordinary Session᾿ 30 – 31 January 2011 http://www.goo.gl/qXvsY1. 
104 n 103 above. 
105 A Nossiter & M Simons ‘African leaders grant themselves immunity in proposed court᾽ 2 July 2014 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/world/africa/african-leaders-grant-themselves-immunity-in-
proposed-court.html (accessed 1 February 2017). 
106 EALA ῾Motion on deferring Kenyan cases to the East Africa Court᾽ 28 April 2012 
http://www.eala.org/new/index.php/media-centre/press-releases/571-defer-the kenyan-icc-case-eala-
states (accessed on 8 February 2017).  
107 n 106 above. 
108 n 106 above. 
109 Kleffner (n 24) 81 - 83. 
110 LE Carter ‘The future of the International Criminal Court: complementarity as a strength or weakness’ 
(2013) 12 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 457. 
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proper application of complementarity. The ensuing misunderstanding widened after 
the case.111 
The ICC made several attempts since its inception to promote an understanding of the 
criteria used for determining the admissibility of a case. In the Katanga case,112 the AC 
clarified the purpose of complementarity. The AC identified complementarity as a 
balancing act that ensures respect of sovereign rights and the need to end impunity.113 
The ICC acknowledges the right of states to exercise jurisdiction in their domain.114 
However, the Court is yet to determine the extent to which states are entitled to use 
their discretion and primacy rights to either stop the intervention of the Court or to give 
direction on jurisdictional matters.115 
The scope and meaning of complementarity presently lacks full appreciation in legal 
scholarship.116 There is a need to address the question of state discretion to reduce 
ongoing frictions between the Court and political actors. Clarity on the issue of state 
discretion will give effect to the rebuttable presumption that states are willing and able 
to administer justice under their jurisdiction.117 A rebuttal requires one to establish that 
a state failed to utilise both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms at its disposal to 
address a situation. In addition, it must be established that regional mechanisms are 
also unwilling or unable to assist a state to bring perpetrators to book. The presumption 
can be viewed as a bedrock of the principle of complementarity.118 
The ICC cannot persuasively contend against the use of alternative forms of justice or 
regional mechanisms because it is secondary in operation. The Court has not been 
able to synchronise its duty to intervene in state affairs with the UN system that allows 
political entities and non-judicial approaches at national, regional and international 
level. 
 
111 B Batros ῾The evolution of the ICC jurisprudence on admissibility’ in C Stahn & MM El Zeidy (eds) 
The International Criminal Court: from theory to practice (2010) 558. 
112 Prosecutor v Katanga & Chui (25 September 2009) 01/04-01/07 ICC OA8. 
113 Katanga & Chui (n 112 above). 
114 Kleffner (n 24 above).  
115 MA Newton ‘The complementarity conundrum: are we watching evolution or evisceration (2010) 8 
Santa Clara Journal of International Law 145 - 146. 
116 El Zeidy (n 19 above) 896. 
117 n 80 above, para 27. 
118 Newton (n 115 above). 
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In its first decision on complementarity, the Court introduced the same person and 
same conduct test to determine admissibility.119 Using this test, the Lubanga case was 
held admissible because the same conduct was not investigated by the national 
authorities.120 The Court viewed the warrants of arrest by competent DRC authorities 
against the accused to contain different crimes from those preferred by the ICC.121 
Inadvertently, the Court laid a foundation with legal cracks on what constitutes the 
‘same’ conduct.122 Inconclusiveness on the issue of same conduct has prompted the 
Court to tailor its wording to the concept in its rulings by using terms such as 
‘substantially the same conduct᾽.123 The Court has also invested time to discuss the 
same person requirement.124 
Recent decisions regarding situations in Libya and Kenya show that the question on 
the practical application of complementarity is still unsettled.125 In Libya’s admissibility 
challenge, the Court emphasised on state action and state ability and willingness to 
institute national proceedings.126 The Court addressed Libya’s ‘inability’ to prosecute 
Gaddafi effectively.127 However, the Court did not consider the element of 
‘unwillingness᾽.128 The Libyan scenario shows that issues of activity, willingness and 
ability should be addressed together due to the need for a holistic approach to 
complementarity.129 For instance, a state that is unable to initiate proceedings due to 
resource constraints may be willing to do so.130 The Court may assist such a state to 
carry out national proceedings.131 
The Kenyan scenario was the first opportunity to fully address complementarity.132 
Kenya became the first state to allege inadmissibility of a case and it cited its capacity 
 
119 Prosecutor v Lubanga (09 March 2006) 01/04-01/06-8-Corr ICC paras 19 - 33. 
120 Lubanga (n 119 above) para 55. 
121 Lubanga (n 119 above). 
122 Jurdi (n 23 above) 69. 
123 Jalloh (n 86 above) 229; Prosecutor v Gaddafi & Al-Senussi (2 April 2013) (01/11-01/11) ICC. 
124 n 80 above, para 33. 
125 Carter (n 110 above) 456 - 458. 
126 Prosecutor v Gaddafi & Al-Senussi (31 May 2013) 01/11-01/11 ICC. 
127 Gaddafi & Al-Senussi (n 126 above) para 200. 
128 Gaddafi & Al-Senussi (n 126 above) para 138. 
129 KA Marshall ‘Prevention and complementarity in the International Criminal Court: a positive approach 
(2010) 17(2) Human Rights Brief 22. 
130 Marshall (n 129 above). 
131 n 1 above, art 93. 
132 Prosecutor v Ruto et al (30 August 2011) 01/09-01/11-307 ICC. 
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to adjudicate the cases before the ICC.133 Kenya argued that legal reforms and steps 
were underway to enable national prosecutions.134 Broadly, the alleged capacity 
included the use of alternative forms of justice and regional mechanisms. Also, it is 
noted that Kenya was the first state to be investigated by the ICC at the initiative of the 
Prosecutor.135 
Despite strong arguments against the intervention of the ICC, Kenya failed to persuade 
the Court that it was ready to commence proceedings against perpetrators.136 The 
Court addressed several legal and practical issues in the Kenyan situation.137 From 
the onset, the lack of a precedent on admissibility challenges raised by states exposed 
the Court’s unpreparedness to apply the principle of complementarity.138 The AC 
acknowledged that it was the first time deciding on the necessity of a state to 
investigate same persons in a case under dispute.139 However, the Court missed the 
rapport between complementarity and co-operation when faced with proposals and 
requests for assistance from Kenya.140 Carter maintains that the most ideal use of 
complementarity is in circumstances where the principle enhances prosecution by 
national courts.141 
The Kenyatta case is important in the evolving nature of complementarity, since the 
case impacts the Court’s jurisprudence.142 The case reinforced the debate on whether 
the jurisprudence of the Court ῾is one case behind᾽.143 The Court seems to interpret 
the principle differently from case to case.144 The Kenyatta case revealed the need for 
the Court to proactively develop a comprehensive jurisprudence to enhance a better 
understanding of the principle of complementarity.145 
 
133 J Trahan ‘Is complementarity the right approach to the International Criminal Court’s crime of 
aggression: considering the problem of overzealous national court prosecutions’ (2012) 45 Cornell 
International Law Journal 569 - 601.  
134 n 77 above, paras 12 - 15. 
135 n 77 above. 
136 n 80 above, para 121. 
137 Jalloh (n 86 above) 229. 
138 Jalloh (n 86 above) 243. 
139 n 80 above, para 34. 
140 Spilman (n 92 above) 21 - 23. 
141 Carter (n 110 above) 459. 
142 Jalloh (n 86 above) 236. 
143 Jalloh (n 86 above) 243. 
144 Jalloh (n 86 above) 243. 
145 Jalloh (n 86 above) 243. 
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Although the parameters for the Court to exercise jurisdiction are well defined,146 the 
extent to which it reacts to jurisdictional conflicts remains blurred.147 The Court should 
consider the extent of its jurisdiction in the Rome Statute in light of practical cases. The 
Court has restricted the tests to determine admissibility by putting less weight on the 
circumstances of each case.148 A holistic approach is thus necessary in the application 
of complementarity in order to avoid unwarranted exclusion of national jurisdictions in 
the prosecution and adjudication of cases.149 
An authorisation for a proprio motu investigation obliges the Prosecutor to prove a 
prima facie case.150 It is the duty of the Prosecutor to prove that a state is acting in bad 
faith and is protecting the accused from accountability.151 In other words, the standard 
of proof generally rests with the Prosecutor and not the concerned state. The state’s 
duty is to share relevant information with the Court, leaving it to the Prosecutor to 
convince the Court of the unwillingness or inability of the state to initiate 
proceedings.152 
While the PTC deliberated on the justification for the Prosecutor᾿s intervention, the 
burden of proof was shifted to the state.153 Prior to the Kenyan situation, the proof of 
admissibility rested on the Prosecutor.154 In the Kenyan situation, the Court may have 
erroneously interpreted the duty or discretion to disclose information by the state under 
rule 51 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (the Rules of the Court) as a duty to 
prove the existence of national investigations.155 The approach adopted by the Court 
on evidentiary requirements would make it difficult for states to retain a case, 
particularly in the preliminary stages of investigations.156 In the preliminary stages of 
investigations, states have limited documents and often initiate legal reforms in the 
process.157 
 
146 n 1 above, art 17. 
147 Brown (n 57 above) 383 - 387. 
148 Jalloh (n 86 above) 236 - 237. 
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153 Prosecutor v Muthaura et al (30 August 2011) 01/09-02/11 OA) ICC para 2. 
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The Rome Statute does not refer to the relationships of the Court and states with 
regional jurisdictions. As seen in the Kenyatta case, the Court must deal with cases 
where states or regional bodies request deference to regional courts.158 Regional 
courts are better placed than national courts and ICC in certain circumstances. For 
example, an aggrieved state may be ‘too willing᾽ to try the crime of aggression against 
citizens of an invading state.159 A regional court is also preferable than the ICC 
because of its understanding of regional issues and the need to ensure long-lasting 
peace in the region.160  
The attainment of sustainable peace should involve the participation of victims whose 
testimony and contribution to international criminal justice approaches are central to 
the nuances of victim-desired justice. The Kenyatta case revealed that the witnesses 
remain at risk of being threatened or killed, despite protecting legislation at the ICC 
and national levels.161 Perhaps, the time has come for the ICC and states, in their quest 
to strengthen their own victim/witness systems, to collaborate with regional 
mechanisms and tap into the experiences of these mechanisms. Considering that the 
threat to witnesses is real in Africa and international criminal tribunals are limited in 
mitigating the threat, Mahony advocates for a forum that understands a context in its 
entirety and contends as follows: 
Where insecurity is apparent, the threat to participating witnesses, or witnesses who are 
perceived to participate, in criminal justice processes is intensified. Such circumstances are 
apparent in states where the capacity of law enforcement is lower than that of criminal groups. 
These circumstances are even more evident in states that suffer from armed conflict. This 
differentiates African witnesses in high profile cases from those protected in Western states. 
Very high threat levels, including in some cases the deployment of the state apparatus, face 
witnesses in cases before international criminal tribunals. The relative impunity with which the 
accused are alleged to have committed crimes points to a high likelihood that they would give 
such orders again in order to prevent proceedings against them. Understanding and evaluating 
the threat requires a thorough insight into the crimes committed, the political, social, cultural, 
 
158 n 106 above. 
159 Trahan (n 133 above) 583 - 587. 
160 Trahan (n 133 above) 569 - 601. 
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security and economic context in which they occurred, and the way in which this context has 
changed and might continue to change in the future.162 
In line with the principle of complementarity, states should be allowed to propose an 
alternative forum to complement their efforts.163 The state’s ownership of proceedings 
should be preserved until all available mechanisms proposed by a state are proved 
insufficient to make the case inadmissible before the Court.164 The Court must open 
itself to proposed mechanisms to allow an enhanced application of complementarity. 
The existing practice and policy of the OTP is to liberate complementarity from the 
restrictions imposed by the Rome Statute.165 The OTP has shown that 
complementarity is a dynamic concept that needs continuous development and 
review.166 To clarify the practical application of the principle, the OTP developed a 
policy paper to regulate its relationship with states.167 From this view, important 
concepts such as positive complementarity emerge. The Court has also introduced 
new standards not expressly stated in the Rome Statute. Examples are requirements 
of ‘inaction’ and ‘same person and same conduct᾽.168 In view of the foregoing, nothing 
should bar the Court from embracing regional initiatives which assist states in their 
exercise of jurisdiction. 
The Rome Statute leaves room for the Prosecutor not to investigate or prosecute in 
the interests of justice.169 Cases may be transferred from the ICC to another forum in 
the interests of justice, or when states prefer non-judicial settlements.170 The 
alternative forum under the current jurisprudence and practice of the Court will 
ordinarily be another state with jurisdiction over the crime. Thus, at the first level of the 
complementary relationship, an unwilling, unable or inactive state is defenceless 
against the Court’s intervention. At the second level, the unwilling, unable or inactive 
Court needs to refer a case to a state. Complications arise at the second level when a 
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state initially made a referral. A lacuna occurs when neither the Court nor state(s) are 
prepared to take up the situation. For example, the Prosecutor may decline a situation 
of human rights violations because of failure to fulfil the gravity test or based on the 
interests of justice. Other states with jurisdiction may also be generally reluctant to 
intervene in the affairs of another state.171 
A third level in the complementary relationship is therefore desirable, in the form of 
regional mechanisms to intervene when the first and second levels fail or are deemed 
inappropriate to institute proceedings. A mechanism such as the African Court can 
intervene to prosecute the violations. The third level may also be considered first or 
second at the discretion of a state. Regional organisations, such as the AU, have 
specific instruments that authorise them to intervene in the affairs of member states.172 
The Rome Statute in article 53(3) enables the Prosecutor to decline to prosecute, in 
circumstances in which the state or UNSC remain convinced that the Court should 
retain jurisdiction. The article is silent on which action the state or UNSC should take 
when the PTC upholds the Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute. Moreover, the 
article is silent on state or UNSC action when the Prosecutor decides not to prosecute 
after conducting an initial investigation. These gaps may defeat the objective of the 
Rome Statute to attain justice for victims of international crimes, since there will be no 
forum to help them. 
In the event that the Prosecutor, the Court and the state(s) may be unwilling or 
unprepared, a policy should be developed to provide a third level of complementarity. 
While there is a need to respect state and prosecutorial discretions not to investigate 
and prosecute crimes, an option of deferral to a regional forum should be ideally made 
available. Proceedings outside usual jurisdictions in the Rome Statute would install 
strong pillars for complementarity that will not be easily broken. An amended or new 
prosecutorial policy should define the three-tier complementarity system: states, Court 
and regional mechanisms. The policy should also clarify the right of states to use 
alternative forms of justice in lieu of prosecutions. 
 
171 n 1 above, Preamble para 8. 
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1.4 Relevance and objectives of the study 
Complementarity is foundational to the existence and operations of the ICC. The Court 
is heavily dependent on the proper application of the complementarity regime to 
maintain its integrity and justify its interventions.173 This study advances the view that 
in a developing system, such as the ICC, consultation rather than confrontation 
between the Court and states is key for the preservation of the principle of 
complementarity. The study stresses the need for the respect of both the letter and 
spirit of complementarity. Both misreadings and misinterpretations may lead to 
absurdity and affect the legitimacy of the Court. Also, they may lead to jurisdictional 
conflicts and undermine efforts for co-operation by states. The spirit of 
complementarity is particularly focused on the prevention of impunity and bringing 
justice rather than controversies on the forum to investigate and prosecute gross 
violations. 
The study aims to: 
• Provide a historical overview of international criminal tribunals. 
• Explore the history of complementarity. 
• Discuss the development of the ICC’s complementarity jurisprudence. 
• Examine the ICC’s approach on the application of complementarity and the 
gaps thereof. 
• Suggest options and proffer recommendations on the application of 
complementarity. 
• Show that complementarity should operate in full regard of state discretion. 
1.5 Scope of the study 
The investigation of the post-election violence in Kenya in 2008 began with the 
establishment of the Waki Commission whose proposal for the establishment of a 
domestic tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators was rejected by parliament. The 
creation of the Waki Commission was part of national mechanisms to investigate the 
violence in Kenya. In addition, Kenya took legal and political steps to bar the ICC from 
exercising jurisdiction and made judicial reforms which included the adoption of a new 
 
173 MJ Struett The politics of constructing the International Criminal Court (2008) 154. 
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Constitution174 and amendments to the Witness Protection (Amendment) Act.175 On 
the political front, Kenya secured the support of the AU and later the EAC in a bid to 
convince the UNSC to facilitate deferrals in view of complementarity and reconciliation 
initiatives.176 All the efforts were in vain, as both the UNSC and the ICC made 
unfavourable responses. 
The study considers whether Kenya could have used judicial or non-judicial national 
and regional mechanisms as alternatives to the ICC in the Kenyatta case. The study 
also looks at the motivation of the Court in retaining jurisdiction in the case against 
opposition by the government of Kenya. The study analyses the prosecutorial and state 
discretions to advance core arguments on the use of state discretion as a determinant 
to the application of complementarity. 
The study covers the period from the establishment of the Waki Commission on 28 
February 2008 to the withdrawal of charges against Kenyatta by the ICC on 5 
December 2014. The analysis is based on available materials for the period under 
discussion. While the study examines complementarity in general, it uses the Kenyatta 
case as a case study to highlight current challenges faced by the ICC. The study also 
looks at the prospects for the Court regarding the direction for complementarity. 
The study does not analyse debates on the AU forums, including threats and actual 
withdrawals from the ICC by some ICC member states during and after the Kenyatta 
debacle. Another study is best suited for this purpose. This limitation applies so as to 
maintain the focus of the study – the application of complementarity. Although the study 
provides a brief discussion of the debates (due to their link to the Prosecutor’s 
application of complementarity and proposals for prosecutions by regional 
mechanisms), the short discussions should not be understood as a focus of this study. 
1.6 Limitations of the study 
The jurisprudence of the ICC is at its earlier stages of development, since the Court 
has adjudicated few cases and currently less than a handful of cases are under 
prosecution. The jurisprudence of the Court is developing in many areas. Although 
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much has been written about the principle of complementarity, gaps appear in the 
operationalisation of the principle. Complementarity as a legal concept is gradually 
gaining relevance and recognition. With the establishment of mechanisms such as the 
complementarity project under the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, the 
principle is growing fast, hence the need to address areas that need attention to ensure 
further development of the principle.177 
Notwithstanding scholarly initiatives on unpacking the principle of complementarity, 
more research is necessary to resolve some dilemmas on the application of 
complementarity. The existing academic writing does not sufficiently address all 
controversial questions pertaining to the application of the principle by the Court. The 
importance of state discretion in resolving jurisdictional conflicts is yet to be fully visited 
by scholars. Owing to this gap, the secondary sources used mainly discuss 
prosecutorial discretion in the ICC practice. 
To a lesser extent, the wide geographical gap between the two jurisdictions of interest, 
namely, Kenya and ICC, also limit the study. Notwithstanding, in a theoretical study 
the proximity factor does not substantially impact the quality of the research negatively. 
On the other hand, states such as South Africa have reduced their support to the Court 
more specifically based on the issue that the Court has been targeting African leaders. 
Therefore, this study is deprived of useful insights and perspectives from such states 
on international criminal justice. The states may reserve their current arguments 
against the Court in the next few years to regional and UN forums instead of assisting 
the Court to find a lasting solution to the application of complementarity and other 
global challenges to end impunity. 
1.7 The relationship of the ICC, states and regional organisations in 
international law 
In an age of armed conflicts and instability, regional organisations increasingly 
contribute to international peace, security and order.178 The AU is growing its influence 
on laws, rules of engagement, status and conduct of troops, and common doctrines on 
the timing of the deployment of peacekeepers. Regional instruments, such as the 
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Constitutive Act and the African Charter, show a desire by Africa to provide an African 
perspective to international law. Therefore, the AU has made great strides to 
‘Africanise’ international law.179 
The African continent is on a drive to provide ‘African solutions to African problems᾽. 
This study argues that the ICC and its member states should embrace regional 
organisations as partners in the development and application of international law to 
collectively contribute to the formulation of policies and initiatives to enhance the 
promotion and enforcement of international criminal justice. Currently, states and 
regional organisations are separated because states either act on individual capacity 
or as representatives of their regional groupings. During the First Review Conference 
of the Rome Statute, states made individual presentations with Kenya and Spain 
advancing regional positions on behalf of the AU and the European Union (EU) 
respectively.180 
1.8 The potential relationship between the ICC and regional organisations 
The study proposes a model relationship for the ICC and regional organisations. The 
study shows the need for a policy to incorporate regional organisations into the 
complementarity project. The OTP has developed a policy to strengthen the principle 
of complementarity. However, the policy is not adequate; hence, there is a need to 
develop complementarity further through either amending the current policy or 
developing a new one to reflect the role of regional organisations. 
1.9 Research question(s) 
Is there a need for statutory and normative (de)activations to ensure that the 
supremacy of state discretion is adequately considered in the exercise of power by the 
ICC Prosecutor? 
In addition to the above central question, the following research sub-questions guide 
this study: 
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• To what extent did the scenario in Kenya strengthen the argument that the ICC 
Prosecutor should be guided by a context analysis and realities in determining 
an appropriate response to international crimes? 
• What is the feasibility of using non-prosecutorial mechanisms instead of 
prosecutorial mechanisms in a system that is designed to prevent impunity? 
Can such use possibly occur without compromising on criminal accountability?   
• To what extent can the inclusion of regional mechanisms in the ICC system 
enhance the realisation of effective international criminal justice? What 
compromises should the ICC make to cope and/or cooperate with parallel 
complementary mechanisms? 
1.10 Current scholarship, methodology and structure of this study 
This study reviews literature on the following: 
• the Rome Statute and other human rights and humanitarian law treaties; 
• the case law of regional and international criminal tribunals, as well as of 
relevant domestic courts; 
• scholarly works on international law; 
• reports of governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations on steps taken by Kenya to ensure deferral to national courts in 
the Kenyatta case and beyond; 
• official documents of the ICC; and 
• dialogue with experts on the subject under discussion. 
Scholars wrote about the inevitability of ensuring accountability in an international 
forum prior to the creation of the ICC. Academics discussed the envisaged operations 
of a permanent international court and projected contribution in ending impunity.181 
When the establishment of the ICC became inevitable, the proposed court was 
scrutinised more, with more interest in the principle of complementarity. The 
international criminal justice system exalted international criminal tribunals above 
national courts before the establishment of the ICC.182 
 
181 See for example JT Holmes The International Criminal Court: the making of the Rome Statute - 
issues, negotiations, results (1999). 
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The establishment of the ICC was a long process, hence the continued debates on 
some of its key principles such as complementarity.183 The first Prosecutor of the ICC 
contributed to the complementarity debate upon assumption of office in 2003. He 
highlighted the importance of complementarity as follows:                       
As a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should not 
be the measure of its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as 
a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major 
success.184 
 
In view of the foregoing, several accomplished scholars extensively discussed the 
principle of complementarity and covered its historical and current development. These 
scholars scrutinised the application of the principle by the ICC in various cases before 
the Court, particularly. However, the scholarly work does not specifically address the 
research question of this study. The Rome Statute does not expressly mention the role 
of regional mechanisms or alternative forms of justice. Furthermore, the potential 
relationship between the Court and regional mechanisms has been discussed only 
recently. Therefore, scholarship is relatively insubstantial in this area. 
To the extent that the relationship between the ICC and regional institutions is 
discussed in scholarships, academics are yet to fully appreciate the provisions which 
operationalise the partnership of regional mechanisms in the complementarity project. 
The examination of the discretion of states fails to address the aspect that regional 
instruments are broad enough to activate the operations of regional mechanisms. 
The current scholarship concentrates on how existing and developing regional systems 
can be used to prosecute international crimes. A failure to appreciate that the Rome 
Statute impliedly includes the use of regional mechanisms requires the amendment of 
the Rome Statute to define and provide for their role. The operations of the Court 
consider provisions, principles and rules of international law.185 However, it is not clear 
what should happen if an amendment in terms of article 121 of the Rome Statute does 
not enjoy the support of all states. The result may be devastating, as some states may 
withdraw their support from the Court. 
 
183 MC Bassiouni The Statute of the International Criminal Court, a documentary history (1998) 5. 
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It is undesirable to ignore international politics in this study, although the study is 
primarily from an international criminal law perspective. Whereas most states in Africa 
are expected to welcome the involvement of regional mechanisms to complement 
states, as evidenced by their push for ‘Africanisation’, it is not certain that other regional 
groupings or non-African states will embrace the proposition. The other regional 
groupings and states may prefer the Court to AU systems in the light of the developing 
jurisprudence of the AU that grants immunities to persons in certain political positions. 
This study prefers an amendment to the prosecutorial policy, as opposed to the 
amendment of the Rome Statute. An amendment to the Rome Statute may adversely 
impact the Court in several ways. First, an amendment to the Rome Statute may create 
a legally binding obligation on states to accept the role of regional mechanisms,186 
whereas a prosecutorial policy may be viewed as a guiding instrument because of its 
‘soft’ nature. Secondly, withdrawals from the Rome Statute are permitted under certain 
circumstances if a state party is not agreeable to an amendment.187 Thirdly, an 
amendment may bind all the state parties.188 The situation differs when amendments 
are effected on the category of crimes under the Rome Statute.189 Such amendments 
only bind those states which accept the amendment and must be inserted on the 
jurisdiction section of the Rome Statute. The effect of this is seen, for example, on the 
AU’s approach to the crime of aggression. 
An expanded definition of aggression under the proposed Malabo Protocol concerns 
some states. The Rome Statute definition does not qualify material support to a warring 
party as an act of aggression.190 The Malabo Protocol expands the definition in the 
Rome Statute to qualify the provision of material support as an act of aggression.191 
States providing material support to armed groups fighting unpopular and oppressive 
governments, and states supporting governments fighting armed groups, would no 
doubt oppose classification as direct participation in hostilities. If ratified in its current 
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form, the Malabo Protocol will give the African Court jurisdiction to hold states 
accountable for aggression by merely providing material support to belligerents. 
This study further demonstrates that an amendment to the Rome Statute is not 
desirable, since the provisions of the Rome Statute are enough to allow regional 
mechanisms to participate in the complementarity project. Strengthening the existing 
prosecutorial policy on complementarity will create fewer complications for the Court 
and possibly avert withdrawals from the ICC. As the study shows, states may find it 
difficult to subject themselves to a system that threatens their interests. Economic, 
political, security and strategic interests come into play when states provide material 
support during armed conflicts and other forms of armed violence. 
Two critical issues need to be activated and extensively defined to allow regional 
mechanisms to participate in the ICC complementarity project without causing anxiety 
regarding the impact of an amendment. These include the nature of state discretion in 
relation to transferring or exercising primacy, and the intention of the Rome Statute 
drafters when creating a complementary system that incorporates the UN. The UN 
Charter provides for regional action in regional challenges.192 Both the UNSC and 
states utilise regional mechanisms to settle local disputes. By implication, regional 
mechanisms may be utilised in the ICC system whose Preamble resembles the UN 
system. 
To this end, the study provides the first critical and in-depth appraisal of the two 
aforementioned issues. The study ascertains the potential for states and the ICC to 
develop a comprehensive policy that defines the role and limitations of regional 
mechanisms in the complementarity project. The discussion that follows is an analysis 
of the main scholarly views. 
Some scholars have discussed how complementarity has been endorsed by the 
international community as the best mechanism to regulate an international judicial 
body such as the ICC.193 However, criticisms against the principle abound, hence calls 
for an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Rome Statute in the implementation of 
complementarity.194 International criminal justice requires some ‘normalisation᾽, to 
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borrow phrasing from Mégret, on the need for an explicit procedure for punishing 
persons suspected of international crimes.195 Newton asserts that the lack of a legally 
binding definition of complementarity destabilises the balance between domestic 
courts and the ICC. 196 
While Schabas acknowledges that the intention of the ICC is to operate in a 
complementary relationship with national jurisdictions, he submits that the relationship 
is not truly complementary.197 Schabas views the ICC and national jurisdictions as 
competing systems which are often hostile to each other.198 He further notes that 
obligations imposed by the principle of complementarity rest on states which must 
embrace the principle as both a right and a duty.199 He observes that the Court has 
expanded admissibility requirements.200 The new component is that of inaction, 
determined through a consideration of whether the national system has ‘remained 
inactive’.201 He explains the ICC’s approach in cases where the state with jurisdiction 
over a case is inactive.202 In such situations, the Court does not examine the issues of 
inability or unwillingness.203 The Court’s reading of article 17 is in opposition to the 
presumption of state primacy over cases.204 
Jurdi advocates for the express inclusion of the ‘inaction’ scenario by amending the 
Rome Statute.205 ‘Inaction’ denotes the so-called uncontested jurisdiction when a case 
is automatically admissible for failure of the concerned state to investigate and 
prosecute the case.206 An amendment will strengthen the jurisprudence of the Court 
and enhance clarity on the application of complementarity.207 
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Carter contributes to the discussion on the weaknesses and strengths of the principle 
of complementarity and notes that the principle preserves the sovereignty of states.208 
This strength enables states to play a more prominent role in the adjudication of 
international crimes.209 However, Carter raises two major concerns on the principle of 
complementarity. The first challenge arises because complementarity emanates from 
the structure of the ICC. The second comes into play due to the complications in 
domestication.210 
On the other hand, Kleffner applauds complementarity for the creation of a legal 
platform through which the Court engages states when it prosecutes international 
crimes.211 However, Kleffner expresses concern for the possibility of abuse when the 
principle is invoked. Kleffner also fears the negative impact the principle may have on 
the efficiency of ICC proceedings, and destruction of evidence by states which the ICC 
intends to investigate.212 
Some scholars acknowledge tensions caused by admissibility challenges and the 
choice of cases made by the Prosecutor.213 Holmes observes that the Court must 
recognise jurisdictional conflict and craft ways to solve the conflict when implementing 
the principle of complementarity.214 Holmes states that inability is derived from facts 
but concedes the difficulties of determining the threshold.215 Phillippe substantiates the 
view of Holmes by indicating that complementarity should be analysed from the legal 
texts and national context.216 However, Phillippe does not explain how national legal 
systems may influence the implementation of the principle of complementarity. 
Scholars also discuss discretionary powers, prosecutorial policies and strategies, 
including positive complementarity, and the focus on same persons and conduct. 
According to Jurdi, an exhaustive list of ‘unwillingness’ was intended to limit the Court 
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from exercising broad discretionary powers.217 Newton supports the view and states 
that the original intent of complementarity prohibits the ICC from replacing the 
discretion of domestic officials.218 Newton advises that the development of the ICC 
jurisprudence and practice should not frustrate prosecutorial discretion at domestic 
level.219 The Court’s respect of state discretion will enhance the confidence and co-
operation of states with the ICC.220 In the view of Cassese, even when prosecutorial 
discretion at the ICC level is enshrined, its exercise can be reviewed by a referring 
state or by the PTC.221 
Burke-White examines the legal mandate and provides a framework for positive 
complementarity.222 Under the policy of positive complementarity, the ICC co-operates 
with the national authorities, both as useful resources and primary enforcers of 
international criminal law.223 Thus, complementarity makes consultation between the 
Court and states obligatory.224 
Several scholars do not consider the same person and same conduct test appropriate. 
Schabas challenges the test, arguing the Court should not be rigid on similar crimes 
but should compare the weight of charges preferred by the Court and states.225 Stahn 
does not fully embrace the test. In general, Stahn is mindful of the arguments made by 
critics and acknowledges that the test limits state discretion and leaves the ICC at the 
forefront when there a dispute with a state over jurisdiction.226 Stahn questions the 
rationale for resorting to a strict approach in functioning legal systems such as Kenya 
and in post-conflict environments undergoing judicial reforms such as Libya.227 
For Du Plessis, complementarity carries a presumption of state action.228 Among other 
contributions, Du Plessis discusses complementarity in the context of the efforts of the 
AU to regionalise prosecutions. The African Court has the potential to complement the 
 
217 Jurdi (n 23 above) 42. 
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219 Newton (n 115 above) 163. 
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work of the ICC.229 Du Plessis gives an example of the African Court’s condemnation 
and order to Libya to stop violations of human rights in 2011.230 The co-existence of 
the ICC and the African Court may pose the question: Which court enjoys primacy?231 
Du Plessis does not discuss whether a complementary relationship between the Court 
and regional mechanisms can be detected. This study answers the question through 
a detailed appraisal of the position of the regional mechanisms in the Rome Statute. 
1.11 Overview of the chapters 
Chapter 1 
The first chapter gives an overview, scope and relevance of the study with the objective 
of laying a strong foundation for subsequent chapters. The chapter outlines the 
background to the study, including the research question, which the study aims to 
answer. Current challenges faced by the ICC in the application of complementarity are 
discussed. The role of regional organisations in the development and enforcement of 
international law is explored, as well as their complementary role to domestic 
jurisdictions. Further, a discussion on the current efforts to strengthen the 
complementarity project and the gap to be filled thereof is also presented. 
Chapter 2 
The chapter presents an overview of international criminal tribunals for an 
understanding on the rationale for the ICC. The formation of the ICC contextualises 
the complexities of forming the Court. Compromises were made on important 
provisions for the ICC to be established. The sticky issues pre-ICC continue to creep 
in from time to time. The historical background clarifies the root causes of some 
challenges facing the ICC. The historical background enhances an understanding of 
the approach to issues such as complementarity. 
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The core of the third chapter is a discussion of the application of complementarity in 
international criminal law. Complementarity is not expressly defined in the Rome 
Statute and neither was it defined in international criminal law before the Court came 
into existence. Despite the failure to define the concept, the Rome Statute can be 
accredited with further development of complementarity. To ensure a better 
understanding of the concept, this chapter starts by providing a historical 
understanding of the notion of complementarity. The chapter then delves into the 
contemporary understanding of the principle as enunciated by the ICC’s jurisprudence. 
Chapter 4 
The fourth chapter gives a legal overview of the Kenyatta case. The chapter outlines 
the understanding of the case from both Kenyan and ICC perspectives. The two 
understood the application of the principle of complementarity differently, hence their 
different approaches to the case. Factors that lead to different perspectives are 
discussed. The chapter suggests how to reconcile the differences for the mutual benefit 
of states, the ICC and other stakeholders. The basis of the discussion is the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute. 
Chapter 5 
This chapter discusses discretionary powers enjoyed by states. The discretionary 
powers of the Prosecutor and the UNSC are also discussed to promote an 
understanding of how these relate or affect the discretion of states. The chapter first 
outlines the primacy and discretion of states in internal affairs. The chapter refers to 
the Preamble of the Rome Statute to show that national measures and international 
co-operation co-exist in a complementary system. 
Measures at national level include the domestic implementation of the Rome Statute 
and crafting policies to facilitate prosecutions. Several national implementing pieces of 
legislation show that states embrace enlarged powers when enacting their pieces of 
legislation. For example, the national legislation may provide for universal jurisdiction. 
This chapter aims to demonstrate that states have various options in the administration 
of international criminal justice. In this regard, states are free to involve regional 
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mechanisms. The sought-for international co-operation by states may involve requests 
for technical assistance to strengthen their national measures. 
Chapter 6 
The sixth chapter examines the role of regional and international organisations in the 
ICC system. It outlines the influence of international and regional politics in the 
complementarity project. The chapter shows that international law is always subject to 
legal-political debates which should always not only be understood but balanced. The 
Rome Statute was born out of a desire to balance states and international interests. 
The chapter employs legal philosophy and different theories in international relations. 
International organisations are key actors in the maintenance of peace, security and 
stability of nations. 
The chapter proceeds to outline the implied jurisdiction of regional mechanisms under 
the Rome Statute. This jurisdiction needs to be activated for a clear understanding at 
both the Court and national level. The chapter refers to various AU mechanisms to 
show how states may be attracted to use these mechanisms as an alternative to the 
ICC. The chapter looks at the advantages and challenges of involving the mechanisms 
in the complementarity project. The position taken in the chapter is for the incorporation 
of AU mechanisms to strengthen some of the current gaps in the application of 
complementarity. 
Chapter 7 
This chapter gives a summary of the main points discussed in the first six chapters and 
makes recommendations to strengthen state discretion. The chapter concludes that 
the lack of clarity in the Rome Statute justifies a prosecutorial policy to expressly 
mention the extent to which states can exercise discretion. Considering that states may 
not be comfortable with hard law nuances, an amendment to the Rome Statute is 
discouraged in this chapter. The recognition by the Prosecutor of the broad discretion 
enjoyed by states to choose the approach and forum of addressing international crimes 
is foundational to the operationalisation of regional mechanisms and other forms of 
justice. Non-legal rules, in the form of a prosecutorial policy, can be developed or 
strengthened to influence ICC practice. 
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1.12 Note on citations 
This study prefers acronyms and other abridged forms to refer to treaties, organisations 
and reports. When a source is referred to for the first time, a full citation is used. In 
subsequent references to the same source, abbreviated forms are used. A 
comprehensive list of all abbreviations and acronyms used in the study is provided at 
the beginning, while a bibliography is inserted at the end of the study. Footnote and 








ICC IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introduction 
States and international criminal tribunals share responsibility in the administration of 
international criminal justice. This is a transition from the erstwhile absolute right of 
states to try crimes under their jurisdiction.1 The transition substituted and 
complemented the sovereign control of states in pursuit of the global goal to end 
impunity for serious crimes in international law.2 Prior to the transition, national courts 
often suffered from ineffectiveness, imbalance and partiality when they prosecuted 
politically connected and powerful persons.3 To bridge the justice vacuum, it became 
desirable to create alternative mechanisms to complement national courts.4 From the 
fifteenth century, the world witnessed both successful and failed attempts to create an 
international criminal court.5 
The twentieth century was a turning point in the push for a permanent international 
criminal court.6 The century witnessed impunity, politicisation of justice and 
shortcomings of ad hoc tribunals.7 Prior to the establishment of the ICC, the call for 
international criminal justice was more reactive than proactive. Attempts at 
international judicialisation were more prevalent following the end of the First and 
Second World Wars. However, political interference made international prosecutions 
difficult and to be marred with imperfections.8 Generally, the prosecutions were 
targeted against defeated armies and their powerless former combatants who bore the 
brunt of the international community, leading to outcries over the victors’ vengeance.9 
 
1 BN Schiff Building the International Criminal Court (2008) 69. 
2 MM El Zeidy ‘The principle of complementarity: a new machinery to implement international criminal 
law’ (2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 870. 
3 WA Schabas An introduction to the International Criminal Court (2007) 1. 
4 WA Schabas An introduction to the International Criminal Court (2011) 1. 
5 MC Bassiouni ‘From Versailles to Rwanda in seventy-five years: the need to establish a permanent 
international criminal court’ (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 11.  
6 Bassiouni (n 5 above). 
7 Bassiouni (n 5 above). 
8 Bassiouni (n 5 above). 
9 Schabas (n 4 above). 
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Since its formation was not connected to a specific war, the ICC became a proactive 
development of international criminal justice. 
Arguably, the internationalisation of crimes leaped into a new dimension with the 
adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998 when the ICC was created.10 The establishment 
of the ICC followed a long-complicated process. For centuries, political considerations 
frustrated the birth of the Court.11 Therefore, the ICC is the product of centuries of 
advocacy for a permanent international criminal tribunal.12 The Court is a result of a 
legal pregnancy that manifested but could not fully develop for a long time. After 
several near-misses and false starts, the ICC finally came into being.13 
This chapter discusses the historical background on the formation of the ICC and 
reveals efforts that contributed to the establishment of the Court. The chapter briefly 
visits history from the late fifteenth to the early twentieth centuries and analyses 
successive failures to create an international criminal court. The chapter also explores 
the approach of states in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars. Thereafter, 
the chapter focuses on the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the late 
twentieth century. The international community rode on the momentum created by the 
above events and eventually established the ICC in 1998.14 The ICC was born when 
conditions were conducive and states were ready to balance the notion of sovereignty 
with the need for international criminal justice.15 Considering that the study focuses in 
part on the role and potential of Africa in international criminal justice, this chapter 
refers to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to broaden the understanding of 
complementarity from an African perspective. Although the SCSL did not contribute to 
complementarity pre-Rome Statute, its contribution to post-Rome Statute is invaluable.  
The reluctance of the international community to establish a permanent international 
criminal court was detrimental to justice, particularly in the twentieth century. This 
chapter highlights that the slow pace in formulating the court was largely due to 
international political divisions and lack of sustained pressure from relevant actors and 
 
10 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute). 
11 Schabas (n 4 above). 
12 Schiff (n 1 above) 2. 
13 LN Sadat ‘The International Criminal Court: past, present and future’ (2014) Harris Institute Working 
Paper 1. 
14 Schabas (n 4 above) 5. 
15 Schiff (n 1 above) 79. 
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states.16 The chapter highlights the evolution of international law from state-oriented 
responsibility to individual-oriented responsibility17 as an inspiration for the creation of 
the ICC.18 
2.2 The prosecution of crimes prior to the codification of International 
Humanitarian Law 
2.2.1 The Breisach trial 
The debut international criminal trial was against Peter von Hagenbach in 1474.19 
Hagenbach was charged under the principle of individual responsibility after he carried 
out manifestly unlawful orders from the Duke of Burgundy, a French head of state.20 
The alleged offences occurred during the occupation of the German city of Breisach 
by France. The crimes committed included sacking, rape, pillaging and burning of the 
city in retaliation of rebellion by residents of the city.21 The attacks were viewed as a 
violation of divine and human laws.22 The trial had an international flavour, as 26 Holy 
Roman Empire judges presided over the case.23 The trial laid a foundation for future 
discussions on trials at the international arena. International criminal tribunals often 
refer to the trial to address some issues they encounter.24 
2.3 International Humanitarian Law and proposed international prosecutions 
2.3.1 The birth of international humanitarian law 
The experience of Henry Dunant at the Battle of Solferino in 1859 led to the formation 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863 and the adoption of 
the First Geneva Convention in 1864.25 From its inception, the ICRC has committed to 
 
16 Schabas (n 4 above). 
17 MJ Struett The politics of constructing the International Criminal Court (2008) 62. 
18 Struett (n 17 above). 
19 CM Bassiouni ‘International criminal justice in historical perspective: the tension between states’ 
interests and the pursuit for justice’ in A Cassese (ed) The Oxford Companion to International Criminal 
Justice (2009) 132. 
20 H Martin The history of France from the earliest period until 1789 (1841). 
21 Martin (n 20 above). 
22 CM Bassiouni ‘Perspectives on international criminal justice’ (2010) 50 Virginia Journal of International 
Criminal Law 269 - 298. 
23 JF Kirk History of Charles the Bold Duke of Burgundy (1864) 499. 
24 MM El Zeidy The principle of complementarity in international criminal law: origin, development and 
practice (2008) 211. 
25 H Dunant A memory of Solferino (1939) 129 - 131. 
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the promotion of international humanitarian law (IHL) or law of war, which is a body of 
public international law that protects civilians and combatants who no longer take part 
in hostilities.26 IHL lays down rules of warfare and regulates weapons and tactics. The 
development of IHL in the second half of the nineteenth century signalled the need to 
prosecute humanitarian abuses.27 Moynier, one of the founders of the ICRC, was the 
first to propose an international criminal court to prosecute violations of the law of war 
following the Franco-Persian War.28 Moynier contended that provisions of international 
law which protected victims of war at the time were fairly strong but needed 
complementation by a criminal court mechanism.29 However, he abandoned his call 
due to the lack of endorsement of his proposal.30 
2.3.2 The Hague Conventions and enforcement of international norms 
A decade after the adoption of the First Geneva Convention to protect the wounded 
and sick on the battlefield,31 the Brussels Protocol of 1874 was drafted to regulate the 
conduct of those fighting in the field.32 The Protocol influenced the Institute of 
International Law to draft the ῾Manual on the Laws of War on Land᾽ in 1880.33 The 
Manual was used as a model during meetings which culminated in the adoption of The 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. At the invitation of Czar Nicholas II, the 1899 
and 1907 Conferences were held. The Conferences defined the scope of IHL.34 
International law on state obligations and enforcement of international norms owe its 
evolution partly to the adoption of The Hague Conventions.35 For the first time, an 
international convention imposed liability on states for breaches of international law by 
 
26 http://www.icrc.org (accessed 16 March 2018). 
27 Schabas (n 4 above) 2. 
28 CK Hall ‘The first proposal for an international criminal court’ (1998) 322 International Review of the 
Red Cross 2. 
29 M Glasius The International Criminal Court (2006) 7. 
30 Glasius (n 29 above) 6. 
31 The First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded in the Armies in the Field (First 
Geneva Convention). 
32 The Brussels Protocol on the Laws and Customs of War (Brussels Protocol). 
33 MN Schimitt Essays on law and war at the fault lines (2011) 93. 
34 LN Sadat The International Criminal Court and the transformation of international law: justice for the 
new millennium (2002) 22 - 23. 
35 Schabas (n 3 above) 2. 
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their armed forces.36 The Hague Conventions were a major step towards the 
codification of laws in an international treaty.37 
2.4 The First World War and the emergence of international tribunals 
The First World War exposed the weaknesses of international law and illustrated the 
need to strengthen the legal framework and judicial mechanisms to punish violations 
of the law of war.38 The war changed the perception of some states which had opposed 
a proposal for an international criminal court in 1907. In 1918, Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Norway and Sweden) produced a joint document with detailed provisions 
for an international criminal court.39 
When the League of Nations was established,40 Scandinavian countries made 
submissions to the Secretariat of the League.41 Neutral states, such as Switzerland, 
also supported an international criminal court.42 Neutral states met with the 
Commission of Inquiry constituted by the League in March 1919 to discuss the 
proposed draft Covenant.43 Switzerland believed that the time was ripe to pursue the 
international project of justice.44 The Netherlands was interested in proposals by 
Scandinavian countries and the neutral states. She called a conference to discuss the 
several draft documents.45 The conference produced a draft document referred to as 
the ῾five-power plan.’46 The document was influential in the drafting of the final treaty 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).47 
 
36 L Green ‘War crimes, crimes against humanity, and command responsibility’ (1997) 2 Naval War 
College Review 389. 
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2.4.1 Treaty of Versailles and Leipzig trials 
The discontent of the public during the First World War in England and other states 
made European powers to rethink the criminal prosecution of instigators of the war and 
perpetrators of war crimes.48 At the end of the First World War, the Allies49 looked at 
both the jus ad bellum50 and jus in bello51 aspects of the war. Jus ad bellum refers to 
justifications for the war, whereas jus in bello denotes the application of IHL in the 
conduct of hostilities. The Allies preferred approaches to punish Germany for its role 
during the First World War. First, the Allies proposed territorial losses, the payment of 
reparations, demilitarisation and limits on Germany’s rearmament.52 Second, the Allies 
debated an international criminal court to punish the instigators of war.53 
The Allies were unprepared for violations committed during the First World War. When 
the War ended, they had no precedent to investigate and prosecute. A hurried 
response resulted in the set-up of a fifteen-member Commission on the 
Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties in 1919. 
The Commission concluded that Germans committed 895 serious crimes.54 The 
doctrine of command responsibility was born when a recommendation was made by 
the Commission to try Kaiser Wilhelm II and other commanders for ordering the 
commission of crimes by German forces.55 
The Commission proposed an Allied ‘High Tribunal’ to try violations.56 The Commission 
also recommended the primacy of an international tribunal.57 At the Paris Conference, 
the Allies deliberated on the desirability and legality of the proposed trials.58 The United 
States of America (USA) and Japan opposed the formation of a Tribunal. USA was 
 
48 Schabas (n 4 above). 
49 http://www.britannica.com/topic/Allied-Powers-international-alliance (accessed 5 November 2016). 
50 Treaty of Versailles art 227.  
51 n 50 above, arts 228 & 229. 
52 Schiff (n 1 above) 22. 
53 Schiff (n 1 above) 22. 
54 ‘Report of the Commission presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference’ (1920) 95 Journal of 
International Law 123. 
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56 n 54 above, 122. 
57 n 54 above, 14. 
58 Schabas (n 4 above). 
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ignorant of the existence of an international convention to give the Tribunal jurisdiction 
over war crimes.59 USA rejected ex post facto justice.60 
Furthermore, USA argued against the prosecution of the German head of state and 
saw the prosecution as an interference with state sovereignty.61 Japan questioned 
whether the law provided for penal sanctions of violations of the law of war.62 France 
and Britain were undecided and uninterested in pursuing prosecutions. Most Allied 
states feared political upheaval in Germany in response to the prosecution of the 
Kaiser.63 
After intense deliberations, the Allies voted in favour of prosecutions. However, 
prosecutions proposed by the Allies through the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 were 
detached from the findings of the Commission.64 The Treaty empowered military 
tribunals to undertake prosecutions.65 The Commission had preferred a special tribunal 
rather than a high tribunal.66 The special tribunal was never constituted. Also, the 
victors failed to implement the provisions of the Treaty on prosecutions.67 The lack of 
co-operation by states curtailed and confined the prosecutions to a national level.68 
The German Supreme Court in Leipzig was empowered to exercise jurisdiction over 
Germans accused of crimes committed during World War I.69 
Features of primary jurisdiction of the state emerged when the Allies allowed Germany 
to try German war criminals.70 The ensuing Leipzig trials took place between 1921 and 
1923.71 Out of 901 accused war criminals identified for indictment, strong evidence 
was found against only 16. Although 13 convictions were secured, the proceedings 
were criticised for bias, shielding the accused from responsibility, lenient sentences 
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and the compromise of justice for political expediency.72 Therefore, questions arose 
on whether it was a wise decision to allow Germany to try its own personnel for war 
crimes.73 During the negotiations and drafting of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had 
protested about the one-sided criminal trials.74 Germany’s prosecution of war criminals 
underlined the integral and essential part played by national courts in the enforcement 
of international criminal law. These early developments showed the importance of 
paying due regard to state jurisdiction over crimes occurring in a state, by or against a 
citizen of a state.75 
The challenges in the practical application of the Treaty of Versailles showed that it 
was premature to establish an international criminal court at the time. States had not 
overcome political hurdles to create conditions necessary for the proper functioning of 
international tribunals.76 Germany preferred prosecution by German courts, as it found 
the Treaty of Versailles unacceptable and because it characterised the Treaty as a 
serious intrusion into its sovereignty.77 By objecting to foreign prosecution, Germany 
demonstrated the value states attach to their discretion regarding entitlement to 
prosecute crimes under their jurisdiction. 
Germany also objected the unfair treatment, as only persons from the losing side were 
to be tried for crimes which were not punishable at the time of commission.78 The 
prosecutions were widely regarded as victors᾽ justice and as an illustration of revenge 
instead of a genuine desire for accountability of perpetrators and appeasement of the 
victims.79 The Netherlands refused to surrender Kaiser Wilhelm II to the Allies for 
prosecution, making his trial impossible.80 The Netherlands politically considered the 
Kaiser’s situation and asserted that the charges against him were retroactive criminal 
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law.81 The norm of state sovereignty remained absolute after the failure to try the Kaiser 
and other Germans.82 
2.4.2 Early genocide cases 
The crimes against the laws of humanity allegedly committed by Turkish officials were 
also brought to the attention of the 1919 Commission which recommended 
prosecutions.83 Some Turkish officials were alleged to have massacred thousands of 
Armenian civilians in 1915. The Allies decided to forgo the prosecution despite earlier 
threats. The Allies had expressed an intention to prosecute members and agents of 
the Ottoman Empire who were implicated in the massacres.84 A promising start, 
marked by the adoption of the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920,85 proved futile because the 
treaty was not ratified.86 The Treaty focused on the prosecution of war crimes.87 
The replacement of the Treaty of Sèvres with the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 promoted 
impunity.88 The Treaty of Lausanne granted amnesty for all offences committed 
between 1 August 1914 and 20 November 1922.89 As a result, no prosecutions took 
place.90 The Allies saw Turkey as an important strategic partner. Hence, the Allies 
considered an alliance with Turkey important.91 The alliance was meant to prevent 
communist expansion from Russia and to ensure stability in Turkey.92 Again, political 
considerations overpowered the needs of criminal justice for war crimes and other 
violations of IHL. 
The Joint Declaration by the Allies on Turkish crimes against the Armenians was one 
of the precursors to the acknowledgment of genocide as an international crime. The 
Declaration was an acceptance that new crimes beyond crimes against humanity and 
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civilisation had been committed.93 The genocidal intent was clear because the 
massacres were against thousands of civilians of Armenian descent.94 
In the 1930s, massacres of Arameans in Iraq were committed.95 The atrocities showed 
that the time had come for the international community to pay special attention to the 
killing of people based on ethnicity. International law scholars began to elaborate 
further on the scope of the genocidal crimes. In 1933, Polish prosecutor Rafael Lemkin 
requested the League of Nations Conference to define and prosecute barbarity at the 
international level.96 Lemkin engaged in activism both as a Polish diplomat and during 
exile in USA.97 It was no surprise that Lemkin propounded a detailed definition and 
explanation of the crime of genocide in a seminal book in 1944.98 His scholarly writings 
and advocacy were incorporated in the drafting of the Genocide Convention.99 
2.4.3 Jurists proposals 
Debates on the proposed court aroused appetite among many international lawyers.100 
Several jurists devoted their attention to the desired court after the atrocities of the First 
World War.101 In 1920, the Advisory Committee of Jurists met in The Hague and 
prepared a draft statute of the PCIJ and submitted a resolution to the League of 
Nations.102 The resolution proposed the establishment of an all-inclusive High Court of 
International Justice.103 The proposed court would exercise jurisdiction over breaches 
of international public order and other crimes committed against the universal law of 
nations.104 
The proposal revealed that a separate international criminal court was on the cards.105 
However, hopes of this were dashed when the Third Committee of the Assembly of the 
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League of Nations and the Assembly itself reviewed the resolution. The two rejected 
the resolution because there was no binding international legal framework for the 
establishment of the proposed court. In the end, a Covenant of the League of 
Nations106 only established a PCIJ with jurisdiction on cases between states.107 
The PCIJ was dissolved in 1946 to pave the way for its successor, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).108 The precedent of the PCIJ and ICJ show an action and 
redress-oriented approach for breaches of international law by states. In the Chorzów 
Factory case, the PCIJ stated that a breach of an obligation results in compensation.109 
The PCIJ and ICJ consolidated foundations laid by the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions. The creation of the PCIJ and ICJ signalled a new approach to 
international law and international institutions and processes. The international criminal 
tribunals are modelled on the same desire but from an individual accountability 
perspective. 
Two other attempts occurred within a few years after the rejection of the proposals of 
the Advisory Committee of Jurists. In 1926 and 1928, the International Law Association 
(ILA)110 and International Association of Penal Law (IAPL)111 produced draft statutes 
for an international court. The drafts envisaged a permanent international criminal court 
with jurisdiction over disputes between states and over individuals.112 However, key 
players in the international community were still unprepared for an international 
criminal tribunal. They were also obsessed with state sovereignty; hence, they did not 
prioritise the two drafts.113 It was apparent at that time that states were undecided on 
what needs to precede the other between an international criminal code and an 
international criminal court.114 States were also unconvinced by the prospective 
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contribution of an international criminal court in the prevention of war. There were 
suggestions that the Court would frustrate reconciliation efforts.115 
2.4.4 The 1937 proposal 
Challenges experienced after the First World War did not deter the League of Nations 
from desiring a future international criminal court. The discussion on the establishment 
of the court was back on the agenda of the League in 1937. The League opened the 
Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court in Geneva for signature 
in 1937.116 The court was to focus on the crime of terrorism.117 Once again, the League 
failed to get a breakthrough. Hence, the 1937 draft did not materialise into an 
instrument. States diverted attention to the Spanish Civil War instead.118 
2.5 Initiatives during and post-Second World War 
2.5.1 Build up to post-Second World War period 
The atrocities of the Second World War brought the idea of enforcing international 
criminal law back onto the agenda.119 The Allies started with the Declaration of St. 
James120 and the Moscow Declaration.121 The Declarations targeted the prosecution 
of Nazis and other war criminals by an international criminal tribunal.122 Prior to the two 
Declarations, the London International Assembly reaffirmed the commitment of the 
Allies to punish war crimes in an international criminal court. The London Agreement 
led to the Nuremberg trials.123 In addition, several treaties signed by the Allies with 
Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland called for the punishment of war 
criminals.124 
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In preparation for post-war prosecution, the Allies established the UN Commission for 
the Investigation of War Crimes (UNWCC).125 Among the achievements, the UNWCC 
developed a Draft Convention for the Establishment of a United Nations War Crimes 
Court. However, political consideration emasculated the effectiveness of the UNWCC 
to investigate and collect evidence of war crimes.126 The evidence collected by the 
UNWCC was only relied upon by governments in national prosecutions.127 
2.5.2 The formation of the International Military Tribunal and International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East 
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg was formed in August 1945 after 
the Allies agreed on procedural and substantive issues.128 The IMT developed the 
positive law and a legal basis for international prosecution of crimes.129 The IMT 
clarified arguments on state sovereignty when it stated that ‘abstract entities᾽ were 
liable for international crimes.130 Some scholars conclude that due to the lessons of 
the IMT, a sense of belief arose among the members of the international community 
on the effectiveness of international law to deter crimes.131 
The IMT exercised jurisdiction and prosecuted individuals who had acted in the 
interests of the Axis Powers (Germany, Italy, Japan).132 The Tribunal progressively 
interpreted the law of war and limited the execution of manifestly illegal orders to 
mitigation.133 The Nuremberg trials gave individuals an international legal personality 
and responsibility.134 In the view of the IMT, the enforcement of international law was 
to be realised through punishing individuals for the crimes they committed.135 This 
position was subsequently reaffirmed in Tadic136 and decisions of other international 
criminal tribunals. Individual criminal responsibility is also emphasised in the Geneva 
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Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols.137 The principle of individual 
criminal responsibility is based on the term nulla poena sine culpa. This means that a 
determination should be made on whether a person was engaged or participated in an 
act before attaching criminal responsibility to such an individual. 
The IMT was empowered through article 6 of the IMT Charter to try actions which 
endangered peace, violations of the laws of war and crimes against humanity. The 
prosecution of these crimes led to a dilemma. The IMT dismissed the arguments 
against ex post facto prosecutions because war crimes were codified in The Hague 
Conventions, while crimes against peace were prohibited in the 1928 Kellogg-Brand 
Pact.138 
Prosecutions of World War II criminals were not limited to Nuremberg. The Allied 
Control Council Law Number 10 (CCL 10) authorised the Allied powers to exercise 
jurisdiction over similar crimes in their respective areas of occupation in Germany.139 
Under both Nuremberg and CCL 10, the political will made the trials possible.140 The 
pre-1939 atrocities were also covered by the CCL 10 because crimes against humanity 
are not confined to wartime.141 
The IMT preceded the formation of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE); the latter was formed in January 1946.142 The IMTFE exercised jurisdiction 
over breaches of war and peace as well as crimes against humanity.143 The IMTFE 
was a result of the work of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) established by the Allies 
in December 1945.144 The FEC had a political mandate to initiate and oversee Allied 
policies towards Japan and the Far East. The IMTFE, unlike the IMT, was not a 
creation of a treaty but an application of military law and procedures by respective 
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Allied powers.145 Therefore, there was no uniformity in the prosecution of accused 
persons. 
Politics played a role in the selection and prosecution of cases before the IMTFE. 
Political instruction led to questionable and unfair trials and undue influence on military 
judges. States such as USA used the opportunity to advance their occupational 
policies.146 The slow progress in creating the ICC was partly due to the failure of states 
to reconcile the establishment of the court and toning down on their policy interests. 
The IMT and IMTFE were created on an ad hoc basis for a specific limited purpose. 
Their jurisdiction was restricted to trials of individuals alleged to have committed major 
crimes during the Second World War.147 They catalysed the process of direct 
protection and entitlement to benefits of international law by individuals rather than 
enjoyment through their national states.148 The landmark approach was reinforced in 
the practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and ICC.149 
Notwithstanding that it took about 50 years to create a successor for the IMT and 
IMTFE, and over 50 years to create the ICC after the Second World War, the IMT and 
IMTFE trials are widely credited for rekindling the fire for the creation of a permanent 
criminal court.150 The developments during the second half of the twentieth century 
were catalytic in the evolution of international criminal law.151 The IMT trials were the 
first major trials in the development of international criminal prosecutions. The 
Nuremberg trials laid the foundation for international criminal prosecutions.152 
Article 8 of the Charter of the IMT discouraged impunity and disregarded immunity. 
Immunity refers to an exemption from duties or obligations because of a certain status 
and office.153 The Charter stated that no person was absolved from prosecution either 
on grounds of official capacity as head of state or who acted on superior orders. Judge 
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Richard Goldstone observed that before Nuremberg, war criminals enjoyed ‘effective 
immunity᾽154 because prosecution was an exception and not a rule.155 The IMT 
convicted 19 persons in a group of 24 defendants who appeared before it.156 
The IMT and the IMTFE were models of victors’ justice because they only tried 
perpetrators from the losers.157 They were one-sided and to the detriment of the 
vanquished.158 Bassiouni observed that the Japanese saw the trials as vengeance and 
justice for victors.159 The recommendation of Sheldon Glueck was ignored as far as 
the prosecution of both sides at the IMT was concerned. In 1944, Glueck 
recommended the creation of an international criminal court to prosecute both sides 
and the development of an international penal code to facilitate the prosecutions.160 
His recommendation also highlighted crimes with a customary international law nature. 
He also argued against immunity based on official position.161 The one-sided trials 
were due to political realities and time constraints which demanded urgent closure to 
the atrocities of the war.162 
Interestingly, ICC trials are also viewed as targeted at weaker states.163 Both the 
strengths and weaknesses of the IMT recur in the ICC system, making the former an 
important precedent in the development of the jurisprudence of the ICC. The IMT 
overcame obstacles of state sovereignty and opened room for external interference in 
the internal affairs of states.164 This study later shows how the ICC dealt with issues of 
sovereignty. 
2.5.3 The adoption of the Genocide Convention 
The IMT trials introduced the crime of ‘genocide’.165 However, the judges of the IMT 
preferred convictions of crimes against humanity.166 The few years following the end 
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of the Second World War led to urgent steps by the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) to establish a legal framework and enforcement mechanisms for prosecution 
of international crimes. 
The crime of genocide was revisited within weeks of the IMT trials.167 The Convention 
for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide 
Convention) was adopted by the UNGA in 1948.168 Article 6 of the Genocide 
Convention provided for a permanent international criminal court. Accordingly, the 
UNGA was occupied with the establishment of the court as early as 1948. When it 
approved the Genocide Convention, the UNGA mandated the International Law 
Commission (ILC) to research on the possibility and rationale for the trial of 
international crimes by an international judicial organ.169 The earlier vision of jurists on 
the possibility to create a criminal chamber of the ICJ once again manifested.170 
2.5.4 The work of the International Law Commission 
The ILC was established by the UNGA in 1947 to develop and codify international 
law.171 The ILC drafted a code of offences and a framework for an international criminal 
court.172 Resolution 177(II) required the ILC to prepare a draft code of offences in light 
of international law principles outlined in the IMT Statute.173 A Romanian jurist, 
Vespasian Pella, wanted the international community to use the IMT and IMTFE 
momentum to agree on an international criminal court.174 
To enhance its capacity and effectiveness, the ILC established a special committee 
and appointed a special rapporteur to prepare a draft code of offences.175 The same 
approach was adopted to prepare a draft statute of a permanent international criminal 
court.176 A special committee was appointed in 1950 and reconstituted in 1953. The 
majority of ILC members voted in favour of the creation of an international criminal 
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court as a separate entity and supported a draft statute to that effect. However, a lack 
of clarity on the definition of aggression and the need for a comprehensive legal 
framework on offences delayed universal support for the concept of an international 
mechanism.177 
Some members of the Committee, such as Ricardo Alfaro, saw the court as both 
῾desirable᾽ and ῾possible᾿,178 while some, such as Emil Sandström, viewed it as a 
possible and yet undesirable initiative.179 The Committee draft of 1951 was based on 
the statute of the ICJ.180 
The Committee gathered the views of states about the international criminal court 
project and concluded that states had reservations on the two ILC codification projects 
at the time.181 The Committee produced further draft statutes in 1953 and 1954. 
However, the two drafts also failed to enjoy universal support.182 The underlying reason 
was reluctance by states to surrender their sovereignty.183 The question of sovereignty 
would delay meaningful debate on the court for about 40 years.184 There was little hope 
for the birth of a tribunal with global coverage.185 
The 1953 draft statute of an international criminal tribunal had important proposals. It 
proposed limited jurisdiction, increased state control and provided for the right of states 
to withdraw jurisdiction. The draft deprived the UN powers to institute proceedings. 
However, the draft retained the powers of the UN to stop proceedings in a case. A stay 
of proceedings or deferral type, such as in the Rome Statute, was proposed.186 The 
draft valued the minimisation of political interference in cases before the proposed 
court and balanced possible criminal proceedings with the need for international 
cohesion. 
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The 1954 draft statute contained a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind (Draft Code). The UNGA mandated a committee composed of 
seventeen-member states, instead of the ILC, to determine the judicial enforcement of 
such a code.187 The UNGA’s approach was criticised for giving the ‘wrong’ people the 
right question. The UNGA expected jurists to deal with political questions and 
politicians to fine-tune legal documents.188 
An unconvinced UNGA requested for further research on the draft code to enhance its 
understanding of the findings of the special committee.189 Despite the submission of 
the draft code in 1954, it was not until 1996 that the draft code was adopted. The UNGA 
deemed it necessary to suspend discussions on the draft code and the draft statute to 
allow further submissions on the definition of aggression.190 As the deadlock on the 
crime of aggression lingered, another attempt was made in 1973 to visualise the future 
international penal tribunal when the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid was adopted. The United Nations Ad Hoc 
Committee for South Africa engaged experts to use the template of the Apartheid 
Convention for an international court statute.191 
The Committee finally agreed on the chapeau elements of aggression in 1974, leading 
the UNGA to adopt the definition of the crime in Resolution 3314 (XXIX).192 However, 
the adoption of the definition did not translate into acceptance of the draft code of 
crimes. The ILC only concluded its first draft code of crimes against peace and security 
of humanity. The ‘draft code of offences’ was changed to a ‘draft code of crimes’ in 
1991 and the amendment was submitted as such to the UNGA in 1996.193 
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2.5.5 The Cold War derailment 
The Cold War hampered the progress brought by the Nuremberg trials.194 Political 
divisions in the UNSC made the creation of international tribunals difficult.195 During 
the Cold War, the world lacked both a platform and the opportunity to debate a 
permanent international court. The international community had to wait for a change in 
the political context.196 The pursuit of international criminal justice was overpowered 
by politics.197 On the bright side, national prosecutions of crimes gained more 
recognition. Resultantly, extradition of offenders and state co-operation became 
effective means of dealing with crimes.198 
During the Cold War, it was difficult for the UNSC to decide on issues which affected 
the international community. Communism conflicted with capitalism.199 Two major 
powers, USA and the Soviet Union, represented the antagonistic forces of capitalism 
and communism respectively. Since both superpowers were members of the UNSC, 
they frustrated and vetoed most of each other’s resolutions, as they viewed support for 
each other as the advancement of capitalism and communism.200 
Competition between the superpowers for supremacy and defence of national pride 
stalled issues before the UNSC. The UN was virtually paralysed during the Cold War. 
Its effectiveness was severely curtailed.201 The competition among UN members took 
the UN by surprise and without strategy to unite the conflicting members.202 There was 
much mistrust between the eastern and western blocs. Both sides were uncertain on 
the purpose of an international criminal court.203 The Cold War meant that hostile 
enemies, such as the Soviet Union and USA, were potential aggressors who needed 
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a clear definition of aggression before any movement on the statute of the court could 
occur.204 
For USA thought the time was not ripe to perfect a definition of aggression. It argued 
that planners of aggression would exploit a prematurely adopted definition of 
aggression.205 The fears were exacerbated by the Korean conflict and rumours of a 
repeat of victors’ justice as in Nuremberg.206 Panicking Western leaders became non-
committal to prosecute war crimes.207 During the Cold War, the ILC reports and draft 
codes fell dormant, only to be revived in the last decade of the twentieth century.208 
2.6 The ‘acceleration years’ (1989 to 1998) 
2.6.1 Drug offences reviving the international criminal court agenda 
In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago and other Caribbean and Latin American states 
proposed international prosecutions for drug offences.209 The states sought a forum to 
extradite and prosecute international narco-terrorists for cross-border drug 
trafficking.210 The states viewed a mechanism such as an international criminal court 
as a possibility to address their drug issues.211 Their proposal led to the UN deliberating 
on the creation of an international criminal court. 
In response to the proposal, the UNGA tasked the ILC to draft a statute for the court.212 
The ILC adopted a draft code of crimes in 1991213 and created a working group on the 
court in 1992.214 There was a broad consensus within the ILC that the court was long 
overdue.215 In the early 1990s, the work of the ILC received considerable attention, 
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unlike before when the ILC was relegated to the designation of rapporteurs and 
working groups who worked in vain, as their findings were largely disregarded.216 In 
1994, the ILC Draft Statute was ready.217 
2.6.2 Ad hoc tribunals laying the foundation 
The end of the Cold War eased political tensions between superpowers and shredded 
fears that some states would abuse international judicial institutions for political 
ends.218 The UN revived its influence on international affairs and kept political 
deadlocks at a minimal. 
The post-Cold War era witnessed the commission of heinous crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The UNSC responded by establishing the ICTY in 1993,219 
and the ICTR in 1994. 220 The tribunals had primacy over national courts.221 The UNSC 
triggered its peremptory powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to establish the 
two ad hoc tribunals.222 
The earlier glimpses for a permanent international criminal court suddenly regained 
momentum with the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals.223 Many governments felt 
the edge and conviction to support the idea of a permanent international criminal 
court.224 The ad hoc tribunals became the trigger and ‘birth pains’ before the ICC was 
born. 
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, investigations were authorised through the UNSC 
Resolution 780 of 1992.225 The UNSC decided on an international tribunal to prosecute 
crimes committed since 1991.226 In the case of Rwanda, the UNSC Resolution 935 of 
1994 established a Commission of Experts to investigate violations of the law in 
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Rwanda.227 The reports of the Commission resulted in the establishment of a 
tribunal.228 
A combination of strong political will and participation made the establishment of the 
ICTY and ICTR possible.229 This shows the importance of political will in the 
prosecution of international crimes. To the contrary, a good measure of political 
opposition made the establishment of the ICC a long process.230 
The ICTY burst into prominence with the arrest, transfer and prosecution of Tadić.231 
The primacy of the ICTY was brought under scrutiny when Tadić challenged its 
consistency with international law.232 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY emphasised 
that the interests of states are subordinate to international mechanisms which promote 
and protect human rights.233 The Appeals Chamber also stated the importance of 
international criminal tribunals such as the ICTY to avoid the trivialisation of 
international crimes and neglect of diligent prosecutions.234 The Tadić case showed 
reluctance by persons and states to be tried outside state jurisdiction. 
The ICTR made groundbreaking prosecution and sentences for the crime of genocide. 
The Akayesu235 case was the first in which an international tribunal tried and convicted 
a person for genocide.236 The indictment of Akayesu came at an opportune time and 
provided a precedent for deliberations at the Rome Conference on the crime of 
genocide. 
The establishments of the ICTY and ICTR were precursors to the formation of the 
ICC.237 The ICC signalled a shift from ad hoc legalism towards a permanent 
international penal system. When it established the ICTY and ICTR, the international 
community demonstrated willingness to end impunity. Before, prosecutions by 
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international criminal tribunals were motivated by revenge against defeated states.238 
The rationale of the ICC augurs well with that of the ICTY and ICTR. Primacy, as 
espoused in the statutes of both the ICTY and ICTR, was reshaped into 
complementarity in the ICC system.239 
The lack of universal recognition of ad hoc tribunals aroused interest for a permanent 
institution that would not be subjected to similar shortcomings.240 The ICTY exercised 
territorial jurisdiction for crimes in the former Yugoslavia,241 while the ICTR exercised 
both territorial and personal jurisdiction for crimes in Rwanda or by Rwandan 
nationals.242 The limitation of jurisdiction to certain conflicts and lack of pre-existing 
statutes raised questions on the principles of legality and fairness in the ad hoc 
tribunals.243 The ad hoc tribunals were also pressured to address situations within a 
constrained time frame; hence, they were susceptible to political manipulation.244 
Furthermore, the ad hoc tribunals were often inconsistent in the treatment of individuals 
who committed similar violations. The inconsistencies were caused by the different 
statutes which established the tribunals.245 
A permanent international criminal court became necessary to build on the foundation 
of the ad hoc tribunals and counter their shortcomings.246 However, the ICC is not 
immune to the shortcomings. Some of the challenges with the ICC include its 
considerable dependence on the UNSC and the states to refer cases to it, its 
subordination to the UNSC and alleged political interference by powerful states. The 
human and financial resource factor is another issue and much will depend on how the 
ICC’s burden is reduced through its approach to complementarity. To its advantage, 
the ICC is permanent and as such has more time to work on its weaknesses and build 
a stronger and more effective mechanism.247 
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In 2002, the SCSL was established at the initiation of the national authorities in Sierra 
Leone and with the support of the UNSC.248 The SCSL was a hybrid court with local 
and international features. Its Statute reflected past realities of conflict and the wounds 
inflicted on the populace.249 In the formative years of the SCSL, the Sierra Leonean 
President Kabbah desired a ῾court that will meet international standards for the trial of 
criminal cases, while at the same time having a mandate to administer a blend of 
international and domestic Sierra Leonean law on Sierra Leonean soil᾿.250 The UN also 
preferred an international court founded on strong national values.251 A Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was also established to operate alongside the 
SCSL.252 Therefore, the administration of justice for Sierra Leone encompassed both 
criminal trials and national reconciliation.253 This approach is preferred in Africa to 
settle conflicts on the continent. The SCSL was preferred ahead of the national courts 
in Sierra Leone.254 The accused in Sierra Leone were prosecuted in respect of fair 
trials and due process of law.255 
 
Notwithstanding that the SCSL was an international criminal tribunal and not an African 
regional court, the fact that the prosecution of its most profile indictee, Charles Taylor, 
occurred amid the peace-versus-justice dilemma, makes the SCSL relevant to current 
debates in Africa on the importance of regional courts.256 As some scholars have 
observed, a truth commission was often relegated to second status in the fight against 
impunity.257 In this regard, a regional court such as the one envisaged for Africa may 
bring equal appreciation of legal and non-legal mechanisms. 
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This chapter showed that an international criminal court was conceived for at least five 
centuries,258 only to manifest with the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998.259 The 
twentieth century was marked by an increase in international crimes which warranted 
prosecutions as part of mechanisms to end impunity.260 The international community 
adopted several international treaties to purge the continued commission of heinous 
crimes.261 The ICC is a desire to respond more effectively to international crimes. 
The push for the ICC capitalised on the growing desire for victims to get justice. Calls 
for mechanisms to end impunity were gaining momentum. The establishment of the 
ICC enhances permanency and consistency in the application of juridical principles 
against impunity for gross human rights violations.262 Other international criminal 
tribunals addressed specific conflicts and varied in scope depending on the 
circumstances.263 
The ICC was established to prosecute persons alleged to have committed crimes 
against humanity, peace and security, in addition to genocide and aggression.264 The 
establishment of the Court was an international community acknowledgment for the 
need to preserve the rule of law265 and provide a framework of global jurisdiction over 
perpetrators of serious crimes who would otherwise evade justice in their states.266 
The chapter discussed the historical background towards the establishment of the ICC 
for several reasons. The understanding of international criminal justice and the 
emergence of the ICC contributes to this study in three ways: as starting points on 
accountability for international crimes; to outline how national and international courts 
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have co-operated over the years to end impunity; and as a background on the ICC’s 
preferred approach of complementarity. 
This chapter further gave a background on efforts towards international judicialisation 
of international crimes and ensuing challenges. Some of the challenges in achieving a 
common approach to the international judicialisation process manifest on the 
application of complementarity. The ICC is a result of years of hard work which saw 
the persistence of the international community against overwhelming odds.267 The 
genesis of the ICC is vital in understanding the evolution of its practice to date. 
International criminal tribunals have been credited for shaping the development of 
international criminal law. The product of the ambitions and workload of many centuries 
has been the establishment of the ICC.
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THE MATTER OF COMPLEMENTARITY 
3.1 Introduction 
International criminal justice is built upon a relationship between national and 
international jurisdictions.1 International adjudication forums proportionally balance 
national interests to preserve state sovereignty and international interests to end 
impunity. The Rome Statute gives states a primary role to address violations.2 States 
which are unwilling and unable to act forfeit their powers to the ICC. 
The interdependence of national and international jurisdictions makes the co-existence 
of the two systems complementary.3 The interdependence obligates states and the 
ICC to function through co-operation and assistance.4 The complementary relationship 
caters for jurisdictional gaps and encourages the intervention of the ICC when states 
fail to punish international crimes.5 Consequently, the ICC supports national criminal 
systems.6 
States highly esteem their sovereignty and rarely waive their exclusive jurisdiction for 
matters in their territories.7 The principle of complementarity is premised on expected 
state action and regulation of absolute state autonomy.8 The Rome Statute presumes 
that states have the capacity and interest to prosecute domestically.9 The dormant 
jurisdiction of the ICC is activated when the presumption is waived.10 Therefore, states 
are preferred forums for the prosecution of crimes. Notwithstanding, certain 
circumstances require states to defer cases to the ICC.11 
 
1 MM El Zeidy ‘The principle of complementarity: a new machinery to implement international criminal 
law’ (2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 889. 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) arts 1 & 17. 
3 n 2 above, Preamble para 10. 
4 M du Plessis et al ‘African efforts to close the impunity gap: lessons for complementarity from national 
and regional actions’ (2012) 241 Institute of Security Studies Paper 5. 
5 M du Plessis ‘The long walk to accountability for international crimes: reflections from South Africa’ 
(2014) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 407. 
6 Du Plessis et al (n 5 above) 4. 
7 El Zeidy (n 1 above) 870. 
8 SA Williams & WA Schabas ‘Article 17: issues of admissibility’ in O Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: observers’ notes, article by article (1999) 20. 
9 Du Plessis et al (n 5 above) 5. 
10 H Olàsolo The triggering procedure of the International Criminal Court (2005) 39. 
11 Olàsolo (n 10 above). 
65 
 
The principle of complementarity is a double-edged sword.12 On the one hand, 
complementarity assures national jurisdictions that their primacy is secured.13 On the 
other hand, complementarity introduces an ῾interventionist policy᾽ that allows the ICC 
to assume jurisdiction over a case when the domestic jurisdiction fails to prosecute.14 
The principle of complementarity thus serves as the anchor of the ICC regime.15 The 
principle regulates the entire ICC system.16 
State parties accepted the Rome Statute owing to the insertion of complementarity 
provisions.17 The principle of complementarity is described in detail in part 2 of the 
Rome Statute. Part 2 was the most contentious issue at the Rome negotiations. Today, 
part 2 is the bedrock of the Rome Statute.18 That part includes, inter alia, the definition 
of crimes, the jurisdiction of the ICC, triggering mechanisms, complementarity and the 
roles of the Prosecutor and the UNSC.19 
This chapter discusses the principle of complementarity as espoused in the Rome 
Statute and the practice of the ICC. The chapter begins with an outline of the historical 
development of the principle. The historical background enables an understanding of 
the roots of complementarity regime as practised by the ICC. This chapter 
demonstrates that long-standing debates and jurisprudence on the preferred forum to 
prosecute international crimes have been key in shaping complementarity. Different 
models of complementarity which emerged in the past are scrutinised in this chapter. 
This chapter further seeks to show that international criminal tribunals which preceded 
the ICC mostly endorsed the reverse side of the principle.20 Historical circumstances 
undermined efforts at understanding the co-existence of national and international 
judicial systems. 
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This chapter proceeds to examine complementarity as enshrined in the Rome Statute 
and as understood in the practice of the ICC. The ICC model of complementarity often 
requires the application of complicated tests to determine the admissibility of cases. 
Complementarity is the most important component of the admissibility determination.21 
The Rome Statute provides guidelines and leaves room for flexibility in the 
interpretation of the principle.22 The chapter also discusses emerging African practices 
as an illustration of how the ICC can appreciate the understanding of complementarity 
from the perspective of states which the Court seeks to assist. 
Finally, this chapter discusses the contribution of scholars in shaping the 
understanding and development of complementarity by the ICC. The last part of the 
chapter focuses on positive and negative schools of thought on complementarity. The 
two schools of thought reveal the importance of a broader interpretation to meet the 
object and purpose of the Rome Statute. 
3.2 The historical development of the principle of complementarity 
Complementarity manifests itself in various forms. The forms of complementarity are 
drawn from statutes and the practices of international criminal tribunals over the 
twentieth century.23 The historical development of the principle of complementarity 
shows that the principle is not static.24 Instead, complementarity varies and should be 
interpreted based on the circumstances surrounding its application at a given time and 
place.25 
The Rome Statute left the term ‘complementarity᾽ undefined, to allow the Court to 
adapt the interpretation of the principle. During informal debates and negotiations at 
the Rome Conference, states did not have adequate time to change positions on key 
concepts such as complementarity.26 The negotiations compressed many issues 
within the allotted five weeks.27 Most delegations had little time to scrutinise the draft 
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statute and had no opportunities to take sustainable positions on what they eventually 
agreed to in Rome.28 Therefore, it is not surprising that today the interpretation and 
application of certain provisions of the Rome Statute are contested by states. For 
instance, the call by the AU to empower the UNGA to influence deferrals alongside the 
UNSC illustrates Africa’s understanding that the UNSC does not enjoy monopoly over 
determinations on issues of international peace and security.29 The AU position finds 
a basis on UNGA Resolution 377(v). The Resolution allows the UNGA to complement 
the UNSC when the latter is unable or unwilling to exercise its primary responsibility. 
The principle of complementarity, as understood in the Rome Statute, was born out of 
compromise. The principle strikes a balance between the supranational power of the 
ICC and the sovereignty of states to function independently from external 
interference.30 The compromises at the Rome Conference decentralised to the two-tier 
national and international systems.31 Inevitably, the principle will open a hornet’s nest 
because national and international jurisdictions are bound to compete for dominance.32 
3.2.1 Origins of complementarity 
The emergence of international criminal tribunals in the twentieth century stimulated 
discussions on the framework of the operations of institutions of international criminal 
justice. The tribunals contended with traditional norms which exalted the jurisdiction of 
states for violations in their territories.33 The use of domestic forums to punish violations 
of international law is a time-honoured practice. The ideas of Hugo Grotius identified 
states as preferred forums to punish violations of norms.34 The Westphalian Treaty, 
which entrenched the doctrine of state sovereignty, codified the position taken by 
Grotius.35 
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Emphasis on state sovereignty often eluded justice for victims of atrocities.36 An 
alternative mechanism became desirable to combat atrocities. International criminal 
justice became the means to make perpetrators answerable.37 States often shielded 
persons accused of gross human rights violations from prosecution.38 As the human 
rights movements emerged and strengthened in the twentieth century, traditional 
channels of justice which observed the sovereignty of states were challenged with 
proposals to advance and strengthen the global enforcement of human rights through 
a broader approach.39 Hence, international criminal tribunals were born. 
International criminal tribunals produced different models of complementarity. Mostly, 
the tribunals assumed inability and unwillingness of national courts to bring 
perpetrators to book.40 Few of the tribunals adopted standards that were lopsided in 
favour of domestic courts.41 In all cases, attempts were made to define the relationship 
between national and international courts when faced with jurisdictional preferences.42 
3.2.2 Complementarity in the Treaty of Versailles 
The principle of complementarity can be traced back to the Treaty of Versailles adopted 
at the end of the First World War.43 The Treaty gave military tribunals supremacy over 
national jurisdictions. The victorious Allies allowed shared responsibility with Germany 
in the prosecution of offenders. The Allies tasked Germany with the prosecution of 
most offenders. The Allied High Tribunal was established to prosecute only those ‘most 
responsible’.44 
Pursuant to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany passed an enabling statute to prosecute 
offenders. Germany strongly argued in favour of using the doctrine of state sovereignty 
to retain jurisdiction over all the cases.45 The basis of the argument was the 
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understanding that a conducive legal and justice environment in a state allows a state 
to exercise its primacy over cases. 
The treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne between the Allied powers and Turkey were 
signed in the context of the Versailles Peace Settlement negotiations. Through the two 
treaties, the Allies declined prosecution of offences committed by Turkish authorities. 
The Allies deferred to Turkey the prosecutions of offenders for massacres committed 
by Turkish officials during the First World War.46 The Allies considered Turkey’s 
sovereignty and political stability when they adopted a non-interference position.47 The 
decision by the Allies demonstrated the need to consider several practical factors 
before resorting to an international criminal tribunal. 
3.2.3 Complementarity at the League of Nations Convention 
Complementarity featured in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism48 negotiated by the League of Nations in 1937. However, the practical 
operation of the principle was not tested because the Convention never came into 
force. The Convention intended to give primacy to states. In addition, the Convention 
sought to give states absolute discretion on whether to prosecute perpetrators or to 
request the assistance of an international criminal court.49 The Convention entirely left 
it to states to demonstrate their ability and to proceed with national prosecutions.50 
3.2.4 The Nuremberg complementarity model 
At Nuremberg, complementarity arose due to the need to share the burden between 
national and international jurisdictions after the Second World War.51 When 
prosecuting Germans for atrocities committed during the War, the Allied powers used 
both national and international courts.52 Arguably, the Allied powers assumed control 
of all the trials but decentralised the trials to different areas and levels of jurisdictions. 
Besides Nuremberg, the law of the Occupying powers applied in their respective areas 
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of occupation.53 The second Nuremberg principle permitted the invocation of 
international law in the absence of national law to try international crimes.54 
The IMT targeted the most responsible, whereas internal criminal jurisdictions 
prosecuted other criminals. Territorial jurisdiction was a major feature in the Moscow 
Declaration of 1943 and the London Declaration of 1945, both of which established the 
IMT.55 
The CCL 1056 enabled Allied powers to exercise jurisdiction when authorised by the 
IMT.57 A notable feature was the co-operation between the IMT and national criminal 
jurisdictions.58 The corollary for the principle of complementarity is co-operation. 
The IMT complementarity model serves as an example of effective partnerships of 
national and international mechanisms.59 The state parties to the IMT Charter 
welcomed the division of labour among themselves and proceeded with the application 
of complementarity in that vein.60 Complementarity in the IMT was conspicuous for the 
lack of conflict between national sovereignty and international criminal justice.61 
3.2.5 Complementarity in the International Court of Justice Statute 
The ICJ was established by the UN Charter in 1946.62 The ICJ has jurisdiction on legal 
disputes between states.63 The ICJ and its predecessor, the PCIJ, significantly clarified 
international law. The ICJ is a constant reminder of the importance of international 
courts in the cohesion of states. Notably, the ICJ only imposes state obligations and 
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not personal criminal liability.64 The position differs from international criminal tribunals 
established since the end of the First World War.65 
The jurisdiction of the ICJ is based on state referral, UNSC intervention and treaty 
obligations.66 Generally, state parties should refer legal disputes to the ICJ. The 
position gives primacy to states to deal with disputes so that the UN only intervenes as 
a last resort. Probably, states drew lessons from the operations of the ICJ when they 
formulated the Rome Statute. In 1992, the report of the Working Group outlined the 
jurisdictional strategy for the ICC Statute and considered the invocation of jurisdiction 
such as the one under the ICJ Statute.67 
3.2.6 The Genocide Convention and complementarity considerations 
The relationship between national and international jurisdictions emerged when the 
Genocide Convention was drafted. During the discussions on the nature of an 
international tribunal to prosecute the crime of genocide, the opposition of most states 
to a tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction was apparent.68 The preparatory documents of 
the Convention show that states exalted state sovereignty and only preferred 
international intervention for times when states would have failed to prosecute 
perpetrators of heinous crimes.69 
USA and Uruguay were vocal in support of the incorporation of the complementarity 
principle in the Genocide Convention.70 Advocacy for the inclusion of complementarity 
bore fruit when most of the Ad Hoc Committee members endorsed the proposal.71 Two 
experts consulted by the Secretariat, Donnedieu de Vabres and Vespasian Pella, 
clarified how an international jurisdiction would function. They indicated that an 
international jurisdiction would be activated in cases of inability or unwillingness of 
national courts.72 
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3.2.7 Ad hoc tribunals and reversed complementarity 
In international criminal justice, the primacy system of the ICTY and ICTR is frequently 
compared with the complementarity system of the ICC. The statutes of the ICTY73 and 
ICTR74 gave jurisdiction to the tribunals and national courts. To address the serious 
violations committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the statutes extended the 
jurisdiction of the tribunals beyond concurrence.75 The UNSC justified the primacy of 
the ICTY and ICTR. 76 
Arguably, a three-pronged approach was adopted for Rwanda: the ICTR, the usual 
national courts, and the re-established traditional community courts (gacaca) 
specifically created to try some of the perpetrators of the genocide.77 The approach 
allowed the prosecution of cases at both national and international level. The gravity 
of individual cases was the main determinant on the appropriate forum for crimes. 
Apart from that, the model resonated with complementarity, a dimension of universal 
jurisdiction manifested when national courts of Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, 
Cameroon and France prosecuted some offenders for crimes committed during the 
Rwandan genocide.78 
The preference of the ICTY and ICTR over national courts enabled the tribunals to 
interfere with national proceedings at any stage.79 The principle of primacy of 
international criminal tribunals obligated states to defer cases to the tribunals when 
asked to do so.80 The jurisdiction of states over crimes committed in their territories 
was subordinated to the tribunals.81 
The ad hoc tribunals assumed inability and unwillingness by national courts to 
prosecute crimes committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.82 Doubts about fair 
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trials83 and promotion of impunity84 were major factors which convinced the 
international community to take cases away from national courts. For instance, in the 
Tadić case, the ICTY was apprehensive to the possibility that national courts would 
trivialise the crimes to the detriment of victims and the interests of justice.85 
When an international criminal tribunal has a primary role in the prosecution of 
perpetrators of heinous crimes, it is irrelevant to consider the positioning and credibility 
of national forums.86 However, the Tadić case challenged the consistency of the ICTY 
primacy with international law.87 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY emphasised that 
the interests of states are subordinate to the protection of human rights.88 The Tadić 
case showed that persons accused of international crimes are reluctant to stand trial 
outside national courts. The reluctance commonly manifests when potential forums are 
availed to try an accused. 
Challenges to the primary status of tribunals also arose in the ICTR. In the 
Ntakirutimana case,89 a USA court refused to surrender the accused to the ICTR. The 
USA court justified its decision on grounds of inadequate evidence to warrant 
extradition. The court also questioned the constitutionality of handing over suspects by 
USA to the ICTR.90 The decision was overturned on appeal, leading to the transfer of 
the accused to the ICTR. The Ntakirutimana case reflected the complications in the 
enforcement of primacy. The case was also a statement on the weakness of ad hoc 
tribunals in the implementation of the principle of complementarity.91 
The tribunals were criticised for alleged insensitivity to local realities when they 
assumed primacy.92 Mindful of such criticisms, the international community negotiated 
for complementarity at the Rome Conference.93 The ICC complementarity model 
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contradicts the approaches of the ICTY and the ICTR. The Rome Statute assumes the 
ability and willingness of states to act and allows the intervention of the ICC in 
exceptional cases.94 
Primacy differs from complementarity on the timing of interventions. Complementarity 
makes the ICC a court of last resort, whereas primacy made ad hoc tribunals courts of 
first instance. The ICC complementarity model provides stringent controls on the 
Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion.95 
The ICC only asserts jurisdiction when convinced that national courts have failed to 
exercise their primary jurisdiction.96 Ad hoc tribunals, on the other hand, assume 
jurisdiction merely on the competence of the tribunals to hear cases.97 The primacy of 
ad hoc tribunals has one striking similarity with complementarity of the ICC. At some 
stage, both concepts presume the inability and unwillingness of national courts to 
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. Within this context, problems 
experienced in the application of primacy are detected during the application of 
complementarity. 
It is challenging to ascertain the threshold for ‘sham’ proceedings in national courts.98 
The ad hoc tribunals selected cases based on the existence of concurrent jurisdiction 
with states. Unlike the ICC complementarity model, the tribunals did not have an 
admissibility criterion. The tribunals solely relied on prosecutorial discretion in cases 
which warranted prosecution before the tribunals.99 The practice of the ICTY was silent 
on the criterion for the selection in Tadić,100 Mrkšić101 and Re: The Republic of 
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Macedonia102 cases. Likewise, the ICTR applied automatic jurisdiction in Musema,103 
Bagosora104 and Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines SARL cases.105 
Schabas contends that the early practice of the ICTY was influenced by the 
desperation of the ICTY prosecutor to bring and prosecute cases before the tribunal. 
He mentions the unlikelihood of the ICTY prosecutor meddling with German attempts 
if Tadić had been arrested a decade later, when the tribunal had a massive caseload 
and intense pressure from the UNSC to conclude its operations.106 Arguably, the 
Prosecutor has been ‘too willing’ to prosecute cases in the ICC. By implication, the 
current ICC prosecutorial policy may be partly shaped by the desire to have ‘some᾽ 
cases prosecuted by the ICC. 
Despite the desire by the ad hoc tribunals to take as many cases as they could, the 
tribunals realised that national jurisdictions were key to the completion strategies of the 
tribunals and the eventual fulfilment of their mandates. Prosecutorial discretionary 
powers were often activated to ensure the proper functioning of the partnership 
between the tribunals and national courts.107 The tribunals occasionally deferred cases 
to national courts as part of the division of labour and sharing of burden.108 
In the Djajić and Jorgić cases, the ICTY acknowledged the competence of German 
authorities to preside over crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the ICTY.109 These and 
other related cases led to a shift in the application of primacy. The two cases redefined 
the relationship between the two jurisdictions and transformed it from purely primacy 
to ‘semi-complementary᾽.110 Absolute primacy was further curtailed in June 2004 with 
the amendment of rule 11bis. The amended rule 11bis enabled national courts to play 
an increased role in the prosecution of crimes. The rule was a replica of the IMT 
complementarity system.111 Although the amendment of rule 11bis occurred after 
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1998, the amendment is relevant to the evolution of the ICC complementarity system. 
As such, the practices of the ad hoc tribunals provide some lessons. 
Through shared responsibility, the tribunals only dealt with persons most responsible 
for atrocities and deferred less serious cases to national courts.112 However, states 
reserved their right to decline cases referred to them by the tribunals. The applicable 
standard was for a state to show willingness and preparedness to take over a case. 
The envisaged co-operation between national and international jurisdictions created a 
system of complementarity based on the distribution of functions.113 
Complementarity was impliedly applied in the ICTY and ICTR without requirements 
and complicated tests reminiscent of the ICC system. Rule 11bis (A) (iii) and rule 11bis 
(F) of the ad hoc tribunals empowered the tribunals to evaluate the quality of 
prosecution by national jurisdictions. National courts were expected to undertake 
prosecutions diligently. When national courts failed in that regard, the tribunal was 
authorised to take over cases.114 As such, the tribunals acted as courts of last resort 
similar to in the ICC complementarity system. 
3.2.8 The construction of the ICC complementarity model 
  The 1994 ILC Draft Statute 
Complementarity was one area of contestation in the making of the Rome Statute. The 
construction of the concept prior to the Rome Conference was made when the UNGA 
decided to debate the ILC Draft Statute in 1994. The ILC was initially inspired by the 
ICTY and ICTR systems of a court with ‘primacy’.115 Subsequent meetings of the Ad 
Hoc Committee and Preparatory Commission (PrepComm) introduced the 
complementarity concept.116 
The Preamble of the revised ILC Draft Statute alluded to the complementary 
relationship between national criminal justice systems and the court.117 It was apparent 
from the draft that complementarity was meant to operate in an impartial, reliable and 
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depoliticised court which would exercise caution when evaluating the action of national 
justice systems.118 The Preamble outlined the intervention of the international criminal 
court in the unavailability or ineffectiveness of national courts. The emphasis in the 
Preamble showed the importance of complementarity to the proposed international 
criminal court. The commentary of the ILC stated that the articles and provisions of the 
draft would be interpreted considering the Preamble.119 
The 1994 ILC Draft Statute encompassed the forum for adjudication as well as aspects 
of criminal procedure and investigation.120 As the reality dawned that the envisaged 
court will assist national courts, debates on jurisdictional and admissibility aspects 
became complex.121 The preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction were hotly 
debated.122 It was difficult to find a universal ground on the elements of the jurisdiction 
of the court.123 The 1994 ILC᾽s proposal was restrictive in that the court was to operate 
on a consent basis and under the direction of the UNSC.124 The proposal was deemed 
unprogressive, problematic and a threat to the establishment of the proposed court.125 
Despite the criticisms, most features of the Rome Statute were contained in the 1994 
ILC Draft Statute. The ILC draft esteemed state sovereignty, provided for state and 
UNSC referrals, and considered interests of justice to cater for peace and security 
demands.126 Accordingly, the ILC draft embodied the concept of complementarity that 
was later developed further in the Rome Statute. However, the Rome Statute is a slight 
departure from the ILC draft in that it provides for proprio motu (bringing cases to the 
ICC at Prosecutor’s own initiative) action by the Prosecutor.127 
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  Complementarity in the eyes of the Preparatory Committee 
The 1996 PrepComm draft addressed some of the shortcomings of the 1994 ILC 
draft.128 The Committee of the Whole in Rome considered the findings of the 
PrepComm and subsequently broadened the exercise of jurisdiction.129 However, the 
Rome Statute maintains the element of consent if, for example, non-state parties 
accept the jurisdiction of the Court.130 
The Ad Hoc Committee meeting in 1995 and the first session of the PrepComm in 1996 
made proposals to give the Prosecutor powers to trigger proceedings on his or her own 
initiative.131 The 1994 ILC draft excluded the idea of proprio motu investigations. The 
PrepComm felt investigations should only commence under the authorisation of states 
or the UNSC.132 Because of conflicting views, the proposal failed to gain adequate 
support.133 
The redefined role of the Prosecutor was a sticking point and created a political and 
legal dilemma that needed resolution before the adoption of the final statute.134 So 
sensitive was the issue that even vocal supporters of an independent Prosecutor 
needed time to appropriately define the role of the Prosecutor.135 The PrepComm failed 
to resolve the issue of prosecutorial powers after a long debate in 1997.136 Just like the 
debates on the role of the UNSC, a deadlock ensued on the role of the Prosecutor. 
Resultantly, the Rome negotiations were on the verge of collapse until a compromise 
was reached.137 
  Perspectives of the Rome Conference on complementarity 
At the Rome Conference, states were ready to embrace a proactive Prosecutor as long 
as the exercise of such powers was free from political bias or bad faith.138 On 6 July 
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1998, the Committee of the Whole endorsed a Prosecutor who could initiate an 
investigation within a framework of imposed checks and balances.139 The safeguards 
against abuse of prosecutorial function appeared in the final statute, as evidenced by 
articles 13 and 15.140 The role given to the PTC to authorise investigations by the OTP 
is one of the checks and balances on prosecutorial discretion.141 The Rome Statute 
also limits the powers of the Prosecutor to ‘initiating᾽ rather than ‘starting’ 
investigations.142 In other words, the Prosecutor demonstrates a desire to investigate 
a particular situation, whereupon the PTC can authorise the Prosecutor to start the 
investigation.143 
Strict admissibility tests were adopted to counter unwarranted ICC intrusion into 
national criminal justice systems.144 Cases were to be inadmissible before the Court if 
a state with jurisdiction demonstrated that it investigated the case and had strong 
reasons not to proceed. Also, the ICC would reject cases if a state was in the process 
of investigating violations. In such situations, the Court needs to wait to avoid 
duplication of investigations. A matter would also be inadmissible if it is not of sufficient 
gravity for the Court to intervene.145 
Regarding admissibility, the approach of the ICC, where a state adopts alternative 
forms of accountability, was extensively but not exhaustively discussed at the Rome 
Conference.146 South Africa and a few other states wanted a permanent court not 
limited to criminal prosecutions in its evaluation of state action.147 Instead, the states 
wanted a court that considers alternative forms of accountability, such as truth and 
reconciliation commissions.148 The proposal for alternative forms of justice became 
unpopular when some delegations quoted unfavourable outcomes of amnesties, 
particularly from South America.149 
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Although other forms of accountability were not expressly included in the Rome 
Statute, the Preamble to the Rome Statute leaves room for states to use these forms. 
The ICC operates within the UN system.150 The case of Sierra Leone is one example 
of how an international criminal tribunal can fully encompass the ideals of a UN system. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, two contemporaneous institutions were 
established in Sierra Leone. The two institutions dealt with post-conflict justice in Sierra 
Leone and served as models for simultaneous operation of an international court and 
a truth commission.151 During the negotiation of the SCSL’s legal framework, Kofi 
Annan mentioned a complementary relationship based on mutual support and respect 
between the SCSL and the TRC.152 Chapter 5 of this study discusses alternative forms 
of justice in greater detail. 
The notion of complementarity found in the Rome Statute went through several 
amendments, starting from the ILC Draft Statute. In all stages, the practical intricacies 
associated with the notion were apparent.153 During the drafting process, some 
prominent international scholars identified loopholes of the complementarity 
mechanism. At the time, the prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, Louise Arthur, saw an 
imbalance in the application of the notion of complementarity and argued that weaker 
states were likely to be targeted for prosecution by the ICC.154 
At the Rome Conference, the delegates compromised on technical aspects of 
complementarity to enable the adoption of the Rome Statute.155 The most contested 
amendments were on key terms that regulate the application of complementarity. 
Issues with the terms were raised even before the Rome Conference and are 
discussed next. Subsequent chapters illustrate the concept of complementarity in the 
Rome Statute and the practice of the ICC. 
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  ‘Unavailability or ineffectiveness᾽ of national proceedings 
The 1994 ILC draft proposed the intervention of an international criminal court when 
national judicial systems were unavailable or ineffective.156 The 1995 Ad Hoc 
Committee argued that complementarity was not designed to replace national 
courts.157 The Ad Hoc Committee conceded that complementarity was a complex issue 
that needed further discussion.158 The 1996 Session of the PrepComm strengthened 
the argument on the primacy of states to conduct proceedings for crimes under their 
jurisdiction.159 The test of unavailability and ineffectiveness was rejected during the 
1996 session because the test was considered vague and ambiguous.160 The rejection 
prompted the drafters to craft new criteria to clarify the function of the complementarity 
system. The revised criteria coined the terms ῾unable᾽ and ῾unwilling᾿.161 
A draft article on complementarity, introduced by the Coordinator of Informal 
Consultations, John Holmes, at the commencement of the session of the PrepComm 
in August 1997, received considerable support.162 Stimulated by the developments of 
the 1996 session, the wording was improved through adoption of terms ‘unwilling᾽ and 
‘unable genuinely᾽ in the draft.163 The criteria to determine both ‘unwillingness᾽ and 
‘inability᾽ was addressed in article 35. The 1997 session deemed it unnecessary for 
the draft statute to include complementarity.164 
   ‘Inability᾽ and ‘unwillingness᾽ to investigate and prosecute 
The definitions and technical aspects of the terms ῾unable᾿ and ῾unwilling᾿ remained 
complicated and unclear to some of the delegates until the Rome Conference.165 All 
attempts were made to avoid subjectivity in the interpretation of the terms.166 With 
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regard to unwillingness, some degree of subjectivity was made to give the proposed 
court flexibility in the interpretation of the terms.167 
The term ‘genuinely᾽ was read-in to simplify the understanding of ‘unwillingness᾿.168 
The 1994 ILC draft had used ‘effectively᾽ or ‘diligently᾽ in lieu of ‘genuinely᾿.169 
Delegates were divided on the appropriate term. Despite strong arguments that the 
term ‘genuinely᾽ could lead to absurdity and uncertainty, it was nevertheless inserted 
in the Rome Statute.170 Genuineness is not limited to the motives of a state but extends 
to situations in which state action, or lack thereof, reveals inability or unwillingness to 
proceed with investigation and prosecution.171 
3.3 Complementarity in the Rome Statute 
3.3.1 The concept of complementarity 
  The ICC-states relationship 
The ICC was created at an era where international criminal tribunals enjoyed primacy. 
The Court had to manoeuvre its way to adopt new standards lopsided in favour of 
domestic courts.172 The negotiators at the Rome Conference endorsed 
complementarity as the most preferred form for an international adjudicatory institution. 
Holmes highlights the vocality of states at Rome on the system that encouraged 
prosecutions through national courts, with the ICC playing a complementary role.173 
The Rome Conference fell short of giving the ICC review or appellant powers.174 In the 
result, the Rome Conference created a Court that can check and can be checked using 
complementarity as a yardstick.175 Complementarity is based on the acknowledgment 
that the ICC and state parties to the Rome Statute are empowered to exercise 
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jurisdiction over international crimes.176 If the Rome Statute had given the ICC 
automatic jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction could have been granted to both the ICC 
and state parties.177 
The Rome Statute motivates both the states and the Court to exercise jurisdiction.178 
States are generally comfortable to maintain and preserve their jurisdiction over 
crimes. At the Rome Conference, most states pushed for a court subordinate and 
subsidiary to national criminal courts.179 
However, the challenge for the states-Court relationship arises from the fact that the 
term ‘complementarity᾿ is not defined in the Rome Statute. Generally, the term is 
understood to refer to the complementary role of the ICC.180 The ICC stays within the 
confines of complementarity when it supports rather than supplant the jurisdiction of 
states.181 
The American English Dictionary views complementarity as a balancing tool to ensure 
that jurisdiction is exercised within the confines of law, administration and prosecution 
demarcations. Co-operation must exist at two levels to avoid confusion and provide a 
working framework for the mutual benefit of states and the Court.182 In the first level, 
the ICC is expected to assist and encourage national jurisdictions to prosecute 
perpetrators of international crimes.183 Support of national authorities may include 
political and diplomatic backing,184 and empowering states to carry out national 
 
176 WW Burke-White ‘Proactive complementarity: the International Criminal Court and national courts in 
the Rome Statute of international justice’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 79. 
177 Newton (n 12 above) 124 - 215. 
178 JK Kleffner  ‘Auto-referrals and the complementarity nature of the ICC᾽ in Stahn & Sluiter (n 36 above) 
41. 
179 HP Kaul ‘The International Criminal Court: its relationship to domestic jurisdictions’ in Stahn & Sluiter 
(n 36 above) 34. 
180 Holmes (n 94 above) 41. 
181 Newton (n 12 above) 121. 
182 OC Imoedemhe The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: National 
Implementation in Africa (2017) 21. 
183 WW Burke-White ‘Complementarity in practice: the International Criminal Court as part of a system 
of multi-level global governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 557 - 569. 
184 L Moreno-Ocampo ῾Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Darfur, the 
Sudan, pursuant to UNSCR 1593᾽ (2005) 3 December 2008. 
84 
 
proceedings.185 In the second level, national authorities should co-operate with the 
Court once the jurisdiction of the ICC has been activated.186 
The overlap between national jurisdictions and the ICC is unavoidable. The principle 
of complementarity exists to solve the problem posed by concurrent jurisdictions.187 
The principle confirms national jurisdictions as priority forums.188 The doctrine of state 
sovereignty creates rights for states to exercise jurisdiction over crimes within their 
jurisdiction.189 More weight has been attached to state sovereignty than international 
intervention.190 The Rome Statute recognises the responsibility of states to 
prosecute.191 Under the complementarity regime, national authorities are the first 
bulwark in the fight against impunity.192 
A perfectly structured relationship is necessary to prevent unwarranted encroachment 
into the existing sovereign rights of states.193 To balance the scale, the shield of 
unconstrained sovereignty must also be pierced194 through procedures to administer 
the practical functioning of the relationship. USA and China ultimately objected to the 
Rome Statute, as they preferred a consent-based approach before the ICC could 
exercise jurisdiction in a given case.195 The ICC is auxiliary to states in this regard.196 
To determine which forum exercises authority at a given time, a clear ‘separation of 
duties᾽ is important. States are the primary custodians of crimes within their 
jurisdictions.197 Hence, states must have the first option to prosecute cases.198 
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Complementarity also dispels the notion of absolute jurisdiction by national courts.199 
Philippe views complementarity as a working tool which avails supporting institutions 
to fill a gap, should the institution with primacy fail.200 
  The legacy of the Rome Conference 
The Rome Conference saw intense negotiations on the characteristics of the 
envisaged court.201 The complementarity system of the ICC is a product of compromise 
between proponents of state sovereignty and hopes for the need to end impunity.202 
The Rome Statute balances competing state sovereignty and external interference 
through enabling the ICC to prosecute international crimes under certain 
circumstances.203 During the drafting of the Rome Statute, states desired to retain 
primacy in the prosecution of international crimes.204 
The project for a permanent international court gained support when some clarity was 
provided on the application of complementarity. Delegates were cautious on the 
relationship between the court and national jurisdictions. The delegates used the 
precedents from Nuremberg and Tokyo, and the ICTY and ICTR as references.205 The 
delegates were mindful of jurisdictional conflicts which often arise between national 
and international institutions.206 
The nature of complementarity 
The jurisdiction of the ICC lies dormant until activated by inactivity, unwillingness or 
inability of a state or group of states with jurisdiction over a case.207 The Court is the 
guardian of the Rome Statute and is empowered to evaluate the performance of 
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states.208 Consequently, the Court has a general obligation to promote the 
effectiveness of existing international and national mechanisms which combat 
impunity.209 The Court should reinforce, and not substitute, these mechanisms.210 As 
observed by a group of experts in 2003, ῾… states will generally have the best access 
to evidence and witnesses, and the resources to carry out proceedings. Moreover, 
there are limits on the number of prosecutions the ICC, a single institution, can feasibly 
conduct᾿.211 This gives domestic prosecutions an edge over the ICC in ensuring 
speedy trials.  
Article 17 of the Rome Statute sets guidelines on the enforcement of 
complementarity.212 The procedural aspects of the ICC are vital for the functioning of 
complementarity, as they protect state sovereignty and strengthen the intervention of 
the ICC.213 Lee submits that the principle of complementarity prevented a deadlock at 
the Rome Conference. He explains how a solution was found with the acceptance of 
a court designed not to hinder but facilitate national efforts.214 
The approach of the ICC to complementarity is like the models adopted by international 
criminal tribunals. However, unlike the statutes of international criminal tribunals, which 
focus mostly on the nature of charges, the admissibility criteria in the Rome Statute is 
concerned with the nature of investigations and prosecutions.215 Even when a state 
has identified a crime under the Rome Statute for prosecution, the case can be 
deferred to the Court if the state is unwilling or unable to prosecute.216 Inactivity, 
unwillingness and inability are the material prerequisites for the activation of the 
Court᾿s dormant jurisdiction.217 However, the Court would only assume jurisdiction 
when any of the parties (states, the ICC and the UNSC) have referred a situation to it, 
or at least when the Prosecutor has taken his/her own initiative to conduct 
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investigations. The triggering powers of these parties are discussed in the sections to 
follow. 
3.3.2 Referrals in the Rome Statute 
The jurisdiction of the ICC remains dormant until it is activated. Activation occurs in 
three ways, namely, self or state referral, UNSC referral, or prosecutorial initiative.218 
The Court has dealt with all the three triggers. Comparisons of the three will be 
frequently made to advance the purpose of this chapter. The activation mechanisms 
originated in the drafting history of the Rome Statute and were consequently included 
in the Rome Statute.219 As will be seen below, the Rome Statute leans heavily on a 
Prosecutor who is guarantor of the proper interpretation and functioning of 
complementarity.220 This thesis advances a proposal in which states take the lead. 
State and UNSC referrals were proposed at the initial drafts of the ILC on the creation 
of a permanent international criminal court.221 The ILC expressed the view that since 
the international legal system was under development, the investigation and 
prosecution of international crimes would progress smoothly when supported by states 
and the UNSC.222 The broad discretion of the Prosecutor was detestable at that stage 
of Court creation.223 Motivations for the view of the ILC will be revisited in this study to 
reiterate the importance of state discretion even in proprio motu cases. 
In contemporary times, the three triggers influence the application of complementarity. 
One common feature, irrespective of the activating power, is the conduct of preliminary 
examinations by the Prosecutor to obtain grounds to proceed with an investigation. 
The position is encapsulated in article 53 of the Rome Statute. While the focus of this 
section is on proprio motu activation, it is expedient to explore the other two activations 
to demonstrate the unique challenges associated with the activation of focus. All the 
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three activations are based on the rationale of ICC action, admissibility vis-à-vis 
evidentiary requirements, and actors of activation and endorsement. 
3.3.3 State referrals 
Article 14 of the Rome Statute specifically deals with state referrals. The article states 
as follows:         
Article 14. Referral of a situation by a State Party 
1. A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed, requesting the Prosecutor to 
investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific 
persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes.  
2. As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant circumstances and be accompanied 
by such supporting documentation as is available to the [s]tate referring the situation.  
From the foregoing, it is explicit that a state refers a ῾situation᾿ and not a ῾case᾿. 
Article 14 also demonstrates that a state referral is an invitation for the Prosecutor to 
initiate a preliminary examination and ultimately an investigation into a situation. After 
an investigation has been concluded, specific cases may be identified for trials.224 
Olàsolo argues that the notion of situation is better established than that of case in all 
three triggers, and that it minimises abuse as the door is closed for targeted and 
politically motivated referrals.225 The PTC I also weighed in on situations when it 
highlighted the constituents of the situation, as follows: 
[S]ituations, which are generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in some cases 
personal parameters, such as the situation in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo since 1 July 2002, entail the proceedings envisaged in the Statute to determine 
whether a particular situation should give rise to a criminal investigation, as well as the 
investigation as such.226  
State referrals are received by the ICC from state parties or non-state parties over 
whom the Court exercises jurisdiction.227 States are the main actors in the scenario 
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and voluntarily surrender their jurisdiction to the ICC when they are unwilling or unable 
to investigate and prosecute. Since states possess the power to refer, they should 
similarly enjoy the power to defer or reclaim their jurisdiction over a situation. Such a 
privilege is already enjoyed by the UNSC under the Rome Statute. If states are denied 
the same privilege, their supremacy under the Rome Statute would be replaced by that 
of the UNSC. In this regard, Stigen228 and Kleffner229 argue that a state self-referring a 
situation to the ICC should be allowed at a later stage to challenge the admissibility of 
a situation. Currently, states can request a deferral under article 18 for state referrals 
and proprio motu proceedings. The granting of the request depends on the 
determination of the Prosecutor or the PTC. The position of states would be 
strengthened further if this limitation were removed through an interpretation that gives 
the states’ requests the same weight as the request by the UNSC under article 16. 
Requests made by the UNSC halts proceedings at the ICC. 
To avoid unwarranted intrusion on state sovereignty, the Rome Statute placed 
restrictions on the Court.230 State referrals are appreciations by both the states and the 
ICC that states must be at the forefront of prosecuting crimes.231 Accordingly, the 
decision of states on whether to exercise jurisdiction over the ICC crimes is 
preserved.232 
There are adequate safeguards to prevent improper intervention by the ICC.233 
Although the Prosecutor is not obliged to seek authorisation from the PTC before 
investigating based on a state referral,234 the Prosecutor must convince the Court that 
the situation or case is admissible.235 The same applies to UNSC referrals. 
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The Prosecutor is unlikely to face an admissibility challenge from a state which has 
referred a case to the Court. Also, the Prosecutor has an added advantage of better 
access to evidence in the state.236 However, an admissibility challenge from an 
accused person, as was the case in the Katanga case, can still arise, albeit often 
weakened by lack of state support.237 This argument is buttressed by the failure of the 
admissibility challenge in the Katanga case due to inability to ‘sufficiently substantiate᾽ 
the challenge with evidence.238 When the Court has the backing of the state, it 
becomes difficult for an accused to win an admissibility challenge. Through a referral, 
a state demonstrates inaction, unwillingness or inability to exercise jurisdiction. 
To date, the DRC, Uganda and the CAR have referred cases to the ICC. Arguably, the 
states have abused the state referral process to advance political gains rather than to 
support the work of the Court and the pursuit of international criminal justice. A striking 
similarity in the referrals is that the Prosecutor targeted only members of irregular 
armed forces and members of opposition political parties. Beyond criticisms of bias 
and subjectivity of the Prosecutor,239 it can be said that the Prosecutor worked with a 
category of persons the states had earmarked for investigation and prosecution. 
In state referral cases, the Prosecutor steps in when a state has already defined the 
parameters of investigation. Most states will endeavour to prevent the Prosecutor from 
stepping out of the stipulated parameters of investigation through limiting access to 
information which implicates state officials or adopting other non-co-operation 
approaches. In the Ugandan situation, the Prosecutor was left convinced that gravity 
was not met for government officials.240 This came on the backdrop of Luis Moreno-
Ocampo having announced the state referral in the presence of Uganda President, 
Yoweri Museveni in London.241 
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3.3.4 United Nations Security Council referrals 
The UNSC is authorised under 13(b) of the Rome Statute to refer cases to the ICC. 
The article states the following: 
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: 
… a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred 
to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations…. 
The UNSC can only refer a ῾situation᾿ and not a ῾case᾿ to the ICC. Section 13(b) was 
specifically drafted to prevent the UNSC from playing a judicial role.242 It was felt during 
the drafting of the Rome Statute that, in so doing, the independence of the Court would 
be preserved.243 Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute further regulates the scope of the 
UNSC’s contribution to the work of the Court. This article enables the Prosecutor to 
decide whether to initiate an investigation after receiving information from outside 
sources. Accordingly, the Prosecutor is not obliged to investigate a situation identified 
by the UNSC.  
The first rejection by the Prosecutor is not the end of the road for the UNSC. 
Article 53(3)(a) allows for the decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed, to be revised. 
In addition, UNSC like states and non-party states can challenge the admissibility of a 
particular case in accordance with article 19. While the UNSC is largely dependent on 
the determination of the OTP and PTC for its requests to be actioned by the Court, 
article 16 on deferrals by the UNSC seems to take an exception to this rule. In terms 
of this article, the UNSC could block the Court᾿s efforts to exercise jurisdiction over a 
case.244 
The Rome Statute acknowledges that serious international crimes threaten peace and 
security.245 Conversely, as a body that is entitled to deal with issues of international 
peace and security, the UNSC was included.246 The desire to involve the UNSC in the 
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affairs of the Court was first advanced by the ILC in 1994.247 The UNSC may invoke 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to refer cases to the ICC. The UNSC referrals aim to 
safeguard political stability in the world when there are actual or perceived threats.248 
There is a paradox for the ICC in this regard. While the Court was not founded on a 
UNSC Chapter VII resolution, its operations are susceptible to UNSC resolutions. 
Upon evidence or prediction on the threat of peace and security, guidance is imputed 
upon the Prosecutor to consider the existence of a reasonable basis to investigate. 
The UNSC may also influence the operations of the Court by requesting deferrals of 
investigations or prosecutions. When it requests deferrals, the UNSC enjoys power to 
decide on the interests of peace and justice.249 The UNSC may theoretically refer all 
states to the ICC. The referral of non-state parties is not expressly mentioned in the 
Rome Statute but is implied under the UN Charter. Therefore, the Court is not only in 
a relationship but is equally dependent on the UN in certain circumstances. For 
example, the Rome Statute gives the UNSC the first bite in determining whether an act 
of aggression exists.250 Also, the resolutions of the UNSC on deferrals are persuasive 
on the Court.251 
The UNSC has referred situations in Sudan252 and Libya253 to the Court. Both states 
are non-states parties to the Rome Statute. The referrals show that the Court is not 
immune to political guidance.254 Also, the referrals were accompanied by specified 
areas for investigation and the identities of persons alleged to have committed crimes. 
In the Libyan situation, crimes against humanity were alleged to have been committed 
in Jamahiriya.255 Although three categories of parties, namely, state armed forces, 
armed groups and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials, were identified, 
crimes by NATO officials were never mentioned to the Prosecutor.256 The omission is 
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indicative that in the exercise of discretion by the UNSC, a selection and prioritisation 
of cases may be made. 
The UNSC is a representative of global states. The narrative and referral of situations 
imply an acceptance in the Rome Statute that a state or group of states may define the 
extent and circumstances in which the Court intervenes. Under the UN Charter, the 
UNSC uses the option of reaching out to regional and national entities to find solutions 
to political and humanitarian crises.257 Hence, the UNSC considered the option of 
regional efforts to end impunity in Sudan.258 
The role of the UNSC in the operations of the Court strengthens the assertion that 
political considerations and priorities influence the Prosecutor.259 The linkages of 
justice, peace and democracy are widely discussed by scholars and the UN.260 The 
intertwined relationship of the concepts makes justice and politics mutually 
reinforcing.261 
In Sudan, the UNSC encouraged the Court to adopt an approach which favours 
complementary forms of justice. UNSC Resolution 1593 advocated for both criminal 
and other alternative justice mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation 
commissions. While the invocation of the UNSC powers does not stop the Prosecutor 
from exercising discretion, undoubtedly the intervention can control the timing and 
sustainability of prosecutorial activities.262 
3.3.5 Proprio motu initiatives 
The jurisdiction of the ICC is also activated by the Prosecutor at his/her own 
initiative.263 Article 15, together with article 53, are the two prominent articles regulating 
a trigger by the Prosecutor. The triggering powers of the Prosecutor commence by 
requesting the PTC to authorise an investigation in terms of article 15(3). The PTC 
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makes a decision after having examined the request and supporting material, in 
accordance with article 15(4). If the authorisation is refused, the Prosecutor has other 
opportunities to resubmit the request, as stated in article 15(5). Scholars debate 
whether the word ῾case᾿ has been misused or used properly under article 15(4).264 
Whichever way it is regarded, such ambiguities were among areas of contention in the 
Kenyatta case. The ICC needs to clarify them to the satisfaction of states and other 
stakeholders who will appear before the Court.  
The jurisdiction of the ICC is also activated by the Prosecutor at own initiative.265  
Article 15(1) of the Rome Statute states that:  
The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.  
The relationship between articles 15 (Prosecutor) and 53 (Initiation of an investigation) 
is not always understood. The misunderstanding emanates from the drafting history of 
the triggering mechanisms in the Rome Statute.266 While the current article 53 has its 
roots in the draft statute of the ILC,267 the current article 15 was a late introduction. The 
article has its origins in the fourth session of the preparatory committee, which was 
held in August 1997.268 Together with article 18 (Preliminary rulings regarding 
admissibility), article 15 was then agreed upon hours before the end of the Rome 
Conference.269 Therefore, the drafting committee did not have time to reconcile articles 
15 and 53, as the discussion on the relationship only arose for the first time in the 
preparatory commission.270  
The rationale behind article 18 is to give states more opportunities to oppose the 
activation of the Court᾿s dormant jurisdiction.271 Therefore, Olàsolo argues that the 
opposition-to-activation request should focus solely on a state᾿s existing capacity to 
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conduct investigations or carry prosecutions, and not on assumed future capacity.272 
Nsereko differs with this opinion and states the following: 
What if a [s]tate, prior to receiving the Prosecutor’s notification, has not investigated the acts 
contained therein, but, prompted by the notification, now wishes to institute investigation into 
those acts? Is it precluded from requesting the Prosecutor to defer to its jurisdiction? It is 
submitted that it is not. The spirit and general tenor of the Statute is to give due deference to 
State jurisdiction. So, a State that has not yet started investigations, but is otherwise able and 
willing to do so, must be given a chance to do so under article 18, para.2.273  
The ability of the Prosecutor to initiate investigations did not come easy. States spent 
considerable time during the Diplomatic Conference in Rome on the necessity or 
otherwise safety of granting the Prosecutor independent powers.274 Some states and 
the ILC were concerned about the possibility of prosecutorial abuse of power and 
submission to political pressure which could lead to unjustifiable exercise of power.275 
On the other hand, some states were of the opinion that the initiation of investigations 
and prosecutions at the prosecutor’s own accord was crucial to ensure the autonomy 
and independence of the prosecutor.276 The states drew precedence from the 
competence of the independent ICTY/ICTR prosecutor and raised concerns that state-
compliant mechanisms within the human rights treaty system are generally poor.277 
The voice of states which supported an independent prosecutor was stronger and 
enabled a compromise for the prosecutor to operate with certain checks in proprio 
motu cases. The German/Argentinian proposal brokered the debate as states finally 
endorsed a prosecutor with powers subject to judicial oversight by the PTC.278 The 
consequential power conferred upon the Prosecutor counters any failures by states 
and the UNSC to refer situations to the Court.279  
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Before embarking on a full investigation, the Prosecutor is not only dependent on the 
approval of the PTC but also relies on the receipt of information from states, organs of 
the UN, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, victims, relatives of 
victims, eyewitnesses and other relevant sources.280 The information helps the 
Prosecutor to convince the PTC to authorise an investigation.281 In addition to the 
information, the Prosecutor is required to inform states with jurisdiction of the intention 
to seek the authorisation of the PTC and to wait for confirmation by states on whether 
the states are able or willing to investigate and prosecute the alleged crimes.282 
Authorisation and notification procedures exalt both the accountability of the 
Prosecutor and the respect of state sovereignty.283 The notification procedure 
precedes the authorisation procedure, thereby relaying the importance of state 
discretion to the Prosecutor and the PTC. While the PTC has a supervisory role in 
proprio motu initiatives,284 states with jurisdiction have a managerial role before the 
authorisation of such initiatives. 
In view of the contentious history of an independent prosecutor, it is not surprising that 
the first exercise of proprio motu powers in the Kenyan situation received considerable 
scrutiny. Some scholars believe the Prosecutor intervened prematurely in Kenya and 
mistakenly ignored admissibility requirements in article 17 of the Rome Statute, 
namely, unwillingness and inability.285 Arguably, the OTP should consider constructive 
criticisms to strengthen the application of complementarity in future cases. 
3.3.6     The Preamble and its interpretative value 
The Preamble of the Rome Statute is an interpretative tool used by the Court to dissect 
the provisions of the Rome Statute. The main object and purpose of the Rome Statute 
is to end impunity using domestic courts as preferred mechanisms.286 However, the 
 
280 n 2 above, art 15(1) & 15(2). 
281 n 2 above, art 53(1). 
282 n 2 above, art 18. 
283 Nsereko (n 273 above) 273. 
284 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (31 March 2010) 01/09 ICC para 81. 
285 See for example J Spilman ῾Complementarity or competition᾽ (2013) Richmond Journal of Global 
and Business Online 18 - 19. 
286 n 2 above, Preamble paras 5 & 6. 
97 
 
Preamble to the Rome Statute does not define the complementary role the Court has 
in relation to national criminal jurisdictions. 
The Rome Statute should be broadly understood in the context of the notion of 
complementarity. The Preamble is foundational to the interpretation of the Rome 
Statute.287 Admissibility provisions in the Rome Statute are built on the preambular 
foundation. 
The Preamble of the Rome Statute alludes to the duty of states to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over perpetrators of international crimes.288 The international community 
has attached certain obligations and expectations on states to prosecute these crimes 
on its behalf.289 Complementarity gives states a great magnitude of discretion in the 
prosecution of crimes under the Rome Statute.290 
The duty of the Court to encourage national jurisdictions to undertake prosecutions 
can be drawn from the Preamble.291 The Rome Statute does not expressly impute the 
duty.292 However, the overall purpose to end impunity, pursuant to the Vienna Law of 
Treaties, obliges the Court to assist states.293 The Preamble of the Rome Statute 
advocates for international co-operation to ensure that international crimes are 
punished.294 
The Preamble provides these four essential features that anchor the complementary 
system of the ICC: state-centric prosecutions; enhanced scope for national 
prosecutions; subordination of international criminal jurisdiction to national criminal 
jurisdictions; and the pledge by states to undertake prosecutions.295 The features are 
discussed below. 
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The Rome Statute puts states at the forefront in the prosecution of international crimes. 
The effectiveness and efficiency of international criminal law enforcement is enhanced 
when states take initiatives and utilise international assistance to undertake 
proceedings.296 
At the Rome Conference, many delegations outlined the advantages of national judicial 
systems297 and saw states better positioned to adjudicate crimes under their 
jurisdiction. Compared to states, the ICC lacks arresting powers and cannot be 
reasonably expected to have full access to all evidence and witnesses.298 
Scope of national prosecutions 
The Rome Statute gives states an enhanced scope of prosecution. While the Rome 
Statute is limited to ‘core crimes᾽ listed in its article 5, the jurisdiction of states 
encompasses a wide range of international crimes. The broad discretion enjoyed by 
states is reflected in the preambular paragraphs of the Rome Statute.299 Delegates at 
the Rome Conference preferred the term ῾international crimes᾽ over ῾most serious or 
grave crimes᾽ in the explanation of the duty of states to prosecute perpetrators.300 The 
terminology permits flexibility to prosecute international crimes beyond the ones which 
were eventually placed under the Court.301 As seen in Chapter 6, Africa’s proposed 
regional instrument recognises crimes beyond the core ones, making the AU an 
important player in the complementarity project of the ICC. 
Arguably, states have a comparative advantage in addressing international crimes and 
other related crimes. The relationship between the ICC and states should be built on 
the appreciation that states will not always define crimes to encompass the definitions 
provided in the Rome Statute.302 
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Supremacy of national jurisdictions 
The foregoing discussions show that under the Rome Statute, national criminal 
jurisdictions are preferred over international jurisdictions. The Rome Statute represents 
a modified and reversed system of primacy.303 Arguably, an authority with primacy is 
given first preference to decide on the appropriate forum for the adjudication of an 
offence. Primary jurisdictions prior to the ICC (the ICTY and the ICTR) permitted the 
use of prosecutorial power to defer cases to national courts.304 Similarly, states use 
state referrals to defer cases to the ICC. Likewise, the UNSC, which represents states, 
may influence deferrals. The Prosecutor may also defer investigations conducted using 
proprio motu powers at the request of a state.305 In view of state primacy, prosecutorial 
deferral should be the rule and not the exception. 
States’ undertaking to prosecute 
The Preamble to the Rome Statute alludes to the commitment of states to undertake 
prosecutions.306 States are guarantors of the enforcement of international criminal law 
enforcement by both national and international jurisdictions.307 The principle of 
complementarity places confidence in states presumed willing and able to prosecute 
international crimes.308 However, the presumption of state prosecutions is rebuttable. 
The ICC exercises secondary jurisdiction.309 
States tend to shield cases away from the ICC for as long as possible. The ICC is 
guided by the unavailability and ineffectiveness of national authorities for the Court to 
intervene.310 The efficacy of the ICC would be adequately appraised when states and 
the Court continue to engage in influencing the practical application of 
complementarity.311 Arguably, the OTP through its Jurisdiction, Complementarity and 
Co-operation Division should invest considerable time engaging states at a political 
and diplomatic level before considering the initiation of preliminary examinations. An 
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engagement will enable the Prosecutor to appreciate and respect the political, peace 
and justice priorities of states. When preliminary examinations start, the Prosecutor 
often moves to the next level of investigation and eventually takes over cases. 
3.3.7       Complementarity and co-operation 
The ICC expects states to act first.312 The ICC also expects states to co-operate with 
the Court when states have waived their primary obligation to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes.313 
The Rome Statute intertwines complementarity and co-operation, since the latter 
needs to be respected for the former to be accomplished.314 Some scholars believe 
that the Rome Statute should have grouped co-operation and complementarity 
together.315 The enforcement of international humanitarian norms largely depends on 
co-operation between the Court and states. The Rome Statute reflects a restricted 
complementary relationship between the Court and states. Hence, the Court is enabled 
by the co-operation of states to exercise its part.316 
The enforcement of international criminal law is characterised by challenges in 
securing state co-operation and the political will in executing arrest warrants from 
international jurisdictions such as the ICC. When a state is unwilling to prosecute, it is 
likely to be unwilling to co-operate with the ICC.317 A strong framework of co-operation 
that is mutually beneficial is therefore necessary. 
3.3.8    Admissibility requirements 
The Rome Statute envisages a distribution of tasks between national and international 
jurisdictions.318 The ICC concentrates on persons most responsible and leaves the rest 
to domestic authorities.319 The question of complementarity is explored in the 
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framework of admissibility as opposed to the jurisdiction of the Court.320 The crux of 
admissibility is to preserve the primacy of domestic jurisdictions and use the ICC when 
the role of the Court is most beneficial.321 
The ICC only exercises jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances when admissibility is 
established. Article 17 of the Rome Statute suspends the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Court until a determination has been made on the admissibility of a matter.322 The 
article majors on the consequences for admissibility when a state fails in its 
obligations.323 On the other hand, the article is read together with the Preamble 
paragraph 10 and article 1 of the Rome Statute to emphasise the need for due 
diligence in ensuring that cases remain within the jurisdiction of states. 
The tests of ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ are used to determine the admissibility of 
cases in the ICC.324 A purposive interpretation of article 17 obligates the Prosecutor to 
ascertain the ability or willingness of a national jurisdiction to investigate and 
prosecute.325 This formulation is supported by the assertion that a state cannot 
automatically start or stop a case that is before the ICC.326 Moreover, the use of the 
word ‘unless᾽ in article 17(1)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute denotes that the burden 
of proof rests with the Prosecutor.327 In short, the Prosecutor has to determine the 
genuineness of a national prosecution.328 
A state which challenges the admissibility of a case in the ICC must provide regular 
feedback329 and other information concerning investigation.330 Therefore, a plain 
reading of article 17 shifts the burden of proof to a state. The state must show that it is 
acting or acted in the case considered by the Court.331 
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The tests of ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ also preserve the state-centric nature of 
complementarity by limiting the intervention of the ICC to exceptional cases.332 The 
tests are designed to promote effective prosecution of international crimes.333 The ICC 
is a supporting mechanism for states and the Court should operate in full cognisance 
of sovereignty rights.334 
The ICC can support prosecutions both directly and indirectly. The Court intervenes 
directly when a state is incapacitated or is neglecting the obligation to initiate national 
processes.335 However, complications arise when the Court challenges the 
‘genuineness’ of the intention of a state to investigate or prosecute when a state alleges 
willingness and ability. For instance, in the Situation in Uganda, President Museveni 
committed the national jurisdiction to prosecute the crimes if brought to Uganda’s 
attention.336 Nevertheless, the OTP decided to investigate the situation.337 Indirectly, 
the Court can incentivise states to exercise their jurisdiction on the basis that if they 
fail, the Prosecutor will take over a case.338 In both scenarios, the pivotal task of 
complementarity is to encourage the primacy and centrality of states in the suppression 
and punishment of core crimes.339 
When the ICC determines the admissibility of cases, the activities of a state are 
weighed against the desire by a state to ensure the accountability of the accused, 
speedy trials, and credibility of courts and the judiciary.340 The factors reveal the 
subjective nature of the ‘unwilling or unable genuinely᾽ criteria.341 
The criteria for genuineness leaves the debate open on the best way to restrain 
unwarranted intervention by the Prosecutor and manipulation of the admissibility 
standard by the Court.342 A state may not be privy to the standard of genuineness 
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expected by the Court, as states and the Court possess inequality of arms and different 
procedures, among other factors. 
3.3.9     Drawbacks of complementarity 
Schabas views the complementarity regime in the ICC system as a misnomer or 
utopia.343 Presently, national and international justice systems co-exist without key 
features of complementarity. Instead, the two systems fight for jurisdictional space and 
consistently conflict.344 By requiring states to exhaust national efforts for the activation 
of the jurisdiction of the ICC, the present system resembles the one adopted by 
international human rights bodies and reflected in customary international law.345 
Customary international law and several treaties require the exhaustion of remedies 
provided by states before an aggrieved party can turn to an international forum for 
recourse.346 The purpose is to give a state first opportunity to address a wrong within 
its jurisdiction and to avoid overburdening international tribunals with claims. Also, it 
must not be assumed that international criminal tribunals are operational and 
effective.347 
For an international court to intervene, remedies at the national level should be deemed 
‘insufficient or inadequate’.348 Hence, international human rights bodies require 
petitioners to prove the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
However, international human rights bodies do not clearly define the partnership and 
co-operation of national courts with international bodies.349 The ICC system 
establishes and defines the relationship between the two jurisdictions.350 Nevertheless, 
the relationship is interpreted differently by interested parties such as the Court, states 
and accused persons. 
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Another drawback of complementarity is the risk to turn the ICC into a review court that 
appraises the performance of national courts. Instead, the ICC is a court which should 
ideally respect the discretion of states in tackling crimes under their jurisdiction.351 
Good judgment and higher degrees of independence are also vital in the determination 
of the criteria and timing of triggering the jurisdiction of the ICC in given situations and 
cases.352 The section that follows considers the application of complementarity in the 
light of the prosecutorial practice of the ICC and case law. 
3.4 Complementarity in the International Criminal Court practice 
3.4.1 Complementarity and the International Criminal Court prosecutorial 
policy 
As previously discussed, when he assumed office in 2003, the Prosecutor, highlighted 
that the ability of states to exercise primacy would be a yardstick for the Court’s 
success. 
The early prosecutorial approach demonstrated that complementarity is not a clear-cut 
concept. The OTP had to adopt prosecutorial policies to craft the best approach to 
complementarity. The drafting of the policies began in 2003 when the Prosecutor 
welcomed the input of experts into the ‘Draft Policy Paper᾽.353 In 2004, the Prosecutor 
launched the idea of a positive approach to complementarity.354 Positive 
complementarity is discussed further later in this chapter. 
The 2003 prosecutorial policy considered practical realities in the selection of cases.355 
The approach encouraged states to initiate proceedings on their own.356 The policy set 
a high standard for the intervention of the OTP. The OTP needed a ‘clear case of 
failure’ by national authorities to undertake investigations.357 Complementarity 
recognised the right and obligation of states to exercise criminal jurisdiction.358 The 
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Court was supposed to be cautious in its application of complementarity so as not to 
trample upon the rights of states. 
The prosecutorial policy outlined the expectations of states in the ICC and the proximity 
of states to evidence and witnesses.359 A constructive relationship between the Court 
and states was seen as one that would facilitate partnership, dialogue and burden-
sharing.360 The experts theorised that states are within their rights to decline 
prosecution and allow the Court to intervene.361 An analysis of the state’s intention, 
rather than actions, would be determinant on whether a state is in compliance with its 
duty to prosecute.362 The OTP endorsed the view and embraced inaction as a test of 
admissibility in instances in which the division of labour is preferred or when 
prosecution by the Court would be in the interests of states and their nationals.363 The 
inaction of national authorities was subsequently endorsed in various cases before the 
Court, as will be seen below. 
Notwithstanding the efforts of the OTP to craft and apply a policy on complementarity, 
the OTP was criticised for its departure from prioritising states in the prosecution of 
crimes.364 A shift in prosecutorial approach began in 2007 when the Prosecutor 
explained rigidness in the execution of a judicial mandate independent from other 
considerations.365 The Prosecutor believed that the ICC᾿s impartiality and 
independence hinged on the freedom of the OTP to decide on investigations and 
prosecutions.366 The approach disregarded the realities in states and closed the door 
for prosecutorial adjustments to these realities.367 
The 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations368 did little to strengthen the 
discretion of states under complementarity. The policy gave the Prosecutor wide 
 
359 n 354 above, 2. 
360 OTP ῾Informal expert paper: the principle of complementarity in practice᾿ 2003 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2009_02250.PDF (accessed 2 May 2019). 
361 n 354 above, 5. 
362 n 354 above, 5. 
363 n 354 above, 5. 
364 Burke-White (n 176 above) 55. 
365 L Moreno-Ocampo ῾Building a Future on Peace and Justice, Address at the International Conference 
in Nuremberg᾽ 24 - 25 June 2007 http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E466EDB-2B38-4BAF-AF5F-
005461711149/143825/LMO_nuremberg_20070625_English.pdf (accessed 12 May 2017). 
366 L Moreno-Ocampo ‘The International Criminal Court in motion’ in Stahn & Sluiter (n 36 above) 15. 
367 Ocampo (n 366 above). 
368 OTP ῾Policy paper on preliminary examinations᾿ November 2013 http://www.icc-




powers to make demands on states and thus made it difficult for states to retain cases. 
The mere existence of state investigations and prosecutions was deemed insufficient. 
The Prosecutor needed to ascertain the genuineness of national processes before 
allowing a state to exercise its primary responsibility to act against perpetrators of 
heinous crimes. Thus, the Prosecutor exercised more supervisory than complementary 
powers. 
In principle, the policy of the OTP has reverted to the original approach to support 
national jurisdictions to undertake proceedings. Hence, the 2016 OTP Policy Paper369 
implies that the Prosecutor is prepared to share the burden with states and assist 
states to conduct investigations and prosecutions. However, it is unclear how the OTP 
would render support to states in practice, particularly when the OTP and states differ 
on the admissibility of cases. 
3.4.2 Complementarity in the ICC: a case law approach 
The practice of the ICC continues to stir debates on the application of complementarity. 
Arguably, the current practice of the Court deviates from the original purpose of 
complementarity.370 While it is desirable for the Court and states to cement co-
operative synergies, there is a spirit of competition between the two.371 The ICC risks 
losing legitimacy and viability if it continues to override the discretion of states.372 
Despite the exhaustive admissibility criteria, the Court has expanded the admissibility 
requirements in article 17 of the Rome Statute through the insertion of an additional 
component of ‘inaction’ by national criminal jurisdictions. The statutory criteria excludes 
the ‘inaction᾽ of the national justice system.373 Also, the concept of ‘inaction᾽ is 
controversial when measured against article 17(1)(b), which allows a state to decide 
against prosecution following an investigation. 
The ICC has often neglected article 17 criteria in interpreting admissibility.374 Instead, 
the Court has explored new means in an attempt to enhance a better understanding 
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of the Rome Statute’s technical terms.375 Accordingly, there is tension between the 
static position purported in the Rome Statute and the evolving Court position that is 
aimed at a contextual interpretation of the Rome Statute.376 There is a middle path for 
the Court to utilise both notions in developing its complementarity model. 
A state’s decision not to prosecute after an investigation constitutes an action by a 
state.377 The Court’s additional requirement of ‘inaction᾽ to the criteria contradicts what 
the drafters of complementarity intended.378 
The results of the investigation should be considered before a determination on the 
unwillingness or inability of a state to act. A question on the scope of an ‘investigation᾽ 
arises. Should the term be given a broader meaning to evaluate thoroughness or is it 
enough to accept the results and recommendations of the state concerned?379 If the 
latter position is accepted, there will be no need to question the state’s findings after 
an investigation. 
To guide its approach to situations or cases, the OTP frequently develops a 
prosecutorial strategy and priorities. In practice, there has often been a diversion from 
the set strategy and priorities. The Prosecutor took the cases from Uganda and the 
DRC contrary to the prosecutorial priorities set out in the initial policy paper.380 The two 
national jurisdictions were not encouraged to undertake prosecutions.381 
The interpretation of technical terms such as ‘genuinely’ can be problematic. The Court 
needs to exercise extreme caution when using tests under article 17.382 During the 
negotiations at the Rome Conference, the term ‘genuinely’ emerged from obscurity, as 
no precedent was quoted.383 Genuineness is about serious intent on the part of the 
national authorities to attain justice.384 Notwithstanding the closed and exhaustive list 
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under article 17, some scholars argue that the reading of article 17 allows the Court to 
consider other factors beyond article 17 when determining admissibility of cases.385 
The ICC demands a higher standard of national proceedings for the inadmissibility of 
situations and cases.386 The component of inactivity creates a theory that renders an 
analysis of the requirements of article 17 unnecessary.387 The view of the Court is that 
considerations of the state’s right to proceed are muted by inactivity.388 
The OTP developed a theory of ῾uncontested admissibility᾽ based on the inactivity of 
states and the interests of justice.389 The concept has been recognised by the PTC 
I.390 The AC also embraced this theory in the Katanga case.391 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute is a yardstick for admissibility. All situations and cases 
before the Court should pass the requirements outlined in the article.392 Arguably, the 
theory of ῾uncontested admissibility᾽ is misleading because a state referral does not 
preclude an accused person from contesting the intervention of the Court. Not only 
states and the interests of the international community are paramount in the Rome 
system of justice. Other possible actors must not be ignored.393 For example, the 
complementarity provisions in articles 17 to 19 of the Rome Statute require the Court 
to safeguard the accused’s rights. Although there is no legal obligation for an accused 
to appear before a domestic court,394 the Court must scrutinise state referral cases 
considering the interests of the accused and victims before activating the jurisdiction 
of the ICC. 
In a description of admissibility, the ICC has consistently used the ‘same person and 
same conduct test’.395 At times, the Court modifies the test to elaborate on the nature 
of the expected same conduct. The Court has referred to ‘substantially’ the same 
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conduct.396 ‘Substantially’ is defined as ‘essentially; without material qualification; in 
the main; in substance; materially; in a substantial manner᾽.397 The term ‘essential᾽ is 
defined as ‘indispensably necessary; importance in the highest degree; requisite᾽,398 
while ‘main᾽ is defined as ‘principal, chief, most important in size, extent or utility᾽.399 
The conclusion one draws from the immediate definitions is that the charge does not 
necessarily have to read the same before a national jurisdiction and the ICC. What is 
important is the weight of the charge brought by either a national jurisdiction or the 
ICC. The OTP and Court should adjust the interpretation of ῾ordinary crimes᾽ to guard 
against weakening the complementarity practice.400 Concentration should be more on 
the penal consequences and contribution to end impunity than on the elements of the 
crime. 
The same conduct requirement was also a talking point in the ad hoc tribunals. The 
requirement was adequately discussed by the ICTR in Bagaragaza.401 In casu, the 
ICTR emphasised criminalising crimes of similar nature. The utilisation of rule 11bis 
was held to be on condition that the accused was to be tried for a crime listed in the 
ICTR Statute and a state was to regard the penalty structure under the ICTR.402 
The ICTR rejected a request by Norway403 to try the Bagaragaza case as murder but 
allowed the Netherlands to try the case, since the Dutch Genocide Convention 
Implementation Act of 1964 domesticated the crime of genocide.404 The ICTR was 
concerned about substantial differences between the crimes of murder and genocide 
in Norwegian law. The crime of murder is committed against individuals as opposed to 
the crime of genocide which is committed when specifically defined groups are 
exterminated. The ICTR expanded the definition of ‘state’ in the ICTR Statute to include 
the ICTR.405 Hence, Bagaragaza was transferred to the Netherlands in terms of strict 
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conditions of fair trial, non-application of the death penalty and review of proceedings 
by the ICTR. 
The ICC presumes admissibility of cases before the ICC in the absence of article 17 
requirements.406 The reading seems to conflict with the plain reading of article 17 that 
identifies national courts as a platform of priority, with the Court coming in as a last 
resort.407 On the question of unwillingness, the Trial Chamber II of the ICC identified 
different forms of unwillingness.408 According to the Chamber, state referrals constitute 
a form of unwillingness on the part of a state.409 The Chamber acknowledged that 
article 17 is silent on the form of unwillingness, leaving the Chamber to substantiate its 
intervention based on the aim of the Rome Statute to combat international crimes.410 
It remains to be seen whether this interpretation will pass the test of time.411 
At this juncture, this chapter proceeds to evaluate the application of the principle of 
complementarity by the ICC in several cases. 
Uganda 
In 2003, the intervention of the ICC was triggered for the first time through Uganda 
referral.412 The Prosecutor found a rationale to open investigations against five leaders 
of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) accused of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.413 
The warrants of arrest concerning the Situation in Uganda were authorised by the PTC 
after the Chamber considered a letter dated 28 May 2004 from the government of 
Uganda414 in which the government stated that it had no intention and ability to arrest 
the most responsible perpetrators. Also, the government averred that it had no means 
and capacity to internally deal with those crimes.415 Therefore, the PTC applied the 
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theory of inactivity in the Situation in Uganda. However, President Museveni later 
undertook to prosecute the crimes if transferred to Uganda. 
The Prosecutor rejected the intention of the government of Uganda to confine the 
investigations to crimes allegedly committed by the LRA.416 When a state refers a 
situation to the ICC, it is for the Prosecutor – not states – to determine which specific 
individuals to charge for the commission of crimes in a given situation.417 The same is 
true for UNSC referrals or proprio motu investigations. The rule is intended to prevent 
states from shielding certain individuals from investigation or prosecution or conducting 
biased investigations or prosecutions only against opposition military forces.418 
The Democratic Republic of Congo 
At the initial stage, the Prosecutor wanted to initiate proceedings in the DRC on his 
own initiative but reconsidered his decision and invited the government of the DRC to 
make a referral.419 The PTC I authorised the Thomas Lubanga warrant of arrest in 
February 2006 based on DRC referral to the Court.420 
The PTC I highlighted encouraging developments in the DRC. The Chamber noted 
that the situation in the DRC had improved since the referral of the case and that the 
justice system in Ituri had been revived since 2005.421 However, it did not rule that the 
Lubanga case was inadmissible and warranted deferral to the DRC.422 
The concentration on different conducts hindered the inadmissibility of the Lubanga 
case. The stance of the OTP and the Court is for states to prosecute crimes identified 
in the Rome Statute and pursued by the Prosecutor for the situation or case in 
contention.423 For a case to be inadmissible in the ICC, national proceedings must 
identify the person and conduct under consideration by the ICC.424 The PTC and the 
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AC have rejected the prosecution of murder and rape in some instances as ‘ordinary 
crimes’. 
When the Court limits itself to crimes identified by the Prosecutor, it ignores the fact 
that at times the so-called ordinary crimes carry a greater penalty than the crimes 
pursued by the Prosecutor.425 The Court should read the Rome Statute in view of the 
object specified in the Preamble. Where ordinary crimes consist of serious crimes, and 
when states stand ready to execute their primary duty to prosecute, the Court must 
ideally encourage states to prosecute.426 
In Lubanga, the Court preferred the enlistment of child soldiers, while the national 
authorities identified more serious offences. The Court missed an opportunity not only 
to encourage national proceedings but also to interpret the same person and same 
conduct test more broadly. The likelihood that an accused person will get a more 
severe penalty for the offences identified by a national jurisdiction satisfies the 
requirements of international law.427 Further, the prosecutorial policy should allow 
national jurisdictions to prefer cases which place them in a better position to obtain a 
conviction.428 One best practice from international criminal tribunals is that they prefer 
crimes that are easy to prosecute rather than complex ones such as genocide.429 
The ICC also shielded Lubanga from greater accountability. The Rome Statute 
considers a case admissible when the action is designed to exonerate the accused 
from liability.430 The practice of the Court should therefore support any state action that 
offers greater punitive action for the accused. Such an approach would no doubt be 
accepted to the victims as well. When the Court settles for less serious offences, its 
conduct is tantamount to shielding an accused from ‘some᾽ responsibility. The 
intervention of the Court should not lower the standard of accountability set by a state. 
Whereas the Court was clear that admissibility consists of two components of 
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complementarity and gravity,431 the Court did not appreciate that the crimes brought 
by the OTP were of less gravity compared to those pursued by the DRC. 
The Central African Republic 
The CAR Situation raised some complications for the Prosecutor. For a considerable 
time, the Prosecutor was not sure whether to initiate an investigation because of 
uncertainty on the ability of the CAR to investigate.432 A national investigation had 
occurred previously.433 The turning point was in May 2007, when the Prosecutor 
explained that the CAR’s highest judicial body, the Cour de Cessation, expressed 
inability to investigate and prosecute.434 The Prosecutor accepted that CAR was 
unable to undertake the proceedings due to the complexity of the situation.435 
Sudan 
In Darfur, the Prosecutor decided to proceed with an investigation of the situation 
despite the establishment of local courts to try perpetrators. The Prosecutor was aware 
of decrees that established a ‘special court’ for Darfur, as well as for Geneina and 
Nyala.436 Notwithstanding, the Prosecutor considered the Sudanese authorities unable 
to deal with the situation due to ‘relatively inaccessible’ courts, limited resources, lack 
of expertise and security issues.437 The Specialised Courts in Sudan were criticised for 
unfair trials, lack of legal representation for accused persons and summary 
executions.438 The Prosecutor convinced the UNSC on the inadequacy of national 
efforts and the appropriateness of the OTP to investigate.439 The OTP used its findings 
from a two-month analysis to explain that the national proceedings in Sudan neglected 
serious crimes and most responsible persons.440 
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Libya brought two admissibility challenges before the ICC. The PTC I allowed Libya to 
retain jurisdiction in the case of Al-Senussi.441 The Court retained jurisdiction in the 
case of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi.442 
In the Al-Senussi case, the PTC I found that Libyan authorities were willing, able and 
genuine to investigate and prosecute.443 Libya had mechanisms to obtain witness 
statements and evidence.444 In the case of Gaddafi, Libya submitted that the national 
judiacial authorities were in the process of bringing the accused to justice.445 Based on 
the national response against Gaddafi, Libya challenged the admissibility of the 
case.446 The PTC I requested the Libyan authorities to prove they were taking concrete 
steps against Gaddafi.447 The Court addressed the ‘same conduct᾽ requirement and 
the ‘inability᾽ test. The PTC I viewed a domestic investigation and prosecution of 
ordinary crimes to be sufficient under certain circumstances.448 However, Libya failed 
in its admissibility challenge, as it could not prove that it was investigating the same 
conduct that was before the Court.449 
The PTC I left the question of determining unwillingness unaddressed.450 On the test 
of ‘inability᾽, the Court found that Libya was unable to prosecute Gaddafi, making the 
case admissible.451 The national system of Libya was considered ‘unavailable᾽, as it 
was limited in geographical scope.452 The accused was also found to lack legal 
representation.453 Like in the Katanga case, the AC stated that the determination of 
unwillingness and inability is preceded by the ‘same conduct᾽ requirement.454 
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Côte d’Ivoire opposed admissibility in the Simone Gbagbo case on the basis that the 
state was pursuing charges similar to the ones before the ICC.455 Côte d’Ivoire argued 
that it was willing and able to try the crimes. The PTC I said that the evidence provided 
by Côte d’Ivoire was insufficient to show that it was taking steps and that the state 
failed to satisfy the same conduct requirement.456 The AC upheld the findings of the 
PTC I on the lack of relevant action at the national level.457 
Kenya 
In the Situation in Kenya, the Prosecutor justified the initiation of a proprio motu 
investigation of the post-election violence because Kenya was inactive. The next 
chapter discusses complementarity in Kenya in general, and in the case of Kenyatta 
in particular. 
3.5 Complementarity and African regional initiatives 
3.5.1 Lessons from Africa 
The inclusion of complementarity in the Rome Statute and the application of the 
principle by the ICC are issues of intense debate in international criminal justice. Earlier 
discussions in this chapter show that the Court can draw lessons from international 
tribunals that preceded it. The Court can also benefit from current African perspectives 
on complementarity. This section looks at some of the African perspectives as a 
precursor to detailed discussions in subsequent chapters. 
The prosecution of Habré and the desire by the AU to prosecute international crimes 
in Africa are initiatives that have borrowed and refined the complementarity principle 
of the ICC. Like the backlash against the ICC, debates on the supremacy of states and 
their unhindered exercise of discretion are likely to continue as states attempt to keep 
cases within national jurisdictions. For this reason, it is desirable to explore, in Chapter 
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6, how Africa shapes the application of complementarity in view of challenges faced 
by the ICC. 
3.5.2 Beyond Habré 
African states have voiced much concern about what they perceived as unfair 
treatment by the ICC, leading to decreased enthusiasm for the ICC in Africa and calls 
to extend the work of the ICC to other parts of the world. Schabas states that ‘right now 
international justice needs more Augusto Pinochets and fewer Hisséne Habrés᾽.458 
Arguably, Schabas’ statement augments the debate that the ICC is anti-African. Africa 
has revealed its anticipation of regional mechanisms in the complementarity project of 
the ICC. Other continents and the ICC have not followed suit. 
Pinochet, the former Chilean head of state, was extradited by the United Kingdom to 
Spain on 6 October 1998 to stand trial for torture, terrorism and crimes against 
humanity.459 Similar to the Pinochet case, the ICC can claim jurisdiction over the crimes 
in the Habré case.460 Hence, the Committee of Eminent African Jurists that was set up 
by the AU to advise on the ideal forum to prosecute Habré cautioned that the ICC 
already exercised powers over crimes faced by Habré.461 
For Spain, the extradition was an opportunity to exercise not only universal jurisdiction 
but other jurisdictional links such as passive personality (jurisdiction based on the 
nationality of the victim(s) to a prosecuting state), since some of the torture victims 
were Spanish. Africa believes Europe abuses the application of universal jurisdiction. 
The government of Chad wanted to be guided by the outcomes of a Truth Commission 
in the Habré case.462 The Truth Commission recommended a domestic prosecution for 
violations of human rights. The prosecution in Senegal was initiated after Habré had 
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fled to Senegal for refuge.463 The determinations on the appropriate forum to try Habré 
were dependent on factors such as the likelihood of a fair trial, access by victims to the 
trial, political will, the extent to which universal jurisdiction could be exercised and 
African wishes.464 
Following deliberations, the Extraordinary Chambers were preferred to try Habré. It 
was also enough for the ICJ to accept the assurances given by Senegal and allay the 
fears of Belgium on his possible abscondment.465 Therefore, Habré was prosecuted 
by the AU in collaboration with Senegal.466 The AU did not allow the weak systems of 
Senegal to hinder the state from participating in the prosecution. The AU gave Senegal 
time and assistance to strengthen its legislation in preparation for Senegal᾿s 
contribution in prosecution. 
3.5.3 Complementarity in the Malabo Protocol 
The Malabo Protocol incorporates provisions from the statutes of other international 
instruments. The Malabo Protocol also seeks to close the gaps from the instruments 
through the insertion of new crimes that it envisages bringing under the jurisdiction of 
the African Court. The emerging African approach raises discussions on horizontal and 
vertical hierarchical models of complementarity.467 Complementarity, as understood by 
the ICC, is vertically applied. Vertical application of complementarity gives the ICC a 
supervisory role over the investigations and prosecutorial decisions of states. The 
application permits the Court to intervene when national action fails to meet expected 
standards.468 On the other hand, horizontal application of complementarity allows 
states that do not ordinarily have jurisdiction or connection to a crime to intervene on 
behalf of the international community.469 
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States without connection to a crime are bystander states and only intervene in the 
affairs of other states based on universal jurisdiction.470 In essence, horizontal 
complementarity is concerned with the relationship between states in international 
affairs. The African Court may opt for vertical complementarity to supervise the 
operations of national jurisdictions based on the Malabo Protocol. Horizontal 
complementarity may best suit the African cause because the AU strives to avoid 
encroaching on the legitimate and sovereign interests of member states. The AU will 
be guided by its intervention policy under the Constitutive Act to determine the proper 
application of complementarity. The AU plays a passive role and leaves greater 
responsibility to states to address their internal affairs. 
The ICC needs to modify its co-operative model in view of the imminent entrance of 
the African Court into the complementarity arena.471 Currently, the ICC restricts co-
operation and assistance. The growing resistance of the AU to partner with the Court 
may be overcome when the ICC embraces co-operation as a two-way model. The 
Court should not only expect assistance from the AU but must also find means to assist 
the AU to fulfil its own ideals. The AU and its member states anticipate co-operation 
between the ICC and AU institutions in future. Existing draft documents indicate the 
anticipated co-operation. 
African states advanced proposals for the recognition of African regional mechanisms 
through the amendment of the Rome Statute.472 The proposed amendment should be 
made in accordance with article 121 of the Rome Statute. Because of its appearance 
and keen interest in the application of complementarity, Kenya swiftly proposed an 
amendment to preambular paragraph 10 of the Rome Statute. Kenya preferred the 
ICC to complement both national and regional criminal jurisdictions᾽.473 Arguably, the 
ICC needs to develop a policy to enable the utilisation of regional mechanisms by 
states under the complementarity system. 
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3.6 Positive and negative complementarity 
3.6.1 Approaches to complementarity 
Complementarity operates within the confines of a relationship between the ICC and 
states. The relationship requires well-defined parameters within which 
complementarity can operate.474 The extent of the interface between the two 
institutions has not gone unnoticed by the OTP and scholars.475 
Two dominant schools of thought emerged to influence the prosecutorial policy and to 
regulate the relationship between the Court and states. The approaches are classified 
as positive or proactive, and passive or negative complementarity. Presently, there is 
strong advocacy to discourage passive complementarity and to widely promote 
positive complementarity in the work of the ICC.476 
3.6.2 Positive complementarity 
Although positive complementarity is not expressly mentioned in the Rome Statute, 
provisions on co-operation between the Court and states, mutual assistance and 
interaction, as well as prosecutorial powers and duties, are indicative of positive 
complementarity. 
The OTP defines positive complementarity in the context of co-operation and capacity 
building of national authorities.477 The notion of positive complementarity is a departure 
from the approach envisioned before the creation of the ICC.478 The concept also 
differs from the current Court practice.479 Through this approach, the ICC 
acknowledges, embraces and respects the potential of domestic proceedings.480 Thus, 
the ICC facilitates domestic prosecutions.481 
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Positive complementarity is an action and strategy-oriented approach. The Court 
overcomes its limitations of expeditiously dealing with impunity by empowering 
domestic mechanisms to oversee the prosecutions.482 The Prosecutor avails 
opportunities and assistance to states that are willing but unable to carry out domestic 
proceedings.483 Consequently, the Prosecutor and states are interdependent and 
strive to jointly strengthen the international system of justice.484 
Viewed under the positive complementarity notion, complementarity is understood 
broadly by encouraging and adopting mechanisms that capacitate states to comply 
with their duty to undertake proceedings.485 The mechanisms include provision of 
technical assistance to states which intend to or undertake prosecution.486 The notion 
views national proceedings as effective and efficient means to end impunity when 
supported by the Court.487 The notion emanates from the understanding that states 
are custodians of jurisdiction over crimes and that the ICC only retains potential 
jurisdiction over crimes.488 
However, the potential jurisdiction of the ICC should be activated first for the 
complementarity principle to operate in favour of prosecution by the ICC.489 
Proponents of positive complementarity assert that the Court has a duty to contribute 
to the efficiency of national jurisdictions.490 Positive complementarity is outlined in 
prosecutorial policies that encourage and assist prosecution by states491 and in the 
domestication of the Rome Statute by states.492 
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The prosecutorial role 
The activation of national proceedings overcomes limitations of inactivity, 
unwillingness or inability.493 The entrenchment of positive complementarity is clearer 
in the policies of the OTP. The OTP crafted policies since 2003 to enhance 
prosecutions by national authorities. In 2003, the Prosecutor stated that the regular 
functioning of national jurisdictions as opposed to prosecutions by the Court underlies 
complementarity.494 The statement was buttressed in 2004 when the Prosecutor 
mentioned the use of positive complementarity to encourage national systems.495 
A Prosecutorial Strategy was adopted from 2006 to 2009 to support the use of positive 
complementarity.496 However, the concept suffered a setback in 2007, despite a 
strategy that advocated for its activation. The Prosecutor faced challenges to balance 
the law and political considerations and chose to separate the law from politics.497 
The interest in positive complementarity was revived with the new Prosecutorial 
Strategy of 2009 to 2012.498 One of the four fundamental principles in the strategy was 
positive complementarity.499 
The latest OTP interventions in co-operation with states include the 2010 Kampala ICC 
Review Conference.500 The Review Conference emphasised on positive 
complementarity.501 The concept was identified as encompassing actions which 
strengthen national jurisdictions to exercise primacy. The capacity building may be 
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through states assisting each other, and provision of financial and technical 
assistance.502 
The above definition implies that positive complementarity allows the participation of 
the Court while allowing states to have ownership of their processes. The intervention 
of the Court is confined to defined limits. The process also allows states to seek 
assistance from one another as they see fit. In this regard, the concept of positive 
complementarity is not a diversion from the position that states have the primary right 
and duty to investigate and prosecute international crimes. The concept advocates for 
the capacitation of states to enable a national response to international crimes. 
The Review Conference’s decision for the ICC to support the work of national 
jurisdictions received overwhelming support.503 The Court and the Assembly of State 
Parties (ASP) supported the building of national capacity.504 The future work of the ICC 
is poised to be influenced by the positive complementarity approach. The Court needs 
to overcome tensions with states to remain relevant in its supporting role to states. 
The policy of positive complementarity creates a conducive platform for national courts 
to act but does not direct the operations of national courts.505 When the OTP assists 
states, the OTP is expected to respect their sovereign rights to choose the forms of 
accountability that best suit their diverse contexts.506 The best the Court can do is to 
contribute to the debate on the most appropriate accountability mechanism within a 
particular context. Through the ‘margin of appreciation᾽ doctrine, the Court is expected 
to respect the approach preferred by states. Arguably, the doctrine regulates 
complementarity through encouraging international and regional institutions to assist 
national institutions to exercise primacy in issues under their jurisdiction.507 
When states need help, international and regional institutions can enhance the 
capacity of states. States are given space to implement human rights obligations as a 
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rule. The right is waived only in exceptional cases.508 The doctrine of margin of 
appreciation has roots in the European Court of Human Rights and will be explained 
further later in this study to demonstrate how states may also use their discretion to 
exclude the ICC from internal affairs and/or to opt for regional mechanisms instead of 
the ICC. 
Furthermore, not only are states protected from the improper encroaching of the Court 
but the Court itself is protected from unjustified shifting of state duty to its jurisdiction.509 
The shifting of responsibility can be a common phenomenon in state referral cases. By 
encouraging engagement and dialogue, options are jointly explored by the Court and 
states before proceeding with an investigation or prosecution approach that is 
acceptable to both institutions. 
Initiatives by states 
Positive complementarity requires the ICC and states to take certain steps to 
strengthen responses to international crimes. The two institutions reinforce each other 
and act complementarily for the advancement of the rule of law and justice.510 Civil 
society organisations may also contribute to domestic initiatives that complement the 
ICC.511 States should translate the provisions of the Rome Statute into domestic law 
to increase their capacity to fulfil the objectives of the Rome Statute. The domestication 
of the Rome Statute creates a framework for national prosecutions.512 
The intention of the Rome Statute is to ensure that serious crimes are punished.513 In 
this vein, states should be utilised to counter any limits on the intervention of the ICC.514 
States act in a positive form of ‘gap-filling’ by invoking unilateral or universal jurisdiction 
to address the limitations of the UNSC and ICC to address international crimes.515 
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The domestic implementation of complementarity strengthens national laws to realise 
norms set by the Rome Statute.516 Implementation is a catalytic effect on national 
systems to prosecute crimes.517 For example, South Africa can exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction after it domesticated the Rome Statute.518 
This means national initiatives have an added advantage of potential universal 
jurisdiction over ICC crimes519 through an expanded scope which is not bound by 
territoriality and nationality limitations.520 South African courts used the concept of 
universal jurisdiction to remind the state of its complementarity, co-operation and 
international law obligations.521 On the negative, the legal framework and decisions 
have so far lacked the backing of the political authorities, making enforcement difficult. 
3.6.3 Passive complementarity 
The initial model of complementarity was more reactive (῾negative or passive 
complementarity᾽) than proactive (῾positive or proactive complementarity᾽).522 The 
jurisdiction and participation of the ICC remain dormant until triggered by a state or 
UNSC referrals or prosecutorial initiative.523 The Court intervenes as a last resort when 
states are unwilling or unable to prosecute perpetrators of heinous crimes.524 As a 
spectator, the Court relies on national jurisdictions to take steps to administer justice.525 
Passive complementarity was a highlight throughout the drafting of the Rome Statute 
as considerations on the parameters of state sovereignty took centre stage.526 One 
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commentator argued that state sovereignty must not hinder international peace and 
order.527 
Passive complementarity means the OTP mainly constrains its contribution to 
international justice by waiting for political authorities in states and the UNSC to give 
guidance on the initiation of investigations.528 The OTP withholds assistance from 
states and only intervenes when the states fail.529 A passive court is therefore bent on 
fault finding and weaknesses of national systems.530 Arguably, this explains why it took 
the Prosecutor nearly a decade to use proprio motu powers granted by the Rome 
Statute. The Prosecutor has little room to manoeuvre under the passive 
complementarity model.531 
Many delegates at the Rome Conference desired an ICC with three main features: a 
court independent from UNSC control; led by an independent prosecutor; and with 
inherent jurisdiction over core international crimes.532 The Court used a two-fold 
approach in its early years. The Court waited in vain for states to exercise and probably 
fail on their primary jurisdiction, and for states to make referrals to the Court. The Court 
was eager to try some cases with the belief that a well-resourced and empowered ICC 
was better positioned to investigate and prosecute international crimes.533 
Current arguments foresee the invocation of passive complementarity when states 
deliberately reject the jurisdiction of the ICC in favour of weaker or developing 
alternative mechanisms, such as regional courts.534 
3.6.4 Rationale for positive complementarity in the Kenyatta case 
The Prosecutor has previously encouraged states such as Colombia to carry out 
national proceedings. The situation in Colombia has been under preliminary 
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examination since 2004. The Prosecutor is yet to request the PTC to authorise an 
investigation.535 The Prosecutor consistently encouraged Colombian authorities to 
conduct genuine national proceedings on the most responsible persons.536 The Court 
and the national jurisdiction shared information that was ultimately used by Colombia 
to successfully preside over cases.537 
The hand of the ICC in Colombia led to the enactment of legislative reforms and peace 
talks between warring parties. In 2015, Colombia enacted the Justice and Peace Law 
(JPL) to resolve the conflict through negotiation and consultation.538 The JPL was 
modified after the Constitutional Court struck down the legislation. The amendment to 
the JPL removed certain amnesty provisions and addressed human rights concerns 
raised by the ICC.539 The peace talks commenced in 2012. Some scholars attribute 
the achievements to the awareness of ICC᾽s watchful eye.540 
The dialogue between Colombian authorities and the ICC reflected the potential impact 
of the ICC in reminding states of their primary obligation to investigate and prosecute. 
Also, it gives hope for the advancement of positive complementarity when the ICC 
engage patiently with states. The assertions augur well for Kenya, which was 
preoccupied with continuous engagement with the ICC on the application of 
complementarity. 
Kenya implored the Court to be patient to enable it to complete domestic reforms. 
Kenya submitted that the reforms were the first step towards effective investigations 
and prosecutions.541 The Court paid little attention to the possibility of invoking positive 
complementarity as a means of ensuring a credible judiciary and police system in 
Kenya. Instead, the Court preferred to expedite the prosecution ahead of requests by 
Kenya for information in the custody of the Prosecutor. Admittedly, the Kenyatta case 
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presented the first opportunity for the Court to apply positive complementarity at a case 
stage. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In the context of international criminal law, both the ICC and national courts have a 
common obligation to ensure accountability.542 Complementarity outlines the legal and 
functional relationship between the two.543 
Complementarity gives priority to national jurisdictions. The ICC is expected to 
complement, and not supersede, national jurisdictions.544 Complementarity makes the 
ICC a support mechanism that succours national jurisdictions when the latter are 
incapacitated to bring perpetrators of heinous crimes to justice.545 
Complementarity is an evolving concept. Both the OTP and the ICC are inventing 
various ways to interpret the concept and enhance its effective application. Presently, 
the ICC has resigned itself to the application of the ‘same person and same conduct᾽ 
test. The test ignores the so-called ‘ordinary crimes᾽. Controversially, the ICC 
maintains the ῾inaction᾽ test, despite the lack of a statutory basis for the test. The OTP 
is increasingly appreciative of the need to empower national jurisdictions through 
positive complementarity. The approach is expected to dominate the relationship 
between the ICC and national jurisdictions in future. 
The next chapter provides an overview of the Kenyatta case and a discussion of the 
application of complementarity in the case. 
 
542 Struett (n 174 above) 3 - 6. 
543 L Yan ‘On the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ 
(2005) 4 Chinese Journal of International Law 121 &132.  
544 Kleffner (n 198 above). 
545 Kleffner (n 198 above). 
545 OTP ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ September 2003 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-




AN OVERVIEW OF THE KENYATTA CASE AND ARISING 
COMPLEMENTARITY ISSUES 
4.1 Introduction 
The ICC was embroiled in unresolved ethnopolitical tensions and entrenched election-
related violence when it intervened in Kenya. The divide-and-rule tactics, the use of 
violence as an election campaign tool and the inspiration to reclaim ῾stolen᾿ land or 
suppress opposition parties, escalated from the reign of Daniel Arap Moi.1 When Moi 
left office in 2002 and with new constitutional reforms in place, such as those limiting 
presidential terms to two and those favouring a multiparty system, there was renewed 
hope for transformation in the political landscape.  
The hope was further ignited in 2002 when the Kenya African National Union (KANU) 
suffered an electoral defeat for the first time since independence in 1963.2 The defeat 
was engineered by the Rainbow Coalition led by Mwai Kibaki. However, soon 
afterwards, it emerged that the struggle to transform the political and election 
landscapes was far from over. The next election in 2007 saw violence of great 
magnitude and crimes being committed against humanity. 
With the Kenyan political authorities seemingly unprepared to provide guarantees of 
violence-free elections in the future and to end impunity, the ICC intervention was 
considered. Uhuru Kenyatta and five others were on the Prosecutor’s priority list. As 
will be seen in this chapter, the Kenyatta case exposed deficiencies in the application 
of complementarity. The case revealed difficulties which arise on admissibility and 
preliminary examination of issues in proprio motu cases. Arguably, the case caught 
the ICC unprepared to invent an interpretation of complementarity that reflects the 
 
1  SF Materu The post-election violence in Kenya: domestic and international legal responses (2015) 24 
- 30. See also M Mutua ῾Justice under siege: the rule of law and judicial subservience in Kenya᾽ (2001) 
23 Human Rights Quarterly 96 -118; D Branch & N Cheeseman Democratization, sequencing, and state 
failure in Africa: lessons from Kenya (2008) 15. 
2  Materu (n 1 above) 31. 
129 
 
evolving theory to practice reality.3 The consequence of the unpreparedness and the 
resultant lack of precision weakened the principle of complementarity and degraded 
state discretion. 
Since the Court mostly relies on the co-operation of ῾interlocutors᾽ for its effectiveness, 
one views the Kenyatta case as a test of the relationship between the Court and states 
which oppose admissibility.4 Some scholars criticised the Court for solely concentrating 
on individual accountability and neglecting other forms of justice.5 Chapter 5 discusses 
alternative forms of justice in the context of state discretion. 
The Kenyatta case presented the ICC with the first admissibility challenge by a state. 
The Court had to reconfirm and redefine concepts related to complementarity. The 
Court differentiated admissibility at situation and case stages and laid a threshold on 
acceptable investigations. Also, the Court stuck with the often-criticised use of inaction 
as a determinant to admissibility, shifted the burden to the accused and disregarded 
the activation of positive complementarity. 
The plethora of legal issues created by the Kenyatta case significantly contribute to the 
understanding of complementarity.6 Most of the issues require further address by the 
Court in future cases, lest the lacuna created by the Kenyatta case may hinder the 
Court from maintaining the confidence of states. While both Kenya and the Court were 
agreeable on the possibility of the latter assuming jurisdiction at some point, the two 
had unreconcilable positions on the threshold for admissibility. Resultantly, this chapter 
analyses the Kenyatta case with a view of dissecting the contested and controversial 
issues related to the case. The case is a perfect foundation for the Court to build a 
strong and clear complementarity regime. Prior to the case, the Court did not receive 
so many submissions from national, sub-regional, regional and international actors on 
the scope of complementarity. Some of the submissions were proposals for the ICC to 
 
3 J Spilman ῾Complementarity or competition᾽ (2013) Richmond Journal of Global and Business Online 
13. 
4 MC Nnaju ῾Violence in Kenya: any role for the ICC in the quest for accountability?᾽ (2009) 3 African 
Journal of Legal Studies 91.  
5 See for example S Kendall ῾UhuRuto and other leviathans: the International Criminal Court and the 
Kenyan political order᾽ (2014) 7 African Journal of Legal Studies 425.  
6 TO Hansen ‘A critical review of the ICC᾽s recent practice concerning admissibility challenges and 
complementarity᾽ (2012) 13(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 217. 
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expand the doctrine of complementarity to allow investigations and prosecutions at a 
regional level.7 
This chapter lays a foundation for a detailed discussion on the need to protect state 
discretion to the greatest extent possible. Only when there is no possible action in the 
foreseeable future can the Court abrogate state discretion. State discretion and 
prosecutorial discretion are discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
The Rome Statute provides for two limbs of admissibility, which are gravity and 
complementarity.8 This chapter does not focus on gravity but only on the 
complementarity limb of admissibility. The chapter presupposes that the gravity 
element was met in the case as per the views of majority judges, notwithstanding the 
persuasive minority decision on gravity. However, where relevant to reinforce the 
arguments on complementarity, gravity will be referred to. 
4.2 The search for an elusive solution to electoral violence in Kenya 
4.2.1      The electoral environment pre-2002 and pre-2007 
To unseat KANU in the 2002 elections, the opposition parties adopted a ῾winning 
strategy᾿ in the elections in Kenya, in other words, participating in elections as 
coalitions. The political parties in Kenya are now accustomed to forging unity prior to 
elections to enhance their chances of winning. As most of these coalitions are 
opportunistic or formed out of convenience, they fail the test of time and fragment with 
time.9 It, therefore, came as no surprise when the winning coalition was destabilised 
before the next general election in 2007. However, when these coalitions are strong 
and when they play the tribal card well, either to divide or unify people for political ends, 
they emerge as a threefold cord that cannot be broken easily. The Kenyan scenario 
appraised the Prosecutor on the difficulties of operating in a highly politicised 
environment and prosecuting a sitting head of state. 
 
 
7 ASP ῾Report of the Working Group on Amendments᾿ 7 December 2014 http//www.asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP13/ICC-ASP-13-31-ENG.pdf. (accessed 19 July 2018). 
8 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) art 17. 
9 Materu (n 1 above) 28 – 34. 
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The cracks in the Rainbow Coalition became visible when a new constitution-making 
process was initiated in 2005. A draft constitution was put to a referendum and partners 
of the Rainbow Coalition differed greatly on the content with the Kibaki-aligned camp 
advocating for its adoption, while the Raila Odinga camp opposed the draft.10 The 
Odinga camp᾿s voice appealed to the Kenyans who had rejected the draft 
constitution.11 Encouraged by the referendum victory, Odinga contested against Kibaki 
for the presidential office in the 2007 general election. Considering this factionalism 
and animosity, the stage was set for a violence-infested election, hence violence 
erupted. The formation of a government of national unity ended the fight between the 
parties.  
4.2.2    The post-2007 election environment 
A pattern of politically and ethnically sponsored violence followed the post-2007 
election.12 Following a disputed election outcome, political leaders manipulated their 
own ethnic grouping to view others as ῾enemies᾿, which exacerbated the magnitude of 
the violence.13 The tragic occurrence left more than 1 300 dead, more than 600 000 
displaced, with many others being tortured, sexually harassed and having their 
property destroyed.14 The cycle of complex politics was upon Kenya again. The 
intuition on the part of Kenyan political authorities was to reinvent the wheel and rely 
on old approaches such as commissions of enquiry, which previously proved 
ineffective15 and absolved perpetrators from accountability.16 It was in this regard that 
the Waki Commission did not escape scrutiny, which was seen by some as a waste of 
 
10 S Elischer ᾿Ethnic coalitions of convenience and commitment: political parties and party systems in 
Kenya῾ (2008) German Institute for Global and Area Studies Working Paper 190. 
11 See ῾Elections in Kenya᾿ http://www.africanelections.tripod.com/ke.html (accessed 28 September 
2020). 
12 Report of the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights ῾On the brink of the precipice: a human 
rights account of Kenya᾿s post-election violence᾿ (2008). 
13 n 12 above, para 43. 
14 CIPEV 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence' (2008). See also Human 
Rights Watch Turning pebbles: Evading accountability for post-election violence in Kenya (2011) 3. See 
also Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 'Speedy reforms needed to deal with past injustices and 
prevent future displacement' 10 June 2010 http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/kenya 
(accessed 4 October 2020). 
15 Materu (n 1 above) 38 - 40. 




time and resources.17 One member of Parliament, namely Esther Muringi Mathenge, 
lamented as follows: 
We have had the same incidents, although not of the same magnitude. One was in 1992,    
another in 1997, a minor one in 2002 and [a] major one in 2007. In the past, after such incidents 
occurred, we formed commissions. We formed the Akiwumi Commission. However, what did we 
do with it? We put it under the carpet. We also formed the Ndung᾿u Commission… What did we 
do with the Ndung᾿u Commission Report? We also put it under the carpet.18 
In the foregoing state of confusion, a room was created for the AU to mediate on the 
crisis and for the ICC to look closely at the developments in Kenya. On the other hand, 
the Waki Commission was entrusted with giving direction on how to proceed after 
completing its investigations. One of the commission’s outstanding recommendations 
was the need for criminal and political accountability.19 The commission was keen to 
see the implementation of its recommendations and for action to be taken against the 
perpetrators who had borne the greatest criminal responsibility for the alleged crimes. 
The failure to establish a domestic criminal mechanism activated the commission’s 
recommendation for the ICC to intervene.20 Furthermore, Kenyatta and Ruto 
encouraged the intervention of the ICC before learning that their names were among 
those that had been handed over to the Court.21 
4.2.3     The desire of the ICC for criminal accountability 
Similar to other parts of the African continent where the ICC has operations, the Court 
was met with the twin considerations of political and legal responses to violations on 
international crimes. Generally, national and regional actors in Africa focus more on 
political solutions to resolving the malfeasance associated with elections.22 This has 
led to the formation of governments of national unity in countries such as Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, following inconclusive presidential elections. The ICC did not fully 
 
17 Republic of Kenya (2008) 18. 
18 Parliament of Kenya (2008). 
19 http://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=d8aa1729-8a9e-7226-acee 
8193fd67a21a&groupId=252038 (accessed 29 September 2020). 
20 Materu (n 1 above) 65. 
21 International Crisis Group (2012) 6. 
22 See P Chigora & T Guzura ῾The politics of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and power sharing 
in Zimbabwe: challenges and prospects for democracy᾿ (2011) 3(2) African Journal of History and 
Culture 20 - 26. 
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appreciate the impact of the political environment and the influence of national/regional 
actors when it intervened in Kenya.   
Prior to the election of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto as President and Deputy 
President of Kenya respectively, the appropriateness of the intervention of the ICC was 
checked from at least four fronts. First, the mediation process brokered by the AU was 
aimed at establishing a long-term programme for Kenya, such as constitutional 
reforms. The objective was to secure a peaceful and stable country underpinned by 
justice and reconciliation.23 The AU believed in dialogue and reconciliation. Justice or 
criminal accountability was seen through a lense of lasting peace and stability. 
Secondly, the Prosecutor appeared to have overlooked the role of Odinga in the 
violence leading up to the election. For instance, he and Ruto are alleged to have 
incited violence by asking the Kalenjin community to remove all ῾stains᾿ from the Rift 
Valley.24 Odinga also called for protests after the election results were announced.25 
The Prosecutor indirectly sent either or both of these messages, namely that those in 
high echo power were untouchable or that he did not care about the ethnic sensitivity 
in Kenya.  
Third, regarding the long-awaited truth commission, perhaps the Prosecutor could 
have given the prosecutorial and non-prosecutorial approaches adequate time before 
adopting a hard stance on the need for a legal response. Lastly, the perennial coalition 
factor sprouted again with Kenyatta and Ruto joining forces for the 2013 elections. As 
discussed earlier, these coalitions can be formidable and render an institution such as 
the ICC ineffective as they pursue their political agenda. Arguably, the Prosecutor was 
inexperienced to deal with the complications arising from a united front. 
4.2.4     The election of Kenyatta and Ruto 
The first four to five years of post-election violence saw the ICC enjoying considerable 
support among Kenyans. They perceived the Court as a genuine option to address 
 
23 http://www.dialoguekenya.org/index.php/negotiating-team.html (accessed 29 September 2020). 
24 Republic of Kenya (2008a) 92. 
25 n 24 above. 
26 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (2011) vi. 
27 n 24 above, 8. 
28 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project (2012a) 57. 
29 Kendall (n 5 above) 408. 
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impunity30 and to prosecute the powerful people who had participated in the post-
election violence.31 However, this support dwindled when the Ocampo six were 
revealed and tribal targeting by the ICC was alleged.32 Crucially, the ICC lost support 
in some of the regions from victims it aimed to protect and whose interests it aimed to 
advance. Once Kenyatta and Ruto had been accused by the ICC of having 
orchestrated crimes against humanity, the two engaged their communities for 
solidarity. Surprisingly, the Kikuyus (Kenyatta᾿s ethnic group) and the Kalenjins (Ruto᾿s 
ethnic group), who had fought against each other in 2007, were united when Kenyatta 
and Ruto formed a coalition named the Jubilee Alliance.33 This posed a dilemma for 
the ICC who could not adequately serve the alleged victims who now preferred 
reconciliation. The closure of the rift between the victims also augmented the need to 
continue with the restoration process. 
For their part, Kenyatta and Ruto successfully pushed the anti-ICC narrative during the 
2013 election campaign. They continued to oppose the ICC at domestic and regional 
levels after assuming office. The ICC intervention was framed as community or tribal 
persecution.34 The Luos (Odinga᾿s ethnic group) were regarded as betrayers as they 
supported the ICC process.35 At the domestic level, the prominent theme of the new 
government was the protection of Kenya᾿s sovereignty. One leader, namely Aden 
Duale, remarked: “Let us protect our citizens. Let us defend the sovereignty of the 
nation of Kenya.”36 At the regional level, African leaders were inspired by the 
outspoken Kenyatta to argue robustly before the ICC and the UNSC for the respect of 
the immunity of the sitting heads of state.  
In addition to the above, the ascendancy of Kenyatta to the office of President, 
reiterated that the ICC could not function as a referee or coach where its targets were 
those with the levers of power. The Court is unlikely to overcome the prevailing politics 
in such scenarios. The Court would do well to contribute to international criminal justice 
as a player, without directing states or penalising them for merely differing with the 
 
30 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (2011) vi. 
31 n 24 above, 8. 
32 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project (2012a) 57. 
33 Kendall (n 5 above) 408. 
34 Kendall (n 5 above) 410. 
35 Kendall (n 5 above) 411. 
36 ῾Kenya MPs vote to withdraw from ICC᾿ BBC News (5 September 2013) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23969316 (accessed 29 September 2020). 
135 
 
Court on the preferred approach to complementarity. The change in the political 
landscape in Kenya also exposed the difficulties of using proprio motu interventions in 
a country that was unwilling to fully cooperate with the ICC. Arguably, the ICC has not 
indicted state actors in self-referrals to avoid jeopardising cooperation relations with 
states. The ICC still needs to find a way to indict state actors without weakening 
cooperation. The Court may make compromises and concessions, such as deferring 
trials and using alternative forms of justice where these are made in good faith.  
4.3   Complementarity in Kenya: the ICC perspective 
The recommendation of the CIPEV inspired the ICC to intervene in Kenya. The CIPEV 
gave the ICC a watchdog status in domestic processes which Kenya was expected to 
undertake. The Prosecutor proposed a three-pronged approach in which persons most 
responsible for the violence were to be prosecuted by the ICC; Kenya would deal with 
middle and lower perpetrators through an STK; and a Justice, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission would oversee cases which required national reconciliation.37 Therefore, 
the ICC assumed jurisdiction and primacy over persons most responsible from the 
onset of the discussions with Kenya following the post-election violence. 
One of the CIPEV᾽s major recommendations was the intervention of the ICC if Kenya 
failed to establish an STK.38 Prosecutions by either the STK or the ICC was indicative 
that the CIPEV was not in favour of purely national prosecutions for persons bearing 
the greatest responsibility.39 The CIPEV did not envisage prosecutions by the existing 
national courts despite Kenya’s ratification of the Rome Statute and initiation of 
processes for the domestication of the Rome Statute. The ICC moved quickly and 
formally commenced a preliminary investigation after the failure to establish the STK. 
The rejection of the STK Bill following democratic parliamentary processes was not 
evidence of inaction on the part of Kenya. Instead, the drafting of the Bill and the 
debates which ensued thereafter were actions credited to Kenya. What lacked among 
most parliamentarians was the willingness for the STK to preside over cases of post-
 
37 C Totten et al ‘The ICC Kenya case: implications and impact for proprio motu and complementarity᾽ 
(2014) 13 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 711. 
38 http://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_08645.PDF (accessed 28 July 2018). 
39 A Wameyo ᾽Transitional justice, a two-prong approach: reconciliation and criminal responsibility for 
Kenya post 2007 elections violence᾽ (2012) African Yearbook of International Law 424. 
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election violence.40 The ICC adopted a threat-based approach to complementarity in 
its early phases of involvement in Kenya. Kleffner notes that the Court may use a 
coercive or co-operative model to address impunity.41 With the foundation of a threat-
based complementarity, the Prosecutor proved reluctant to concede to crucial 
demands by Kenya from the beginning to the withdrawal of the Kenyatta case. 
4.4      Complementarity in Kenya: Kenya’s perspective 
At first, Kenya appreciated the intervention of the ICC following Kenya’s failure to use 
national mechanisms to deal with post-election violence. The desire to demonstrate 
national ability led to discussions with the Prosecutor. One of the discussions was held 
on 3 July 2009 and attended by a high-powered Kenyan delegation which met the 
Prosecutor in The Hague and agreed on the course of action. Following the meeting, 
Kenya appraised the OTP on national steps but did not refer the cases to the ICC when 
the STK Bill was rejected by parliament.42 
Arguably, Kenya preferred the intervention of the ICC through a state referral rather 
than the Prosecutor’s own initiative over the situation, hence Kenya’s arguments on 
the inadmissibility of Kenyan cases before the ICC. Kenya expected its guidance to 
influence the timing of the Court’s intervention. Kenya’s view was that complementarity 
is operational when a state with jurisdiction is satisfied that it lacks willingness or ability 
to control its own affairs. When the Court allows states to exercise their discretion to 
the greatest extent possible, the duty of states is enhanced. 
4.5   Situations and cases 
Philippe Kirsch, who chaired the Bureau at the Rome Conference, said that in principle, 
states should refer ‘situations᾽ rather ‘cases᾽ to the Court.43 The negotiators wanted to 
prevent states from making politically motivated referrals against opponents.44 Hence, 
 
40 C Meloni ‘The ICC and Kenya: a boomerang effect?᾽ (2014) Institute for International Political Studies 
paper 6. 
41 J Kleffner ‘Complementarity as a catalyst for compliance᾽ in J Kleffner & G Kor (eds) Complementary 
views on complementarity (2006) 80. 
42 OTP ̔ Kenya’s post-election violence: ICC Prosecutor presents cases against six individuals for crimes 
against humanity᾿ 15 December 2010 http://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr615 (accessed 
28 July 2018). 
43 P Kirsch & D Robinson ‘Reaching agreement at the Rome Conference᾽ in A Cassese et al The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: a commentary (2002) 623. 
44 Kirsch & Robinson (n 43 above) 74. 
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the drafting history of the Rome Statute shows a deliberate use of the term ‘situations᾽ 
to exclude scenarios where specific persons have been identified.45 The Rome Statute 
does not clearly differentiate between situations and cases. The Court has given a 
descriptive definition of the two terms. Kenya highlighted the alleged inconclusiveness 
of the meaning of the terms in its appeal on the admissibility of the Kenyan cases 
before the ICC.46 The Court acknowledged the ambiguity and emphasised contextual 
interpretation of the terms.47 
Broadly, the view of the Court is that a situation stage begins from a preliminary 
examination and ends with the completion of the examination. At this stage, a general 
assessment or investigation is done to identify specific persons for prosecution.48 The 
Prosecutor has ‘potential᾽ rather than ‘concrete᾽ cases. On the other hand, the case 
stage begins when specific persons have been identified and the Prosecutor is ready 
to summon the persons to appear or issue warrants of arrests.49 
The Kenyatta case revealed that although a determination has been made, the 
controversy of separating the two stages is far from resolved. The question arises as 
to whether it is necessary to treat situations and cases differently. Prosecutorial 
powers, evidentiary standards and expected outcomes are different in the two stages 
as argued by the Court. 
4.5.1      Key provisions relating to situations and cases 
The Court identified articles 15, 53(1) and 18 of the Rome Statute as situation 
provisions, and articles 19, 58 and 61 of the Rome Statute and regulation 52 of the 
Regulations of the Court as case provisions.50 
An analysis of situation provisions 
The Prosecutor has powers in terms of article 15 to initiate an investigation and 
preliminary examination on own initiative, to analyse the information received from 
numerous sources and to proceed with an investigation if a reasonable basis exists 
 
45 International Law Commission Draft Statute art 23(1). 
46 The Prosecutor v Muthaura et al (30 August 2011) 01/09-02/11 OA ICC para 27. 
47 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 38. 
48 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 38. 
49 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 39. 
50 Muthaura (n 46 above) paras 38 & 39. 
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following the authorisation by the PTC. The prosecutorial powers are checked under 
this and other articles of the Rome Statute.51 Article 53(1) outlines the factors the 
Prosecutor should consider in determining the rationale of proceeding, such as 
jurisdiction of the Court over the alleged crime, admissibility of the case, and interests 
of victims and justice.52 Article 18 focuses on preliminary rulings regarding 
admissibility. The article provides that a state may challenge both the authorisation of 
an investigation and the admissibility of a case upon submission of additional 
significant facts or a significant change of circumstances.53 
The link between articles 15 and 53(1) is mentioned in rule 48. Article 15 covers 
preliminary examinations and investigations at the situation stage. While the 
Prosecutor requires a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation (situation 
stage), a sufficient basis to proceed is required for a prosecution (case stage).54 The 
Court has differentiated between a reasonable and sufficient basis to demonstrate the 
quality of required evidence. The differentiation was made in the later stages of the 
drafting of the Rome Statute.55 
The reasoning of the Court on the rationale of abandoning a ‘sufficient basis to 
proceed᾽ is understandable when the two standards are read together or used 
interchangeably from the stage of preliminary examinations, where appropriate. 
Undoubtedly, article 53(2) on prosecution is a transition from article 53(1) on 
investigation, yet the two are treated separately by the Court. The two articles share 
 
51 N Jurdi The International Criminal Court and National Courts: A Contentious Relationship (2011) 97 -
99. 
52 See M Scharf ῾The amnesty exception to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court‘ (1999) 
32 Cornell International Law Journal 507 - 527 arguing that article 53 of the Rome Statute, reflects 
creative ambiguity ‘which could potentially allow the prosecutor and judges of the ICC to interpret the 
Rome Statute as permitting recognition of an amnesty exception to the jurisdiction of the court᾿, see 
also K Henrard ῾The viability of national amnesties in view of the increasing recognition of individual 
criminal responsibility at international law᾿ (1999) 8 Michigan State Universi ty-DCL Journal of 
International Law 595 - 650. 
53 For a discussion on the change of circumstances see M Bergsmo & J Pejic ῾Prosecutor᾿ in O Triffterer 
(ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute: observers᾿ notes, article by article (1999) 359 - 368; J 
Lindenmann ῾The Rules of Procedure and Evidence on jurisdiction and admissibility᾿ in H Fischer et al 
(eds) International and national prosecution of crimes under international law: current developments 
(2001) 173  - 184. 
54 n 8 above, art 53(2). 
55 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (31 March 2010) 01/09 ICC, paras 23 - 24. 
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the common requirements of admissibility, interests of justice and victims, and 
adequate information to proceed.56 
The fact that the outcome of a preliminary examination may not identify specific 
suspects as opposed to the outcome of an investigation should not disregard the fact 
that the Prosecutor has unlimited time to do a preliminary examination before 
approaching the PTC for authorisation of an investigation. The OTP previously 
confirmed the unlimited time.57 Therefore, the Prosecutor should not seek authorisation 
for an investigation without a sufficient basis, as acting otherwise may be an affront to 
the proper administration of international justice.58 
Complementarity will be better protected if the Prosecutor only intervenes in 
investigations or prosecutions when reasonable and sufficient bases to proceed are 
read together. Until then, states should exercise discretion on a situation. However, it 
is justifiable for a reasonable basis to be used for the preliminary examination when 
facts are still obscure from the Prosecutor and no danger exists for a Prosecutor to 
improperly interfere with the right and duty of a state to investigate or prosecute crimes 
under its jurisdiction. 
Another motivation for using a sufficient basis to proceed from the onset is to provide 
the Prosecutor with a strong justification if a state challenges authorisation of an 
investigation. A state is expected to base its challenge on the basis that it has the ability 
 
56 Article 53(1) states: ῾The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or 
her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed 
under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: 
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed; 
(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and 
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. 
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his or her determination 
is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.᾿ 
Article 53(2) states: ῾If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis 
for a prosecution because: 
(a) There is not a sufficient legal or factual basis to seek a warrant or summons under article 58; 
(b) The case is inadmissible under article 17; or 
(c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, including the 
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a referral under article 14 or the Security Council in a case under article 13, paragraph (b), of his or her 
conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion.᾿ 
57 Situation in the Central African Republic (30 November 2006) 01/05 ICC. 
58 A Cassese ῾The Statute of the International Criminal Court: some preliminary reflections᾿ (1999) 10 
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and willingness to investigate or prosecute the alleged offences. Cassese highlights 
the challenges of states which are ῾bent on shunning international jurisdiction and 
therefore unwilling to cooperate in the search for and collection of evidence, or even 
willing to destroy such evidence to evade justice.᾿ 59 A reasonable basis to proceed, 
when used in isolation, may create doubt that a state has failed to exercise its primacy 
in investigation and prosecution. 
Article 18 of the Rome Statute requires a state to provide significant facts or significant 
change of circumstances when challenging the admissibility of a case following the 
PTC᾿s authorisation of an investigation. Such a challenge is made under article 19 
(case stage). This disregards the fact that a transition from article 18 to article 19 does 
not necessarily encompass specific suspects. The challenge by a state may be 
confined to the authorisation of an investigation and not the result of an investigation. 
Article 87(7) refers to a case that may also be viewed as a situation if the current 
demarcation by the Court is maintained. In this regard, a situation challenge can be 
dealt with under article 19 (case stage), an observation that strengthens the 
undesirability to treat situations and cases differently. 
If the Prosecutor can rely on a reasonable basis to proceed at the situation level, 
fairness demands that the same standard available to the Prosecutor also be available 
to the challenging state. Article 53(1) allows the Prosecutor to decide on the absence 
of a reasonable basis to proceed. Likewise, a challenging state must be allowed to 
challenge the authorisation of an investigation on the grounds of the absence of a 
reasonable basis for the Prosecutor to proceed. The solution is to resort to a sufficient 
basis to proceed to meet the high requirements of article 18(7). The low standard of 
the reasonable basis to proceed will make it difficult for a Court to sustain the decision 
on investigation. 
An analysis of case provisions 
Article 19 of the Rome Statute regulates challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court and 
admissibility of cases. The article requires the Court to deal with challenges before or 
at the commencement of a trial. In exceptional cases, and with its permission, the Court 
may deal with subsequent challenges. Article 58 and regulation 52 provide for 
 
59 See Cassese (n 58 above) 159. 
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summons to appear and warrants of arrest, and the accompanying details, after the 
completion of an investigation by the Prosecutor. Article 61 covers procedures for the 
confirmation of charges before trial. 
In terms of article 19, most admissibility challenges must be made before a trial begins. 
The Rome Statute encourages states to launch challenges at the earlier stages of 
proceedings to avoid interruptions once trials begin. Unnecessary delays undermine 
the rights of accused persons to a fair trial.60 The right to a fair trial includes being tried 
expeditiously.61 Fair trials can be enhanced if the Prosecutor uses the reasonable basis 
to proceed thoroughly at the preliminary examination stage and when the Prosecutor 
invokes the sufficient basis test to proceed at the investigation stage. Logically, a 
sufficient basis at an earlier stage may ensure the exhaustion of debates on 
admissibility before a transition to the case stage. 
The Prosecutor must lay down all necessary reasons for intervention at an earlier 
stage.62 At the same time, a state must be given an opportunity to prevent the 
intervention of the Court.63 To wait until suspects have been identified and a trial is 
nigh before a higher standard is required from the Prosecutor opens room for vigorous 
challenges by a state which claims jurisdiction. A state or Prosecutor may introduce 
more arguments that could have been dealt with at earlier stages. Consequently, 
accused persons face prejudice, as they will endure lengthy processes before their trial 
commences or is completed. Hall argues that: 
 It would be consistent with judicial economy and with due process to limit “exceptional                                    
circumstances” in a challenge to admissibility to adopt a standard similar to that in article 
84(1)(a) for  revision of convictions or sentences, which would require that the challenge based 
on newly discovered information be sufficiently important so that the decision on the ruling on 
admissibility would have been different. Given that both the State and the Court have 
concurrent jurisdiction over the crimes, if the Court has determined that a case was admissible, 
 
60 JK Cogan ῾International criminal courts and fair trials: difficulties and prospects᾿ (2002) 27 Yale 
Journal of International Law 136 -137. 
61 n 8 above, art 64(2). 
62 MM El Zeidy ῾The principle of complementarity: a new machinery to implement international criminal 
law᾿ (2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 906 - 910. 
63 RB Philips ῾The International Criminal Court Statute: jurisdiction and admissibility᾿ (1999) 10 Criminal 
Law Forum 80. 
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the right of the accused to a prompt trial would appear to outweigh the State᾿s interest in trying 
the case, as a transfer of the case to the State᾿s court could lead to delay.64 
Admissibility challenges can be made at situation and case stages. The Court 
endorses this statutory position.65 However, the Court seems to pay little attention to 
article 19, which is not solely limited to the case stage.66 Should the Court overcome 
the restrictive view, it will put admissibility requirements in the same basket as 
situations and cases. An admissibility challenge may be made prior to the 
commencement of a trial.67 The Rome Statute is silent on the specific stages before a 
trial starts for the purposes of article 19(4). Arguably, article 19 applies to challenges 
which include challenges on the authorisation of an investigation. 
As earlier stated, admissibility challenges should ideally be made at the earliest 
possible moment. A state or person may not be able to include all the necessary 
documents at the time of filing. The Court should consider such limitations and not 
insist on ‘sufficiently substantiated᾽ admissibility challenges at the time of filing.68 At 
any stage, the Court should comply with the guidelines in article 17 to determine the 
admissibility of cases.69 The Rome Statute leans in favour of keeping the same 
standard to ensure consistency in the application of complementarity in both situation 
and case stages. 
Admissibility challenges in terms of article 19 may be made by an accused person who 
has been issued with a warrant of arrest or summons to appear. Also, a state party 
and a non-state party with jurisdiction may make an admissibility challenge in terms of 
article 19.70 A challenge by an accused strongly affirms that article 19 challenges are 
done at the case stage, considering that an accused will have been issued with a 
warrant of arrest or summons to appear. There is no provision for a challenge by an 
accused under article 18. The non-participation of an accused at the situation stage of 
 
64 CK Hall ῾Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of as a case᾿ in O Triffterer (ed) 
Commentary on the Rome Statute: observers᾿ notes, article by article 412 - 413. 
65 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 37. 
66 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 39. 
67 n 8 above, art 19(4). 
68 CM De Vons ῾A catalyst for justice? The International Court in Uganda, Kenya and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo᾽, PhD Thesis, Leiden University, 2016 68.  
69 J Gurule ῾United States opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute establishing an international criminal 
court: is the Court’s jurisdiction truly complementary to national criminal jurisdictions?᾿ (2002) 35(1) 
Cornell International Law 1. 
69 n 8 above, art 19(2). 
70 n 8 above, art 19(2). 
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proceedings is understandable because it is naturally impossible to consult an accused 
who is yet to be identified. 
On the flip side, a state enjoys participation from the situation stage, since states have 
the right of first preference or refusal in the Rome Statute complementarity system.71 
Article 19 admissibility challenges may encompass investigations (situation stage).72 
Article 19(11) empowers the Prosecutor to defer an investigation and to request a state 
to avail information on the status of the proceedings. In short, a case may not always 
be a concrete case as interpreted by the Court. A group of persons may be narrowed 
to individual persons beyond the situation stage, particularly during the confirmation of 
charges. 
4.5.2   The pros and cons of the differentiation of situations and cases 
Advantages 
The different treatment of situations and cases has several advantages. First, the 
situation stage gives the Prosecutor time and flexibility before preparation for trial. 
Second, the situation stage enhances the chances of a credible conclusion by the 
Prosecutor flowing from the unlimited time available to examine a situation intensely. 
Third, the situation stage broadens the scope of examination for the Prosecutor. The 
Prosecutor is not required to identify specific suspects until the case stage. Fourth, the 
‘limited interference᾽ nature of preliminary examinations reduces chances of potential 
political interference. Even the UNSC is precluded from requesting deferral of 
preliminary examinations.73 Last, the low standard required for the Prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation makes authorisation by the PTC easier. 
Disadvantages 
The differentiation has several disadvantages. First, the duplication of preliminary 
examinations and investigations wastes considerable resources. An option is to 
conduct preliminary examinations and investigations concurrently and leave the Court 
 
71 L Yang ῾Some critical remarks of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court᾿ in Lee (ed) 
States’ responses to issues arising from the ICC Statute: constitutional, sovereignty, judicial cooperation 
and criminal law (2005) 290. 
72 n 8 above, art 19(11).  
73 n 8 above, art 16. 
144 
 
to decide whether, based on the submission of investigation results, there is a sufficient 
basis to prosecute. 
Second, different approaches in national jurisdictions and the ICC cause different 
interpretations.74 Whereas the Court precedes investigations with preliminary 
examinations, most national jurisdictions do not conduct preliminary examinations. 
Because of preliminary examinations, the Prosecutor is given considerable time to 
weigh options from the situation stage. Undoubtedly, Kenya asked for additional 
information from the Court. 
Third, information received by the Prosecutor before the start of a preliminary 
examination may contain the names of persons who will become subject of 
investigation and prosecution, thereby defeating the demarcation between a situation 
and a case when a case is situation-dependent. For instance, the Prosecutor received 
an envelope from Kofi Annan with the names of Kenyan suspects before an 
investigation was authorised by the PTC.75 The same names were not shared with 
Kenya until at a late stage to facilitate the application of complementary through 
Kenyan national courts.76 
Fourth, the Prosecutor may fail to identify the most responsible persons, yet the state 
may be able to do so. Owing to the same person and same conduct test, the Court 
may miss an opportunity to prosecute persons most responsible for atrocities. The 
state may assist in identifying the most responsible persons. 
Last, the test for reasonable basis to proceed impugns the thoroughness of a 
preliminary examination and demonstrates a deficiency which can be cured by 
concurrent conduct of preliminary examinations and investigations. The outcome will 
not be limited to a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation which is 
contentious, subjective and controversial. The unnecessary contention may be 
 
74 Yang (n 71 above) 289. 
75 OTP ῾ICC Prosecutor receives sealed envelope from Kofi Annan on post-election violence in Kenya᾿ 
9 July 2009 http://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr436 (accessed 16 August 2018). 
76 n 75 above. 
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avoided, as the Prosecutor’s early engagements with a state and request for the 
authorisation of the PTC will be based on a weightier basis to proceed.77 
4.5.3 Kenya’s view on situations and cases 
Kenya contested the approach of the Court in the application of different standards for 
situations and cases. It advocated for the application of the same standard in all stages 
of proceedings before the Court.78 Kenya contended that the Court should have 
accepted that a state is not under obligation to investigate the same suspects as the 
Court.79 As long as the state concentrates on persons of the same hierarchy, the Court 
lacks justification to intervene.80 The interpretation of Kenya allows the Prosecutor to 
apply flexibility in the choice of cases and choices of forms of justice.81 Since the OTP 
concedes in its prosecutorial policy that the Court cannot prosecute every person in a 
situation, the desire of the Prosecutor to prosecute the most responsible persons can 
still be fulfilled if persons who are equally responsible are prosecuted by the Prosecutor 
instead of the persons initially identified for prosecution. 
In the Kenyan scenario, the Prosecutor was supposed to evaluate the extent to which 
the implicated persons were at the same level of responsibility. The goal to end 
impunity and violence in future elections could have been achieved while respecting 
Kenya’s discretion to investigate and prosecute identified perpetrators.82 In former ICC 
prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo’s own words, Kenya was to serve as an example to 
the whole world on the intolerance of violence and impunity.83 By prosecuting equally 
responsible persons, Kenya could have demonstrated the advancement of the 
interests of victims. According to Tallgren: 
 
77 RS Lee ῾States’ responses: issues and solutions᾿ in Lee (ed) States’ responses to issues arising from 
the ICC Statute: constitutional, sovereignty, judicial cooperation and criminal law (2005) 23. 
78 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 29. 
79 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 29; K Vaid ῾What counts as state action under article 17 of the Rome 
Statute? Applying the ICC᾿s complementarity test to non-criminal investigations by the United States 
into war crimes in Afghanistan᾿ (2002) 44 International Law and Politics 604 - 605. 
80 The Prosecutor v Ruto et al (30 May 2011) 01/09-01/11 ICC para 65.  
81 K Vaid ῾What counts as state action under article 17 of the Rome Statute? Applying the ICC᾿s 
complementarity test to non-criminal investigations by the United States into war crimes in Afghanistan᾿ 
(2002) 44 International Law and Politics 609 - 610. 
82 See WA Schabas Unimaginable atrocities: justice, politics and rights at the war crimes tribunals (2012) 
91, proposing the need for the Prosecutor to seek political guidance in certain circumstances. 
83 J Makori ῾Ocampo presses Kenya for justice᾿ 5 November 2009  
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8343843.stm (accessed 27 August 2018). 
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A [n]ational decision not to proceed because of insufficient evidence or because prosecution 
would not serve the interest of justice would suffice. A national decision, not amounting to a 
conviction or acquittal, must be subject to the same criteria, the negligence of which lead to 
the application of the exception.84 
4.5.4 International Criminal Court’s view on situations and cases 
The Prosecutor and the Court consistently argue that situations and cases should be 
treated differently.85 As discussed above, a situation differs from a case in that the 
former consists of a general assessment of a cluster of persons, while the latter 
consists of specific persons whom the Court intends to prosecute. The separation of 
situations and cases encroaches on state discretion and ignores state priorities. The 
separation also makes the interpretation of the Rome Statute somehow uncertain 
because one must know the contextual environment to determine whether a stage falls 
under a situation or a case. 
Considering that the Rome Statute applies to several states, clarity and certainty are 
important. Uncertainty breeds arguments on the proper application of complementarity. 
The Court practice needs to evolve to address the confusion created by the Court’s 
formulation of the contextual interpretation of situations and cases. Ideally, the Court 
should avoid the application of the law using a situation or a case as the underlying 
basis for its reasoning. 
Provisions for situations and cases can borrow strengths from each other. For instance, 
a sufficient basis to proceed at the situation level will lead to a more convincing 
argument on the admissibility of a case at a later stage. On the other hand, there is a 
need to narrow the ῾hierarchy of persons᾽ standard, and the gap between the findings 
of the Court and of a state. The gap was apparent when the ICC intervened in Kenya. 
It would have been interesting to see whether the ICC was to intervene based on 
complementarity, had the STK been established. 
The STK was the recommended first option and may have excluded suspects who 
were later revealed by the ICC investigations. The dilemma for the Court could have 
been to gain national and international support to pursue the excluded suspects and 
 
84 I Tallgren ῾Article 20: Ne bis in idem᾿ in Triffterer (n 53 above) 431. 
85 Muthaura (n 46 above) paras 38 - 46. 
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override the discretion of the STK. The report of CIPEV only recommended the 
intervention of the ICC if the STK was not formed.86 The STK was to possess an 
international appearance through the mixture of national and international staff,87 
further supporting the proposition that ICC intervention would have been unthinkable 
if the STK started and completed its work. 
4.6   Dichotomy of investigations 
Investigations are covered in parts 2 and 5 of the Rome Statute. The investigation 
stage follows a preliminary examination into a situation. The stage can either begin 
with the authorisation by the PTC in the case of proprio motu initiatives or 
independently, as in the case of state and UNSC referrals. Regardless of the trigger, 
an investigation is foundational to the issuance of summons to appear or warrants of 
arrests. Similarly, to the prosecution stage, the investigation stage determines the 
applicability of complementarity. The Court first considers whether a state is or has 
investigated or prosecuted a case before granting the Prosecutor permission to 
intervene.88 The status of an investigation on the part of a state can catalyse the 
intervention of the ICC in a state’s sovereign affairs or restrain the ICC. It is on this 
basis that this section intends to dissect the meaning of an investigation in the context 
of the Rome Statute. 
4.6.1     Key provisions on investigations 
Before delving into the controversy of the definition of the substance and scope of the 
investigation in the Kenyatta case, it is necessary to briefly examine the main 
provisions of the Rome Statute, which cover investigations. The analysis will enable a 
better understanding of the discussion that follows in subsequent paragraphs of this 
section. 
Article 17 is protective of the national jurisdiction and is crafted skilfully to assume 
inadmissibility of cases before the ICC.89 Article 17(a) highlights the general rule of 
 
86 Wameyo (n 39 above) 423. 
87 Wameyo (n 39 above) 428. 
88 n 8 above, art 17(1)(a). 
89 Art 17(1) states in part that a Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where the case is being 
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or 
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. Further, a case is inadmissible where the 
case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to 
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excluding the ICC when state action genuinely exists.90 Article 17(b) covers the 
genuine decision of a state not to prosecute. 
Article 19(2)(b) allows a state with jurisdiction to challenge the admissibility of a case 
based on national proceedings, either concluded or ongoing. 
The PTC cannot authorise an investigation if a case is ‘being᾽ or ‘has been᾽ or ‘is᾽ 
investigated by a state. At face value, the use of the terms ῾is᾽ or ‘being᾿, juxtaposed 
with ‘has been᾽, suggests that an investigation must be ongoing (current) or concluded 
(past). However, the Rome Statute falls short in that it does not provide guidance on 
when an investigation is deemed to have begun. Does an investigation begin at the 
preparatory phase or when investigation results are tangible? Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines an investigation as follows: To follow up step by step by patient inquiry or 
observation; to trace or track mentally; to search into; to examine and inquire into with 
care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of 
evidence; a legal inquiry.91 
The foregoing definition demonstrates that an investigation is a patient and structured 
process which happens when an investigator takes steps on the ground or mere 
observation (assessment); it involves tracing, searching, examination, inquiry, and 
collection of evidence or tracking. Therefore, an investigation is not limited to 
deployment on the ground but includes preparatory measures which contribute to 
results. Preparatory measures are key to genuine investigations envisaged by the 
Rome Statute. The measures may lead to credible investigation results. It may have 
been unhelpful and a panacea for sham investigations had Kenya investigated the 
suspects without legal or police reforms. The drafting history of the Rome Statute 
indicates that ̔ the Court was intended to operate in cases where there was no prospect 
of trial in national courts.᾿92 
 
prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the 
State genuinely to prosecute. 
90 PF Seils ῾Making complementarity work: maximizing the limited role of the Prosecutor᾿ in C Stahn & 
El Zeidy (eds) The International Criminal Court and complementarity: from theory to practice (2011) 
1012. 
91 Black᾽s Law Dictionary 956.  




In addition, article 15 presents two phases of an investigation, namely, initiation and 
commencement. The terms ‘initiation᾽ and ‘commencement᾽ arguably refer to one and 
the same concept. However, the context in which they are used shows that the terms 
refer to two different stages. The Prosecutor may ‘initiate᾽, not start investigations on 
his or her own initiative.93 It is for purposes of a preliminary examination (preliminary 
investigation) that a Prosecutor receives and evaluates information before approaching 
the PTC. Before starting a full investigation, the Prosecutor presents the received and 
evaluated information for the PTC’s consideration. In other words, proprio motu 
investigations are initiated when information is assessed by the Prosecutor at the 
preliminary examination stage and commence (start) when investigation authorisation 
is given by the PTC. 
An investigation within the context of article 15(1) of the Rome Statute is factually a 
preliminary examination. The commencement and continuation of an investigation may 
be prohibited once the UNSC requests for a deferral of a situation,94 an illustration that 
an investigation consists of many phases. The Court should consider all the different 
phases of an investigation, whether in situation or case stages, to adopt a broader 
definition of an investigation. A preliminary examination is equivalent to a preliminary 
investigation; hence, the definition and scope of investigations can be traced back to 
preparatory stages before the launching of a full investigation. 
Since Kenya had an impression that investigating suspects in accordance with the 
same level of hierarchy sufficed,95 a preferred option for the Court and Kenya was to 
first reconcile their differences. In the spirit of complementarity, the Court would have 
allowed Kenya to exercise its discretional powers to include or exclude the suspects 
identified by the Court. The risk of the exercise of primacy by the Court in the 
identification of suspects would be avoided. 
A state that is undergoing legislative and other reforms must be considered at worst to 
have initiated investigations and at best to have commenced investigations. 
 
 
93 M Bergsmo & J Pejic ᾽Article 15: Prosecutor᾽ in Triffterer (n 53 above) 730. 
94 n 8 above, art 16. 
95 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 27. 
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4.6.2      International Criminal Court interpretation of an ‘investigation’ 
The view of the Court is that an investigation must be accompanied by detailed 
information on the concrete and ongoing steps taken by a state.96 At the case stage, 
the identities of persons who are investigated must be availed by a state challenging 
the admissibility of a case.97 An intention to investigate falls outside the scope of an 
investigation and accordingly fails the test in an admissibility challenge.98 The Court’s 
interpretation is a rubber stamp of the prosecutorial regulations that stipulate that 
existing facts should be used in assessing complementarity.99 The standard is so high 
at the case stage such that a sufficient degree of specificity needs to accompany the 
admissibility challenge.100 
Although according to the Court, the genuineness of an investigation is not an issue, a 
state must reveal the investigative steps taken at national level.101 The approach 
requires results or outcomes of an investigation rather than preparatory or incomplete 
investigations. State procedures and strategies towards a full investigation are not 
considered in this approach, despite the challenge states may face in tackling politically 
sensitive issues.102 This fundamentally affects peacebuilding before launching full-
scale investigations. 
The state approach may not always be expected to be the same as the one for the 
Court which already has legislative and institutional mechanisms in place.103 An 
approach such as the one adopted in the later cases of Simone Gbagbo and Saif Al-
 
96 H Olàsolo ῾The Prosecutor of the ICC before the initiation of investigations: a quasi-judicial or a 
political body? (2003) 3 International Criminal Law Review 87; Muthaura (n 46 above) para 49. 
97 R Rastan ῾What is a case for the purpose of the Rome Statute᾿ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 441; 
H Olàsolo & EC Rojo ῾The application of the principle of complementarity to the cecision of where to 
open an Investigation: the admissibility of situations᾿ in Stahn & El Zeidy (eds) The 
International Criminal Court and complementary: from theory to 
practice (2011) 393 - 420; Muthaura (n 46 above) para 67. 
98 K Vaid ῾What counts as state action under article 17 of the Rome Statute? Applying the ICC᾿s 
complementarity test to non-criminal investigations by the United States into war crimes in Afghanistan᾿ 
(2002) 44 International Law and Politics 603 - 604; Muthaura (n 46 above) para 49. 
99 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor 29(4). 
100 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 61. 
101 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 40. 
102 LA Young ῾Political complementarity and ICC᾿s engagement in Darfur, Sudan῾ in International 
criminal justice: the ICC and complementarity (2014) 132; M Du Plessis ῾Complimentarity: a working 
relationship between African states and the International Criminal Court᾿ in Du Plessis (ed) African 
Guide to International Criminal Justice (2008) 137. 
103 P Jakob ῾The principle of complementarity in the cases of the Sudanese nationals Ahmad Harun 




Islam Gaddafi, if consistently applied by the Court, may help to clarify the scope of an 
investigation. In the Gbagbo case, the PTC clarified that the required evidence may 
extend to all material which proves the existence of investigation or prosecution.104 The 
Gaddafi case added that this includes documents, guidance, reports and decisions of 
national authorities pertaining to domestic proceedings105 
4.6.3       Kenya’s interpretation of an ῾investigation᾿ 
Kenya submitted that national investigations were underway and pleaded for more time 
to execute the national strategy.106 States should be given more discretion in line with 
the principle of complementarity that favours domestic jurisdictions.107 The pillar of 
Kenya’s arguments was on the judicial and police reforms that had been taken or were 
being undertaken.108 Limitations or shortcomings could be cured by sharing 
information in the possession of the Prosecutor.109 Kenya also argued that an 
admissibility challenge is a process; hence, information can be submitted at any 
time.110 The argument finds support in rule 84 of the Rules of Court which allows an 
investigation by the Prosecutor after the confirmation stage and any disclosure 
proceeding.111 
4.7   Inaction and admissibility 
4.7.1     Dissecting the element of inaction 
The Rome Statute presumes that states are able and willing to genuinely invoke 
national proceedings.112 The Rome Statute also accepts that a state may decide, in 
good faith, not to investigate or prosecute.113 More focus should be placed on the 
 
104 Prosecutor v Gbagbo (11 December 2014) 02/11-01/12-47-Red ICC para 29. 
105 Prosecutor v Gaddafi & Al-Senussi (11 December 2014) 01/11-01/11-239 ICC para 29. 
106 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 71. 
107 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 43. 
108 C Alai ῾Measured hope: positive complementarity and accountability for sexual crimes in Kenya᾿ in 
International criminal justice: the ICC and complementarity (2014) 62 - 63; Muthaura (n 64 above) para 
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110 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 75. 
111 Situation in the Democratic of Congo (13 October 2006) 01/04-01/06-568 ICC paras 49 - 57. 
112 n 8 above, art 17(1)(a). 
113 n 8 above, art 17(1)(b). 
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motives rather than actions of a state that decides not to prosecute.114 The 2003 OTP 
Policy Paper endorsed the assertion that inaction may be the most appropriate 
decision in certain circumstances.115 As a general rule, cases are inadmissible before 
the Court unless a state has triggered admissibility through failure to investigate and 
prosecute.116 
The limitation of the Court’s intervention makes it mandatory for the Court to adopt a 
cautious approach before making admissibility determinations. The Court should 
exhaust all efforts to define inaction before it snatches jurisdiction from a state. 
Reliance on ‘inaction᾽ at the expense of ‘unwillingness᾽ and ‘inability᾽ impacted on the 
application of complementarity in the Kenyatta case. In a bold decision, the Court found 
it unnecessary to consider the core terms of article 17, such as unwillingness, inability 
and genuineness. While the Court may be correct that inaction leads to automatic 
admissibility or uncontested admissibility,117 it is important to refer to unwillingness or 
inability in discussing inaction because inaction does not exist in isolation. According 
to Schabas, ‘even in a case of “uncontested admissibility”, it remains legitimate to 
consider whether the state is itself willing and able to prosecute᾽.118 
Whereas the unwillingness of national courts to effectively prosecute was predicted 
when the ICTY was created, the inability of national courts to effectively prosecute was 
predicted when the ICTR was created.119 Inaction is a direct result of either 
unwillingness or inability to prosecute. The essence of a challenge to the admissibility 
of a case is that a state is willing and able to investigate or prosecute.120 
 
114 WA Schabas & MM El Zeidy ‘Article 17: issues of admissibility᾽ in O Triffterer & K Ambos Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: a commentary (2016) 796. 
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The Court held that the Kenyatta case was admissible based on a lack of judicial 
activity in Kenya,121 despite the information provided by Kenya on the ongoing 
investigations. Judge Ušacka noted in a dissent that Kenya demonstrated the 
existence of national proceedings, including the investigations and allegations against 
one of the persons targeted by the ICC, Mr Ruto.122 The reliance on inaction by the 
Court was somehow misplaced in view of the activity of Kenya. 
The OTP᾽s 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations clearly provides guidelines 
on what constitutes inactivity in a case.123 Factors to be considered include deficiencies 
in the legislative framework; laws which promote non-judicial approaches; bias toward 
persons with political clout; political will; and judicial capacity.124 The Court mentioned 
the alleged focus on low-level perpetrators to justify the inactivity of Kenya. On the 
other hand, the Court denied Kenya’s evidence in the possession of the Prosecutor, 
making it difficult to determine the intention of Kenya to ignore the investigation of 
persons identified by the Court. 
The Court invented the consideration of inaction as a means of authorising automatic 
admissibility and to avoid at times the cumbersome process of determining 
unwillingness or inability.125 Prior to Kenya, the Court often relied on the standard of 
inaction to alter state jurisdiction. The understanding of the Court is that when 
investigative or prosecutorial steps are invisible, states with jurisdiction are inactive. 
The additional element of inactivity has received both support and criticism from 
scholars. Conservatives maintain that the admissibility interpretation should be limited 
to unwillingness or inability to investigate or prosecute.126 The conservative view 
advocates for non-intervention of the ICC on other grounds except the grounds 
expressly mentioned in the Rome Statute. On the other hand, liberals contend that the 
consideration of inaction is at the forefront of determining admissibility. The liberal view 
regards the consideration of unwillingness or inability as secondary, since it is 
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unnecessary once inaction is detected.127 The Court has overwhelmingly and 
consistently endorsed the liberal view. 
4.7.2     What if ability was considered? 
Inability is assessed based on the effectiveness or availability of the national judicial 
system to conduct proceedings, the ability to obtain the accused or evidence, and a 
demonstrated ability to carry out proceedings.128 Inability becomes mute when the 
readiness, resources and structural capabilities in the national legal system are 
unquestionable or progressively developing.129 The national judicial system needs to 
be non-existent, or in a total or substantial collapse, among other requirements for the 
test to apply. 
Had the PTC considered the inability of Kenya, it could have found it hard to authorise 
the investigation. None of the above assessments easily qualify as inability in the 
Kenyatta case. Possibly, the Court dodged the analysis to avoid the controversy that 
could have emerged had it authorised the investigation when it was inconclusive that 
Kenya lacked the ability to investigate or prosecute. Genuineness or intention to 
undertake national proceedings in future could also have given Kenya an edge by 
invoking positive complementarity to appeal for assistance in strengthening its national 
systems. 
In the aftermath of the post-election violence, Kenya admitted that its criminal justice 
system needed reforms to effectively investigate and prosecute perpetrators.130 At that 
point, Kenya could be said to have lacked the ability to undertake national proceedings. 
The position changed when Kenya started legislative reforms to infuse reforms into the 
national process. Riding on CIPEV recommendations, Kenya began by enacting the 
International Crimes Act (ICA) in 2008 to domesticate the Rome Statute.131 The ICA 
authorised the prosecution of international crimes by the High Court of Kenya,132 and 
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protection of victims and witnesses.133 Kenya announced an intention to establish an 
International Crimes Division within the High Court.134 
South Africa is one example regarding the potential of national courts to remind states 
of the impact of domestication. The ICC Act gives domestic courts powers to adjudicate 
the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.135 The High 
Court of South Africa ordered the government to exercise jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in Zimbabwe, since South Africa is obliged under the Constitution and the 
ICC Act to investigate and prosecute international crimes ῾as far as possible᾿.136 Just 
like in this South African scenario, a strong international crimes legislation and 
competent judiciary may not be backed by the necessary political will. 
Following the enactment of the ICA, another chapter to the ongoing reforms was added 
with the drafting of a new Constitution that commenced before the PTC authorised the 
investigation. The new Constitution was adopted in 2010, soon after the authorisation 
of an investigation. The Constitution empowered Kenya with competence to carry out 
national proceedings. The Constitution provides for strong mechanisms in the 
judiciary137 and the police,138 and enshrines a justiciable Bill of Rights.139 
The strengthening of the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission 
(KNHREC) enhanced the ability of Kenya to promote the attainment of justice and 
realisation of human rights. The KNHREC is a constitutional body, with powers to 
conduct investigations on human rights violations.140 In light of the constitutional 
developments, Kenya has made strides in pursuit of democracy, human rights and 
accountability. The Constitution of Kenya has been described as ‘revolutionary᾽ and 
‘progressive᾽.141 
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The KNHREC is an independent institution which exerts checks and balances on the 
government. The promulgation of the new Constitution in Kenya can be likened to the 
stance adopted by South Africa when the country made a transition from apartheid to 
democracy. South Africa adopted the 1996 Constitution in response to the oppressive 
social, economic, legal and political history occasioned by an apartheid system.142 The 
transformative nature of the South African Constitution enhances fundamental human 
rights.143 
In the Kenyatta case, the Court should have considered that Kenya was making 
significant progress through the enactment of constitutional reforms which 
acknowledged past injustices and the historical context in the country. However, the 
Court could have been justified in overlooking the steps taken by Kenya if Kenya was 
moving towards ‘abusive᾽ or ‘sham᾽ constitutionalism. Abusive constitutionalism 
depicts a state which makes constitutional changes aimed at closing the democratic 
space for citizens.144 Sham constitutions give governments excessive powers which 
are often exercised to quash human rights.145 
The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), predecessor to the 
KNHREC, supported the intervention of the ICC in Kenya in 2008.146 The KNCHR did 
not utilise its first Strategic Plan of 2003 to 2008 to encourage the strengthening of 
institutional capacity to effectively and efficiently deliver on human rights.147 Also, the 
KNHREC did not utilise the Strategic Plan of 2009 to 2013 developed by its 
predecessor and lost the opportunity to activate a strong administration of justice 
mechanism.148 As a result, the ability of Kenya to investigate and prosecute post-
election violent crimes was not fully explored. Potential accountability mechanisms at 
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the domestic level were overlooked to pave the way for the ICC. As an important 
institution and a check on state human rights obligations, the KNHREC could also have 
pressured the government to conduct transparent domestic proceedings.149 
4.7.3      What if willingness was considered? 
Unwillingness is assessed based on sham or biased national proceedings, unjustifiable 
delays in the proceedings and interference with decisions of courts.150 Following 
controversial debates at the Rome Statute negotiations, the above three alternative 
criteria were adopted as an exhaustive list for the definition of unwillingness.151 The 
notion of unwillingness mostly refers to the political will to investigate or prosecute, and 
the authenticity of national proceedings. The existence of willingness is dependent on 
politics.152 
Proceedings at the national level should be diligently conducted if a state wants to pass 
the willingness test.153 The Court is empowered to evaluate the credibility of national 
proceedings to end impunity which may result from procedural and legislative 
defects.154 The Court should holistically evaluate article 17 to evaluate admissibility 
without transforming itself into an appellate court.155 
Arguably, the Court missed a great opportunity to justify the admissibility of the 
Kenyatta case by neglecting the analysis of unwillingness. Kenya was active and 
evidently demonstrated an ability to investigate persons identified by the ICC through 
the legislative and police reforms that were progressively enacted. Nevertheless, 
serious doubt remained on whether the country was willing to effectively investigate 
the alleged perpetrators. The mere existence of national proceedings is not enough. A 
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state should show that the quality and fairness of the proceedings comply with due 
process and international law standards.156 
Kenya displayed reluctance to try perpetrators identified by the ICC and refused to 
sufficiently co-operate with the Court. Kenya also threatened to withdraw its ICC 
membership.157 The strength of the political will to implement the ICA was put to the 
test when Kenya was presented with an opportunity to enforce a High Court decision 
to arrest Omar Al Bashir on Kenyan territory on 27 August 2010.158 Kenya refused to 
arrest Bashir, an indication that it lacked the political will to prosecute or facilitate the 
prosecution of certain categories of persons accused of atrocities. The failure to 
prosecute because of the desire to protect an alleged perpetrator is inconsistent with 
the fight against impunity. 
A case of unjustified delay may have been imputed on Kenya which had over a year 
from early 2008 to late 2009 to deal with the case involving the identified persons. 
Kenya made little progress.159 The reluctance was shown during the ICC proceedings 
and through the criticism of the ICC by prominent politicians in Kenya. Reliance on 
unwillingness could have given legitimacy to the Prosecutor’s case, particularly in the 
face of widespread criticism in Africa. The Prosecutor could also have attained 
justification to dismiss the alternative regional mechanisms proposed by Kenya based 
on their largely unsatisfactory record to address human rights violations on the 
continent. 
The Prosecutor had the space to make sustainable and convincing submissions based 
on express provisions in the Rome Statute. Kenya would have been left with an 
insurmountable task to rebut convincing prosecutorial arguments. Positive 
complementarity could not have helped Kenya’s admissibility challenge when 
unwillingness was proven.160 In future cases, it is advisable for the Prosecutor to rely 
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on inaction within the context of both inability and unwillingness of a state to investigate 
and prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. 
4.7.4      What if genuineness was considered? 
The adjective ‘genuinely᾽ is affixed to the words ‘unwilling or unable᾽ in article 17 of the 
Rome Statute. Neither the Rome Statute nor its preparatory documents provide 
guidance on the meaning of ‘genuine᾽ proceedings.161 However, the term refers to 
circumstances in which things are truly what they purport to be, and they are not false, 
forged, fictitious, simulated, spurious or counterfeit.162 A state is required to conduct its 
proceedings in good faith, without pretence or insincerity.163 In other words, the 
intention of a state forms the basis of genuineness. 
The term ‘genuine᾽ was inserted in the Rome Statute after the negotiators dropped the 
terms ‘effectively᾽, ‘diligently᾽ and ‘efficiently᾽.164 The objective was to narrow the 
leverage of the Court in judging certain aspects of national proceedings.165 In 
interpreting genuineness, every attempt should be made to defer cases to a state to 
conduct the proceedings in good faith.166 Some scholars prefer a lower standard in 
interpreting genuineness and argue that national proceedings can be genuine even in 
the absence of due process.167 The Prosecutor must demonstrate a lack of 
genuineness of national proceedings.168 The Court determines the lack of genuineness 
after assessment of the Prosecutor’s submissions. Had the Court considered 
genuineness in the Kenyatta case, it could have prevented the unprecedented shifting 
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4.8   Burden of proof and evidentiary requirements 
In the Kenyatta case, the Court appraised four standards of evidence as applicable to 
different stages of proceedings. The ‘reasonable basis to believe᾽ standard is the 
lowest evidentiary burden.169 The standard applies to circumstances in which the 
Prosecutor is yet to get investigative powers. The duty of the Prosecutor is to show the 
PTC that a reasonable basis exists for the authorisation of an investigation. The 
Prosecutor does not need concrete, tangible or conclusive evidence at this stage of 
the proceedings. That which can be reasonably assumed, believed, suspected and 
predicted will suffice for the Prosecutor’s submissions to be accepted. 
Closest to the ‘reasonable basis to believe᾽ standard is the ‘reasonable grounds to 
believe᾽ standard found in article 58 of the Rome Statute. The ῾reasonable grounds to 
believe᾿ standard applies at the issuance of warrant of arrest or summons to appear 
stage.170 Unlike the preliminary examination stage that majors on the commission of 
crimes within a particular context, the warrant of arrest or summons stage majors on 
the criminal responsibility of an individual.171 A reasonable basis to believe gives the 
Prosecutor flexibility to leave the room open for other possibilities that may exist 
alongside the preliminary conclusion.172 Article 61(7) of the Rome Statute requires 
‘substantial grounds to believe᾽ in the confirmation of charges. Finally, ‘proof beyond 
reasonable doubt᾽ is required to convict an accused person.173 
4.8.1      Burden of proof 
The Rome Statute allows a state or an accused person to make an admissibility 
challenge.174 The Court’s demand for Kenya to back up its admissibility challenge with 
concrete evidence sparked fierce debate, particularly because an admissibility 
challenge should be accompanied by significant facts or evidence.175 The Prosecutor 
can request a review for an inadmissibility decision.176 In the Kenyatta case, the Court 
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held that a party challenging the admissibility of a case bears the burden to prove that 
the case is inadmissible.177 The Court maintained the position in the Libyan situation.178 
A party that challenges admissibility should provide supporting documents or evidence. 
However, there is no clear guidance on whether merely producing documents suffices 
as the disclosure of evidence or whether one needs to prove inadmissibility in the 
process. Prior to the Kenyatta case, the understanding was that the Prosecutor bears 
a burden of proof.179 The Kenyatta case altered the rigidity of the position and 
established a new standard which imposes a responsibility on a challenger of 
admissibility to prove that a case is inadmissible.180 
The Rome Statute and the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide some 
guidance on the bearers of the onus to prove (in)admissibility. Article 67(1)(i) of the 
Rome Statute and rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide the most 
relevant guidance. Article 67 is on the submission of evidence and indicates who bears 
proof or any onus of rebuttal. Article 67 is placed under the trial section of the Rome 
Statute, thereby raising questions on whether it is only applicable at the later stages of 
the proceedings when, for instance, the Prosecutor needs to prove guilt beyond any 
reasonable doubt. Rule 63 fills the lacuna by establishing a link between article 67 and 
rule 63. 
Rule 63 promotes an interpretation that acknowledges the Rome Statute as a 
multilateral treaty governed by the customary rules of interpretation embodied in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
allow an interpretation that encompasses the object and purpose of a treaty. Rule 63 
applies to proceedings before all Chambers. Arguably, article 67(1)(i) applies to 
proceedings before all ICC Chambers, although it is placed under the trial section of 
the Rome Statute. 
The Court’s decision in the Kenyatta case was made pursuant to a deliberate disregard 
or oversight of the statutory provisions of the Court. The Court may need to revisit its 
practice to conform it to the Rome Statute because a state does not need to establish 
 
177 Ruto et al (n 122 above) paras 61 & 83. 
178 Prosecutor v Gaddafi & Al-Senussi (31 May 2013) 01/11-01/11 ICC para 52. 
179 Spilman (n 3 above) 15. 
180 Muthaura (n 46 above) para 61. 
162 
 
inadmissibility. The Rome Statute already presumes inadmissibility. The onus is on the 
Prosecutor to rebut the presumption of inadmissibility. The Prosecutor conducts 
preliminary examinations or investigations to determine whether a situation is ripe for 
intervention and to determine a state’s procedures.181 A thorough process results not 
only in the Prosecutor considering the existence of a reasonable basis to proceed but 
also on the conclusion about the genuineness of a state’s ability or willingness.182 
A warrant of arrest can only be granted if it contains evidence which shows reasonable 
grounds that crimes were committed and the necessity to bring the person before the 
Court.183 Thus, the Prosecutor bears the burden of proof. At the confirmation of 
charges, the Prosecutor shall support alleged charges with sufficient evidence.184 The 
accused will only be convicted if the Prosecutor proves guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt.185 With all the evidentiary burdens on the Prosecutor, the Court has surprisingly 
interpreted the submission of information or evidence or observations by a state 
insufficient if not accompanied with proof of the adequacy of such evidence. 
4.8.2      Fair trials and burden of evidence 
International criminal tribunals often strive for legitimacy and credibility, as their 
performance is scrutinised globally.186 The first Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY and the 
ICTR, Richard Goldstone, once remarked, ‘Whether there are convictions or whether 
there are acquittals will not be the yardstick of the ICTY. The measure is going to be 
the fairness of the proceedings….᾽187 For the ICC, the aim is to end impunity and at 
the same time deliver justice in a fair, independent and impartial manner.188 
The Rome Statute has a high standard to prevent unjustified trumping of an accused’s 
rights. The Court primarily considers the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes, the 
Rules of Evidence and Procedure, and applicable treaties, principles and rules of 
international law to give effect to the rights.189 The OTP developed the Strategic Plan 
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2012-2015 to cement the preservation of fair trials, among other objectives. Through 
the Plan, the OTP committed to carry out its activities with due regard to human rights, 
due processes and fair trial.190 
Article 67 of the Rome Statute protects the accused from bearing the burden of proof 
or any onus of rebuttal.191 Further, the rights of the accused including fair trial should 
be respected in terms of article 64(2). In the Libyan situation, the Court linked 
admissibility with fair trials.192 Libya’s ability to guarantee the rights of the accused was 
scrutinised based on its criminal justice system and assurances for fair trial.193 The 
Prosecutor submitted that the accused was in danger of prosecution without due 
diligence.194 The Court made various fair trial considerations in the light of Libya’s laws 
and international human rights instruments.195 
The Court negatively impacts the accused’s right to a fair trial when the burden of proof 
is transferred to a state. The burden of proof should remain with the Prosecutor in all 
stages of proceedings before the Court. Otherwise the Court will risk creating scenarios 
that it endeavours to prevent, such as ῾sham᾽ proceedings. The Court needs to guard 
against the assertion that international criminal tribunals pay little attention to the rights 
of the accused. The Court should assess the evidentiary burden in conjunction with 
the need to preserve fair trials.196 
4.9   Substantially the same person 
4.9.1     What is in the term ‘substantial᾽? 
The term ‘substantial᾽ is commonly used by the Court in matters in which particular 
standards apply on a certain issue. The Court has created its own standards that are 
subsequently amended and interpreted in different ways. The term substantial is 
defined as ‘of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable᾽.197 The term 
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denotes that to a greater or significant extent essential parts are covered.198 The term 
has been used to define the extent of the state’s co-operation with the Court, the weight 
of evidence presented and elements of crimes preferred by the Court or state. 
The Court uses the term when a higher standard is required in a case. A mere action 
by a state in response to issues is deemed inadequate under the circumstances. The 
objective is to prevent shallow or half-hearted investigations and prosecutions by a 
state. The Court evaluates a state’s willingness and ability in comparison with the 
standard set by the Court. 
The substantial standard usually comes into play when a state takes some action which 
does not entirely convince the Court. The subjective nature of the term leads to 
controversy due to differences in the threshold of expectations between the Court and 
a state.199 The anomaly can be cured by reconciling the different thresholds through, 
for instance, giving a state a broader discretion to define the parameters of its action. 
The prosecutorial policy can be read together with state policy to find the middle ground 
on the substantiality of state action. 
4.9.2      The two-fold test 
The Court has consistently held that for a case to be inadmissible, state action should 
encompass the same conduct and the same person under the focus of the Court.200 
The ῾same person and same conduct᾿ test is often criticised because it disregards the 
contextual or circumstantial nature of different cases.201 The test may also place a high 
standard which a state may not meet due to deficiencies of resources and information. 
This test was first used in the case of Lubanga202 and robustly argued in the Kenyatta 
case. In the Kenyatta case, the Court addressed the same person component for the 
first time.203 The bone of contention was the meaning of a ‘case᾽ and of a ‘person᾽. 
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The Court viewed the case as specific and concrete with identified persons, while 
Kenya argued that the Court is yet to authoritatively define the term.204 The Court 
defined a person as an individual identified for prosecution, whereas Kenya viewed a 
person as belonging to a group of persons.205 Kenya believed in a hierarchical or 
representative approach to prosecutions, as opposed to an individual-specific 
approach to prosecutions. The view is not far-fetched and finds a basis in the 
jurisprudence of most international criminal tribunals. 
The Court developed the interpretation of the same conduct component of the test. In 
its early practice, the Court adopted a strict approach which required a state to show 
that it was investigating or prosecuting the same conduct. The Court required 
proceedings in a state to reflect not only the prosecution of international crime(s) under 
the Rome Statute but also the definitions as embodied in the Rome Statute.206 
After some time, the Court realised that it was drifting towards primacy, as it is not 
always possible for a state to investigate or prosecute the same crimes pursued by the 
Court. The realisation led to the modification of the same conduct component. 
Resultantly, the Court accepted the ‘substantially same conduct᾽ approach in the Ruto 
et al and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi cases.207 Despite the modification, the Court is yet to 
appreciate the inadmissibility of cases when ῾different conduct᾽ state proceedings offer 
a stronger liability or punishment for the accused.208 Also, the Court is yet to modify 
the same person component of the test. 
The modification of the same conduct component opens room to debate the 
modification of the same person component of the test, since in the context of the ICC, 
a ‘case᾽ comprises both crimes (conduct) and perpetrators (persons). The modification 
may lead the Court to appreciate investigations or prosecutions in accordance with the 
same hierarchy of persons. Such a scenario offers a likely advantage for states to try 
military and non-military commanders who bear more responsibility than persons 
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preferred by the Court. In future cases, the Court should consider a comparative 
assessment of the persons presented by a state and those under the focus of the 
Court. If the persons under the focus of the state bear a relatively similar or more 
responsibility than those preferred by the Court, an admissibility challenge by a state 
should succeed. 
4.9.3     Case or person selection 
International criminal tribunals often deal with cases involving low-level to high-level 
perpetrators. Tribunals based on complementarity do not prosecute all or most crimes 
like domestic courts.209 Prosecutorial discretion is exercised to limit cases tried by 
international tribunals.210 Resource constraints, sharing of burden between the 
tribunals and states, and the need to expedite trials lead tribunals to prioritise crimes 
and perpetrators.211 The prioritisation and selection process is challenging due to 
several factors which encompass political, ethnic, geographical and hierarchical 
considerations.212 
The policy of the OTP changes periodically to outline the priorities of the Prosecutor at 
a given time. In the early years of the Court, the Prosecutor mostly targeted persons 
bearing the greatest responsibility for international crimes. The 2012-2015 Strategic 
Plan refined the Court’s approach to include middle-level perpetrators.213 The OTP 
policy shows that the Prosecutor can independently and in consultation with states 
exercise flexibility in crafting a selection strategy. The Prosecutor is guided by the 
gravity of the offences, the degree of responsibility and potential charges, and crimes 
that have traditionally been under-prosecuted.214 
Other international criminal tribunals have also prioritised crimes and perpetrators. The 
SCSL focused on the most responsible. Cambodia prioritised senior leaders, whereas 
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the initial policy of the ICTY and ICTR was based on the position of the person, serious 
violations, policy and practical considerations.215 The ICTY and ICTR considered the 
importance of not jeopardising inter-ethnic reconciliation and regional equity in the 
selection process.216 The strategy of the ICTY and ICTR was later revised to implement 
the completion strategy that required more deferrals to Yugoslavia and Rwanda under 
rule 11bis.217  
With a change in strategy, the ICTR held the contribution of African regional 
mechanisms to international criminal justice in high esteem. The ICTR turned to 
Rwanda and the African Commission for the finalisation of cases referred by the 
tribunal. In the opinion of the ICTR, the African Commission possessed requisite 
competence to monitor trials prosecuted by Rwanda.218 In this regard, the ICTR 
assisted the African Commission in monitoring guidelines, as demonstrated in the 
Prosecutor v Uwinkindi (Uwinkindi referral).219 Therefore, the ICTR created a 
cooperative model where a state, international criminal tribunal and African regional 
mechanism were party to, or displayed interest in a case.  
Notwithstanding practical advantages associated with the selection of cases, scholars 
criticised the criteria of selecting crimes and persons based on geographical or ethnic 
considerations. Scholars argue that a prosecutor steps out of responsibility when he 
or she is motivated partly by the affiliation of suspects instead of the role of 
perpetrators.220 
4.9.4       Hierarchical considerations in the Kenyatta case 
The ICTY raised alarm on the selection of senior leaders and individuals based on their 
positions or functions in a relevant hierarchy.221 Previously, the ICC identified with the 
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prioritisation of senior leaders, although the Court has not extensively demarcated 
persons in view of the scope of same hierarchy. 
The Kenyatta case called for an assessment of what constitute persons in the same 
level of hierarchy. Kenyatta was an indirect co-perpetrator with subordinates and 
possibly those at the same level of hierarchy.222 At the situation stage, the Court had 
no problem with hierarchical considerations.223 It is at the case stage when the Court 
has raised dissatisfaction with certain categorisations.224 
In the Kenyatta case, two considerations emerged on the view of the Court and Kenya 
on the application of the same level of hierarchy test. Both considerations are based 
on Kenyatta’s position as a superior or non-military commander. First, the application 
of superior responsibility has a lower standard under the Rome Statute.225 While article 
28(1) of the Rome Statute requires military commanders to know or to predict the 
commission of crimes by subordinates, article 28(2) of the Rome Statute applies a 
lower standard by only expecting that the civilian superior knew or ignored information 
on the commission of crimes by subordinates. 
Complications arise when a state identifies mostly superior actors, in lieu of potential 
military perpetrators, with the aim of giving effect to the doctrine of superior 
responsibility to the greatest extent possible. Will the Court discourage national 
proceedings claiming the suspects are different from those identified by the Court, or 
will the Court embrace the prosecution of superiors who will normally evade justice at 
the national level? Ideally, the Court should accept the selection of cases by a state 
and encourage the state to broaden its horizon to include other suspects who bear the 
most responsibility. By putting the military and non-military commanders at the same 
level of hierarchy, the superior responsibility standard is raised, thereby auguring well 
with the objective to end impunity. 
Kenyatta was charged with crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity entail 
widespread and systematic attacks against civilian populations.226 The attacks may 
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also be part of a state or organisational policy.227 In the Tadić case, the term ‘policy᾽ 
was used to explain collective, as opposed to ‘isolated, random acts of individuals᾽.228 
The explanation resonated with the 1996 ILC Draft Code that viewed an attack as 
‘instigated or directed by a government or by any organisation or group᾽.229 Crimes 
against humanity differ from common crimes, as the former constitute the policy 
element.230 Cassese contends that members of joint common enterprise may operate 
at the same level or form part of a hierarchically constituted organisation or structure.231 
Therefore, in terms of the Rome Statute, Kenyatta either initiated or implemented a 
state or organisational policy as a senior government official. 
When the Prosecutor chose Kenya for investigation and prosecution, the Prosecutor 
wanted to make Kenya an example of the outcomes of inaction by a state which is 
expected to address impunity.232 The Prosecutor also wanted to break the culture of 
electoral violence in Kenya.233 The Prosecutor aimed to dismantle a policy that 
authorised and institutionalised violence and promoted impunity for decades. 
The conduct of perpetrators is often co-ordinated to carry out a widespread and 
systematic attack against the civilian population.234 Since it is not always possible to 
gather evidence for every aspect of the attack, including specific persons who carry 
each attack, individual conduct can be fitted within a criminal scheme of an established 
hierarchy.235 Arguably, a number of persons carried or facilitated the accomplishment 
of the policy, not only in the 2007 to 2008 violence but dating back to 1963. Hence, the 
investigation of the CIPEV encompassed violent acts from independence.236 
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The Prosecutor was spoilt for choice on the number of persons who were part of the 
policy. Arguably, the Prosecutor should have considered persons in the same level of 
hierarchy from a list of suspects. 
International crimes are predominantly committed through direct or indirect 
governmental or organisational authority.237 A number of superiors may exercise 
effective control and therefore are likely to be implicated for crimes committed by 
subordinates.238 In a prosecutorial policy that aims to identify few superiors or 
commanders for prosecution, the selection process can be done within the ambit of 
persons at the same level of hierarchy. Just like the Prosecutor is free to exercise 
discretion on preferred persons, a state should also be allowed to exercise discretion 
in choosing persons in the hierarchy. 
The Court practice must reflect the ‘substantially same persons᾽ test, where 
appropriate. This is not to exonerate certain persons from responsibility but to show 
that when the need is to address a policy or when equally responsible persons exist, a 
sample of individuals will suffice. If the persons are at the same level of hierarchy, 
preferred persons are of little relevance. 
The discussion that follows examines examples from the ICTY and the ICC to 
substantiate the interpretation of superior command responsibility and ensuing 
prosecution in the context of a policy. 
4.9.5   Joint Criminal Enterprise in the International Criminal Tribunal for the    
former Yugoslavia jurisprudence 
In the Čelebići case, the ICTY laid a foundation for the ‘effective control᾽ or ‘material 
ability᾽ test which entails the responsibility of commanders or superiors for acts 
committed by subordinates. Responsibility can be imputed if the person exercised 
effective control over the subordinates and had the ability to prevent or punish the 
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violations.239 The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions are also 
authoritative on the duties and relations of commanders and their subordinates.240 
The Čelebići standard was subsequently endorsed in Kunarac,241 Krstic,242 and 
Kvočka et al.243 The ICTY practice also developed the joint criminal enterprise theory 
whereby co-perpetration exists such as in the case of Kenyatta. In the Tadić case, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber fully discussed the ‘notion of common purpose᾽244 through 
which co-perpetrators have a common design or enterprise and possess the same 
criminal intent to commit a crime.245 The co-perpetrators aim to further a criminal 
activity or purpose of a group.246 The common enterprise may result in the conviction 
of an offender for an act committed by another member of a group.247 Participants are 
dependent on one another and none has overall control of the offence.248 
In the Brdjanin case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that a crime can be imputed to 
at least one member of the joint criminal enterprise, provided the member acted in 
accordance with the common plan.249 Mundis posits that the doctrine of superior 
responsibility may be used in conjunction with joint criminal enterprise to close any 
gaps and to ensure the prosecution of the greatest possible number of perpetrators.250 
A prosecutor must establish superiors who were part of a joint criminal enterprise with 
either commanders of a similar rank or even with subordinates in the chain of 
command, and select cases within the given same or different hierarchy. 
For purposes of complementarity under the Rome Statute, it is ideal for the Prosecutor 
and states to jointly establish the persons under a hierarchy to determine the extent to 
which a national jurisdiction investigates or prosecutes crimes that were allegedly 
committed. Considering the near impossibility of prosecuting every person in a 
hierarchy, the Prosecutor should be guided more by a qualitative rather than a 
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quantitative nature of national proceedings. The qualitative nature must include a 
sample of the most responsible persons as per the discretion of a state. The Court 
must be satisfied where ‘substantially same persons᾽ are prosecuted. 
4.9.6   Joint Criminal Enterprise in the International Criminal Court jurisprudence 
Article 25 of the Rome Statute imposes criminal liability for individual and joint acts. 
The ICC first applied the concept of co-perpetration in the Lubanga case.251 The case 
not only identified the necessity of an agreement or common plan but also the 
importance of a co-ordinated contribution by each perpetrator.252 On this basis, if a 
state or Court institutes criminal proceedings against selected individuals or 
commanders, the identified persons will be representative of the group and thereby fall 
within the ‘substantially same persons᾽ concept. Ambos observes that an individual 
may commit a crime as part of a group or in advancement of a group plan, hence the 
need to consider individual responsibility and collective responsibility together.253 
The organisational or policy of a constituent of joint criminal enterprise was not 
articulated in the Lubanga case but came to the fore in the Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui 
case.254 In the latter, the two accused were identified as indirect co-perpetrators who 
agreed on a common plan as commanders of their respective hierarchical 
organisations to attack the village of Bogoro.255 By failing to separate the two 
organisations so as to establish the criminal acts committed by each organisation 
respectively, the Court impliedly confirmed that the two groups were substantially the 
same at the time the acts were committed. Accordingly, individuals can rightly be 
prosecuted for acts committed through others as if they had individually committed the 
acts.256 
The Al Bashir257 and Blé Goudé258 cases further narrow the participation of hierarchical 
organisations by treating different organisations as one, if the different organisations 
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acted with a common purpose. Various co-perpetrators combine to act under one 
hierarchical organisation. 
Notwithstanding the above, the Joint Criminal Enterprise theory at the ICC has been 
subjected to extensive critique. Cassese and Gaeta are of the view that article 25(3)(a) 
permits the use of the theory owing to the acknowledgement that a crime can be 
committed jointly.259 On the other hand, some scholars highlight the complications 
brought by the Lubanga case, which endorsed the ῾Control of the Crime᾿ theory.260 
This theory distinguishes between principal liability and accessorial liability. There is 
also no consensus among the judges of the ICC on an appropriate theory for the Court, 
for example, Judges Fulford and Van den Wyngaert previously held that the Control of 
the Crime theory is inconsistent with the Rome Statute.261  
4.10   Disclosure of evidence 
4.10.1     Necessity of disclosure 
The disclosure of evidence by the prosecution or the defence is mandatory in many 
international and domestic jurisdictions.262 The duty to disclose evidence is suspended 
only in exceptional circumstances, such as protection of persons or evidence, or 
prevention of abscondment of persons.263 Disclosure is at the heart of fair trials as well 
as the ability of the prosecution and the defence to adequately prepare cases.264 The 
interests of justice are better served when opposing parties are symmetrically 
prepared. The sharing of information redresses structural and resource imbalances.265 
Article 66 of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes mandated disclosure throughout the 
proceedings. Just as the parameters of a potential case should be known by the Court 
and a state for comparison to be made on what both are investigating, the parameters 
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of the outcomes of investigation should be availed by each party to initiate a discussion 
on the application of complementarity. 
A party who has custody, possession or control of evidence should share helpful 
evidence with the other party.266 In the Lubanga case, the failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence led to a temporary stay of proceedings and provisional release 
of the accused.267 The Court considered the duty of the Prosecutor to disclose 
evidence more important than the Prosecutor’s privilege to retain confidential 
information.268 Exculpatory evidence may assist in proving the innocence of the 
accused and to help the Court reach an appropriate sentence after conviction.269 
In the Kenyatta case, if the Prosecutor had disclosed evidence requested by Kenya, 
the credibility of evidence may have been affected through a revelation that Kenya was 
prepared to investigate the suspects as soon as it was in possession of adequate 
information. The disclosure of evidence enhances the ‘equality of arms᾿.270 In Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Chui, the Court emphasised the importance of exculpatory evidence.271 
The Prosecutor should reveal exculpatory, incriminating and exonerating evidence 
without the request of the Defence prior to trial.272 The duty should be performed ‘as 
soon as possible᾽,273 and ‘as soon as practicable᾽.274 
4.10.2      Disclosure requests in the Kenyatta case 
This section looks at disclosure requests made by either Kenya or the Prosecutor in 
the Kenyatta case. The objective is to emphasise the importance of disclosure for both 
parties and to demonstrate that the disclosure of evidence is a key consideration in 
cases before an international criminal tribunal such as the ICC. 
One of the notable submissions made by Kenya in the Kenyatta appeal case was that 
‘unlimited and continuous᾽ disclosure of evidence should be done during the 
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subsistence of an admissibility challenge.275 Judge Ušacka endorsed the assertion in 
a dissenting judgment. The Court dismissed this interpretation of admissibility and saw 
it as Kenya’s strategy to extend admissibility proceedings beyond acceptable time.276 
The AC noted that the PTC retains discretion to allow the filing of additional evidence 
after an admissibility challenge has been raised.277 A rejection of the filing by the PTC 
does not amount to an abuse, the AC held.278 This means a state should be ready to 
suffer consequences of a premature filing, since an amendment to an admissibility 
challenge is not guaranteed. 
Three requests arose in the Kenyatta case that are pertinent to the approach to the 
disclosure of evidence either by a state or the Prosecutor. The first two requests pertain 
to Kenya’s requests for an oral hearing and additional evidence in possession of the 
Prosecutor. The request for an oral hearing was designed to update the Court on the 
status of domestic proceedings, while the request for additional evidence was 
designed to enable a deferral to the domestic jurisdiction. Kenya hoped to trigger the 
Prosecutor’s deferral powers when it requested additional evidence.279 The third 
request led the Prosecutor to make a counter request, without success, for Kenya to 
release evidence implicating Kenyatta. The three requests show that the obligation to 
disclose evidence rests with both the Prosecutor and states. 
Regarding the first request, Kenya wanted the conduct of an oral hearing for the Court 
to be briefed by the Police Commissioner that indeed the country was taking steps to 
investigate and prosecute the suspects.280 The Court found the submission 
unnecessary and accordingly rejected the request.281 
The second request was unsuccessful because the Court failed to get a linkage 
between the disclosure of evidence by the Prosecutor and the issue of admissibility.282 
This was despite a low burden placed upon the defence in rule 77 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. The rule requires the establishment of a prima facie 
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relevance of the information.283 The requested information was filed out of time and 
the Court considered the requested information to be of irrelevance in the current 
challenge. The Prosecutor advised Kenya to make such a request in a future 
admissibility challenge.284 Further, the Court declined that it has an obligation to assist 
states with evidence. 
In relation to the third request, the Prosecutor failed to convince Kenya to produce 
Kenyatta’s financial history.285 The non-co-operation by Kenya forced the Prosecutor 
to withdraw the charges, as he could not build a strong case to secure a conviction.286 
Since the evidence was relevant to the Prosecutor’s case, the failure to obtain the 
evidence was viewed by the Court as having an adverse impact on the Court’s ability 
to exercise its powers and functions.287 Arguably, the Prosecutor’s failure to share the 
evidence requested by Kenya also adversely affected the ability of Kenya to comply 
with its primary duty to investigate and prosecute Kenyatta. 
The above requests stemmed from the Rome Statute, Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, and Regulations of the Court. The Court applied a lower disclosure standard 
and ignored the materiality of prosecution disclosure to the admissibility of cases. Since 
the aim of complementarity is to preserve the primacy of states, every effort and 
opportunity should be exhausted to assist states to exercise their primary duty. 
Concentration on the procedural flaws of a state frustrates the substance upon which 
complementarity is built. The Court could have used the flexibility in the Court’s legal 
instruments to create opportunities for the transmission of evidence to Kenya as 
proffered below. 
First, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence empower the Court Chambers to decide 
on procedure when an admissibility challenge has been filed.288 Through the conduct 
of an oral hearing, the sticky issues that arose during the admissibility challenge may 
 
283 Prosecutor v Banda & Jerbo (28 August 2013) 02/05-03/09-501 ICC para 42. 
284 Ruto et al (n 122 above) para 118. 
285 OTP ̔ Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the status of the Government 
of Kenya’s cooperation with the Prosecution’s investigations in the Kenyatta case᾿ 4 December 2014 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-04-12-2014 (accessed 26 August 2018).  
286 Prosecutor v Kenyatta (13 March 2015) 01/09-02/11 ICC. 
287 Kenyatta (n 286 above) para 10. 
288 n 264 above, rule 58. 
177 
 
have been narrowed and the assistance to be rendered to Kenya to carry out its own 
domestic proceedings may have been better appreciated. 
Secondly, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence permit an adjournment under certain 
circumstances to address issues raised by a state or an accused person.289 An 
adjournment was also an opportunity for Kenya to inspect material availed by the 
Prosecutor. The Court and Kenya could have used the adjournment to assess the 
potential impact of the Prosecutor’s evidence on admissibility. 
Lastly, the Court could have used its discretion to allow the disclosure of additional 
evidence by both Kenya and the Prosecutor. The Regulations of the Court allow for 
the extension of time when the extension is justified.290 Kenya’s willingness and ability 
to carry out domestic proceedings was to be further tested if no steps were taken after 
the Court had exhausted its duty towards the state. The failure of the Prosecutor to 
obtain evidence from Kenya showed that the Court and states exist in an 
interdependent relationship. The interdependence should inspire the Court to assist a 
state to retain jurisdiction. 
4.10.3     Disclosure prior to confirmation of charges 
The PTC II authorised the Prosecutor to intervene in Kenya on 31 March 2010. On 8 
March 2011, the Prosecutor issued summons for Kenyatta and two others to appear 
before the Court. Kenya unsuccessfully challenged the admissibility of the cases on 
31 March 2011. On 30 August 2011, the AC upheld the decision of the PTC II. On 23 
January 2012, PTC II confirmed charges against Kenyatta. The historical background 
indicates that the requests by Kenya that are relevant to the discussion on 
complementarity were done before the Court confirmed charges. 
The proceedings in the ICC consists of a two-stage disclosure framework, namely, 
disclosure prior to the confirmation of charges and disclosure related to trial. Disclosure 
prior to the confirmation of charges is discussed in this section. Notably, there is no 
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longer a distinction in the ICC practice between confirmation and trial stages regarding 
prosecutorial disclosure.291 
The confirmation of charges stage is specifically covered by article 61 of the Rome 
Statute as well as rules 121 to 126 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. As 
discussed earlier, ‘substantial grounds to believe᾽ standard is used at the confirmation 
stage. The confirmation stage begins the transition into the trial stage. The Court 
established the application of this standard in the admissibility challenge by Kenyatta. 
Considering that the Court required Kenya to present evidence with a high degree of 
specificity and probative value, the disclosure by the Prosecutor becomes even more 
important. Kenya needed all the available evidence to meet the evidentiary standard. 
 Before the confirmation of charges, the Prosecutor is required to hold a hearing to 
confirm the charges and also share evidence to be presented to the Court with the 
accused within a reasonable time.292 The PTC plays a supervisory role and may issue 
orders to compel the release of evidence to be used at the hearing.293 Amendments to 
the list of evidence may be done prior to the hearing.294 The defence is also expected 
to present its evidence prior to the hearing.295 The defence has often urged the 
prosecution to adopt a flexible interpretation on defence filings for the defence to 
effectively prepare for trial. The provisions provide guidance on the admissibility of 
cases which are due for the confirmation stage. 
The focus of this section is not on disclosure for purposes of determining charges but 
on disclosure for purposes of determining complementarity. Comparison is done for 
these two determinations, in this case, to show how the confirmation standard applies 
in the determination of complementarity. The keywords for the comparison as derived 
above are timing, fair trials, ongoing investigation and amendment, postponement, 
scope of application, and the Prosecutor’s burden. 
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Advance and timely notification is required before the hearing takes place to enable 
adequate preparation by the defence to challenge the charges. Likewise, the 
Prosecutor must disclose adequate information if the Court expects a state to present 
evidence of probative value. A state must analyse the Prosecutor’s findings to 
determine the rationale for preferred suspects. Otherwise, the same case requirement 
will remain difficult to apply. 
Fair trials 
Before the confirmation of charges, a status conference must be held to disclose 
evidence, to preserve the accused’s right to a fair trial. Admissibility determinations 
should not be limited to the gravity of offences, interests of victims or justice but must 
encompass the interests of the accused as well. 
Ongoing investigation and amendment 
The Prosecutor may continue with investigation and amend the charges before a 
hearing. An investigation should be treated as a continuous process and additional 
evidence should be allowed for the state to strengthen its admissibility challenge. 
Postponement 
The Prosecutor may request the PTC to postpone a hearing. The PTC can also use its 
discretion to postpone a hearing. In admissibility challenges, the Prosecutor or the PTC 
can invoke the same powers to postpone an admissibility determination to such a time 
as will be clear that a state is genuinely unwilling or unable to carry out national 
proceedings. 
Scope of application 
A confirmation hearing serves to identify important aspects and persons for trial. Some 
charges may be preferred above others based on gravity or the likelihood for the 
Prosecutor to prove the charges. In determining the admissibility of cases, the 
emphasis should not be limited to the capacity a state has but should consider the 
potential of a state to carry out national proceedings. 
180 
 
The Prosecutor’s burden 
The Prosecutor should support each charge with sufficient evidence. For purposes of 
determining admissibility, the Prosecutor must prove that the case is admissible. 
4.11   Conclusion 
The application of complementarity in the Kenyatta case presented unprecedented 
challenges which the Court had to consider for the first time. The case gave the Court 
the first opportunity to deal with an admissibility challenge from a state. Likewise, it was 
the first time for the Court to deal with a case of crimes against humanity committed 
outside an armed conflict. 
Faced with the new challenges presented by the Kenyatta case, it emerged that the 
determination of admissibility of cases requires consideration of several factors. The 
factors include careful demarcation between situations and cases, reconsideration of 
the definition of investigation, clear parameters on the chapeau elements of 
admissibility, burdens of proof and expectations of disclosure. The failure by the Court 
to consider the factors makes it difficult to exhaustively address the practical 
application of complementarity. 
Broadly, the Kenyatta case was a battle between the standards and perceptions of the 
Court and those of a state. Chapter 5 proceeds with the argument through a discussion 
of prosecutorial and state discretions. The aim is to ascertain how state discretion has 
thus far been limited in the application of complementarity. The chapter will show that 
by giving states more discretion, the controversies surrounding the practical application 





GIVING EFFECT TO STATES᾽ DISCRETIONARY POWERS 
5.1 Introduction 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of international criminal 
justice and the safeguards to curtail the unwarranted use of the discretion have 
received considerable academic attention. The effect of prosecutorial discretion on 
relations between the ICC and other entities, such as the AU, have also received 
attention.1 However, state discretion in the operations of the ICC is relatively ignored. 
Complementarity in copycat to international criminal law is built on a paradox,2 
competition and yet reinforcement of states and ICC jurisdictions. 
When the exercise of discretion is lopsided in favour of the Prosecutor, state primacy 
is endangered. When prosecutorial discretion is improperly exercised, the integrity and 
credibility of the Court is also compromised.3 The Prosecutor was heavily criticised for 
the manner in which he exercised discretion on the preliminary examination in Kenya.4 
Some argue that the Prosecutor violated the tenets of the Rome Statute in the 
exercising of powers,5 and that the Prosecutor was motivated by political rather than 
legal interests.6 
A complementary-based system leads to jurisdictional conflicts.7 Hence, debates on 
discretion are common in the operations of the ICC. As partners in the prosecution of 
international crimes, domestic criminal justice systems and the ICC will thrive in a well-
developed interactive and co-operative system.8 The two institutions require an 
 
1 K Mills ῾Bashir is dividing us: Africa and the International Criminal Court᾽ (2012) 34 Human Rights 
Quarterly 404 - 407. 
2 C Stahn & L van den Herik ‘Future perspectives on international criminal justice: through the looking 
glass᾽ in C Stahn & L van den Herik (eds) Future perspectives on international criminal justice (2010) 2. 
3 D Dukic ‘Transitional justice and the International Criminal Court- in the interests of justice?᾽ (2007) 89 
International Review of the Red Cross 717. 
4 WA Schabas ῾Prosecutorial discretion v judicial activism at the International Criminal Court᾽ (2008) 6 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 731 - 761. 
5 See for example MM de Guzman ‘Choosing to prosecute: expressive selection at the International 
Criminal Court᾽ (2012) 33 Michigan Journal of International Law 265 - 320. 
6 S Nouwen & W Werner ῾Doing justice to the political: the International Criminal Court in Uganda and 
Sudan᾽ (2011) 21 European Journal of International Criminal Law 941 - 965. 
7 WA Schabas An introduction to international criminal law (2007) 175. 
8 W Burke-White ῾Proactive complementarity: the International Criminal Court and national courts in the 
Rome system of international justice᾽ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 53 - 108; JK Kleffner 
Complementarity of the Rome Statute and national criminal jurisdictions (2009) 309 - 310. 
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integrated approach to give equal attention to both state and prosecutorial discretion, 
and to enable the Prosecutor to incorporate different views in decision making. The 
Prosecutor may escape criticism when exercising power during preliminary 
examinations because, at that stage, the Prosecutor has considerable leeway to 
patiently explore possibilities for future action with limited checks from any other actor.9 
The same cannot be said of subsequent stages where different perspectives frequently 
influence the interpretation of prosecutorial discretion.10 
The Prosecutor is tasked by the international community to discern, dissect and decide 
on the scope of prosecutorial intervention. Backed by the statutory provisions on 
prosecutorial independence as well as discretional powers, the Prosecutor may 
exercise the discretion in disregard of state discretion. In addition, the weakened 
Westphalian model of state sovereignty motivates an international prosecutor to select 
cases when convinced that domestic systems are poorly placed to serve the interests 
of justice and to thwart impunity for international crimes. 
However, convincing concerns emerged during the Rome Statute negotiations on the 
dangers of an all-powerful prosecutor whose unfettered discretion may lead to 
uncontrolled abuse of power.11 Lines are clearly drawn for judicial oversight and the 
powers of the UNSC to ‘veto᾽ prosecutorial discretion.12 States have the prerogative to 
act first,13 and as such, states are the main players in international criminal justice. 
However, the current practice gives little attention to state discretion. Bassiouni 
correctly observes that the longevity of international criminal justice depends on 
internal rather than ICC processes.14 
The inconsistency and diversity of Court decisions and frequent policy proclamations 
are examples of many grey areas in the application of complementarity. One 
controversy is the lack of recognition in the Court practice that states, just like the 
 
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) arts 1, 15, 17 & 53. 
10 D Robinson ῾The mysterious mysteriousness of complementarity᾽ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 67-
102. 
11 SAF de Gurmendi ῾The role of the international prosecutor᾽ in RS Lee (ed) The International Criminal 
Court: the making of the Rome Statute (1999).  
12 M Bergsmo & J Pejić ‘Article 15, Prosecutor᾽ in O Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: observers᾽ notes, article by article (1999) 363. 
13 K Ambos ῾The role of the Prosecutor of an International Criminal Court᾽ (1997) 45 The Review of 
International Commission of Jurists 53. 
14 MC Bassiouni ῾Perspectives on international criminal justice᾽ (2010) 50 Vancouver Journal of 
International Law (2010) 269. 
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UNSC and ICC Chambers, may directly suspend the exercise of prosecutorial power. 
States should not be confined to an ῾observer status᾽ and should not be put in a 
position in which they rely on the goodwill of the Court or UNSC to tame the Prosecutor 
as he or she encroaches on state discretion. This chapter unlocks the dominance of 
state discretion. The chapter explores existing gaps in the Court’s approach to state 
discretion and the detrimental effect on relations between the Court and states. The 
chapter also revisits the overall objective of complementarity.15 
This chapter commences with a discussion on the rationale of discretion before delving 
into the boundaries of prosecutorial discretion. The chapter proceeds to discuss the 
duties and position of states in the Rome Statute. Thereafter, the chapter examines 
the elements of discretion, the overlap between UNSC and state powers and the widely 
debated interests of the justice phenomenon. Finally, the chapter demonstrates that 
the Court already respects, albeit in an uncomfortable manner, the supremacy of state 
discretion under certain circumstances. 
5.2   The rationale for discretion 
5.2.1     The context 
As the practice of the Court continues to evolve, the extent to which discretionary 
dimensions are understood, developed and applied needs scholarly attention. The 
legal, political and theoretical bases upon which discretion is exercised by different 
actors in the Rome Statute should be explored. The exercise of discretion and the 
adequacy of the ICC legislation as well as prosecutorial policies, principles and 
practices which promote the overall objective of complementarity also need academic 
attention. The broad understanding of the scope of discretion allays fears of bias, 
inconsistency and political manipulation. 
The proper exercise of discretion is essential for a criminal justice system. The goal of 
ending impunity is attached to the exercise of discretion and the reconciliation of 
complex national and international interests. Discretion is the glue that binds the 
system together and a force that drives the ability of an institution to adapt to 
 
15 C Stahn ‘Admissibility challenges before the ICC: from quasi-primacy to qualified deference?᾽ in C 
Stahn (ed) The law and practice of the International Criminal Court (2014) 253. 
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circumstances.16 States, the Prosecutor, the UNSC, ASP, the Court and other 
supporters of the Court have a role to play in developing the proper exercise of 
discretionary powers in the Rome Statute. 
5.2.2     Defining discretion 
The term discretion is associated with a variety of meanings and numerous uses.17 
Linds18 and Dong19 convincingly dissect the definition of discretion. Linds refers to 
discretion as the making of a decision in a galaxy of interconnected factors,20 while 
Dong views discretion as the authentication of a preferred option among other 
options.21 However, there is debate on which definition mostly captures discretion. The 
comprehensive and impressive scholarly work on the promotion of the understanding 
of discretion at both the national and international levels is greatly appreciated in this 
study. 
Discretion finds legitimacy when various options are availed to a person or entity. In 
the midst of the options, power accrues to the permissible choice of one or more 
courses of action.22 Black’s Law Dictionary views prosecutorial discretion as the power 
given to a prosecutor to utilise various options when either prosecuting or refraining 
from prosecuting a criminal offence.23 The power of discretion enables the person or 
entity to discern, dissect and decide on the most appropriate course of action under 
the circumstances. Discretion is also interpreted in the negative, in that it allows 
flexibility to refrain from taking an action that the law otherwise permits.24 International 
prosecutors and states, in their attempt to address the dynamics of law and politics, 
face criticisms in both the pursuit of cases and their failure to do so. 
 
16 HB Jallow ‘Prosecutorial discretion and international criminal justice᾽ (2005) 3 Journal of International 
Criminal Law 145. 
17 CH Koch ‘Judicial review of administrative discretion᾽ (1986) 624 George Washington Law Review 
470. 
18 A Linds ‘A deal breaker: prosecutorial discretion to repudiate plea agreements after R v Nixon᾽ (2012) 
38 Queens Law Journal 301. 
19 J Dong ‘Prosecutorial discretion at the International Criminal Court: a comparative study᾽ (2009) 2 
Journal of Politics 109. 
20 Linds (n 18 above). 
21 Dong (n 19 above). 
22 A Danner ‘Enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of prosecutorial discretion at the International 
Criminal Court᾽ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 510 - 552. 
23 Black’s law dictionary (2009) 534. 
24 K Stith ‘The arc of the pendulum: judges, prosecutors, and the exercise of discretion᾽ (2008) 117 Yale 
Law Journal 1420. 
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Although a control mechanism regulates the discharge of certain responsibilities,25 and 
a fixed criterion normally exists,26 discretion creates room for broad consideration of 
issues.27 One is given the ability and freedom to make own decisions.28 The conferred 
authority allows considered judgment and conscience to prevail over certain 
conditions, situations or control by other people.29 Nsereko views discretion as the 
autonomy to act as one sees fits in circumstances which are constrained by the need 
to adapt action to realities.30 The view augurs well with the Kenyatta case in which 
Kenya was in the process of developing a future plan to address electoral violence in 
view of its violent electoral history. 
Unlike the Prosecutor who is subject to legal constraints, states have boundless 
options. Kenya had options, both at national and regional level, to deal with the post-
election violence for the healing of the nation and punishment of perpetrators. If the 
options proposed by a state are not manifestly unreasonable and unfounded, the Court 
has no basis to interfere with state discretion. In future, the prosecutorial policy should 
outline options available to states to tackle international crimes under their jurisdictions. 
Consequently, there is a need to (re)define and explain key terms in the Rome Statute 
to create an impetus for state discretion to be accepted as a broad concept beyond the 
express provisions of the Rome Statute. 
5.2.3     Exercise of discretion at international criminal tribunals 
Like complementarity, the concept of discretion evolved with the emergence of 
international criminal tribunals. However, the extent to which international criminal 
tribunals make room for prosecutorial discretion is a bone of contention. 
Notwithstanding the exception of the early tribunals after the Second World War, an 
independent prosecutor is a pillar of international criminal justice. At the IMT and the 
IMTFE, the influence of states on prosecutorial discretion could not be 
 
25 Dong (n 19 above) 109 - 114. 
26 R Kerr International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: an exercise in law, politics and 
diplomacy (2004) 178. 
27 S Boolell ῾Challenges in crime in the 21st century᾿ 20 March 2012 
http://dpp.govmu.org/English/Documents/publication/hopac.pdf (accessed 2 November 2018). 
28 The New international Webster’s pocket dictionary (2002) 168. 
29 R Pound ‘Discretion and mitigation: the problem of the individual special case᾽ (1960) 4 New York 
University Law Journal 926; Black’s law dictionary (n 23 above) 466.  
30 DDN Nsereko ῾Prosecutorial discretion before national courts and international tribunals᾿ (2005) 3 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 124 - 144. 
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underestimated.31 After the disappointment of the IMT and the IMTFE, many attempts 
were made for prosecutorial discretion to exist as a critical component in the 
jurisprudence and practice of international criminal tribunals. This section looks at the 
development of discretion since Second World War. Also, this section examines the 
status of both state and prosecutorial discretion at international criminal tribunals. 
The IMT thwarted all efforts for an independent prosecutor as the Allied powers sought 
to expedite trials and punish former foes. A Committee of Prosecutors, rather than a 
single prosecutor, prosecuted war criminals. At the helm of the Committee were Chief 
Prosecutors appointed by IMT Charter state parties.32 The independence of 
prosecutors was compromised, since the Chief Prosecutors received direct 
instructions from their respective governments.33 The compromise of prosecutorial 
independence promoted bias and the proliferation of victors᾽ justice to the benefit of 
many who were aligned to the Allied powers.34 State discretion dominated 
prosecutions at Nuremberg, as the prosecutors could not discharge their duties 
independently but under the oversight and instructions of their member states. 
The IMTFE slightly departed from the IMT when it granted more discretion to 
prosecutors. The appointment of prosecutors was not left entirely to the political wing 
of their respective governments partly, as the Chief of Counsel (Chief Prosecutor) was 
an appointee of the Supreme Commander.35 Notwithstanding, the IMTFE could not be 
detached from state influence. The Supreme Commander served the interests of the 
Allied powers. Notably, the indictments of the IMTFE were politically negotiated before 
issuance.36 
The weakness of the IMT and IMTFE flowed from the use of state discretion to promote 
politically motivated and biased prosecutions. States intended to avoid these two 
dangers at the ICC and thus rejected a prosecutor with absolute discretionary powers. 
The proper use of state discretion at the IMT and IMTFE could have advanced at least 
two interests. First, the recognition of the primary of Germany and Japan could have 
 
31 WA Schabas Unimaginable atrocities: justice, politics, rights at the war crimes tribunals (2012) 76. 
32 Charter of the International Military Tribunal Charter (IMT Charter) art 14. 
33 Schabas (n 31 above) 75. 
34 MM de Guzman & WA Schabas ῾Initiation of investigations and selection of cases᾽ in G Sluiter & H 
Friman (eds) International criminal procedure: principles and rules (2013) 133 - 134. 
35 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE Charter) art 8. 
36 Guzman & Schabas (n 34 above) 134. 
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given the two states the first bite in trying their nationals. In that case, the Allied powers 
could have rendered support to strengthen national systems. Secondly, by allowing 
Germany and Japan to prosecute Allied powers, the perception of biased and partial 
trials could have been avoided. 
The lesson for the ICC is that state discretion is a priority. The intervention of the Court 
is only justified if political bias or discrimination (understood differently from national 
interests or political goals) or any form of bias on the part of the state can be 
established. In the Kenyatta case, these elements were not established by the 
Prosecutor. Therefore, it cannot be said that Kenya wanted to exercise its discretion in 
a manner that intended to shield Kenyatta from prosecution or accountability. Kenya 
used its discretion to address the big picture in the post-electoral violence with the aim 
of finding long-lasting peace solutions. 
In view of the shortcomings of both the IMT and IMTFE, the UNSC was explicit in 
conceptualising prosecutorial discretion for the ICTY and the ICTR.37 The ICTY and 
ICTR had a single Office of the Prosecutor until 2003 when the two were given 
separate prosecuting authorities.38 The entrenched provisions of the ICTY39 and 
ICTR40 Statutes are better summed up in the position of the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
on discretionary powers. In the Delalić et al decision, the Appeals Chamber confirmed 
the broad discretionary powers of the prosecutor in selecting and prosecuting crimes.41 
The Appeals Chamber held that the prosecutor acts independently and is only subject 
to statutory limitations.42 
Despite clear guarantees of independence, the ICTY and ICTR were criticised for bias. 
Critics argued that the expectation of a perfect system of international criminal justice 
was utopian.43 Defenders of prosecutorial discretion dismissed accusations of bias. 
Kerr emphasised the differentiation between discretionary and case selection powers 
 
37 Schabas (n 31 above) 76. 
38 UNSC Resolution 1503 (2003). 
39 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY Statute) art 16. 
40 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR Statute) art 15. 
41 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (20 February 2001) IT-96-21-A para 602. 
42 Delalić et al (n 41 above) para 603. 
43 See for example T Mariniello ‘One, no one and one hundred thousand: reflections on the multiple 
identities of the ICC᾽ in T Mariniello (ed) The International Criminal Court in search of its purpose and 
identity (2015) 8. 
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of a prosecutor.44 Discretion is based on a defined and fixed criterion, while selective 
prosecution permits prosecutorial partiality or bias due to certain limitations such as 
financial implications.45 
Criticisms against the ICTY and ICTR were a precursor to future discussions on the 
exercise of discretion. At the SCSL, the Prosecutor was expected to act independently 
without interference from any government or other source.46 The Prosecutor᾿s deputy 
was a Sierra Leonean.47 This meant that the Prosecutor needed someone who 
understood the local context. The Prosecutor was further given powers to resort to 
alternative truth and reconciliation mechanisms where appropriate.48  
In East Timor, the reports of the UN and Indonesia commissions of inquiry into the 
violence of 1999 recommended prosecutions of perpetrators of violence.49 The 
Indonesia᾿s Ad Hoc Human Rights Court first prosecuted crimes committed in Timor-
Teste amid international criticism on the effectiveness of the national process.50 
Following its limited success in prosecuting the crimes, the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) created the hybrid Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes (East Timor Tribunal) to try serious criminal offences that had been committed 
in East Timor in 1999.51 The Deputy Prosecutor-General who headed the Serious 
Crimes Unit (SCU) reported to the Timorese Prosecutor-General and the Attorney 
General.52 That way, some domestic ownership of the process was maintained. In the 
earlier years of the East Timor Tribunal, several prosecutors resigned due to alleged 
external political interference.53 The appointment of Siri Frigaard as Deputy General 
for Serious Crimes was accompanied by prosecution reclaiming its independence.54  
 
44 Kerr (n 26 above). 
45 Kerr (n 26 above). 
46 SCSL art 15(1). 
47 n 46 above, art 15(4). 
48 n 46 above, art 15(5). 
49 C Reiger & M Wierda ῾The serious crimes process in Timor-Leste: in retrospect᾿ March 2006 
http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-TimorLeste-Criminal-Process-2006-English.pdf (accessed 5 
October 2020). 
50 Reiger & Wierda (n 49 above) 10. 
51 Reiger & Wierda (n 49 above) 10 - 12. 
52 Reiger & Wierda (n 49 above) 17. 
53 See for example C Vasconcelos, “Briefing on East Timor’s Serious Crimes Unit,” Annual Conference 
of the International Association of Prosecutors, 2001. 
54 Reiger & Wierda (n 49 above) 20. 
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The appointment of co-prosecutors in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC), one Cambodian and the other an international staff member, was 
an interesting innovation.55 However, divergent views between the two prosecutors led 
to conflict between the two prosecutors. On an interesting note, there are two 
observations of benefit to this study, as far as the exploration of the state versus 
prosecution discretionary power is concerned. 
First, the rationale for two co-prosecutors was meant to protect prosecutorial discretion 
in the expectation that an international prosecutor would resist political manipulation. 
A national prosecutor may be susceptible to manipulation, particularly in undemocratic 
states or where there is a breakdown of the rule of law. Secondly, the most notable 
cause of tension between the national and international prosecutor in Cambodia was 
the unresolved question of state versus prosecutor discretion. The international 
prosecutor and national prosecutor differed on investigating top Khmer Rouge leaders, 
with the national prosecutor arguing on the prevention of undue tension and frustration 
of reconciliation efforts.56 
Similar to the aforementioned, the tension between Kenya and the ICC stemmed from 
the unresolved discretionary boundaries. Kenya sought to prevent tensions and 
promote reconciliation in the country through the selection of preferred individuals for 
possible future prosecution. Persons excluded from the prosecution list were likely to 
be a focus of the national dialogue for peace and reconciliation. The Prosecutor, on 
the other hand, maintained a rigid approach to attain justice through the prosecution 
of the most responsible in Kenya. 
The Rome Statute was drafted against the backdrop of tensions between, on the one 
hand, prosecutorial independence and discretion, and on the other hand, the 
supremacy of state sovereignty. In addition, the Rome Statute was drafted after the 
power politics had pervaded the IMT and IMTFE.57 Also, the broad prosecutorial 
discretion had proven problematic for the ICTY and ICTR.58 As such, the ICC adopted 
 
55 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers (Law on ECCC) art 16. 
56 Open Society for Justice Initiative ‘Political interference at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia᾽ (July 2010) 16) http//www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/politicalinterference-
extraordinary-chambers-courts-cambodia (accessed 3 November 2018). 
57 MR Brubacher ‘Prosecutorial discretion within the International Criminal Court᾽ (2004) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 71. 
58 Dukic (n 3 above) 711. 
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a different approach to prosecutorial discretion. A compromise was reached between 
states who favoured the ICTY or ICTR approach and those who raised concerns about 
an overzealous, abuse-prone and politically inspired Prosecutor.59 Arguably, the Court 
is designated as a mechanism to advance the ambitions of sovereign states who 
negotiated the Rome Statute. Therefore, it is submitted that the Court should 
concentrate on helping states to promote national interests when faced with internal 
crimes. 
The goal to end impunity, the application of complementarity and the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion must be rooted in the fact that the Court exists to succour 
states in the pursuit of national interests. National interests are paramount before the 
consideration of international concerns. The Prosecutor is at the heart of balancing the 
interventions of the Court and the interests of states. As will be discussed in this 
chapter and subsequent chapters, the Court is criticised, particularly in Africa, for its 
application of complementarity while disregarding national interests. Kenya has been 
one of the vocal states on how the Court has interfered with its national interests. 
5.2.4     Administration of justice and prosecutorial independence 
States and institutions which act under the Rome Statute enjoy the flexibility to 
discharge their functions when given discretion.60 The centrality of discretion in the 
administration of justice requires all the actors to appreciate their part and timing in 
decision making.61 The Prosecutor and judges of the ICC exercise discretion guided 
by the fact that the ICC is a court of last resort.62 
Independence is one of the elements of prosecutorial discretion.63 The integrity and 
quality of legal proceedings largely rests on prosecutorial independence.64 The ICC 
endeavours to prevent impunity by prosecuting persons without fear or favour of their 
 
59 Dukic (n 3 above) 711. 
60 Jallow (n 16 above) 142.  
61 Nsereko (n 30 above) 125. 
62 Coalition for the International Criminal Court ῾Setting the mark for Rome Statute 20: Argentina first to 
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63 n 9 above, art 42; M Bergsmo & P Kruger ‘Article 54: Duties and powers of the Prosecutor with respect 
to investigations᾽ in O Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the ICC Statute of the International Criminal Court 
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positions and the political interests of states.65 Paradoxically, there is a legal basis for 
incorporating issues of international peace and security in the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.66 Practically, discretion facilitates the selection of cases and shared 
responsibility in the prosecution of cases.67 
The major tension between Kenya and the ICC was based on the cases preferred by 
the two institutions. The Prosecutor could have considered the status of Kenya as a 
common law jurisdiction. As a common law jurisdiction, Kenya’s understanding may 
be that the availability of evidence does not result in automatic prosecution. A state 
may still use discretion not to prosecute. The public interest is a dominant consideration 
in common law systems.68 A national public prosecutor has unrestricted discretion on 
whether to prosecute.69 The powers given to the Director of Public Prosecutions by the 
current Constitution of Kenya support the discontinuation of prosecutions when the 
Director deems it necessary.70 
5.2.5     Prioritisation needs 
The preceding chapter discussed the need for the Prosecutor to endorse the selection 
of persons at the same level of hierarchy under certain circumstances. This chapter 
provides an additional observation on the selection of cases. Stigen states that 
prosecutorial discretion is both absolute and relative.71 Absolute discretion entails the 
overall result of the preferred mechanism.72 Relative discretion prioritises the most 
demanding matters to deliver justice, considering available resources.73 The first 
categorisation of discretion is pertinent to the arguments advances in this study. 
In states, absolute discretion is not only limited to the power to exercise unfettered 
discretion but allows states to consider all appropriate options to deal with violations. 
The Prosecutor and the Court opposed Kenya’s discretion to select persons for 
 
65 Brubacher (n 57 above) 76. 
66 Brubacher (n 57 above) 81. 
67 OC Imoedemhe The complementarity regime of the International Criminal Court: national 
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prosecution. Both maintained that the same persons must be under investigation by a 
state. The Prosecutor may strongly argue that the most responsible persons were 
targeted using relative discretion. Arguably, a rigid application of the same person 
requirement makes it difficult at times to justify the absolute limb of discretion. 
However, prosecution is not always the best mechanism to address transitional or post-
conflict contexts. Kenya can be said to have favoured absolute discretion that looks at 
numerous options such as alternative forms of justice, the interests of justice and 
regional mechanisms. 
5.2.6     Co-existing national systems 
International criminal justice is secured through multiple systems which either 
complement or compete. Arguably, the effective functioning of the ICC depends on its 
relationship with states. The tensions between the Prosecutor and states may be 
reduced when it is established who and when discretion must be exercised. Even in 
proprio motu cases where the discretion of the Prosecutor appears paramount, all 
possible available interests should be considered in all stages of proceedings. In any 
event, it is desirable for the Prosecutor to take advantage of state action when state 
action is likely to yield better results for international criminal justice.74 The excitement 
for the Prosecutor should not be on the lack of capacity of national systems but on how 
these can be capacitated to preserve states᾽ primary obligation to prosecute. 
5.3   Demarcated prosecutorial discretion at the International Criminal Court 
5.3.1      Controlled powers 
The powers, independence and discretion of the Prosecutor were contested at the 
Rome Conference and beyond. The Prosecutor receives, assesses and sometimes 
initiates cases which come before the Court. Hence, the Prosecutor is key to the 
administration of justice. The Prosecutor has enormous discretionary powers in the 
Rome Statute. Although the discretion given to the Prosecutor is clear on paper, 
varying legal interpretations call for scrutiny of the concept. Prosecutorial discretion, 
the exercise of powers and control mechanisms are extensively outlined in the Rome 
Statute. The defined nature of prosecutorial powers not only puts restrictions on 
 
74 CC Jalloh ‘The contribution of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to the development of international 
law᾽ (2007) 15 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 173. 
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prosecutorial discretion but also allows other actors, such as states, to explore and 
exercise their own discretion. 
5.3.2     Operational environment 
Undue influence from political actors and the undermining of justice are undesirable in 
the operations of an international criminal justice system.75 Still, the decision to use 
complementarity to allocate jurisdiction between states and the Court indicates that 
state sovereignty was not entirely abandoned with the adoption of the Rome Statute.76 
The Rome Statute strikes a balance between sovereignty and the intervention of the 
Court. In striking the balance, the Court acknowledges the reality of politics while 
protecting its legal mandate. The former ICC President, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, 
explicitly stated that the Court ῾is a judicial institution which operates in a political 
world᾽.77 Louise Arbour observed that a system based on complementarity is ill-defined 
and complex when the issue of prosecutorial discretion arises.78 
The foregoing observations show that the Court is enclosed within a political structure 
that makes the Court dependent directly or indirectly on states, the UNSC and the 
ASP.79 The political entities can trump prosecutorial efforts through contribution to 
prosecutorial policy development, scrutinising the prosecutorial use of power and 
creating a difficult environment for the operation of the Court.80 
In collaboration with the aforementioned observations, most criticisms on the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion are due to a blurred distinction between law and politics in 
the practice of the Court.81 The Prosecutor is often seen as confining discretion to the 
plain reading of the Rome Statute, leading to an improper, insufficient and inadequate 
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79 H Olàsolo The triggering procedure of the International Criminal Court (2005) 5. 
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American Journal of International Criminal Law 385 - 386. 
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application of complementarity.82 In this regard, the Prosecutor underscores the 
apolitical function of the prosecutorial office and the duty of the Prosecutor to apply the 
law strictly.83 The Prosecutor has consistently found support from human rights 
organisations. These dismiss the invocation of political factors to guide prosecutorial 
decisions.84 In a forum organised by the International Peace Institute in 2012, Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo argued against the ῾politicisation᾿ of the ICC: 
I follow evidence. I’m a criminal prosecutor, I’m not a political analyst. Maybe you don’t like 
it, but I will not prosecute people for political reasons. Contrary to public perception, the 
court’s intervention never destroyed a peace process. On the contrary, the court intervention 
was used by negotiators to start a peace process. The issue is who’s in charge of peace, 
who’s in charge of justice. How much these two dimensions are connected, how much this 
affects the prosecutor’s office. My point is, the Security Council is in charge of peace, the 
ICC is a new international institution doing justice. Peace is not the responsibility of the 
prosecutor. The prosecutor has the responsibility to do justice, and judges will review in 
accordance with critical law,” he said. “Prosecutors cannot adjust to political considerations. 
We cannot decide that when the negotiator says ‘okay, now it is better to stop,’ I stop. I have 
no mandate to do that, and I will destroy the Office of the Prosecutor and the court if people 
perceive that the court is just adjusting to political considerations.85 
The arguments for law and against politics are far from convincing, since the complex 
environment of international criminal law hardly separates law and politics.86 While 
scholars such as Zappala attempt to give assurances that the political dimension is not 
ignored by the Rome Statute as evidenced by the powers given to the UNSC,87 the 
Court’s practice appears to ignore the political considerations of states, leading to 
concerns. Political considerations dominated the Kenyatta case in Kenya and at the 
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AU, thereby suffocating any support or co-operation the Court may have hoped to get 
in Africa. 
5.3.3     Narrowing discretion 
The Rome Statute incorporated oversight provisions to ensure accountability and 
minimise the abuse of power by the Prosecutor.88 The Rome Statute prohibits 
arbitrariness in the exercise of power. The Prosecutor is obliged to make well-reasoned 
and thoroughly assessed decisions which benefit international criminal justice.89 
Limitations on prosecutorial power were negotiated in Rome and finally inserted with 
some adjustments. Arguably, the major limitation is the general prohibition on the 
Prosecutor to intervene in state affairs and to defer to genuine national efforts for the 
prosecution of international crimes.90 
Discussions on potential prosecutorial abuse in the administration of justice started 
before the IMT trials. A former US Supreme Court judge, Robert Jackson – who later 
became a prosecutor at the IMT – remarked the influence and discretion of the 
prosecutor.91 Jackson argued that the prosecutor may either promote the interests of 
a society or act against such interests.92 
What influenced Jackson’s approach to prosecutorial discretion or acceptance of broad 
control by states at the IMT cannot be easily ascertained. A hint may be drawn in his 
opening remarks at the IMT in 1945, when he presented ‘a United States case᾽ rather 
than ‘a Prosecutor’s case᾽.93 The statement indicated that at the international criminal 
justice level, Jackson viewed prosecutorial discretion as subordinate to state 
discretion. 
In the early days of the Court, the Prosecutor was mindful that the world will 
continuously evaluate the success of the Court. The success criteria was highlighted 
as based on the proper functioning of national courts to exclude the ICC from 
 
88 Bergsmo & Pejić  (n 12 above) 363. 
89 Bergsmo & Pejić (n 12 above) 367 - 368; RH Jackson ῾The federal prosecutor᾽ (1940) 31 Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 1 - 6; Dukic (n 3 above) 716. 
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exercising jurisdiction.94 The dawn of realities at the Court, just like in the experiences 
of ad hoc tribunals, shows that the successful functioning of the Court depends on the 
ability of the Court to stay on its ‘lane᾽ and not to encroach beyond politically acceptable 
state boundaries. For states, the effective application of international criminal justice is 
motivated mainly by political goals, as opposed to legal goals.95 
The narrowing of prosecutorial discretion to a level understood and acceptable by both 
the Prosecutor and states will strengthen the complementarity principle and lead to 
stronger ICC-states co-operation. This argument is not a call for an amendment of the 
Rome Statute but an inspiration to make more use of the provisions on state discretion, 
as some remain dormant and sealed. The policy of the OTP may be developed in a 
more state-centred than prosecutorial-centred way to enable the Prosecutor to give 
states leeway to explore all options before intervening. 
5.3.4     Hard and soft law constraints 
The Rome Statute and the UN Guidelines for Prosecutors regulate the discretion of 
the Prosecutor.96 The Rome Statute does not expressly mention the application of soft 
law, although this is implied through the inclusion of rules and principles of international 
law as a source of law applicable by the ICC.97 The UN system, with which the Rome 
Statute works in parallel, uses both hard and soft laws. The realisation of international 
norms and standards when the Court applies the law persuades one of the applications 
of both hard and soft law. Soft law encompasses norms and standards that are not 
legally binding, but which are accepted by states.98 Therefore, it follows that if an 
ambiguity exists in the Rome Statute, reliance may be made to the Guidelines to 
determine what the Prosecutor can do or cannot do. 
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Checks in the Rome Statute 
Prosecutorial discretion is exercised in subordination to superior powers who can stop 
the exercise of discretion.99 The PTC has review powers over prosecutorial powers. 
The absolute discretion of the Prosecutor freezes after the conclusion of a preliminary 
examination. The Prosecutor is accountable to the PTC to justify a decision to proceed 
or stop an investigation.100 Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute indicates that the 
Prosecutor proposes, rather than decides, to launch a full investigation. The final 
decision on an investigation is the prerogative of the PTC. In a shared power with the 
other Chambers, the PTC also enjoys the discretion to determine the admissibility of a 
case.101 
A referring state may request the Court to reconsider a decision of not pursuing a 
matter.102 The state interests are not only limited to state referrals but extend to UNSC 
referrals and proprio motu cases. If a state is given power to interrogate the Prosecutor 
for a nolle prosequi, it is submitted that a state has more powers to reject the 
Prosecutor’s decision to investigate or prosecute because this prosecutorial decision 
has a bearing on the primacy of a state to investigate or prosecute. 
The UNSC can influence the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The PTC may review 
the decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed at the request of the UNSC.103 Most 
prominently, the UNSC may use its political powers under the UN Charter to request a 
deferral of an investigation or prosecution in the interests of international peace and 
security.104 A deferral lasts for 12 months but is renewable. The Rome Statute does 
not stipulate the number of permitted renewals. However, renewals are not automatic 
but at the determination of the UNSC. It is also unclear whether the UNSC can advise 
on the termination of an investigation or prosecution prior to or after successive 
deferrals. Also, it is unclear whether the UNSC can recommend deferral to state 
jurisdiction. 
 
99 Bergsmo & Pejić (n 12 above) 397. 
100 n 9 above, art 53(1)(c). 
101 n 9 above, art 19(1). 
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198 
 
Clearly, the UNSC can trigger the jurisdiction of the Court. Arguably, the UNSC may 
also trigger a state to use its deferral powers. The UNSC failed to utilise an opportunity 
not only to request a deferral for 12 months but to establish a new practice of 
recommending a deferral to state jurisdiction when an article 16 deferral request was 
made by Kenya and the AU in the Kenyatta case.105 
The completion strategy of the UN-controlled ad hoc tribunals serves as guidance on 
the viability of deferring cases to national authorities.106 The Prosecutor has endorsed 
the UNSC’s political powers in the justice versus peace debate, allowing the UNSC to 
refer a case to a state. Through this transfer, a state is endowed with increased 
discretional powers to exercise its primacy under the complementarity regime. 
Soft law checks 
The UN Guidelines explore means to enhance the contribution of prosecutors in the 
criminal justice system and define the scope of prosecutorial discretionary powers.107 
The Guidelines apply to both national and international prosecutors.108 Prosecutors are 
encouraged to consider alternatives to prosecution, such as the diversion of criminal 
cases from formal justice systems when the interests of the suspects or victims so 
demand.109 
Factors considered when determining whether prosecution is in the interests of justice 
are substantially the same in article 53(2)(c) of the Rome Statute and article 19 of the 
Guidelines. The factors include the nature and seriousness of the crime, personal 
circumstances of the accused, and the interests or protection of victims. In view of the 
Guidelines, prosecutorial discretion at the ICC should be exercised in consideration of 
many other interests engraved in the criminal justice systems. 
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5.3.5     Limitations from within 
Beyond the checks imposed through various mechanisms, the OTP continuously 
develops prosecutorial policies, documents, guidelines and practices. The initiatives 
bear on prosecutorial discretion and form the basis through which the Prosecutor 
concedes to a certain extent the practicability of exercising some prosecutorial 
functions. The Prosecutor makes efforts to diffuse misconceptions and 
misunderstandings on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The 2013 Policy Paper 
on Preliminary Examinations is an example. The Paper outlines the policy and practice 
for the determination of the Prosecutor’s intervention.110 It further mentions the 
independence, impartiality and objectivity of the Prosecutor. On admissibility, the 
Paper states that the Prosecutor must assess complementarity and satisfy himself or 
herself before proceeding. 
The position of the Prosecutor in the Kenyatta case, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
conflicted with the ideals of the Paper. A reading of the policy indicates that the onus 
is on the Prosecutor to justify intervention under the complementarity provisions. In the 
Kenyatta case, the Prosecutor shifted the onus to the state. On complementarity, the 
Paper acknowledges that the principle is case-specific.111 Thus settling the question of 
whether the same person and same conduct test can be used in all the cases that 
come before the Court or a case-by-case basis is the appropriate approach. 
5.4   Rebuttable presumption on the fulcrum of prosecution 
5.4.1     Rome Statute objectives 
When there is discretion, several options are available to the persons exercising 
discretionary powers. The ICC was created to address global concerns on persistent 
violations of the set legal order. The Court aims to contribute to peace, security and 
the well-being of the world.112 The Court is positioned to prosecute or adopt other 
mechanisms to prevent serious crimes and to promote peace. The synergy between 
justice and peace is vital to fulfil the overall objective of the Rome Statute. The 
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Prosecutor is entitled to step in when national jurisdictions fail to investigate and 
prosecute. 
On the other hand, persuasive voices for alternative forms of justice highlight that the 
Rome Statute is not confined to the investigation and prosecution of crimes. The 
Preamble of the Rome Statute provides guidance for the rebuttal of the presumption 
that the prosecution of international crimes is the only goal for the Prosecutor. The 
Prosecutor is yet to fully appreciate the role of states on matters involving competing 
prosecution and peace initiatives. The Prosecutor has acknowledged the powers of 
the UNSC to request deferral of cases on peace and security considerations. 
5.4.2     The obligation to prosecute 
During the Rome negotiations, many states preferred complementarity due to 
arguments that states must prosecute international crimes and that an international 
court should not enjoy primacy.113 In essence, states meant that they enjoy discretion 
on how to proceed with their internal affairs. In view of sovereignty entitlements, the 
choices of states in dealing with crimes come in various forms. Nevertheless, what 
matters is the good faith and the ability of states to justify the preferred course of 
action.114 
The preferences of states often differ from those of international criminal tribunals.115 
Accordingly, a state’s duty to prosecute is not absolute. There are exceptions in both 
international and national levels which accommodate considerations of peace, security 
and the interests of justice.116 Arguably, the Court misdirected itself when it used the 
failure by Kenya to establish a special tribunal as a pretext for the Court’s intervention 
in Kenya. The focus on the special tribunal arguably led the Prosecutor to pay little 
attention to other efforts which Kenya initiated to keep the Kenyatta case and other five 
cases in Kenya. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, some schools of thought believe that the 
preambular paragraphs of the Rome Statute establish a strict standard for prosecution. 
For example, Human Rights Watch contends that prosecution provides a safeguard 
against impunity and that the intention of the drafters of the Rome Statute is reflective 
through the insertion of the need to punish international crimes in the Preamble.117 
Human Rights Watch further dismisses the argument that the interests of justice 
encompass non-prosecution mechanisms. Later in this chapter, this study attempts to 
show that the position adopted by Human Rights Watch is inaccurate. 
5.4.3      Conflicting or complementary judicio-political system? 
The Court has been described as a multifaceted body which targets individuals, leaves 
room for restorative justice, carries the justice aspirations of the public, and is a 
contributor to stability and the protector of human dignity. Also, the Court has a catalytic 
effect on prosecutions by national jurisdictions.118 The conceptions demonstrate the 
complexities faced by the ICC in defining its main goal and the expectations of 
outsiders. The Court cannot afford to be rigid if it is to be better understood. The 
contextualisation of the operations of the Court is the panacea to a widely endorsed 
and understood Court. Law is no longer an autonomous discipline presenting itself as 
an end but a socially entangled and controlled discipline.119 Therefore, the law should 
be understood, criticised and developed in the context of a society.120 
Supporters of the Court advocate for the Prosecutor to strictly apply the law and 
disregard political factors in initiating investigations and prosecutions.121 The views 
ignore that the wings of the Court are already clipped by restrictions placed on the 
discretionary powers of the Prosecutor. The negotiations leading to the adoption of the 
Rome Statute are an experience of balancing judicial and political interests. While the 
Prosecutor should guard against politically influenced decisions, Nsereko posits that 
restrictions placed on the Prosecutor are necessary to make him or her relevant to 
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global politics, for transparency and protection of the Prosecutor from the temptation 
of pursuing politically motivated prosecutions.122 
The argument by Nsereko infuses the legal and political landscapes to the end that the 
two provide checks and complement each other. There is an endeavour to protect the 
integrity of the Prosecutor and to avoid abuse of prosecutorial powers through 
consideration of the interests of states in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
Politics has an important influence on the development of legal systems. The OTP 
needs a formula to integrate politics into prosecutorial policy and practice. The law may 
be subordinate to politics and play a less decisive role in directing prosecutorial 
preferences.123 
The Rome Statute presents a Prosecutor who is a servant of both the law and political 
powers. As a servant of the law, the Prosecutor decides whether to prosecute 
independent of the direction and control of any person.124 As a servant of politics or 
states, the Prosecutor needs to dissect what constitutes interests of justice, peace and 
security. By including the UNSC and states in the operations of the Court, the Rome 
Statute endorses the goals of peace and security advanced by these two political 
entities in the context of international criminal justice.125 
5.4.4       The unique nature of crimes against humanity 
Although war crimes are covered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and whereas 
genocide is covered by the 1948 Genocide Convention, the international community is 
yet to adopt a specialised convention on crimes against humanity.126 The lacuna has 
not stopped the inclusion of crimes against humanity in the statutes of almost all 
international criminal tribunals, including the ICC. In addition, the prohibition of crimes 
against humanity, has been considered a peremptory norm of international law, from 
which no derogation is permitted, and which is applicable to all states.127 Hence, crimes 
against humanity are also considered crimes under customary international law. The 
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statutes of all the tribunals inserted different definitions (with areas of commonality), 
resulting in a dozen definitions.128 The thin line between what an international criminal 
tribunal identifies as a crime against humanity and an ordinary crime is another 
challenge.129 It is unclear what converts an ordinary crime into a crime against 
humanity when moving from the domestic to the international realm and which 
mechanism is better placed to determine the threshold.130 
The crimes against humanity dilemma is like the one faced when a threshold is drawn 
between a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) and other situations of violence. 
The intensity threshold131 is not entirely clear due to its subjectivity. In the Tadić case, 
the ICTY determined that a non-international armed conflict exists when armed 
violence within the territory of a state reaches a certain intensity and duration. As 
highlighted in the preceding chapter, this study does not focus on whether the gravity 
test was reached in the Kenyatta case. However, the dilemma associated with the 
nature of crimes against humanity is helpful in reinforcing the reality of jurisdictional 
tensions between states and the ICC. 
It is submitted that in a system that operates on complementarity, the determination of 
a mechanism that enjoys primacy should be given preference. The decision of a state 
to prefer ordinary crimes and to identify the mechanism to address the crimes should 
be respected, except when the interpretation deviates completely from the letter and 
spirit of the Rome Statute. The AC endorsed such a position in the Libyan cases. The 
Chamber held that ῾there is no requirement in the Rome Statute for a crime to be 
prosecuted as an international crime domestically᾽.132 This position leaves room for 
amnesties at a national level. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the general 
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5.5   Preserving a state-centric interpretation 
5.5.1       The ideal application of complementarity 
The current interpretation of the Rome Statute largely demonstrates a two-horse 
contest between the Prosecutor and the UNSC when the interests of peace and 
security are discussed. The centrism of states is pushed down the ladder. The Collins 
English Dictionary defines centrism as the state or condition of having (a specified 
thing) as the centre of attention or focus.133 It follows that state-centrism in international 
criminal law is premised on the assumption that other entities, such as courts, exercise 
discretion with a focus on state interests. The assumption augurs well in a 
complementary system such as the one for the ICC. Therefore, complementarity has 
roots in state-centrism, making it obligatory for any meaningful interpretation and 
application of the concept to be holistic enough to encompass the ingredients and 
ideals of state-centrism.134 
When a conflict of discretions exists, the subdued state discretion must arise to 
determine the course of action. Apart from proving the unwillingness or inability of a 
state, another duty accrues to the Prosecutor to prove the exhaustion of state 
discretion. The Prosecutor must demonstrate a condition of impracticability in a state 
before extracting a case from a state. The Rome Statute supports the exhaustion of 
state discretion first and obliges the Prosecutor to notify states with jurisdiction and 
check their status of investigation or prosecution before commencing his or her own 
investigation.135 
Secondly, the assistance rendered by a state to the Court may be within the ambit of 
national laws or procedures.136 In this regard, the Court must consider the intention for 
future investigations as per the demands and uniqueness of each case. Some national 
procedures may be cumbersome to allow a state to demonstrate its willingness or 
ability in the time fixed by the Court. 
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Lastly, article 17(1) of the Rome Statute reads in the negative to demonstrate the 
interpretation of complementarity envisaged by the Rome Statute. The article foresees 
situations when the Prosecutor claims and proves the admissibility of cases in view of 
several factors that favour state discretion. 
The Court considers many factors to determine whether national remedies have been 
exhausted before accepting the admissibility of a case. The exhaustion of domestic 
remedies is normally associated with the claims of individuals against states.137 The 
Rome Statute has inadmissibility checks which are reminiscent of the exhaustion of 
national remedies found in most international and regional human rights 
instruments.138 The allowance to use applicable treaties as an interpretive guide to the 
Rome Statute139 provides a basis for the Court to further draw from the jurisprudence 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples᾽ Rights (African Commission),140 
the European Court of Human Rights (European Court)141 and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court).142 
The African Commission considers whether remedies are ‘available, effective and 
sufficient᾽ in its admissibility determinations.143 The African Commission assumes that 
national procedures are in place and capable of providing redress for a violation.144 
Interestingly, the African Commission only considers judicial remedies.145 Therefore, 
non-judicial remedies available at the discretion of a state, such as amnesties, are 
excluded.146 Other international actors such as the European Court have a different 
view and permit states to exercise discretion and to utilise non-judicial remedies as 
long as the remedies meet the availability, effectiveness and sufficiency test.147 
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5.5.2      State-centrism as a pillar of the Rome Statute 
The ICC operates in a state-centric world of international law which make the Court 
push for survival and success on the irresistible political reality.148 Post-Cold War 
ambitions to tilt the tide towards the supremacy of international criminal tribunals over 
international crimes succeeded to a certain extent, and yet failed to dismantle the state-
centric nature of the international legal structure.149 The international community and 
the ICC are restricted from interfering with the state’s legitimate use of force,150 internal 
affairs151 and discretion on the use of non-judicial mechanisms.152 The Court needs to 
adjust its approach to fit into the state-centric model. The existing ICC case law favours 
a strong ICC-centric vision, and this is one of the causes of tension with states.153 
International criminal enforcement is prone to frequent disruptions from states that 
claim primacy over international crimes. Whereas the deferral powers of the UNSC 
give the institution primacy on matters of peace and security,154 there is little guidance 
on the effect of state deferral powers on complementarity. Human Rights Watch noted 
that a peace process supported by the UNSC is the only means to ῾trump᾽ 
prosecutorial efforts.155 The UNSC powers can influence the suspension rather than 
withdrawal of a case.156 A deferral request by a state also has a suspensive effect on 
the determination by the AC.157 Deferral requests by states provide opportunities for 
states to demand their right to primacy.158 In this regard, the AU has previously sought 
increased participation of states in the granting of deferral requests. 
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The AU proposed an amendment of the Rome Statute to allow the UNGA to consider 
deferral requests when a state request is not approved or attended to by the UNSC.159 
States may feel undermined and vent their frustration through non-co-operation with 
the Court when their primacy is overlooked against their wishes. Kenya went to the 
extent of regarding ICC᾽s intervention and continued resistance to defer cases to 
Kenya as neo-colonialism.160 Kenyatta argued that the ICC’s administration of justice 
is increasingly questionable.161 The controversies can be minimised through clear 
guidelines on state and prosecutorial discretion in the ICC system. 
5.5.3     Protection of national interests 
Sovereign states adopted complementarity as a model to govern their relations with 
the ICC primarily to protect their national interests.162 States reasonably expect the 
Court to give them time and assistance to carry out their primary obligations. States 
are historically and consistently sensitive to the protection of their political, strategic 
and economic interests ahead of the interests of international criminal justice.163 Any 
unwarranted intervention by the Court may compromise the support an international 
prosecutor needs from states to keep the enforcement of international criminal justice 
alive.164 
The co-operation of states is almost guaranteed and the marginalisation of the Court 
is minimised when the Prosecutor incorporates state interests in the exercise of 
discretion.165 The inclusion of the UNSC in the ICC affairs was to provide for 
multidimensional protections including the protection of legitimate interests of states 
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from potential abuse of prosecutorial discretion and protection of victims when no 
forum is available to initiate prosecutions.166 
National interests were considered during the revival of international criminal tribunals 
in the late twentieth century. After the international community had given the ICTY 
primacy over crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, the importance of national 
interests was revisited with the proposal for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) to function concurrently with the ICTY. The proposal was, however, shot down 
by the leadership of the ICTY who thought a TRC would interfere with the mandate of 
the ICTY and act as a possible stronger competitor.167 
The acknowledgement of the doctrine of state sovereignty is central to the debate on 
national interests in the international relations arena. As seen in chapter 6 of this study, 
the African states interpret the doctrine partly based on the continent᾿s colonial past. 
This view is endorsed by scholars such as Anghie who asserts the following: 
[C]olonialism was central to the constitution of international law in that many of the basic 
doctrines of international law – including, most importantly, sovereignty doctrine – were forged 
out of the attempt to create a legal system that could account for relations between the 
European and non-European worlds in the colonial confrontation.168 
The sentiments from Africa on the relationship between ICC prosecutions and 
violations of state sovereignty would occupy the international criminal justice space for 
a time to come. One can argue that as some colonial injustices remain unresolved on 
the continent, the debate on state sovereignty will feature occasionally when the ICC 
is discussed in Africa. Some definitions of the doctrine of state sovereignty may provide 
guidance on balancing state sovereignty and the prosecution of crimes at an 
international level. According to Crawford, the doctrine of state sovereignty entails the 
῾… totality of international rights and duties recognised by international law.᾿169 Bodley 
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highlights an element of equality among states through the doctrine.170 In the view of 
Cassese, state sovereignty enables a state to exercise its functions without external 
interference, and to claim immunity for their officials from foreign courts.171 Therefore, 
there is little or no argument that state sovereignty is accompanied by rights and 
responsibilities for states. The doctrine may be waived for the international good. 
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that any intervention by the ICC should avoid a 
perception of bias and inequality among states, should acknowledge that temporary 
immunities may be in the national interests, and should avoid interference with the 
proper functioning of governance systems where the ICC operates. That state 
sovereignty is not absolute172 and indeed on the decline,173 shows the desire for 
external intervention on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with laid down 
procedures. The move should be towards restricted sovereignty developed in conduit, 
with an emphasis on individual criminal responsibility in the commission of international 
crimes.174   
5.5.4      The interests of justice 
Article 53 of the Rome Statute introduced one of the most contentious and undefined 
concepts, namely, the ῾interests of justice᾽. Ordinarily, the concept denotes a 
retributive approach to justice.175 The possibility of deferrals to a non-prosecutorial 
mechanism is not expressly provided in article 53.176 The broader concerns of 
transitional societies, truth commissions and amnesties either occupy the back seat or 
have no space at all.177 The existing literature leans on the proposition of a broader 
understanding of the concept in order to accommodate these concerns.178  
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In the application of complementarity, preservation of state-centrism and protection of 
state interests, the OTP can use the ambiguity of ῾interests of justice᾽ to allow states 
to tap into non-prosecutorial options. The Prosecutor cannot pursue all cases because 
of limited resources. The Prosecutor mostly selects cases to advance the interests of 
justice.179 The non-exhaustive list of what should be considered under the interests of 
justice and different interpretations of the concept presents the Prosecutor with an 
advantage to adapt discretion in accordance with a context.180 
Rodman believes that the safety net for the Prosecutor is to consider the exigencies of 
different situations when exercising discretionary powers.181 Rodman further states 
that the pursuit of justice finds its strength and success when it considers political 
realities.182 
The Prosecutor has the discretion to apply and interpret the concept ‘interests of 
justice’. The Prosecutor has an advantage derived from the flexibility attached to the 
concept. The challenges are associated with the lack of definition of the concept in the 
Rome Statute and the Rules of the Court.183 However, the ambiguity has seen the 
Prosecutor adopting an interpretation which conflicts with the overall object of the 
Rome Statute and which ignores the interests of states. Moreover, the OTP has 
previously made a vague distinction between the ̔ interests of justice᾽ and the ̔ interests 
of peace᾽.184 
As a safeguard against arbitrary prosecutorial decisions, the Prosecutor owes the PTC, 
UNSC and states an explanation on the basis for declining an investigation or 
prosecution.185 The opposite is implied in that the Prosecutor needs to outline that a 
decision satisfies the interests of justice. The burden to prove the admissibility or 
inadmissibility rests with the Prosecutor, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
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5.6   Qualifying notions of peace and interests of justice 
5.6.1       Considerations of necessity 
Justice is a broad phenomenon that transcends criminal prosecutions for those 
accused of international crimes.186 Justice encompasses peace. The two concepts of 
justice and peace are tightly joined together to an extent that a prosecution process 
can be deemed successful if it leads to national reconciliation.187 Narrowly interpreted, 
justice is equal to prosecution and punishment.188 A broad interpretation considers 
contextual realities and the challenges of administering justice, particularly in post-
conflict situations. In a broad interpretation, criminal responsibility co-exists or is 
replaced by other forms of justice.189 
The UN, in its Rule of Law and Transitional Justice report of 2004, acknowledged other 
forms of justice. The organisation stated that although the administration of justice is 
normally understood from a prosecution perspective, non-prosecutorial measures hold 
the same weight.190 
Although in some contexts criminal prosecutions may be the ideal approach to end 
impunity, departure from criminal prosecutions may be justified by necessity in other 
cases. Scholars such as Robinson balance the nature and credibility of the measures 
adopted and the extent to which these are justified by necessity.191 Other scholars, 
such as Stahn, are satisfied that any or some form of sanction, whether retributive or 
restorative, suffices after an investigation.192 A situation of necessity stems from social, 
economic or political factors, as well as the national proceedings that opted for a non-
retributive approach.193 A state which lacks sufficiently trained lawyers and has a weak 
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judiciary during a transition may still be willing or able to use indigenous solutions to 
foster the locally desired healing, peace and reconciliation.194 
5.6.2      The peace and justice interface 
The peace versus justice debate was intense during the Rome negotiations. The 
debate divided the negotiators into two groups. One group was made up mainly of 
states advocated for the express inclusion of alternative forms of justice in the 
complementarity principle.195 This group was overpowered by the group which strictly 
favoured prosecutions. Supported by vocal non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
the group successfully prevented the inclusion of an express provision on the use of 
national amnesties.196 
Today, supporters of retribution postulate that anything less than punishment is an 
endorsement of human rights violations.197 The opponents of ῾retribution only᾽ firmly 
believe that reconciliation and amnesty are part of the national healing process and at 
times the only feasible mechanisms.198 Doyle maintains that restorative and retributive 
accountability mechanisms reinforce each other and combine to provide solutions for 
past violations. Both are urgent goals in the enforcement of international criminal 
justice.199 
In a speech welcoming the adoption of the Rome Statute in July 1998, the UN 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, identified the role of the Court towards global respect 
for human rights and justice.200 In the early days of the Rome Statute, many persons 
welcomed the advent of the Court as a means to intensify prosecutions.201 Amnesty 
International opposed the insertion of considerations of political stability in the interests 
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of justice criteria.202 Amnesty International favoured a restrictive interpretation of article 
53 that focuses on prosecuting international crimes.203 Amnesty International 
developed a prosecutorial perspective and agreed with the perspective of Goldstone 
who dismissed political considerations. Goldstone saw no legal justification in the 
Rome Statute and a threat to the credibility of the Court when treading prosecutions 
for amnesties.204 
The Appeals Chamber of the SCSL ruled that, while amnesty could apply to domestic 
jurisdictions, it was inapplicable in international law.205 The former ICC Deputy 
Prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, dismissed the notion that the Rome Statute is also 
occupied with political considerations.206 
The context in which the Court operates reflects a different picture from the one 
envisaged by ῾prosecutions only᾽ advocates. Hence, several NGOs changed their 
stances and have promoted ideals of alternative forms of justice where appropriate. 
The NGOs realised that a discretional case-by-case basis is desirable for the effective 
operation of the Court.207 Unfortunately, the Prosecutor is often disconnected from 
realities on the ground. Persons and institutions which operate on the ground, such as 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Uganda, seek to 
balance the duty to punish the most serious crimes with other measures aimed to 
address the needs of victims and society as a whole through reconciliation and healing 
mechanisms.208 The OHCHR advised states on appropriate forms of accountability 
following a national consultative process.209 The recommendation supports the 
assertion that states need to tap into their discretionary powers to clarify the proper 
application of complementarity. 
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In contemporary times, the failure to adequately appreciate that the tension between 
the norms of international criminal justice and the political or peace imperatives is not 
the preserve of the Court and UNSC is a missing link in the practice of the Court. The 
UNSC has rightly been identified as a political body responsible for peace and security. 
However, the role of states in this field of international relations is under-discussed. 
The 2007 Prosecutorial Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice highlighted that justice 
and peace are not mutually exclusive.210 According to the Paper, the Prosecutor will 
look to partner with institutions such as the UNSC to deal with the intersection of 
justice, peace and security.211 The Paper should specifically define the involvement of 
states in the balance between the norms of justice and peace. 
The ICC has missed important complementarity components by paying little attention 
to the political perspectives of states. States, as was the case in the Kenyan cases, 
may think beyond the ICC and their own jurisdictions. The Prosecutor could develop 
better rapport with regional structures to avoid criticisms such as the one by the former 
AU Commission chairman, Jean Ping who stated that ῾we Africans and the African 
Union are not against the International Criminal Court. That should be clear. We are 
against Ocampo who is rendering justice with double standards.᾿212 The value of the 
use of regional mechanisms to complement national efforts is discussed in the 
following chapter. 
5.6.3         The influence and role of the United Nations Security Council in the                                         
                  maintenance of peace 
 
As earlier noted in this chapter, the UNSC takes the lead in the maintenance of peace. 
Investigations and prosecutions may be suspended by the Prosecutor when the UNSC 
advises on the need for peace and security in a particular context.213 Prosecutorial 
discretion is influenced by the UNSC, which has the prerogative to define the scope of 
the interests of peace and security. Before the role of the UNSC was finally inserted in 
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the Rome Statute, there was a hot debate on the role of the institution. The initial draft 
of the ILC mirrored an international criminal court subordinate to the UNSC.214 
A closer look at the arguments advanced by states that wanted extensive UNSC 
powers, such as USA, shows a push for states to exercise their discretion with very 
limited Court control. In 1995, USA voiced its support for an international criminal court 
and argued for the UNSC to maintain and restore peace and security.215 USA further 
clarified its position in 2002 by stating that the ICC cannot unilaterally control USA 
internal affairs.216 According to this view, the UNSC powers should be read together 
with state powers or interests. USA voice is guaranteed when the UNSC is involved 
because it has veto power. Likewise, the AU is proposing the use of UNGA for all AU 
member states to be heard on matters pertaining to the ICC. The question arises on 
the extent to which considerations of international peace and security are being 
interpreted by the Prosecutor in view of both the UNSC or UNGA and states discretion. 
When it exercises powers under the UN Charter, the UNSC protects states from 
unwarranted external interference. Article 2(1) of the UN Charter identifies ῾the 
sovereign equality of all its members᾽ while article 2(7) prohibits the UN from 
intervening ῾in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state᾽. The two principles are reflected in the Preamble of the Rome Statute. The ICC 
regime clearly endows states with primacy. Therefore, it is not an overstatement to 
argue that state discretion should also occupy a more prominent role in issues 
impacting peace in their territories. 
Arguably, the UNSC will consider its principles relating to the primacy of states, as 
outlined in the UN Charter, when using its deferral powers. The consequence of this is 
that the UNSC and state discretions will be both considered before a decision is 
reached to invoke the powers of the UNSC. A prominent example is the negotiated 
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agreement between the UN and the government of Sierra Leone to establish an 
independent special tribunal alongside a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.217 
5.6.4     Transitional justice 
The term ῾transitional justice᾽ is commonly used in navigating the most suitable form 
of redress in a post-conflict society. Transitional justice is multifaceted and 
encompasses several approaches, mechanisms and comprehensive strategies that 
are ordinarily foreign to international criminal tribunals because of their non-judicial 
nature.218 These include amnesties, pardons and alternative forms of justice such as 
TRCs.219 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) equates 
transitional justice with truth discovery, and public acknowledgment and participation. 
The IACHR views the first step to address impunity as truth-telling before resorting to 
judicial redress.220 Voices against alternative forms of justice reject the thought of 
international criminal justice stepping aside to allow negotiated settlements or domestic 
priorities.221 
Kenya largely considered alternative forms of justice that suited its context. Kenya’s 
transitional justice was a reaction to the 2007 electoral violence.222 Furthermore, Kenya 
stood to benefit from initiatives at UN level. On 29 September 2011, the Council 
resolved to establish the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, 
Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence.223 The mandate of this 
Special Rapporteur aims to ensure accountability and justice, provide truth about past 
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violations, promote the rule of law and reformation of national institutions, promote 
healing and reconciliation, and deter future violations of human rights.224  
Regarding Kenya, the Special Rapporteur emphasised the importance of blending and 
mutually reinforcing truth-seeking justice initiatives, reparations and guarantees of non-
recurrence.225 As the Special Rapporteur observed, the main goal was to put victims 
at the centre of the process, to build trust among affected communities, and to 
contribute to the reconciliation and strengthening of the law.226 Despite the findings 
and recommendations of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) 
and the Special Rapporteur, the impact of transitional justice in Kenya are yet to be 
fully realised. Challenges include the lack of access by the public or victims to the 2013 
TJRC report with detailed findings on the proposed way forward, failure by the 
government to pursue accountability for crimes, and continued human rights violations 
by the police.227  
The retributive versus restorative justice debate adds to the list of other dichotomies 
associated with the ICC, such as law versus politics, peace versus justice, and primacy 
versus complementarity.228 Since the 1980s, attempts have been made to reconcile 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms in dealing with international crimes.229 An 
integrated and diverse response became imperative to tackle complex challenges from 
the era of the Cold War and beyond.230 
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The continued use of amnesties with or without global approval relegates justice to a 
secondary solution by hostile parties.231 The Rome negotiators rejected mechanisms 
such as TRCs. As a result, proponents of alternative mechanisms gradually 
strengthened their case in the peace versus justice debate. Kofi Annan endorsed the 
positive contribution made by TRCs to international criminal justice.232 
Non-judicial mechanisms are often preferred because they identify with local 
ownership processes.233 Where these mechanisms offer a comparative advantage, 
their use is more desirable than judicial mechanisms. Considerations of reconciliation, 
peace and stability were used in various platforms in Kenya to oppose the intervention 
of the ICC. In establishing a fund for post-election victims, President Uhuru Kenyatta 
spoke of the preference for restorative over retributive justice and the need for 
forgiveness.234 To prevent the unwarranted intervention of the Court, Kenya previously 
called for an amendment to the Rome Statute to prosecute Court authorities for crimes 
against the administration of justice235 and to give Independent Oversight Mechanism 
more authority.236 
A controversy arises from the fact that the ICC, although silent on alternative forms of 
justice,237 does not expressly oppose the use of appropriate alternative 
mechanisms.238 The Court adjudicates over serious international crimes and any 
amnesty is generally excluded for these crimes. 239 The UN Human Rights Committee 
considers amnesties to conflict with obligations of states to prosecute violations under 
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).240 Some see 
amnesties as the promotion of impunity from criminal prosecution.241 The opposition is 
despite amnesty laws dominating post-conflict contexts and their perceived 
effectiveness in reconciling broken societies.242 
The inconclusiveness of international law on the place of amnesty derives from article 
6(5) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Some contend that 
the Protocol encourages amnesties through its references to possible use of amnesty 
by authorities at the end of hostilities.243 The argument holds, since alternative forms 
of justice are more appealing after an NIAC or situation of violence which normally 
involve citizens of the same state as opposed to international armed conflicts (IACs)  
between different states. Citizens of the same state need solutions to rebuild their 
communities and to heal, since they co-exist with fellow citizens following a violent 
period. The authenticity of alternative national approaches to justice has a bearing on 
prosecutorial discretion.244 If the approaches are deemed valid, they serve as another 
check and balance on prosecutorial discretion. At the same time, the use of alternative 
forms of justice widens the discretion of states to keep cases from the Court for as long 
as legally or politically justifiable. 
The extent of the relationship of the ICC and restorative alternative forms of justice is 
a bone of contention.245 The Prosecutor must adhere to the provisions of the Rome 
Statute while considering the place of national mechanisms in the Rome Statute. A 
balance must be struck between the test laid down in the Rome Statute and associated 
political constraints which redefine accountability for international crimes.246 One way 
of modifying the practice of the OTP is to develop a living policy document which 
specifically mentions the validity of alternative forms of justice and that 
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complementarity considerations will include both judicial and non-judicial processes of 
states. 
Since the Prosecutor operates in a court of last resort, the Prosecutor has considerable 
discretion about whether, when and how to proceed when called to intervene.247 The 
proposed policy document will also outline the criteria for the use of non-judicial 
mechanisms. Above all, evidence of non-judicial mechanisms should be good enough 
to make a case inadmissible before the Court if the state has good faith. Encouragingly, 
the current Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has renewed interest to improve the conduct 
of preliminary examinations and review previous prosecutorial policies. She has 
changed the strategy used by Moreno-Ocampo by prioritising more engagement with 
states.248 
5.6.5     Victim participation 
Victims are interested parties in proceedings of the ICC. The ICC is a forum in which 
the voices, interests, personal circumstances and possible reparations are 
considered.249 The interests of victims are among the constituents of the interest of 
justice.250 The Rome Statute impressively allows victim participation in Court 
proceedings. Arguably, there is no better platform for victims to be fully heard than in 
the restorative arena. If the intention of the Court is to advance the interests of victims, 
it cannot afford to undermine the use of alternative forms as accountability 
mechanisms. The Court faced challenges in securing sufficient evidence in the 
Kenyatta case, leading to the collapse of the case.251 To ensure that some form of 
platform was availed for victims, the Court could have co-operated with willing Kenya 
to establish an alternative justice mechanism. 
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The early practice of the Prosecutor exalted the interests of victims and tailored 
investigations and prosecutions. In issuing the first arrest warrants in Uganda, the 
Prosecutor noted that consultations with many stakeholders were helpful in 
understanding victims and local traditions.252 
An important question that frequently arises in international criminal law is how to 
effectively merge retributive and restorative processes.253 Restorative justice is 
primarily concerned with securing restoration through the active participation of victims, 
perpetrators and the community in order to build a harmonious relationship between 
the victims and perpetrators.254 The proximity of processes to victims may address 
individual needs and concerns of many victims. However, this may not be the case 
when crimes are prosecuted at an international level.255 Ultimately, victim participation 
may facilitate reconciliation, shame the perpetrators and contribute to the prevention 
of crimes.256 In the process of pursuing national unity and reconciliation, the rights of 
victims should be safeguarded and never compromised.257 
The Prosecutor must consider both the interests and personal circumstances of victims 
when exercising discretion on whether to proceed with an investigation. The ῾personal 
circumstances᾽ consideration individualises justice and is the most appropriate model 
if one stands true to the aspirations of justice. The incorporation of the views of ordinary 
citizens is crucial in the bid to confront the past and prepare for a peaceful future.258 
International criminal law is often criticised for adopting a normative worldview and 
neglecting the preferences of local populations.259 
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5.6.6      Evading the strict standard for serious crimes 
The exclusion of mechanisms such as amnesties for serious crimes means that 
amnesties fall outside the consideration of the Prosecutor. Proponents of amnesties 
have responded with proposals that do not divorce amnesties from the goal of the 
Court to prosecute. Stahn cites an example given by the South African TRC and argues 
that the ICC does not outrightly reject alternative forms of justice although the Court 
desires to see prosecutions at the end of the chain.260 Stahn finds support from Dugard 
who views amnesties as an alternative to prosecution.261 Hence, the notion of 
investigation is gradually interpreted to include judicial and non-judicial 
investigations.262 
Although prosecution is not obligatory following a non-judicial process, it should be 
given due regard before it is discarded.263 The lid which blocks amnesties and other 
alternative forms of justice for serious crimes is removed through the grounds, such as 
the interests of justice and the interests of victims. At the national level, international 
crimes may be treated as ordinary crimes without reducing liability or punishment of 
the offenders. The modification of the definition allows states to use non-judicial 
mechanisms to minimise conflict with the standards set in the Rome Statute. For 
example, a state may choose to prosecute a crime as murder instead of as a crime 
against humanity. Flexibility may also occur for child soldiers. A rehabilitative rather 
than a retributive forum may be developed for such offenders. 
5.6.7       Selected case studies 
Rwanda 
Rwanda was devastated by the 1994 genocide and struggled to deal with the violent 
past. Rwanda implemented several justice initiatives,264 which included the ICTR 
established by the UN, prosecutions in the formal national court system, and the 
traditional or indigenous Gacaca system aimed at community-driven conflict resolution. 
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The ICTR was ῾forced᾽ on Rwanda which at the time was a member of the UNSC with 
no veto powers. Rwanda shunned the resolution which established the ICTR.265 The 
UNSC overrode state discretion and preferences and further gave primacy to the ICTR 
prosecutor. Therefore, it is not surprising that the current Rwanda President Paul 
Kagame is critical of international criminal justice in the form of the ICC.266 Historical 
neglect of African justice needs to be coupled with the perceived bias of the ICC 
against Africa influenced his perception. 
Although the competence and credibility of Gacaca courts was questioned,267 several 
positives were derived from the courts. The Gacaca courts widened victim and citizenry 
participation;268 hence, they were termed ῾people’s justice᾽. People could testify about 
the genocide and share their experiences.269 The courts blended the restoration of 
social harmony and integration with prosecutions.270 Arguably, Rwanda combined the 
norms of justice with the aspirations of the local population.271 
Sierra Leone 
The establishment of the SCSL was motivated by anger and the desire for revenge. 
The government of Sierra Leone, which initially endorsed amnesty in its TRC 
mechanism,272 opposed the mechanism after the armed group, the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), attacked UN peacekeepers and civilians.273 State discretion 
applied in both choices on amnesty when the state decided what was appropriate 
under the circumstances. The UN helped to establish the SCSL when its peacekeepers 
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were kidnapped and killed by the RUF.274 The UN respected state discretion on the 
preferred approaches – SCSL and TRC. 
The SCSL operated parallel to the dynamics of culture, reconciliation, forgiveness, 
dialogue and local ownership of a post-conflict process.275 The court focused on the 
prosecution of the most responsible in Sierra Leone.276 However, the prosecutorial 
definition of persons most responsible was too narrow and excluded several 
perpetrators. The definition confined itself to commanders who ‘caused᾽ or ῾instigated᾽ 
war in Sierra Leone.277 The Prosecutor of the SCSL exercised discretion with due 
consideration to international and Sierra Leonean law.278 The use of national law 
enhanced a sense of identity and local ownership of the court processes. It also 
integrated national and international perspectives of justice. 279 
A more reconciliation-inspired mechanism was the TRC whose objective was to 
stabilise Sierra Leone and attain long-lasting peace.280 The TRC had no punitive 
component and was tasked with promoting healing and national reconciliation through 
extracting truth.281 In appropriate circumstances, there was acceptance of the need to 
sacrifice judicial trials for the sake of peace.282 In the Norman case, the Appeals 
Chamber of the SCSL held that the work of the TRC and the SCSL complemented 
each other in the advancement of the interests of justice and the desirability of the co-
existence of the two institutions.283 The Chamber thwarted the decision of the Trial 
Chamber that rejected the proposal by the TRC for a public hearing before the TRC.284 
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The law of the ‘big picture᾽ demands that a clear picture of the past285 and the 
investigation of the abuses according to the context in which they were committed286 
should provide guidance on the appropriate mechanism. In Kenya, the crimes were 
part of recurrent electoral violence as discussed in Chapter 1. Such a context can be 
adequately dealt with using different mechanisms. 
The SCSL and the TRC faced their own ‘same person᾽ requirement. The requirement, 
in the ICC, requires the same person identified by the Court to be the subject of 
investigation or prosecution by a state alleging the inadmissibility of a case. In the case 
of Sierra Leone, the requirement revealed an interesting dimension, for the question 
was, under which forum a person needed to appear when identified by both 
mechanisms. A conflict ensued as the SCSL and the TRC fought over the same 
persons.287 The SCSL was uneasy with the attempts of the TRC to access the indictees 
of the SCSL.288 
The problem was exacerbated by lack of guidance on the relationship between the two 
mechanisms, a problem which was caused by the fact that the TRC and its working 
methodology were enacted at a time when the SCSL was not envisaged.289 The ICC 
faces a similar problem on the application of the ‘same person᾽ requirement due to 
lack of guidance on alternative forms of justice. The Prosecutor appears blind to the 
fact that a state may genuinely exercise its discretion to refrain from investigating or 
prosecuting a person identified by the Prosecutor. Instead, the person identified by the 
Prosecutor may concurrently be under a non-judicial mechanism in a state. 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
The negotiations for the establishment of the ECCC to prosecute the Khmer Rouge 
regime started in 1997. The initial UN assessment concluded that Cambodia was 
unable to prosecute due to incapacitated national courts.290 In reaction, Cambodia 
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safeguarded its right to prosecute and rejected the recommendations of the UN and a 
unilateral passage of the Law on the Establishment of the ECCC in 2001. The Law 
provided for the creation of special Chambers within the domestic court structure.291 
Eventually, an agreement between the UN and Cambodia led to the establishment of 
the ECCC in 2003292 and amendment of the Law on the Establishment of the ECCC in 
2004. The ECCC᾽s approach to justice is one of combining retributive and restorative 
or victim-centred processes.293 The objectives of the ECCC law are anchored on the 
aspirations of the Cambodian government and Cambodian people. Justice, 
reconciliation, healing and victim participation are identified as the main concerns.294 
Uganda 
In Uganda, the ICC indictments were made against the existing and locally driven 
immunities granted under the Uganda Amnesty Act.295 The extent to which the 
Prosecutor could have taken the domestic law into consideration is debatable. In any 
event, the Prosecutor should have weighed the indictments in view of the interests of 
justice to keep track of the proper application of complementarity in the circumstances. 
In the Kenyatta case, Kenya attempted, without success, to convince the ASP to 
amend the Rome Statute for sitting heads of states to enjoy immunity from 
prosecution.296 This section does not support the granting of blanket immunities. 
Instead, it proposes the use of other forms of justice when there is a deadlock on 
complicated and politically sensitive cases such as for the Kenyatta case. 
Some people opposed the ICC indictments in Uganda on the grounds that they would 
be detrimental to peace efforts which included the use of amnesties.297 
Complementarity was interpreted for Uganda with the conclusion that it was better to 
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try members of the LRA in Uganda.298 Debates on the African approach to justice 
arose, with some accusing the ICC of imposing Western values in an African 
context.299 To the Acholi people in Uganda, justice has a restorative, and not punitive, 
meaning and purpose.300 The Prosecutor was accused of presenting a manipulated 
version of complementarity.301 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
The DRC ratified the Rome Statute on 30 March 2002 and was the second state after 
Uganda to allow the ICC to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed 
in the state.302 Various pieces of legislation highlight that the DRC has frequently 
adopted legislation to end impunity. The 2014 DRC Amnesty Law prohibits amnesty 
for serious violations of IHL.303 Prior to the Amnesty Law, the 2002 Military Criminal 
Code criminalised ‘crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes᾽.304 
To harmonise the national legislation on international crimes with the Rome Statute, 
three new laws were promulgated by the DRC on 31 December 2015, including the 
DRC Implementation Act.305 The DRC has also applied the Rome Statute directly when 
there are deficiencies in the national legislation. For example, in the Ankoro case on 
crimes against humanity, the military tribunals (that enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over 
core international crimes until 2013) invoked article 215 of the 2006 Constitution to 
prefer the Rome Statute over national legislation.306 
In the last two and a half decades, the DRC experienced various armed conflicts. The 
instability continues today. The UN Mapping Report of 2010 documented armed 
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conflicts of various types dating back to 1993.307 The long history of instability calls for 
integrated mechanisms beyond judicial measures to attain a long-lasting end to 
impunity. The frequency of violence is analogous to that of Kenya, albeit in different 
circumstances, motivations and gravity. In this vein, the ICC should adopt a 
complementarity approach that pays attention to the historical context of a state. 
The ICC activities in the DRC are limited to crimes committed from 1 July 2002.308 
Bearing in mind these considerations, the ICC cannot go solo in a context such as the 
DRC, since the Court is likely to achieve favourable results by allowing the DRC, which 
better understands its history and future aspirations, to oversee the crimes. Also, the 
DRC has options other than judicial mechanisms at its disposal. 
5.7   Entrenched exceptionalism 
5.7.1         Exceptionalism in international law 
There is a thin line between exceptionalism and exemptionalism. Exceptionalism is 
when states interpret and apply international law and norms to reflect their own values 
and interests.309 Exemptionalism is refusal by a state to be bound by the rules of 
international law.310 While some states may be exempt from the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
there are universal norms of international law that bind all states.311 In one way or the 
other, all states have features of exceptionalism in their approach to international 
law.312 
Kenya’s opposition to the ICC intervention was a demonstration of exceptionalism. The 
background to its arguments and criticisms were essentially based on the protection of 
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its values and interests. Kenya regarded the ICC as interfering with its sovereignty and 
broadly as fighting against the Kenyan people.313 
The frequent conflicting interpretations of international law at the UNSC, ICC and state 
levels have a basis in state exceptionalism. The sooner the Court appreciates the 
existence of exceptionalism, the more the Court will recognise the exercise of state 
discretion to the greatest extent possible. The strong opposition to the work of the Court 
by USA and recently by the AU give a wrong impression that only a small clique of 
nations believe in exceptionalism.314 
The Rome Statute is among instruments that accommodate exceptionalism expressly 
or impliedly. The Rome Statute recognises and is powerless on agreements entered 
into by states to entrench their discretion and to limit the intervention of the Court. 
Related agreements were reached in countries such as Sierra Leone and the DRC as 
discussed above. Some states may make reservations to limit the intervention of the 
Court. This is in addition to states having autonomy to crimes committed in Peace 
Support Operations (PSOs). 
5.7.2     Agreements by states 
The issue of state agreements and their impact on the operations of the ICC is often 
understood within the context of article 98 agreements. These agreements aim to 
preserve harmony among states through respect of international obligations, 
particularly to non-state parties to the ICC. Under article 98 of the Rome Statute, a 
state gives preference to obligations to another state including a third state or non-
state party against the competing co-operation with the ICC. This gives states leverage 
to adopt an interpretation that protects their values and interests. 
The article 98 agreements can therefore be said to promote exceptionalism and to 
curtail the Prosecutor from exercising discretion without the consent of relevant states. 
Prosecutorial discretion is suspended to pave the way for priorities that states have at 
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a given time. Reference to article 98 agreements dominated the controversy on the 
continued protection of Al Bashir by African states.315 
In predominately contemporary internal conflicts, local agreements may be entered 
into by the belligerents to facilitate the peace process. The question that arises is the 
extent to which the Court should respect such agreements, some of which are 
constitutionally enacted. An example is the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act of South Africa.316 Although adopted before the Rome Statute, the 
Act serves as a guidance on the approach a state that has an option to prosecute may 
instead take a non-prosecutorial approach. 
Other examples include the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, reached 
on 29 June 2007 in Uganda.317 Unfortunately, the peace accord was not signed 
because the LRA snubbed the ceremony on two occasions.318 The Preamble of the 
Agreement indicates that the customary processes are deemed to be among the most 
appropriate justice mechanisms with a specific objective to promote reconciliation.319 
In the Agreement, the parties undertook to use judiciary and reconciliation institutions 
of Uganda.320 In that regard, the parties endorsed the use of alternative justice 
mechanisms, such as traditional justice processes and reparations for victims.321 The 
parties agreed that formal courts would prosecute the most serious international 
crimes.322 The failure by Kenya to pass a Bill to establish the STK should have 
motivated the ICC to propose to Kenya the considerations of other possible national 
mechanisms. 
5.7.3      Reservations by states 
The Rome Statute prohibits reservations in its application.323 However, Colombia 
adopted a contrary approach and made a reservation when it ratified the Rome Statute. 
 
315 J Petrovic et al ‘To arrest or not to arrest the incumbent head of state: the Bashir case and the 
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317 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (Uganda Agreement). 
318 C Mbazira ‘Prosecuting international crimes committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda᾽ in 
C Murungu & J Biegon (eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (2011) 208. 
319 Mbazira (n 318 above) 207. 
320 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (Uganda Agreement) para 2(1). 
321 n 320 above, para 5(3). 
322 n 320 above, para 6. 
323 n 9 above, art 120. 
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Colombia declared that it was necessary in its context to use amnesties and pardons 
if these conformed to national and international law.324 
Colombia exercised its discretion to outline what works best in its political and legal 
context. The state departed from a plain reading of the reservation article in the Rome 
Statute and accordingly argued that reservations are allowed under certain 
circumstances to enable, inter alia, amnesties and pardons. The overall objective is to 
promote national peace and reconciliation.325 
France also made a reservation to protect its nationals and territorial integrity.326 As a 
permanent member of the UNSC, the French stance is illustrative that a member with 
veto power will use such power to advance its national interests. Article 16 deferrals or 
refusals to defer thereof is not only a matter of international peace and security but 
largely a reflection of the national interests of members of the UNSC, particularly the 
ones with veto powers. The weakness of the Rome Statute is that it limits the power to 
invoke national interests at the UNSC level. To respect the equality of nations,327 the 
Court should allow national interests to take precedence over the desire of the Court 
to intervene. 
The positions of France and Colombia are strengthened by what some call the ‘opt 
out᾽ article in the Rome Statute. Article 124 allows a state to make a declaration which 
invokes the application of exceptionalism over war crimes for a period of seven years 
from the date of its ratification. The provision develops a strong assertion that a state 
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5.7.4       Exceptionalism in Peace Support Operations 
Military and civilian personnel who participate in PSOs are subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of their states and immune from other jurisdictions.329 To this effect, the 
sending states (or the UN as the case may be) and host states enter into status-of-
forces agreements (SOFAs) or status-of-mission agreements (SOMAs).330 The SOFAs 
or SOMAs as secondary sources for the immunity of peacekeepers are primarily 
derived from customary law.331 The immunity does not absolve members of the 
sending states from accountability. Instead, the sending states must investigate and 
prosecute alleged violations by their members.332 
The doctrine of exceptionalism with regard to PSOs was advanced at the Rome 
negotiations after some states, particularly USA, threatened to stop their contributions 
to peace missions if the ICC was given jurisdiction over crimes committed in PSOs.333 
Despite these and other submissions on the immunity of peacekeepers, the Rome 
Statute appears to be a departure from the traditional protection approach given to 
peacekeepers, as it leaves a possibility for their prosecutions.334 
To reiterate that the exclusive application of national laws is still operational, the UN 
Secretary-General’s Bulletin released a year after the Rome Statute was adopted 
included national action in the event of violations in PSOs.335 Section 4 of the Bulletin 
authorises states to prosecute IHL violations by their own soldiers. The position of the 
UN derived from the Bulletin makes it difficult for the ICC to prosecute a case arising 
from a PSO environment. To honour agreements between sending and host states, 
and to respect the provisions of the Bulletin, the UNSC must initiate the deferral of such 
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cases. States also have every cause not to co-operate with the Court in view of existing 
PSO agreements between states. 
5.7.5      USA and Exceptionalism 
While all states have a measure of exceptionalism, no state has made its 
exceptionalism known to the international community more than USA. To comprehend 
the vocal stance of USA against the Court, the discussions at Rome and what USA 
wanted form a perfect basis. USA was very supportive of the creation of the Court at 
the initial stages. In 1994, the report and proposals of the ILC to the UNGA made an 
impression on USA.336 It endorsed the ILC draft that provided for a Court that was 
subordinate to the UNSC.337 USA support of the draft was motivated by the measure 
to which the draft allowed UNSC control over the Court. 338 
The exceptionalism model of USA developed following the conception of a Court with 
significant prosecutorial independence.339 USA perceived the Court as having 
detrimental effects on its national sovereignty, interests and independence.340 
USA also presented policy declarations with the main emphasis on the prominent role 
of the UNSC before the Rome Statute was adopted.341 Following the adoption of the 
Rome Statute, USA resorted to the use of agreements with other states, national 
legislation and veto powers in the UNSC to preserve the concept of exceptionalism. At 
the state relations level, it has coerced (through financial, military and humanitarian 
aid) several states to sign article 98 agreements (Bilateral Impunity Agreements) to 
guarantee protection of American citizens from the ICC.342 
At the national front, USA adopted a legislation in 2002 to penalise any state for 
handing over a USA national to the ICC.343 The Court has not publicly rebuked USA. 
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The silence may be interpreted as acceptance of the validity of exceptionalism.344 At 
the UNSC level, USA has used its veto power to block some resolutions intended to 
trigger the intervention of the Court in a non-state party.345 
5.8   Conclusion 
In international criminal justice, prosecutorial discretion is not a matter of competition 
between the Prosecutor and states. Instead, discretion provides guidance for the 
maximisation of complementarity to unlock state discretion and assist states to 
consider various options to deal with international crimes under their domain. The 
Court is demotivated to interfere in state affairs when interference creates tensions 
instead of binding the Court and states. Options for states extend beyond the Rome 
Statute and necessitate a flexible approach on the part of the Prosecutor when dealing 
with states. The current misunderstandings on the application of complementarity are 
rooted in the unresolved state and prosecutorial discretions. 
Future dialogue between the Court and states should decisively deal with the place of 
law and politics in the exercise of discretion. For states, some allegiance or 
dependence on political forums cannot cease, as they are political institutions and 
subject to interstate politics. In this regard, the following chapter discusses the role of 
regional mechanisms in the application of complementarity. While reference is made 
to different regional or international mechanisms, the focus is on African mechanisms 
because such are more relevant to this study. Kenya is an African state and Africa is 
currently involved in the debates on prosecutorial-state discretion. 
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ENHANCING STATE DISCRETION THROUGH THE USE OF 
REGIONAL MECHANISMS 
6.1   Introduction 
The lack of common positions among states on who exercise discretion and to what 
extent in the prosecution of core crimes deprives the ICC of potential universal 
acceptance. As seen in the preceding chapter, USA raised concerns on the powers 
given to the Prosecutor during the creation of the Court. USA advanced proposals to 
limit the discretion of the Prosecutor through broadening the powers of states and 
UNSC. USA strongly argued for state consent to be sought before the intervention of 
the Court1 and for the UNSC᾿s referrals to encompass broad considerations.2 
Had the above proposals been adopted, state discretion could have been strengthened 
in the Rome Statute. The approach favoured greater state involvement before a UNSC 
referral to the ICC. The extension of the scope of the UNSC beyond Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter opens a window for states to consider peaceful settlement of disputes 
under their jurisdiction and to request assistance from institutions such as regional 
agencies. 
After the creation of the ICC, USA envisaged to influence the operations of the Court 
and considered ratification of the Rome Statute. Despite concerns, the Clinton 
administration made inroads towards the ratification of the Rome Statute.3 However, 
USA actively opposed the ICC during the Bush administration and was convinced of 
insufficient safeguards to protect national interests and discretion of states.4 This 
chapter explores how the preservation of state discretion, as initially promoted by USA 
and advanced by the AU in the last decade, can be enhanced through the use of 
regional mechanisms. 
 
1 F Mckay ‘US unilateralism and international crimes: the International Criminal Court and terrorism᾽ 
(2004) 36 Cornell International Law Journal 461. 
2 DJ Scheffer ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court᾽ (1999) 39 American Journal of 
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3 DJ Scheffer ‘Staying the course with the International Criminal Court᾽ (2001-2002) 35 Cornell 
International Law Journal 55 - 61. 
4 Mckay (n 1 above) 463 - 468. 
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The ICC underwent a tumultuous phase in the last decade due to allegations of 
unwarranted intervention in national affairs. The opposition came mainly from African 
states and their mother body, the AU, that increasingly view the Court as biased,5 
imperialistic,6 insensitive to African values,7 undermining state sovereignty,8 
exacerbating conflicts in the continent,9 making politically motivated interventions10 and 
misinterpreting the principle of complementarity.11 As a result, the rapport between the 
ICC and some African states has deteriorated. The situation raises fears for the 
creation of an unpleasant gap in the prosecution of international crimes. 
The last decade tested the survival of the ICC and the direction of the AU on future 
engagement with the Court.12 To mend the relations and save the principle of 
complementarity requires the addition of regional frameworks to the complementarity 
project.13 The calls for the addition of regional mechanisms have merit, given their role 
in the field of international law from the second half of the twentieth century.14 
Africa can persuasively claim that it has always been proactive and occupied with the 
establishment of its own mechanisms that advance international criminal justice. The 
continent has devised ways to counter allegedly undesirable intrusions of the ICC. 
Africa’s backup plan has manifested in crucial intervals in the age of international 
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criminal law. The Constitutive Act15 came into force a year earlier than the Rome 
Statute.16 It is not clear whether this was a coincidence or deliberate design by Africa. 
Discussions on the establishment of a permanent international criminal court and an 
African Court gathered momentum in the early 1990s. An Additional Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples᾽ Rights Establishing an African Court on 
Human and Peoples᾽ Rights was adopted in 1998 when the Rome Statute was 
adopted. The foregoing developments reveal a continent that has made strides to 
create mechanisms that either replicate or strengthen the achievement of the 
objectives of international criminal law. Africa finds a basis to claim jurisdiction over 
international crimes through its mechanisms.17 
In the unfolding tensions with the ICC, Africa is demonstrating not only the need for 
regional ownership of justice but also the importance of the preservation of the 
supremacy of state discretion. African states also prefer a multifaceted approach to 
resolve African problems. South Africa’s plan to withdraw from the Rome Statute was 
motivated by the alleged failure of the ICC to consider peace, security and stability 
issues in the pursuit for international criminal justice.18 In South Africa’s view, the ICC᾽s 
interpretation of justice should not conflict with the peace obligations of states.19 South 
Africa represents Africa’s desire to balance competing interests in the application of 
the complementarity principle as envisaged in the Rome Statute. 
The AU and associated sub-regional mechanisms want recognition as participants in 
the complementarity system of the Rome Statute. Recognition will enable them to help 
in the balancing process.20 Hence, due diligence is needed from the ICC to explore 
opportunities to resolve violations beyond the Court and states. It is an exercise the 
ICC may be interested in overseeing as evidenced by the Prosecutor’s hint in 2016 
 
15 Constitutive Act of the African Union (Constitutive Act). 
16 The Constitutive Act entered into force on 26 May 2001 while the Rome Statute of the International 
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that the ICC as a court of last resort is not necessarily opposed to proposals for an 
African Court.21 
The emerging African approach intends to preserve the equality of states in ending 
impunity and creating a violence-free continent. Africa believes that it can find African 
solutions to African problems and that the continent can keep states as the centrepiece 
of initiating solutions in their respective territories.22 The use of regional mechanisms 
also promotes a decentralised approach in the enforcement of international criminal 
justice.23 To its credit, Africa can draw from the relative success of hybrid mechanisms 
such as the SCSL and the Extraordinary Chambers to augment the position that Africa 
reached judicial maturity and is ready to provide a continental forum to deliver 
international criminal justice.24 With this foundation, Africa can confidently pursue the 
ratification of the Malabo Protocol to stretch the hand of the AU in combating 
impunity.25 
The ICC would benefit when regional mechanisms influence and assist states to craft 
strategies of resolving internal problems. Likewise, the ICC will not experience 
negative consequences if regional courts play a role that the Court would ordinarily 
play in bringing perpetrators to justice. In a complementary system that involves 
regional organisations, the ICC can nurture the regional mechanisms to align regional 
prosecutions of international crimes to internationally recognised standards.26 The 
eventual use of the regional mechanisms finds support in the lingering proposals for a 
broader use of positive complementarity.27 Arguably, the spirit of complementarity is 
more concerned about whether adequate action is taken against perpetrators than the 
forum that takes the action.28 
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This chapter begins by exploring the role played by international organisations in the 
development of international criminal law and justice. The exploration demonstrates 
the importance of international organisations as partners to international criminal 
courts. The chapter proceeds to discuss the emergence of regional mechanisms and 
the associated dynamics in the evolution of international criminal law and justice. The 
chapter largely adopts Africa as a case study to highlight the need for the use of 
regional mechanisms to complement national efforts. 
Africa is used in this chapter as a case study for several reasons. First, the study is 
based on Kenya – an African state. Second, historical developments indicate that 
Africa spearheads the push for alternative mechanisms when both national and 
international courts are not appropriate forums to deal with situations. Regional 
mechanisms are suitable substitutes for international efforts in the advancement of 
international criminal justice. Lastly, Africa is at the forefront of tensions with the ICC 
and the UNSC. Common positions of African states have adversely hindered co-
operation with the ICC. The ICC, states and the UNSC are notable participants in the 
ICC processes and are all acquainted with the position of the AU on ICC operations, 
making Africa a strong fourth participant in international criminal justice. 
6.2   International organisations and international criminal law 
6.2.1      Overview of international and regional organisations 
International organisations and regional organisations are often seen as one and the 
same thing. In some instances, regional organisations are considered as part of 
international organisations.29 The interdependence of the two in areas of peace, 
security, stability and other international relations matters makes them to be closely 
associated.30 For purposes of this chapter, international and regional organisations are 
differentiated to allow a discussion on the contribution of the AU to be separate from 
that of the UN. 
 
29 AF Snyman ‘Regionalism and the restructuring of the United Nations with specific reference to the 
African Union᾽ (2011) 44 Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 361 - 362; BO 
Chinedu ‘The African Union, the United Nations Security Council and the politicisation of international 
justice in Africa᾽ (2014) 7 African Journal of Legal Studies 359 - 360. 
30 Chinedu (n 29 above). 
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International organisations refer to organisations with global coverage, such as the UN, 
whereas regional organisations refer to organisations that deal specifically with 
regional issues, such as the AU and the EU. International organisations consist of 
members who agree to be bound by common goals, aspirations and concerns.31 
International organisations cover the global community. On the other hand, regional 
organisations, due to regional coverage, can be said to consist of states joined by both 
geographical location and common values.32 
6.2.2       Status of international organisations 
The ICJ and the ILC treat international organisations as legal persons, giving 
international organisations the capacity to assume rights, duties and jurisdiction in 
international law.33 Bearing this capacity, these can contribute to the development of 
international criminal law and bring about new dimensions and norms. Despite their 
notable contribution, international organisations are often labelled as tools for the 
pursuit of the interests of powerful states.34 The negativity explains the rationale for 
both international and regional organisations reinforcing one another and filling gaps 
in their operations. 
In the context of the complementarity regime of the Rome Statute, the role of 
international organisations is better understood by revisiting the reason for the ICC. 
The ICC aims to end impunity for international crimes and to contribute to international 
peace and security. The practice of the ICC has confined the preservation of 
international peace and security to the UNSC.35 The inclusion of the UN – an 
international organisation – in the ICC processes36 is a recognition of the pivotal role 
of international organisations in the work of the Court. Article 23 of the UN Charter 
regards the maintenance of international peace and security to be in the ambit of the 
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advisory opinion᾽ (1949) 174. 
34 JJ Mearsheimer ‘The false promise of international institutions᾽ (1994 - 1995) 3 International Security 
5-49; Bennett & Oliver (n 32 above) 5. 
35 W Schabas ‘The International Criminal Court’ in DR Black & PD Williams (eds) The International 
politics of mass atrocities: the case of Darfur (2010) 147.  
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UNSC. In turn, the UNSC partners with regional bodies to secure a peaceful and stable 
world (article 52 - 54). 
The Rome Statute establishes two prominent institutions with primacy, namely, states 
(which prosecute international crimes)37 and the UNSC (which determines situations 
which threaten international peace and security).38 The UN Charter brings the UNSC 
into a relationship with regional actors. The voluntary subscription of states into 
regional establishments brings states into a relationship with regional actors. The 
common denominator between the two forums of primacy is their position that states 
may need assistance from regional organisations and that regional actors may be 
handy in assisting states to abide by internationally recognised standards and norms. 
The forums take this common approach to give sovereign states more and suitable 
options in dealing with internal affairs. 
It follows that in the operations that concern states, both international and regional 
organisations exalt the discretion of states to choose a forum to assist with internal 
matters, thus explaining the obligation of the ICC to always consider the best interests 
of states before intervening. To protect their interests, states should be allowed to offer 
secondary jurisdiction to a forum of choice, including regional courts and international 
criminal tribunals. Once the ICC accepts the reality of the existence of other forums 
that a state may use, the Court will truly become a court of last resort. The ICC is a 
court of last resort not only by operation but also by observation. 
Arguably, the Court has an ῾observer status᾽ through which it watches, with a subdued 
interest, the breadth, length and depth of the exercise of state discretion in the 
prosecution of international crimes. Although some situations require the Court’s 
contribution, states remain the main drivers of dispute settlement in their jurisdictions. 
Before proprio motu triggers, the Prosecutor must diligently observe state processes 
and be persuaded that states have reached the end of their discretion. The willingness 
or ability of a state must be considered by the Prosecutor, being mindful that there 
could be room for a state to resort to alternative mechanisms of justice. 
 
 
37 n 36 above, arts 10 & 17. 
38 n 36 above, art 16. 
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6.2.3       Law and decision-making powers 
Modern international law is associated with the development of a strong bond between 
international institutions and states.39 States entrust international organisations with a 
responsibility to succour them to realise certain goals and objectives.40 Accordingly, 
states maintain interest in the performance and practice of international 
organisations.41 International organisations influence the governance and behaviour of 
states through law and decision-making powers.42 They invoke certain norms that 
serve as a standard for states in setting their own laws and justice systems.43 States 
can draw from the new rules, patterns of conduct and compliance mechanisms brought 
about by international organisations.44 
The UN is the main arena which shapes the policies and actions of states. The UN 
also shapes the response of the ICC through UNSC referrals and deferrals. The UN is 
credited for the development of the ‘common law of international organisations᾽.45 In 
pursuit of effective global systems, the UN seeks the co-operation of regional 
organisations to ensure security, development and respect for human rights at regional 
level. The joint efforts of the UN and regional organisations will immensely contribute 
to the prosecutorial policy of the ICC on complementarity to encourage states to adhere 
to the principles and purposes of the UN when they exercise discretion in the 
prosecution of international crimes.46 
The Constitutive Act of the AU gives states primacy in internal affairs. The AU only 
intervens to stop the commission of core international crimes in Africa.47 The African 
Peace and Security Architecture is designed for peace and stability on the African 
 
39 MN Shaw International Law (2008) 1284. 
40 D Akande ‘International organizations᾽ in M Evans (ed) International law (2003) 271. 
41 Akande (n 43 above).  
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243 
 
continent.48 The UN retains the primary responsibility to ensure peace and security 
globally.49  The UN and AU share a lot of similar objectives, but the intervention of 
these two institutions differ in scope, complexities and capacity to respond. The general 
view is that the AU needs the authorisation of the UNSC before invoking article 4(h) of 
the Constitutive Act to intervene in grave circumstances.50 
6.2.4      Interpretation of complementarity 
The UNSC has demonstrated that regional organisations could be brought into the fore 
to advance positive complementarity. In Resolution 1593, through which the UNSC 
referred the conflict in Darfur to the ICC, the UNSC encouraged the Court and the AU 
to co-operate on the situation. The UNSC specifically considered a regional solution to 
the crisis.51 Some scholars argue that Resolution 1593 offered options for Africa which 
included allowing the ICC access to the conduct of investigations in Africa, the AU 
conducting proceedings itself and enabling the ICC to sit in Africa.52 In addition, the 
resolution left it open for the AU to use African mechanisms to assist and pressure 
Sudan to craft an appropriate road map to resolve the conflict in Darfur.53 
The Darfur resolution required the AU and Sudanese authorities to consider alternative 
justice mechanisms to complement criminal prosecutions.54 The Darfur example is a 
scenario in which an international organisation (the UN) emphasised the importance 
of a regional organisation (the AU) in assisting a state resolve a conflict.55 For the first 
time, a UNSC resolution indicated to the ICC that complementarity is not limited to 
states and the ICC. 
If the UNSC and the ICC consider and pursue the Darfur approach in relevant 
situations and cases in the future, it would bring into fruition the proposal of USA that 
encouraged the UNSC to exercise powers granted under chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII 
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of the UN Charter.56 When the UNSC uses these powers, the institution is not limited 
to intervene in internal affairs only to enforce international peace and security. Instead, 
its intervention is authorised to encourage states to find solutions through consultation, 
mediation, judicial settlement, use of regional agencies and other means chosen by 
states.57 
6.2.5       International theorism and regional realities 
International theories on the relationship between states and external institutions are 
unsettled on who is the dominant actor in international relations. Notwithstanding, it is 
apparent that states are participants in all the theories advanced by different scholars. 
Whether dominant or subordinate, states should be complemented to advance their 
interests and those of the international community. The prominent theories of realism, 
institutionalism, liberalism, constructivism and legalism58 place states at the centre of 
discourse. The establishment of effective global governance structures requires 
political will and the extent to which states allow interference with their sovereignty.59 
Since states are at the centre of the discourse, a consideration emanates that states 
are en route to the periphery of regional or international systems and that states should 
be involved in decisions which trigger the prosecution of international crimes by 
alternative mechanisms. Beyond the focus on states, international theories cannot 
escape the universalism versus regionalism debate. Universalism represents 
intervention in state affairs by the broader international community, while regionalism 
represents the ῾localisation᾽ of international criminal justice by preferring regional 
mechanisms over international ones. The universalism versus regionalism debate is 
revisited later in this chapter. 
Realism considers state interests to be fundamental even when international co-
operation is sought to advance state interests.60 Realists believe that international rules 
 
56 n 49 above, art 24. 
57 n 49 above, chapters VI and VIII.  
58 Abbot (n 23 above) 364 - 367; M Koskenniemi ‘From apology to utopia: the structure of international 
legal argument᾽ (2005) 17 - 18. 
59 PF Diehl & B Frederking ‘Introduction᾽ in B Diehl & PF Frederking (eds) The politics of global 
governance: international organizations in an independent world (2010) 4. 
60 HJ Morgenthau Politics among nations (1948); JH Herz Political realism and idealism (1951); J Asin 
‘Pursuing Al Bashir in South Africa: between apology and utopia᾽ in HJ Van der Merwe & G Kemp (eds) 
International criminal justice in Africa: issues, challenges and prospects (2015) 9 - 10. 
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and institutions are too weak to control states that have deep sovereignty roots.61 To 
this end, Goldsmith and Posner assert that international criminal tribunals lack the 
pulling power in getting state co-operation in the prosecution of crimes.62 For 
institutionalists, states may need supportive international institutions to shape state 
behaviour and create platforms to tackle international crimes.63 It is expedient for states 
to cede some sovereign rights to these institutions.64 Co-operation with external actors 
may be induced either by the benefit accruing to states or duress from the international 
community.65 
According to liberalists, international politics is debated by states, individuals and 
private groups in the context of domestic politics.66 International organisations serve 
as a platform of interaction for states to extract best practices from one another.67 
Constructivists consider shared norms, such as cultural values, to identify forums that 
regulate state conduct.68 The shared norms are internalised by states. The realisation 
of shared norms occurs through the support of actors such as individuals and local 
organisations. The actors are authorised to work with states to advance and influence 
the position of states in international institutions.69 As discussed in Chapter 2, local, 
regional and international NGOs played a prominent role in the creation of the ICC. 
Finally, legalists try to separate law from politics – an approach criticised for its 
leanness and inconsiderate reasoning, since law is a product of politics.70 
The above theories guide the ICC on the proper application of complementarity. When 
translated into practical realities, the theories support the proposition that regional 
organisations are better positioned to solve challenges related to state sovereignty, 
political will, forum options and appropriate co-operation. The creation of the AU 
mechanisms reflects the views of institutionalists, since African states were inspired by 
 
61 Koskenniemi (n 58 above) 29 - 30; Asin (n 60 above). 
62 J Goldsmith & E Posner The limits of international law (2005) 116. 
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64 J Goldsmith ‘Sovereignty, international relations theory and international law᾽ (2000) 52 Stanford Law 
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65 Diehl & Frederking (n 59 above) 3 - 4). 
66 Abbot (n 23 above) 366. 
67 R Keohane & L Martin ‘The promise of institutionalist theory᾽ (1995) 1 International Security 39 - 51. 
68 Abbot (n 23 above). 
69 Alvarez (n 63 above) 44; K Sikkink The justice cascade: how human rights prosecutions are changing 
world politics (2011). 
70 J Maogoto War crimes and realpolitik: international justice from World War I to the 21st Century (2004) 
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regional harmony, integration and co-operation on regional issues.71 The operation of 
the AU mechanisms reflects the constructivist theory because they advance common 
regional positions and interpretation of international norms in the African context.72 
African mechanisms adopt a realist approach due to reluctance to intervene in the 
internal affairs of states. The intervention of the AU is construed as a last and 
unpopular resort.73 Intervention is unpopular because practice has shown that the 
intervention clause is difficult to enforce. This will be seen under Section 6.7 of this 
chapter on the discussion of article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. The blurred distinction 
between politics and law74 brings liberalism and legalism into play. 
The theories also highlight that states should be at liberty to express their objectives 
and desires through regional organisations to which they belong before resorting to the 
ICC. Although at times the ICC may theoretically be the best alternative mechanism to 
intervene and open dockets, in practice a regional mechanism may be preferable to 
secure co-operation, conflict resolution and compliance with international law. States 
consider motivating factors when they join and use external institutions. The underlying 
basis is for the interests and needs of states to be considered and respected, and for 
the said institutions to respect their right to choose forums to intervene in internal 
affairs. 
6.3.1       The great debate 
The ICC views the use of regional mechanisms to complement national mechanisms 
as a creation of a triangular relationship crisis. The ICC was unprepared to appreciate 
the seemingly new dimension of state discretion in which states prefer to push the 
Court down the ladder in the complementarity project. The Rome Statute has no 
express provision regarding regional mechanisms. Consequently, the ICC has 
endorsed the view that the relationship between the Court and states excludes regional 
mechanisms. The view of the Court highlights the challenges brought by the possible 
complementary role of regional mechanisms. However, the advantages of using 
 
71 n 15 above, paras 1 & 9. 
72 n 15 above, art 3. 
73 n 15 above, art 4. 
74 B Leebaw Judging state-sponsored violence, imagining political change (2011) 24. 
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regional mechanisms as an alternative to the ICC effectively overshadow the 
challenges that may arise. 
Scholars explore the feasibility to incorporate regional mechanisms in the 
complementarity project.75 While some scholars, such as Gathii and Turner, shy away 
from being entangled in debates regarding the potential relationship between the ICC 
and regional courts,76 several scholars are occupied with the debate. Gallant believes 
that regional courts can fill the gaps created by the restrictive operation of the ICC.77 
Africa can use its experience with international criminal tribunals that operated on the 
continent, such as the ICTR and the SCSL, to develop a strong mechanism to address 
impunity.78 However, other scholars oppose regional mechanisms because the African 
Court has failed to execute its mandate since establishment in 2008.79 Sub-regional 
mechanisms are not an option if prematurely used in the absence of legal 
fundamentals, capacity and competence to adjudicate international crimes.80 
Opponents of regional mechanisms further argue that the best option for Africa at the 
moment is to encourage states to co-operate with the ICC.81 They are concerned about 
the motives of African leaders who are bent on avoiding prosecution by the ICC and 
the lack of political will for an effective regional court.82 As persuasive as the opposition 
is, it can be argued that in a developing system such as the African Court, it would be 
fair to avoid conclusive judgments before the system fully matures and to consider that 
 
75 See for example KS Gallant ‘Africa and beyond: should the International Criminal Court be the sole 
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the ICC itself is battling with accusations. The accusations levelled against the ICC are 
aimed at encouraging the Court to reform rather than to destroy it. 
6.3.2      Room in ambiguity 
The UN is a precursor to regional mechanisms that emerged two decades after its 
formation. The regional mechanisms are the Organization of American States (OAS),83 
the EU84 and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).85 The OAU changed to AU with 
time.86 In addition to the definition provided earlier, regional mechanisms or 
organisations in this chapter encompass both judicial and non-judicial institutions that 
influence the political, economic, social and legal governance of regions of the world. 
Such mechanisms are expected to complement states to advance compliance with 
international law.87 
The operations of regional mechanisms show that states function in established 
complementary relationships outside the ICC.88 For this reason, it is expedient to 
mention that the inseparability of states and regional organisations cure the silence of 
the Rome Statute on the role of regional mechanisms in the complementarity regime 
of the ICC. This creates room to advocate and convince the ICC to recognise regional 
mechanisms in its application of complementarity.89 
There is a need for an undertaking by all stakeholders to ensure that the relationship 
between the ICC and regional mechanisms would stem from a common objective to 
help states to exercise their discretion in the prosecution of international crimes. The 
discretion allows states to request assistance from a forum of choice in the 
investigation, prosecution and resolution of international crimes. 
 
83 The OAS was founded on 30 April 1948 to promote regional solidarity and cooperation among its 
member states. 
84 European political and economic integration began with the Declaration of 9 May 1950. 
85 The OAU was formed on 25 May 1963 to encourage political and economic integration among 
member states. 
86 The OAU became the AU on 9 July 2002. 
87 TE Sainati ‘Divided we fall: how the International Criminal Court can promote compliance with 
international law by working with regional courts᾽ (2016) 49 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
225. 
88 Sainati (n 87 above) 232 - 233. 
89 AM Danner ‘Enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of prosecutorial discretion at the International 
Criminal Court᾽ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 544. 
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States should not be ignored in the discussion that is likely to shape the approach to 
complementarity because states have primacy under the Rome Statute. The ICC 
prosecutorial policy should be revised and developed in consultation with states 
because states are the intended beneficiaries of protection. A limiting of the revision to 
a group of experts and the exclusion of states would overlook the perspectives of states 
on obsolete state efforts. 
The ICC practice should ride on the experiences of states and regional organisations 
and start to cement the strong bond between politics and law.90 The exigencies of the 
problem faced by the ICC requires legal and political clarifications.91 It is inevitable for 
the Court to rely on both legal and political interpretations in future situations and 
cases. 
The silence of the Rome Statute neutralises the prohibition of regional mechanisms in 
the complementarity project.92 Since the Rome Statute does not prohibit regional 
mechanisms, the ICC should study the role of regional mechanisms to determine their 
contribution to the attainment of international criminal justice. The ICC should avoid 
competition with regional mechanisms and should ward off any connotations that its 
work would be undermined if the Court accepts new ideas and structures.93 The Court 
should close the important gap created by the failure of the Rome Statute to improve 
from the traditional weakness of crafting international law with ambiguities.94 
It is not surprising that the ICC has not defined the scope of intervention by regional 
mechanisms in its application of complementarity. Unlike the express provisions on the 
relationship between the ICC and the UN, the Rome Statute created an implied role of 
regional mechanisms.95 As a result, there is no need for an amendment of the Rome 
Statute to recognise regional mechanisms. The role and hierarchy of regional 
mechanisms can be catered for through development of the prosecutorial policy. The 
policy would help the ICC to answer questions on how to adequately include regional 
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91 Du Plessis & Gevers (n 45 above) 1 - 2. 
92 Naldi & Magliveras (n 13 above) 123. 
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mechanisms in the operations of the Court and to prefer regional mechanisms when 
appropriate. 
6.3.3      Regionalism 
Regional organisations increasingly assume the roles of defenders and promoters of 
international law.96 They offer enlarged enforcement of international law through the 
use of diverse approaches, treaties and tribunals.97 Regional organisations anchor the 
space between states and the international system.98 As earlier alluded, it is not too 
ambitious to argue that regional mechanisms exist to enhance national interests.99 
Regional organisations must reflect on the facilitation of the interests of states before 
they contend for a place in the complementarity project.100 The same applies to the 
ICC whose primary responsibility is to complement states and not the international 
community. 
In view of the foregoing, states should develop guidelines on when to resort to the ICC 
and regional mechanisms. The former UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, 
normatively appealed for the use of regional mechanisms to advance international 
criminal law. In his view, these mechanisms may be relevant in diplomacy and peace 
initiatives of states.101 
Boutros-Ghali saw an opportunity to use regional mechanisms because of the 
advantages of diversity in their operations. The international community should step 
up efforts to end the underutilisation of regional mechanisms and to discover their 
potential in the restoration of peace and stability, and attainment of justice. The 
observation of Boutros-Ghali represented the UN view during the formative years of 
the ICC. The observation must be revisited and pursued to enlarge the discretion of 
states in tackling issues under their jurisdiction. 
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The freedom to delegate authority will satisfy states for an adequate balance of their 
sovereignty with the pursuit to end impunity.102 It will also align with the ambitions of 
states to promote their interests through the combined use of international and regional 
mechanisms.103 States may also be willing to utilise regional mechanisms and often 
consider the importance of restorative justice in lieu of prosecutions.104 
The potential surrounding regional mechanisms need to be checked to determine 
whether they are viable options for states. Africa embraces assistance from actors 
such as civil society organisations to develop jurisprudence and protection of human 
rights. Africa’s support for the creation of the ICC had strong backing from civil society 
organisations. Although most civil society organisations are generally pro-ICC 
prosecutions, they have shown flexibility in the endorsement of alternative 
mechanisms. In the case of Uganda, civil society organisations considered the need 
to delay justice to secure peace.105 The ICC works in a co-operative relationship with 
several civil society organisations. The Court will do well to embrace the views of civil 
society organisations to allow regional mechanisms to work with states in a 
multidimensional approach to the prosecution of international crimes. 
The localisation option provides an added advantage of preserving cultural and political 
homogeneity, cohesion, co-operation, integration, pursuit of common interests and 
peaceful resolution of disputes within a particular regional set-up.106 African civil 
society organisations can influence the operations of the African Court, since ῾any 
African organisation recognised by the OAU (AU) may request an advisory opinion 
from the African Court᾿.107 The engagement enables the sharing of information and 
discussion on how to solve problems presented to the African Court. 
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However, some scholars argue for the exclusion of regional mechanisms because 
there are no express provisions for regional mechanisms in the Rome Statute.108 Some 
scholars also consider the debate on the inclusion of regional mechanisms as a push 
for an uncalled duplication.109 The opposing voices may diminish with careful thought 
on the relationship between the ICC and the UN, and the former’s subordination to the 
objectives of the latter. The universal appreciation of the use of regional mechanisms 
finds itself in the UN᾽s encouragement for the establishment of such mechanisms to 
tackle human rights issues.110 In essence, the UN largely interprets universal 
jurisdiction in the context of regional priorities and politics, as well as national 
circumstances. 
What was initially brushed aside or devoid of specificity during the formulation of the 
UN Charter111 later became central to the approach of the UN to regional issues. In the 
1970s, the UN adopted resolutions which encouraged the establishment of regional 
mechanisms.112 Currently, the focus is on how to use these mechanisms for the benefit 
of international criminal justice. Possible approaches include the use of regional 
mechanisms as an alternative to the ICC and complementary to the ICC.113 
6.3.4       Multidimensionalism of regional mechanisms 
The AU, like other regional mechanisms, has multidimensional and multipurpose 
features that allow it to address legal and other aspects.114 In addition to sharing the 
aspirations of the ICC to prosecute international crimes, the AU system is designed to 
consider several approaches, most of which are likely to be used after the adoption of 
a broader interpretation of complementarity. Considering numerous African 
institutions, a way has been devised for some of these to complement one another. A 
known example is the mentioned complementarity between the African Commission 
and the African Court.115 However, the Protocol to the African Charter does not clarify 
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the complementarity relationship, thereby raising questions on the practical application 
of the relationship.116 
The ICC has a similar dilemma on the practical application of complementarity. 
Although complementarity has different meanings under the Rome Statute and 
Protocol to the African Charter, it is interesting that Africa is dealing with the meaning 
of the term under the ICC and AU statutes. The African approach to complementarity, 
as advanced by the Rome Statute, can be understood through ‘Africanisation᾽ in the 
regional legislation, as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The multifaceted nature of African institutions enables them to deal with impunity, 
promote peace and enhance accountability in Africa.117 A cautious and patient 
dialogue with states is the norm in African institutions.118 The AU does not deprive 
states of primacy but intervenes in internal matters of states as a last resort when 
states have explored various options available to them.119 The African Charter ensures 
the respect of state discretion by preferring amicable settlement of disputes between 
states before resorting to other options.120 
African states exercise considerable discretion because the African Commission 
shares recommendations and trusts states to deal with internal problems.121 The fact 
that the recommendations of the African Commission are not binding shows the idea 
of the AU not to decide the course of action to be taken by states. While there is a 
move towards an African Court with criminal jurisdiction,122 the AU is not shy to allow 
peace processes to prevail in a state where such are desirable.123 Complementarity in 
the Rome Statute will fare better if the ICC does not dictate to states but invests 
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considerable time under the positive complementarity model to encourage states to 
explore various options. 
6.3.5       Piercing the International Criminal Court monopoly veil 
The ICC has a monopoly to define and determine the scope of the application of 
complementarity.124 The Court decides the admissibility and inadmissibility of cases. 
There is a strong competing voice which is arising amid the privilege of the ICC. The 
voice of the AU and African sub-regional institutions has resulted in considerations to 
look beyond the ICC to address crimes committed on the African continent.125 The 
message to The Hague is that certain standards are crafted for specific regions and 
the ICC may fall short in fulfilling all regional goals.126 The regional ambition is for 
national and regional justice in which states play a collective role to help one another 
to find domestic solutions to problems.127 
Consequently, future agreements between the ICC and the AU should reflect the 
importance of state discretion in the application of complementarity. Preliminary steps 
taken by the sub-regional organisations in Africa point to such direction. The Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) Model Enabling Act on Ratification of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court128 and the Arab League Model Law 
Project on Crimes under the Jurisdiction of the ICC129 are illustrative regional efforts to 
domesticate the Rome Statute and adapt it to local conditions.130 The models allow 
states to demarcate the domestic application of the provisions of the Rome Statute to 
suit unique circumstances. Africa has further demonstrated its ability to adopt its own 
interpretation of the Rome Statute by allowing the African Court to consider a vast 
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number of human rights instruments that apply to a state appearing before the African 
Court.131 
In Rome, states appeared to have surrendered their sovereignty by giving the ICC an 
unassailable right to dictate the pace of the application of complementarity.132 The 
post-Rome scenario is one in which sovereignty is severely tested. The test defines 
the extent to which states can use discretion in the complementarity project.133 
Africa is known for breaking veils.134 In the 1970s and 1980s, the continent used the 
piercing strategy to withdraw from the ICJ after dissatisfaction with the Court’s handling 
of the situation in South West Africa (Namibia) in which South Africa had extended its 
apartheid policy to the territory of the former.135 
Currently, the AU is intensifying efforts to pierce the monopoly of the ICC. The efforts 
of the AU started before friction between the two institutions.136 The efforts are wrapped 
up in the Malabo Protocol that gives the African Court jurisdiction over international 
crimes and does not mention the ICC.137 The failure to mention the ICC can be viewed 
as piercing the monopoly of the ICC, since this assumes that the ICC may at times be 
completely excluded in regional dealings with states. Further, Africa exerts a conviction 
of finding solutions to African problems without outside guidance.138 The monopoly veil 
can be effectively pierced if it is established that the ICC does not have a monopoly 
over prosecutions of international crimes.139 Thereafter, the process of identifying other 
forums of assistance to states flows with little or no hindrance. 
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6.3.6      Extracting from the forerunners of the African system 
The African system of human rights was preceded by the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 (the European Convention) and the 
American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 (the American Convention). The two 
Conventions provide for regional courts.140 Africa has drawn lessons from the two 
earlier mechanisms through embracing a commission and a court in human rights 
advocacy and protection. Therefore, Africa has legislated its commitment to end 
impunity.141 
The EU is committed to ending impunity for the most serious international crimes.142 
Both the EU and AU support the concept of ῾Responsibility to Protect᾽ through regional 
organisations and co-operation.143 Importantly, the EU and AU adopted a common 
strategy in 2007 to promote the prosecution of international crimes at both domestic 
and international level.144 The fact that the EU assisted Senegal financially and 
logistically in the prosecution of Habré shows that states are capable of prosecuting 
and acting on atrocities if supported by well-equipped regional organisations.145 
The ability of the African Court to interpret the African Charter, the Protocol to the 
African Charter and other international human rights instruments applicable to AU 
states is a unique feature.146 It allows the African Court to consider various judicial or 
non-judicial options available to states. Another unique feature for Africa is the 
motivation to prosecute international crimes at a regional level compared to other 
regions where the activity of the ICC is almost invisible.147 While the EU believes in 
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justice preceding peace,148 Africa holds the view that justice may be sacrificed to attain 
peace.149 
Africa believes it is faced with peculiar crimes150 and that the continent is in the age of 
‘Africanisation᾽ and consequently wants to align its approach to issues with African 
values, concerns, traditions, conditions and aspirations.151 It follows that the prevailing 
circumstances in Africa have led the continent to invent new ideas that are relevant to 
the continent. Other regions have also been pressured by their own circumstances to 
adopt certain approaches to human rights.152 The Kadi case under the European 
system provides good guidance on the resolution of a potential conflict between the 
norms of regional and international bodies. The case highlights the importance of 
considering and respecting the laid down norms of a regional body.153 
6.4   African Union’s contribution to international criminal law 
6.4.1      Exploring the AU arena 
Bound by the chains of colonialism and oppression, African states forged a united front 
in search of freedom and independence.154 The re-entry of African states into 
international affairs in the 1950s took a turn for the better with the formation of the OAU 
in 1963.155 Since then, African solidarity has shaped the approach to common 
problems.156 Common interests are vital in the governance system of the AU.157 The 
agenda of the AU includes the promotion of human rights and the creation of regional 
mechanisms to deal with African issues.158 From 2009, the AU has examined the 
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implications of the African Court empowered to prosecute international crimes159 and 
the possibility of regional influence in the processes of the ICC.160 Several African 
organisations have also raised their support for regional ownership as a panacea to 
obstacles faced by the ICC.161 As it stands, the African Court does not have criminal 
jurisdiction despite recommendations from experts for it to be conferred with such 
jurisdiction.162 
The African system is one of the clustered mechanisms that continue to develop 
despite the establishment of the ICC.163 African mechanisms are built on historical 
influences, cultural norms and the search for solutions. The history of the continent and 
present realities are determinant factors in the scrutiny of legal doctrines and the 
approach to complementarity.164 Africa previously stated that its passion for the ICC 
was motivated by atrocities such as slavery and wars that are a feature on the 
continent.165 The present conflict environment in Africa calls for stabilisation, conflict 
resolution and reconciliation among ethnic and religious groups.166 
The AU strives to safeguard the sovereignty, territorial integrity and ability of states to 
adjudicate cases under their jurisdiction. The AU aims to be a last resort in its 
intervention to maintain peace and security in the fight against impunity. The 
organisation esteems interaction with the UN and other organisations where such co-
operation results in the capacity building of its organs.167 The involvement of the AU 
should not be interpreted as a promotion of exceptionalism to the ICC. Instead, the 
organisation’s contribution to the preservation of state discretion should form the crux 
of the discussion on the value it adds to the complementarity project. Strong AU organs 
will ultimately result in persuasive, practical and enforceable recommendations to AU 
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member states. Based on recommendations, states will use their discretion to choose 
the best option(s), bearing in mind that external intervention is only due at the end of a 
long internal chain. 
6.4.2     The African judicial system 
The primary human rights instrument for Africa (the African Charter) provides for a 
quasi-judicial body (the African Commission) and a judicial body (the African Court) to 
look at serious human rights violations in Africa.168 The African Court was added to the 
system due to the insufficiency of the African Commission on the protection of human 
rights.169 The Protocol to the African Charter states that the African Court shall 
‘complement the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples᾽ Rights᾽.170 It appears from the provision that primacy is given to the African 
Commission and that the African Court only intervenes when necessary. In that regard, 
a non-judicial body may be given priority over a judicial body. 
In the analysis of the recent tension between the ICC and Kenya, one may be inclined 
to defend Kenya for taking an African approach of prioritising peace over prosecutions. 
At the time Kenya and the ICC were battling to control the Kenyatta and other cases, 
the African Commission exemplified this approach through a promotional visit to Kenya 
in October 2011.171 Promotional visits present the African Commission, states and 
other relevant stakeholders with opportunities to discuss human rights matters in a 
state and to identify joint approaches to find sustainable solutions to human rights 
violations.172 
The African Court may either offer advice or resolve issues of contestation brought 
before it.173 The African Court exercises contentious jurisdiction to interpret and apply 
the African Charter.174 Advisory jurisdiction advances the protection of human rights, 
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similar to the practice of the Inter-American Court.175 Therefore, the African Court 
provides guidance when states are struggling to interpret and apply expected human 
rights standards.176 The African Commission, unlike the African Court, cannot make 
binding and enforceable decisions.177 Nevertheless, the African Commission can 
convince states to promote and respect human rights.178 The African Commission 
enjoys the support of the AU Assembly (the Assembly) in rendering its decisions.179 
The vital role played by the African Commission in recommending the most appropriate 
approach to cases is clearly recognised when the African Court transfers cases to the 
African Commission.180 
Arguably, the judicial system for Africa provides for at least three outstanding 
advantages for states. First, the judicial system mirrors how states can either use 
judicial or non-judicial bodies as persuasive, enforcement or implementation 
mechanisms. Second, the judicial system assists states to carry out their human rights 
mandate by providing guidance and recommendations. Third, complementarity should 
not be limited to judicial bodies. 
The first advantage reiterates that states have a broad discretion to deal with issues 
under their jurisdiction. The second advantage suggests that states may be assisted 
by a regional body to exercise their discretion. The third advantage shows that non-
judicial mechanisms are essential as judicial mechanisms. In view of this, the ICC 
should embrace a definition of the interests of justice that adequately covers judicial 
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6.4.3        The complementarity parallels between the African Union and the       
                 International Criminal Court 
 
The promotion and protection of human rights is unavoidable in the language and 
practice of the ICC and regional mechanisms.181 The ICC operates as a court of last 
resort and intervenes when states are unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or 
prosecute perpetrators of serious crimes in international law.182 The African system 
demands the exhaustion of national remedies before the intervention of the African 
Commission. The African Court can only intervene when there are grave 
circumstances.183 When national courts have done a shoddy job in the investigation or 
prosecution of crimes, regional courts have intervened.184 Interventions may include, 
inter alia, sanctions for non-compliance with regional policies and decisions.185 
One may be tempted to view the ICC and African system as sharing common ideals 
on complementarity. However, there is a dispute between the ICC and Africa on the 
interpretation and application of complementarity. The ICC is criticised for departing 
from its mandate as a supporting institution186 and for its failure to acknowledge that 
circumstances that motivated Africa to submit to it during its early years have 
marginally changed, as there is an increased potential to prosecute within the 
continent.187 
The growing interest in the potential role of regional mechanisms to complement states 
and the ICC makes a review of the justiciability of the intervention of regional 
mechanisms desirable. Reference instruments of both the ICC and AU mention the 
attainment of justice and peace. The Rome Statute is both reactive and proactive to 
threats to peace caused by international crimes and aims to ensure that justice prevails 
for victims of such crimes.188 The Constitutive Act, and the Peace and Security Protocol 
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of the AU seek to ensure accountability for serious crimes and to restore peace to 
states ridden by conflict.189 
However, the ICC and the AU differ on the value, circumstances and priority accorded 
to justice. A controversy on whether political considerations may compromise or 
enhance the complementary work of the ICC emerges.190 The African Charter is 
recommended for attaching considerable importance to local circumstances and state 
discretion to define the scope and protection of human rights.191 Accordingly, the ICC 
attaches more weight to the attainment of international criminal justice that punishes 
individual responsibility. On the other hand, the AU envisages how international 
criminal justice could be accomplished for the benefit of a society. For this reason, it 
could be expected for AU member states to take some years studying the Malabo 
Protocol before committing to ratification. International criminal justice would therefore 
progress at a slow pace to fill carefully consider and fill any gaps identified from the 
ICC practice. 
In the pre-ICC era, many African states were explicit in expressing the hope for a court 
that complemented national and regional courts. The Dakar Declaration on the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, adopted in February 1998, 
advocated for a complementarity system which included regional mechanisms.192 
African states hoped for a court that protected state sovereignty and that was immune 
from the control of the UNSC.193 The aspiration to regulate external interference 
remains in Africa. The continent has established mechanisms that seek to preserve 
the discretion of states in the interpretation and application of complementarity. One 
such mechanism is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which creates an 
environment for states to undertake a voluntary self-assessment process under the 
supervision of a panel of eminent persons.194 
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The APRM is one of the options that could have worked in the Kenyan post-election 
violence scenario. First, there was an opportunity for the eminent persons, which 
recommended the situation to the ICC to push for a regional or national solution as 
advocated by Kenya. Second, Kenya showed its commitment to the APRM by 
becoming one of the states to submit to a second review by the APRM.195 
The strategy for Africa developed by the African Commission is another potential 
mechanism. The strategy provides for a collective approach to human rights by the 
AU, regional economic communities and members.196 Under the strategy, states have 
a say on issues affecting them without going through the cumbersome processes of 
the ICC. 
6.4.4      Complementing the International Criminal Court 
The AU stretches its hand towards the ICC and not away from the Court. There are 
many possibilities for regional mechanisms to contribute to the goals of the ICC. 
Notwithstanding that the continent currently lacks strong institutions to enforce law and 
justice, the steps currently underway to strength these mechanisms in addition to other 
non-judicial approaches are interesting.197 After the ratification of the Malabo Protocol, 
Africa may do more than the ICC to prevent and prosecute crimes on the continent.198 
Since states are likely to continue to challenge the interpretation and application of 
complementarity by the ICC,199 the standard in the African Charter may offer a solution. 
The features of the African Charter are more aligned to the interests and considerations 
of states. The growing visibility of the African system and its relevance to member 
states can be detected from plans for a common defence policy and self-reliance within 
the AU.200 
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The following discussion demonstrates the tide towards respect for state discretion, 
the adoption of common positions by the AU, belief in positive complementarity, 
compatibility with UN aims and flexibility of AU operations. This positions the African 
system as a machinery to further the goals of the ICC. 
The common position of the AU on ICC cases against African leaders has been widely 
discussed by scholars. The position is based on the application of complementarity in 
consideration of regional and national interests.201 Africa learnt that states are sensitive 
in their protection of political and legal discretion.202 A practical example is the SADC 
region where the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal has been limited after concerns by 
Zimbabwe on intrusion into its land reform programme and fears by other SADC 
member states that such interference with state discretion may happen to them in the 
future.203 
The neglect of positive complementarity by the ICC may find full use under the African 
system. Making positive complementarity functional takes considerable effort and 
dedication.204 The ICC may experience limitations in the advancement of the positive 
complementarity initiative because of distance from Africa. The same cannot be said 
of the AU and African civil society organisations who enjoy proximity to states and have 
a better understanding of local conditions and needs. The UNSC referral of the Darfur 
situation to the ICC acknowledged the need for the inclusion of the AU in practical 
arrangements to make it more feasible to conduct the proceedings in Africa.205 
The use of regional mechanisms would be compatible with the UN goals, which the 
ICC purports to advance. Co-operation between the UN and regional mechanisms is 
implied in the Rome Statute.206 The UN advocates for the promotion and protection of 
human rights through regional mechanisms.207 On their part, the African regional and 
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sub-regional organisations contribute to the objectives of the UN Charter by revising 
their mandates to encompass peace and security.208 
Numerous institutions within the AU provide for flexibility in the adoption of models or 
policies as well as different approaches when dealing with challenges. Likewise, states 
have many forums to defend their discretion to deal with issues in their jurisdictions. 
African states would prefer to be guided by principles that respect the dignity and 
sovereignty of the continent.209 
6.4.5      Towards an expanded African Court 
Africa went to the Rome Conference with reminders of unpleasant memories of 
previous failures by an international criminal tribunal to render assistance when the 
continent needed help most. The continent also carried memories of failing to establish 
its own court with criminal jurisdiction. The proposal for a continental court emerged in 
the 1970s when the African Charter was being discussed. The idea of criminal 
jurisdictions was struck down as premature.210 The memories still live, resulting in 
delays in the empowerment of the African Court with jurisdiction over international 
crimes. 
After the foregoing plans to prosecute the crime of apartheid on the continent on the 
belief that the prosecution was catered for because of the existence of an international 
convention on the crime of apartheid211 and an expectation of prosecution by an 
international court,212 Africa failed to get the international prosecution it had hoped for. 
Despite a declaration by the UNGA that apartheid was a crime against humanity in 
1966213 and the affirmation of the same in 1984 by the UNSC,214 apartheid in South 
 
208 A Jegede ‘The African Union Peace and Security Architecture: can the Panel of the Wise make a 
difference᾽ (2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal 430 - 431. 
209 AU ‘Decision of the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court᾽ 3 July 2009 http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/decision-meeting-african-states-parties-rome-
statute-international-criminal-court-icc (accessed 25 March 2019) ; JM Isanga ‘The International 
Criminal Court ten years later: appraisal and prospects᾽ (2013) 21 Cardozo Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 306. 
210 K M Baye ‘Introduction to the draft African Charter on Human and Peoples᾽ Rights᾽ (2002) OAU 
Doc.CAB/LEG/67/1. 
211 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (Apartheid 
Convention). 
212 n 211 above, art V; AU ‘Rapporteur’s report of the ministerial meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, 
Organisation of African Unity᾽ (2002) OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/67/Draft.Rapt.Rpt (II) Rev.4 para 13. 
213 UNGA Resolution 2202 A (XX1) (1966). 
214 UNSC Resolution 556 (1984). 
266 
 
Africa and elsewhere continued unabated and unpunished at international level.215 
Additional efforts by the UN in the 1980s to try apartheid offences were in vain.216 The 
enactment of national pieces of legislation that gave states universal jurisdiction to 
prosecute apartheid criminals provided some answers to the challenges.217 
Arguably, Africa learnt from experience not to rely solely on international criminal 
tribunals. The continent has an open room for regional mechanisms to assist states 
when assistance at the international level is either unavailable or undesirable. The 
continent learnt that states are not always unwilling or unable to prosecute. 
International tribunals may also be unavailable, unwilling or unable to prosecute. This 
explains the need for a two-way complementarity process broadly interpreted to 
scrutinise the appropriateness, willingness or ability of international tribunals to prevent 
unjustified intervention of the ICC or neglect of regional needs. The unwillingness or 
inability of states to investigate or prosecute does not automatically translate into a 
right of the ICC to intervene. The Court should further test and establish whether a 
state has waived its discretion by exhausting other possible forums at its disposal. 
The establishment of the ICC in the turn of the twenty-first century brought about a new 
dimension in the approach to prosecution of international crimes. During the same 
period, Africa revived its ambition to use regional mechanisms to complement the 
efforts of states. The protection and monitoring of human rights was discussed within 
the ambit of the African Court in the Strategic Plan of the AU Commission in 2004.218 
An idea to create a criminal chamber of the African Court was advanced during 
discussions to create a single African Court in 2005.219 
The dispute of the AU with the ICC on Sudan and Kenya arose after the proposal to 
extend the jurisdiction of the African Court was already in motion.220 However, the 
dispute has accelerated the proposal.221 Inevitably, African states adopted a protocol 
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in 2014 to give the African Court jurisdiction on international and transnational 
crimes.222 The expanded court will have jurisdiction beyond crimes mentioned in the 
Rome Statute. The criminal chamber of the African Court will fight impunity in 
complementarity to national jurisdictions and processes.223 The Malabo Protocol is 
silent on the authenticity of national proceedings and on the genuineness of 
investigations and prosecutions by states.224 
There are arguments for and against the criminal jurisdiction of the African Court. Some 
scholars view the project collapsing due to several challenges associated with the 
African Court and the African Commission. The challenges include financial constraints 
and prosecutorial independence.225 Proponents want to give the African Court an 
opportunity to contribute to criminal justice on the continent.226 The ICC and AU can 
agree on the division of labour and set priorities for each institution.227 Prosecution in 
Africa promotes a harmonised approach to justice and peace.228 The approach is 
dominated by the participation of states in decision-making processes. 
6.5   The dispute between the International Criminal Court and the African Union 
6.5.1      From co-operation to conflict 
The ICC and Africa relationship was perfectly poised to strengthen in the early years 
of the Court when the Court received state referrals from Uganda and the DRC. The 
relationship has changed. The ICC is increasingly viewed on the continent as a 
destabiliser.229 The AU is displeased by what it sees as improper and ill-timed 
indictments against African leaders. The indictments have a negative impact on the 
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political, social, governance and economic developments of targeted states.230 On the 
other hand, the ICC is concerned that the AU exempts African leaders from 
prosecution.231 
The ICC needs an orientation to get a better understanding of local political conditions 
and how to unite communities divided by atrocities.232 The Court is partly correct to say 
that peace achieved through neglecting justice is unsustainable,233 since justice 
without peace is impossible. The combination of judicial and non-judicial demands as 
well as the move towards equality in global governance should encourage the ICC to 
think beyond legal settlements and to extend the international criminal justice debate 
to regional mechanisms. 
The approach of the AU to the operations of the ICC is a fight for the interests of its 
member states. When relevant, the ICC should deal with states in a regional context, 
not as isolated entities. States are encircled within the wall of common positions built 
by the AU, the foundation of which are state interests. Notable common positions 
include shielding sitting heads of state or high-ranking political officials from 
prosecution, promotion of Pan Africanism and African Renaissance, and adoption of a 
common defence policy. The common positions are in addition to the balancing of 
peace and justice. The most prominent feature is the protection of state interests. 
The first common position in Africa is temporary immunity for certain officials during 
their tenure in office. The AU acknowledges the general absence of immunity in the 
Rome Statute regardless of personal status but is uncomfortable when the timing of 
prosecution may have adverse effects on the political or economic operations of a 
state.234 The AU is dissatisfied with the disregard of customary international law rule 
that grants personal immunity of certain officials before domestic prosecutions.235 
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While every person should be prosecuted for international crimes,236 the prosecution 
may be suspended for the incumbents.237 The suspension augurs well with deferral 
provisions in the Rome Statute. As Cryer et al note, the room to suspend certain 
prosecutions is a time-honoured approach, as follows: 
The law of immunities has ancient roots in international law, extending back not hundreds, but 
thousands of years. In order to maintain channels of communication and thereby prevent and 
resolve conflicts, societies needed to have confidence that their envoys could have safe 
passage, particularly in times when emotions and distrust were at their highest. Domestic and 
international law developed to provide both inviolability for the person and premises of a 
foreign [s]tate᾿s representatives and immunities from the exercise of jurisdiction over those 
representatives.238 
The old (non-negotiable immunity for state officials) and the new (prosecuting those 
most responsible for international crimes, regardless of status) are in competition 
today. The adoption of the Rome Statute appeared to have resolved the conflict 
between the old and the new, but the post-Rome environment indicates that the 
competition lingers. The two forms of immunities are functional immunity (immunity 
ratione materiae or subject matter immunity) and personal immunity (immunity 
personae or procedural immunity) with functional immunity aiming to protect conduct 
rendered in an official capacity or on behalf of a state.239 Personal immunity protects a 
person from accountability in private and public acts, provided that the state of the 
office holder does not waive the said immunity.240 State practice and jurisprudence is 
generally unbalanced in favour of upholding personal immunity, although there is a 
growing reflection on the extent to which functional immunity applies.241  
Some states enacted pieces of legislation which prohibit immunity but struggle to use 
the immunity provisions in practice and often have contradictory pieces of legislation. 
For instance, the South African ICC Act242 prohibits immunity in contradiction to the 
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunity Act.243 The contradictory provisions made it difficult 
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for the South African government to authorise the arrest of Al Bashir when he visited 
South Africa. This was after a High Court of South Africa had ruled on South Africa᾿s 
obligation to arrest him in terms of the International Criminal Court Act. Hence, the 
argument in favour of balancing legal and political considerations once again emerged. 
244 In the Kenyatta case, the Prosecutor could have used an interpretation that 
considers domestic legislation. The interpretation provides for immediate political 
considerations and leaves room for future execution of the demands of the Rome 
Statute. 
The ICJ has provided some guidance on the application of different forms of 
immunities. The domestic courts in the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Spain and 
the USA, among other courts, have endorsed the interpretation of the ICJ. In the Arrest 
Warrant case,245 the ICJ held that Belgium had ῾failed to respect the immunity from 
criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC 
enjoyed under international law᾿ when it charged the minister for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.246 The case augmented the position that, under customary 
international law, certain state officials enjoyed absolute personal immunity for crimes, 
including international crimes, and that the domestic courts of other states had no 
jurisdiction over those officials. However, those officials may still be prosecuted in an 
international criminal tribunal.247 On the other hand, it was found that those officials did 
not enjoy functional immunity in domestic and international criminal tribunals.248  
The Malabo Protocol has weighed in on the issue of immunities and its article 46A bis 
reads as follows:    
No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any serving AU Head 
of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior 
state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office. 
The Malabo Protocol favours deferrals of prosecutions for some state officials and 
suggests the granting of personal immunity to these state officials. In other words, the 
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immunity should be attached to the tenure of office, unlike functional immunity which 
continues to apply when the official has left office. In view of the foregoing, functional 
immunity is based on the acknowledgement that the responsibility accrues to the state 
as conduct was carried out on its behalf. Personal immunity detects individual criminal 
responsibility, but prosecution may be suspended to allow the individual to continue 
serving the state. Arguably, the suspension is largely for the benefit of the state and 
not the person. 
The second and third common positions on the current AU agenda serve as eye-
openers on how the AU uses various avenues to strengthen state discretion. Much has 
been written about these two positions. However, this does not discuss the impressive 
scholarly work in this regard. A brief mention in connection with state discretion is 
sufficient for purposes of this chapter. 
Although Pan-African solidarity can be traced to the formation of the OAU249 and the 
Constitutive Act,250 the Agenda 2063 document on the ‘Africa We Want᾽251 is used for 
reference in this section. The document is rooted in Pan Africanism and African 
Renaissance, and prioritises a dialogue-centred strategy to the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts.252 It provides for common defence, foreign and security policies. 
The African Standby Force which deals with defence, safety, security and peace 
support issues on the continent was declared operational in 2016.253 PSOs provide an 
opportunity for states to conduct national investigations or prosecutions of their own 
troops. 
6.5.2      Usurpation of state powers 
There are concerns that the complementary role of the ICC erodes state discretion and 
regional mechanisms.254 The interpretation of complementarity in a manner that takes 
away power from states is a major concern.255 States are ῾protected᾽ entities. Hence, 
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the Court needs to consult them on the options at their disposal for them to retain 
jurisdiction over internal affairs. In proprio motu cases, such as the Kenyatta case, the 
Prosecutor should not limit the criteria to unwillingness or inability of states. Instead, 
there is a need for a holistic approach to determine whether incapacitated or unwilling 
states have utilised all the available options in the interests of justice. 
In the Kenyatta case, the Prosecutor failed to use the margin of appreciation to protect 
Kenya’s own discretion, ignored opportunities availed to Kenya through membership 
to regional and sub-regional mechanisms, ill-considered Kenya’s ability to define the 
scope of complementarity, and did not fully appreciate the existence of freewill co-
operation between the Court and Kenya. 
It is impossible to disassociate the Rome Statute from the ICCPR, given the human 
rights protections found in the two instruments.256 The doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation, adopted by the Human Rights Committee, which was established under 
the ICCPR, amplifies the need to avoid painting states with the same brush.257 The EU 
had earlier crafted the doctrine. The European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Justice applied the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.258 Absurd 
decisions may be arrived at if differences in the social, economic and political 
circumstances of states or regions are ignored.259 The ICC will achieve better results 
and reduce confrontations with states by considering the use of the doctrine in certain 
cases where the justice and peace debate is dominant. 
Complementarity is not restricted to a two-tier system between the ICC and states. In 
a similar vein, the Protocol to the African Charter also does not prohibit the use of other 
forums.260 The consequence is a wide range of choices that are available to states 
locally, regionally and internationally. In exploring the options, states are not mere 
spectators but participants. A desirable system for states is one that fully involves them 
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and considers their discretion in the process. Viljoen observes that external systems 
should be of benefit at the domestic level.261 
Arguably, one can deduce from the foregoing reading that the operations of regional 
and international mechanisms are relevant and effective at domestic level. Their 
operations advance the vision of domestic systems. Regional mechanisms are better 
positioned to consolidate the powers of states. Flexibility in approach enables regional 
mechanisms to ensure that states have room to execute their obligations. The African 
Charter includes the element of ̔ peoples᾽ as a signal of a collective approach to human 
rights interpretation, unlike Western individualistic concepts.262 The AU mechanisms 
operate more as partners than alternatives to states by maintaining a sense of oneness 
in tackling challenges. The AU creates a conducive environment for states to be heard 
and their preferences to be adequately considered. 
AU member states and the African Commission engage in constructive and friendly 
dialogue to promote human rights standards.263 Some scholars have noted the 
influence of the African Charter in the development of constitutional and human rights 
law on the continent, since several states have domesticated its provisions.264 In future, 
the ICC may prove to be of assistance to states through the use of positive 
complementarity, a concept that could have helped Kenya to keep the cases had it 
been used by the Prosecutor. The assessment of state reports as demonstrated in the 
AU context should be aimed at assisting states to overcome human rights challenges 
rather than to serve as a fault-finding process.265 Instead of adopting a coercive 
approach to co-operation with Kenya, the ICC had a chance to evaluate the Kenyan 
report on the basis of the intended steps by Kenya, the challenges faced and strategy 
to overcome the challenges.266 
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6.5.3      Allegations of favouritism and calls for disengagement 
There are perceptions in Africa and other quarters that the ICC has an anti-African 
agenda.267 Africa alleges that weaker states are targets of the Court and that 
superpowers are untouchable by the Court.268 Africa is opposed to an ICC that is 
dominated by superpowers who sacrifice other states in the guise of promoting 
international criminal justice.269 The alleged bias of the Court against Africa has 
resulted in several threats to withdraw from the Rome Statute. The negative 
perceptions have also ignited calls for the use of regional mechanisms as alternatives 
to the ICC. 270 
The AU member states which were once firm supporters of the ICC, including South 
Africa, Uganda and Kenya, are opposed to the application of complementarity by the 
Court in certain cases. South Africa highlighted to the UN Secretary-General in 2016 
that her withdrawal decision was motivated by the UNSC interference in the operations 
of the ICC and an alleged departure by the ICC from its founding principles.271 
However, the political will to leave the ICC hit a brick wall in February 2017 when the 
High Court invalidated the notice of withdrawal on the grounds that parliamentary 
approval was not sought and obtained.272 The setback has not hindered South Africa 
from reviving its interest to leave the ICC, although the intensity towards that goal has 
been reduced.273  
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The reduced intensity may be due to lack of a common position within the AU member 
states on whether to leave the Court or to influence it from within. It is believed that 
countries such as Botswana, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia rejected 
calls for withdrawal when tensions with the ICC were at their highest.274 Botswana᾿s 
Masisi (the then Vice President) remarked on the sidelines of an AU summit arranged 
to endorse withdrawals from the ICC, as follows: 
The best defence is not to abuse, but to stick to the law. We would never allow our [P]resident 
to get away with murder. We are not being prescriptive, we are just asking that we up the 
game.275 
It is submitted that despite growing dissatisfaction with the ICC, Africa should stay with 
the ICC and contribute to the developing complementarity practice of the Court. On the 
political front, the continent has been consistent in the need for a reformed UN 
system.276 In Africa, the same energy and zeal can be used to demand a reformed 
complementarity system at the ICC. In Africa, recent developments on the work of the 
ICC in Afghanistan could be used to pressurise the ICC to demonstrate that no person 
or entity is sacred and that the Court is not targeting Africa, as has been widely alleged. 
The Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and another ICC official were recently banned from 
entering the USA and had their assets in the USA frozen for launching an investigation 
into whether the USA troops had committed war crimes in Afghanistan.277 Although the 
USA is not party to the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over the USA in this 
instance as the alleged crimes were committed on the territory of a State Party 
(Afghanistan).  
It could be a watershed moment for the ICC should the Court stand firm against USA᾿s 
hostility and proceed with the investigations (and possible prosecutions) of American 
personnel. The perception of the Court in Africa, and indeed globally, would change 
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for the better. The credibility and legitimacy of the Court would also be enhanced. The 
USA may use its influence in the UNSC or bilateral agreements with other states to 
frustrate the proceedings. Even if such reactions occur, the ICC would have made its 
mark as a Court that is not afraid to investigate and prosecute citizens of powerful 
states. 
The complementary role of the ICC is misunderstood and politicised when the Court 
solely occupies itself with pursuing cases.278 The participation of regional organisations 
changes the perspective to that of unified and well-co-ordinated forums complementing 
rather than substituting the roles of states. The importance of regional organisations is 
apparent when looking at parties involved in the dispute between the ICC and the AU. 
Some scholars correctly observed that the dispute is mainly between the AU and the 
UNSC.279 The AU and the UNSC need to strategise on the administration of justice 
which does not undermine the interests of states. The UNSC and the ICC are bound 
to make uninformed decisions if they do not involve the AU due to their detachment 
from regional and state realities.280 The credibility of the UNSC and the ICC will remain 
questionable if regional organisations, which are better vehicles of state interests and 
priorities, are excluded from the debate and application of complementarity. 
6.5.4      Judicio-political ῾self-determination᾽ 
The history of the struggle against colonialism in Africa is well documented. Hence, 
important documents such as the Constitutive Act and African Charter recall the 
history.281 The fight for political independence in Africa was followed by new ῾wars᾽ for 
economic and judicial independence. This section looks at the importance of judicial 
equality and independence and the discretion of states. The dispute between the AU 
and ICC is rooted on pertinent issues regarding the co-existence of justice and politics, 
as well as their meaning in national, regional and international forums. 
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Arguably, political oppression in Africa is being reinvented via a judicial forum in the 
form of the ICC.282 In the view of the AU, there is a need for the reform of the UNSC to 
enable states to exercise equal sovereign rights.283 Equality is crucial for the 
development of trust between regional groups, as it enables them to solve their own 
challenges.284 States would enjoy greater discretion if there is a shift from the decisions 
of few powerful states to an inclusive determination by equal states on issues that 
pertain to them.285 
It is easy to recognise and enforce equality in a regional setup. The Constitutive Act 
guarantees African states sovereign equality and interdependence.286 Concepts for the 
protection of the equality of states are enshrined in most state pieces of legislation and 
customs. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is among the concepts.287 The positions 
in the Taylor case,288 the Rome Statute,289 and the ICC decisions in Kenyatta290 and 
Al Bashir291 cases seemingly nullify state discretion on the use of immunity in 
international crimes. The discussion that follows centres on how state discretion can 
be preserved in controversial cases when the immunity discourse is yet to be resolved. 
The ICC and AU interpret the application of immunity differently. The latter insists that 
immunity applies to international crimes, while the former is of the view that no person 
is excluded from prosecution. AU member states refrained from arresting Al Bashir 
because, in their opinions, he enjoyed immunity as a head of state.292 The AU also 
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asked the UNSC for deferral of the Kenyatta case on the same basis. The crux of the 
matter is how states can convince the ICC that immunity applies despite clear 
prohibitions of immunity in the Rome Statute. AU member states can use the ‘self-
determination᾽ concept enshrined in the UN Charter293 and the African Charter294 to 
claim that states enjoy discretion to invoke immunity. 
Self-determination refers to ῾the right claimed by a people to control their destiny’.295 
The concept is mostly used for people who seek political independence or inclusion in 
the fight for recognition in international law before attaining statehood.296 However, the 
interpretation of self-determination goes beyond the fight against colonial domination. 
The ICCPR scope of self-determination applies to independent states and 
acknowledges the participatory right of citizens in their affairs.297 Self-determination is 
further recognised as an economic, social and cultural right under the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.298 
The broad interpretation of self-determination and protection of national interests is an 
opportunity for states to advocate for the supremacy of their immunity pieces of 
legislation and the priority of their interpretation. The foregoing argument does not 
render the provisions of the Rome Statute on immunity ineffective. The argument 
merely accommodates temporary immunity. The Rome Statute permits temporary 
immunity by allowing case deferrals as earlier argued. 
6.5.5      Constraints of universalism 
Universal jurisdiction is a principle of international law which empowers states to 
prosecute crimes committed outside their borders.299 Universalism is one of the 
concepts used in response to international crimes which raise common concerns 
among states.300 Some international instruments that deal with international crimes, 
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such as the Geneva Conventions301 and national implementing legislation in South 
Africa302 and Kenya303 prefer the concept of universalism. The AU supported 
universalism when it adopted policies and developed model legislation to apply the 
concept.304 
The AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction applies to a wide range of international 
crimes.305 Under the Model, African states commit to punish serious international 
crimes.306 When there is a conflict between state action and universalism, the Model 
gives priority to state action.307 
During the establishment of the UN, the concept of universalism gained endorsement 
ahead of the competing concept of regionalism.308 Regional organisations and states 
are the main implementers of universalism. EU states are at the forefront in the 
application of the concept to the extent that some African nationals have appeared 
before the European courts.309 Africa is uneasy with the prosecution of Africans in 
Europe. For example, when Spain charged 40 Rwandans for murder and other crimes 
using universal jurisdiction in 2008, Rwanda complained about the indictment.310 
Rwanda presented the matter to the UNGA and alleged harassment and disrespect of 
its sovereignty.311 
The AU accuses Europe of abusing the concept of universal jurisdiction with an 
intention to oppress Africa.312 There are emerging views that African mechanisms are 
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needed to solve the abuse of universalism.313 The efforts to enable the African Court 
to prosecute international crimes are partly inspired by the dissatisfaction of the AU 
with the use of universal jurisdiction.314 The EU and AU joined hands in 2009 to 
recommend the best use of the concept. The joint recommendations identified states 
as masters of their destiny and primary initiators of prosecutions for crimes committed 
in their territories.315 
6.6    Competing obligations for states 
6.6.1      The obligations 
States have national, regional and international legal obligations. States create and 
bind themselves to the obligations as aids to national agendas.316 The challenge for 
states is when complementary forums compete for jurisdiction with states and when 
states compete among themselves. In the multiplicity of obligations, states face 
challenges regarding which obligations should prevail. Du Plessis discusses the 
proposal to extend the jurisdiction of the African Court and observes the difficulty 
African states may face in balancing ICC and AU obligations.317 The conflict is 
complicated such that the ICC has been unable to rise above it.318 
Although there is guidance in certain instruments and practices such as the European 
Convention on the law or forum that prevails in conflicting situations,319 grey areas 
remain. States should implement the judgments, decisions and resolutions of the ICC, 
the UNSC and regional mechanisms. The AU member states that are party to the 
Rome Statute, the UN Charter and AU human rights treaties are bound by the 
provisions of these treaties.320 The Rome Statute creates a possibility of equally 
binding non-state parties through UNSC referrals or acceptance of the Court’s 
jurisdiction.321 
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The Kenyatta case placed Kenya in a position in which it received competing requests 
and orders from different mechanisms. The AU added a voice to the debate through 
ordering non-co-operation with the ICC and deferral of the Kenyatta case by the 
UNSC.322 The silence of the UNSC on the AU request served as a decision of the 
UNSC for the ICC to proceed with the prosecution. Viewed differently, the silence of 
the UNSC meant that it expected the AU to take a proactive role in finding a regional 
solution. The UN understands the role of the AU and is aware of existing and 
developing African mechanisms on security and other emergencies on the continent. 
The UN operates a model that gives the AU the go-ahead to act as a first responder 
before it takes over or assists.323 Since the UNSC is involved with the ICC, it is 
submitted that the UNSC should leave it to the AU to initiate proposals to solve regional 
security issues. 
States must co-operate with both the ICC and regional mechanisms. The effectiveness 
of the ICC hinges on co-operation by different partners. Hence, article 112(2)(f) of the 
Rome Statute requires the ASP to take steps against non-co-operation. The ICC, 
states and regional mechanisms may ask for co-operation and other forms of 
assistance.324 The enlarged African Court anticipates co-operation with judicial bodies 
such as the ICC.325 
The ICC, the UNSC and the AU are engaged in a triangular conflictual relationship.326 
The AU and the ICC are in a frosty relationship. The ICC criticises the AU for not 
helping the Court to effectively carry out its operations.327 The relationship is further 
complicated by the role played by the UNSC in cases that have faced opposition from 
the AU.328 In the midst of the conflict, the AU reacted by demanding the reform of the 
UN system.329 The ICC, as seen in the Al Bashir case, believes that the obligations of 
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states under the UN Charter should prevail over other obligations330 in line with the UN 
Charter which makes the obligations under the UN Charter supersede those under any 
other international agreement.331 The AU position urges for a balance between AU and 
ICC obligations, and guidance from the AU before states allow the intervention of the 
ICC.332 The AU member states are bound by the decisions of the AU in terms of article 
23(2) of the Constitutive Act. 
In addition, the AU maintains that its decisions prevail over the decisions of the ICC.333 
A failure by states to respect the decisions of the AU may result in sanctions.334 Kenya 
highlighted to the ICC that it respected the AU obligations when it overlooked to arrest 
Al Bashir.335 The balancing requirement shows that the AU is simply asking the ICC to 
consult and consider other competing obligations before taking decisions.336 The AU 
legal framework provides for consultations and relationship-building to resolve 
challenges on the continent.337 
States may make referrals to the ICC and regional mechanisms. Senegal is a case in 
point. When Senegal referred the Habré case to the AU, which in turn gave guidelines 
to Senegal on how to proceed,338 the AU held that the case was admissible in terms 
of the Constitutive Act.339 The AU then authorised Senegal to try Habré on its behalf. 
Senegal acceded to the directive and reviewed its Constitution to assume 
jurisdiction.340 Habré is a Chadian national and Chad is a state party to the Rome 
Statute.341 
The decision of Chad and the AU to use a regional mechanism rather than the ICC to 
prosecute Habré was a positive step and a reminder to the ICC that states reserve the 
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right to make referrals to other forums. The decision also demonstrated that regional 
organisations have a part to play in referrals and deferrals. 
The UNSC and regional mechanisms can request the deferral of cases. The AU Peace 
and Security Council (PSC) once applied for a UNSC deferral of the Kenyatta case 
when it was already before the ICC.342 The legal basis on which the AU PSC makes 
applications for deferrals and implications for regional mechanisms in the Rome 
Statute needs discussion. 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute does not specify who can request the UNSC to approach 
the Prosecutor on the deferral of cases. Regional organisations can capitalise on the 
ambiguity and the provisions on regional initiatives under chapter VIII of the UN Charter 
to request deferrals. The Malabo Protocol also envisages the role of the AU PSC in 
making referrals to the African Court.343 The role may be interpreted to encompass the 
interest of the AU PSC on cases before the ICC. 
The African Charter stipulates at least three ways for deferrals in the African 
Commission. The African Commission must submit its reports and findings on alleged 
human rights violations. The African Commission should also make recommendations 
to concerned states and the Assembly.344 The Assembly is the supreme organ of the 
AU.345 The obligation is stronger when violations are serious or massive.346 A deferral 
by the Assembly is important, considering that the organ may return the matter with 
necessary recommendations for the African Commission to do in-depth research 
before further action.347 The Assembly can give directions on resolving conflicts, war 
and other emergency situations.348 
The Assembly may defer regional cases for a certain period or indefinitely in the 
interests of peace and security. The power to defer under the AU system is further 
strengthened by allowing the African Commission to make use of best practices from 
international law instruments.349 Therefore, the African Commission can draw lessons 
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from the Rome Statute on the importance of deferrals in certain circumstances. 
Requests for deferrals may be included in its recommendations to the Assembly. 
6.6.2      Absence of hierarchy 
International criminal tribunals are bound to specific mandates, geographical 
concentration and exist as separate entities with hierarchy among themselves.350 The 
only competition they contend with is from states with jurisdiction over the same crimes. 
The same cannot be said of the ICC that has unexpectedly faced competition from 
African regional mechanisms. The new development has ignited a discussion on 
handling the issue of hierarchy to determine the operations of secondary forums in the 
Rome Statute.351 The hierarchical relationship between the ICC and the African Court 
is yet to be established. 
In the Kenyatta case, considerations included prosecutions at national, sub-regional, 
regional and ICC levels. Just as the UN Charter permits regional arrangements or 
agencies to maintain peace and security, the Rome Statute should permit and prioritise 
– when necessary – the use of regional mechanisms to achieve the purposes and 
objectives of the UN. If the ICC adopts such an approach, it would wait for the 
unwillingness and inability of both national and regional courts before exercising 
jurisdiction.352 
The Malabo Protocol demonstrates the understanding of the AU regarding the 
hierarchical order. It states that the African Court shall be complementary to the 
national courts and to the courts of Regional Economic Communities (RECs).353 The 
Malabo Protocol does not expressly provide for complementarity with international 
courts such as the ICC. However, the Protocol permits the African Court to seek the 
co-operation or assistance of regional or international courts, non-state parties or co-
operating partners of the AU.354 
The hierarchy is in descending order as follows: national courts, RECs, African Court, 
and other forums such as regional or international courts from outside the continent. 
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This shows that the AU attempts to make every effort to keep cases at a national level 
or where states are more participatory in the decision-making process before 
considering the ICC. National or regional mechanisms may be home-grown solutions 
due to the degree of state participation. 
6.6.3     Managing the conflict 
Poor management of the relationship between states, the ICC, the UNSC and regional 
organisations imperils international criminal justice. The management system is not 
easy with the emergence of contemporary issues and mechanisms that seek to give 
an interpretation and application of complementarity beyond what is ordinarily 
endorsed by the ICC. States are determined to preserve autonomy and sovereignty. 
At the same time, states pay allegiance to regional and international commitments that 
bind them. 
The ICJ highlighted the need to adopt an inclusive approach to debates that involve 
sovereignty and obligations. In the view of the ICJ, international systems operate with 
the consent of states.355 Notwithstanding, states are searching for answers on how to 
manage competing regional and international obligations, and how their own discretion 
should be respected in the process. 
The ICC, regional mechanisms and the UNSC are checks to state discretion. The ICC 
aims to assume jurisdiction once a state is unwilling or unable to exercise primacy. The 
UNSC either turns to the ICC or regional mechanisms when there are alleged human 
rights violations. A regional organisation (i.e. the AU) works towards complementing 
states in the prosecution or settlement of international crimes. The states᾽ broader 
interpretation in dealing with serious violations resonates well with the approaches of 
the AU and the UNSC. The Malabo Protocol does not confine approaches of the AU 
to prosecutions. 
RECs which may not have jurisdiction over criminal cases may intervene when they 
provide better solutions than the African Court.356 Africa has eight RECs,357 whose 
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main purpose is to ensure economic integration as well as the maintenance of peace 
and stability. The Prosecutor can manage the jurisdictional conflict by adopting a policy 
that allows states to make recommendations on the forum that offers an advantage to 
them and which considers various complementary relationships of states. In the 
balance of scale, the ICC needs to accept that regional mechanisms would normally 
be preferred ahead of it. The same ICC zeal to evaluate the capacity of states to 
investigate or prosecute must be transferred to an evaluation of whether regional 
mechanisms are able to complement states. 
6.7   Proactiveness, protectiveness and normativeness in the African Union 
6.7.1     What has been, what should be? 
Tense engagements between the ICC and AU on the activities of the ICC in Africa are 
common. The AU takes proactive steps to keep African cases in Africa for as long as 
possible due to the potential challenges of prosecutions outside the continent. 
Preparatory work to turn the tide in favour of Africa prosecutions began in February 
2009 when the Assembly requested the African Commission to study and furnish it 
with the implications of vesting the African Court with criminal jurisdiction over 
international crimes.358 The desire for African solutions intensified when the ICC issued 
warrants of arrest against sitting heads of states.359 The AU innovation is not surprising. 
Africa has taken initiatives on several occasions to clarify international criminal law. 
Over the years, Africa has shown that it is not taking a back seat and that it will not let 
the international community and international criminal courts dictate the pace on issues 
of concern to the continent. Africa plays a proactive role in contributing to the creation 
of new rules, conduct and compliance mechanisms.360 The SCSL became the first 
court in the world to complete its mandate and transition into a residual mechanism.361 
The Extraordinary Chambers marked the first prosecution of a former African head of 
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state in another country.362 Through the Malabo Protocol, the African Court is due to 
become the first regional mechanism to exercise jurisdiction over unique crimes such 
as unconstitutional change of government, corruption and illicit exploitation of natural 
resources.363  
Debates on the regionalisation of international crimes legislation and prosecutions 
continue. Africa intends to bring the Malabo Protocol and its expanded prosecution 
opportunities into force. Regarding when the instrument will finally attain enough 
ratifications and come into force (if it will), the author of this study concedes that it is 
still a pipe dream. This chapter proceeds based on the visualisation of a future with the 
Malabo Protocol in force. For now, the prospects for an African court with criminal 
jurisdiction remain ambitious,364 yet worth it for scholarly analysis purposes. In this 
regard, the African state actors, assisted by African civil society, can reinvigorate and 
expedite a regional vision of international criminal justice. Such a step would not only 
give hope to victims and human rights advocates on the continent, but it would also 
generate the confidence that Africa has solutions to impunity within its institutions. 
The Habré case is a trophy that the continent displays for the world to realise that Africa 
is ready to play an active part to end impunity.365 The case is still considered historic 
and a beginning of a new dispensation in Africa.366 Africa is in the process of 
developing its systems to effectively contribute to international criminal justice.367 The 
Habré case unpacks how the project is likely to unfold.368 States and regional 
mechanisms would work in partnership to end impunity on the continent. 
States have the discretion to request assistance from regional mechanisms, as 
demonstrated by Senegal’s request for guidance from the AU.369 The referral did not 
take away the control of the Habré case from Senegal but was an appeal for assistance 
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by a state willing to prosecute. International support was not excluded in the 
Africanisation of the international criminal justice process.370 State-centrism was 
further promoted through the options advanced by the Committee of Eminent African 
Jurists for either Senegal or Chad to take the case and try the accused in an African 
state or by an African state.371 Lessons learnt from the case are that impunity shall not 
be tolerated, although prosecutions may be delayed owing to the status of a person as 
a head of state.372 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, more still needs to be done to clear doubts on the 
effectiveness of the AU and states in dealing with international crimes. The ambition to 
preserve the primacy of states may suffer from a deficiency and weakness of domestic 
systems and legislation. This lacuna has a negative bearing on effective enforcement 
at a domestic level. Senegal showed that the challenge can be overcome when it made 
constitutional modifications to prosecute Habré.373 The AU needs to formulate a 
strategy to strengthen both national courts and the African Court. Necessary 
adjustments should be made to conform national laws with the African Charter.374 
The AU should also craft ways to consolidate international support for its initiatives. 
The prosecution of Habré became a reality because of massive financial support from 
the international community.375 
Africa should seize opportunities to persuade the ICC of its readiness to prosecute 
international crimes. The AU can invite the ICC to attend some AU meetings as an 
observer. Ironically, an EU team that assisted in the preparation of the Habré trial was 
headed by a serving Registrar of the ICC.376 The involvement of the Registrar raised a 
question on the independence of the ICC from the EU and revealed that the ICC does 
recognise the work of regional mechanisms. Although the Registrar is responsible for 
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the non-judicial aspects in the ICC,377 it is unfathomable for the Court to have released 
its Registrar to assist a mechanism which the Court did not recognise. The Court 
cannot disassociate itself from the political world when it allowed one of its top officials 
to lead a political organisation. 
6.7.2     Strengthening domestic initiatives 
The AU protects the interests of member states in anticipation of an increased sharing 
of the burden between states and the expanded African Court. The development of the 
AU practice in relation to complementarity may be overshadowed by the footprints 
already inscribed by the approach of the EU to the obligation of its member states to 
the ICC. The ICC-EU Agreement advances the objectives of the Rome Statute. The 
AU advances additional objectives of promoting the interests of Africa and 
commanding member states to submit to regional direction in their dealings with the 
ICC. It is important to note that the AU, like other separate organisations with legal 
personality, may enjoy its relationship with states detached from the ICC. Arguably, 
the degree of distinctiveness enables the AU to develop initiatives to strengthen 
domestic systems beyond the understanding of complementarity by the ICC. 
Efforts to capacitate domestic systems are sprouting up through guidance to states, 
resolutions and legislation development. The Abubakari case378 is illustrative in this 
regard where the applicant alleged a violation of his right to a fair trial by a domestic 
court in a case of armed robbery. On appeal, the African Court not only ruled that a 
violation occurred but also asserted its power to evaluate procedures and decisions of 
national courts to ensure consistency with international standards and the African 
Charter.379 The African Court helps states to align their procedures with international 
standards. States expect to align domestic laws with treaty obligations.380 
The AU may also make resolutions to help states conform to good practices and 
international standards. In 2016, the African Commission adopted 37 resolutions 
including those related to human rights in Africa.381 Among other issues, the resolutions 
dealt with human rights and acknowledged transitional justice as an alternative to 
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prosecutions in Africa.382 The proposal gives states many options and does not 
downplay the fact that when prosecutions are considered by both the ICC and a 
regional mechanism, the use of a regional mechanism is likely to serve the interests of 
a state better and therefore a regional mechanism is bound to be preferred. 
It needs no further emphasis that the Malabo Protocol brings a new dimension in the 
prosecution of international crimes. The Malabo Protocol is an attempt to fill existing 
gaps in the Rome Statute. For instance, the Rome Statute is vague on the jurisdiction 
of the ICC over violations by multinational corporates, while the African Court is moving 
towards addressing corporate criminal responsibility.383 Another example is that the 
African system384 offers better protection to the environment outside wartime 
compared to the ICC that aims to use a prosecutorial policy to prosecute the 
destruction of the environment as a crime against humanity.385 The examples indicate 
that a forum with better protections and a likelihood to assist domestic initiatives under 
any circumstance should be preferred. 
6.7.3     The ‘delay or suspension᾽ theory 
As seen above, Africa operates the ῾delay or suspension᾽ theory in its interpretation of 
the immunity of heads of state and government and other senior government 
officials.386 The Habré and Taylor cases proved that the continent is not opposed to 
the removal of immunity once a person ceases to function in an official capacity. The 
theory helps to balance the demands of justice and peace in complex conflict and 
political environments.387 The AU used the theory to advocate for deferrals of the Al 
Bashir and Kenyatta cases. 
One of the striking features of the Malabo Protocol is defining the crime of aggression 
to include non-state actors.388 The Rome Statute limits the crime to the action of 
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states.389 The modified definition of the Malabo Protocol raises several issues which 
support the notion that Africa is often inclined to delay or suspend prosecutions. A 
limitation of the definition to states in the Rome Statute assumes that the crime is 
committed in an IAC. On the other hand, the Malabo Protocol definition caters for both 
IACs and NIACs. The classification of IACs is not subject to the controversial elements 
of intensity, duration and level of organisation used in NIACs.390 
The definition of IACs and NIACs in the Tadić case by the ICTY has been endorsed by 
other international bodies. The ICTY pronounced the existence of an IAC when states 
use armed force against one another. On the other hand, as discussed in the preceding 
chapter, an NIAC requires protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organised groups or within such groups. Therefore, an IAC is a matter 
of international concern, whereas an NIAC is more of an internal matter. In that regard, 
the AU enlightened the international community on the reality of handling internal 
matters. Prosecutions alone are not ideal for solving internal matters. 
States are reluctant to allow the ICC to preside over ‘classified᾽ internal affairs which 
require the full understanding and appreciation of local and regional contexts. States 
have every motivation to delay or suspend the prosecution of non-state actors in favour 
of alternative mechanisms that promote peace and harmony. States are likely to resort 
to these mechanisms as they watch the evolution of the situation from low-intensity 
violence to a fully fledged NIAC. Once a situation graduates to an NIAC, states and 
the AU prefer a peaceful resolution and negotiated settlement to prevent prolonged 
and devastating armed conflicts. 
6.7.4     Invocation of implied powers 
This chapter has shown that regional organisations have implied powers under the 
Rome Statute. The AU has begun the process of invoking these powers for them to be 
recognised in the complementarity project. The justification stems from the fact that 
international instruments generally contain both express and implied provisions. Thus, 
the doctrine of implied powers is widely endorsed.391 For instance, the Treaty 
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Establishing the European Community provides for action by the European regional 
body when necessary to achieve its objective(s) regardless of an express empowering 
provision in the European Treaty.392 The AU can copycat the EU and take appropriate 
actions, including intervening politically or legally in the affairs of a state, to achieve the 
objectives or purposes of the organisation. 
The ICC needs inspiration from another court with international recognition to 
determine the broad or restrictive application of the doctrine of implied powers. The 
majority and minority views by the ICJ in the Reparation for the Injuries case provide 
guidance.393 The broad determination of the majority was that an international body 
such as the UN is deemed to have implied powers if it can be established that the 
powers are essential for the performance of its duties.394 On a restrictive sense, a 
connectedness between express and implied powers should be established before 
invoking the latter.395 
In the Rome Statute, the restrictive interpretation is more visible because of the 
relationship between the ICC and the UN. The ICC is in a secondary relationship with 
the AU on the basis that principles and purposes of the UN are mostly achieved 
through partnerships with regional organisations. When the ICC and AU conclude the 
proposed partnership agreement, there would be more clarity on the place of the AU 
in the Rome Statute. This may result in the AU advancing its demands for peace, 
security, stability and justice before the ICC, which is a broader interpretation of the 
doctrine of implied powers. 
6.8   African Union’s responsibility to protect: Beyond victims 
6.8.1     Rationale for Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
The discretion of a state to determine the forum for prosecution or settlement of 
international crimes may be interrupted using two developing doctrines, namely, the 
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Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Intervention.396 This section focuses 
on the R2P to demonstrate that the doctrine, as envisaged by the AU, respects the role 
of a targeted state when pursuing its greater purpose to protect civilians affected by an 
armed conflict or situation of violence. The R2P doctrine imputes responsibility on the 
international or regional community to protect vulnerable populations from serious or 
grave crimes encompassing genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing where a state has failed to execute its sovereign mandate to do so.397 
Africa is making great strides to assume ownership of PSOs and other forms of 
intervention on the continent. Experience taught the continent that the international 
community may be slow to intervene and may not intervene at all to solve a crisis in a 
member state.398 The need for self-sufficiency of the AU was necessitated, for 
example, by failure to respond satisfactorily to atrocities in Somalia, Rwanda, DRC and 
Sudan.399 Following the tragedies, African states began discussions with respect to the 
AU᾿s need to protect civilians from egregious crimes. 
In 2000, the R2P doctrine was enshrined in the AU system. Resultantly, the doctrine 
changed the non-interference approach initially endorsed by the OAU.400 Under article 
4(h) of the Constitutive Act and in line with the shift to a ‘non-indifference᾽ approach 
that encourages solidarity in the pursuit of solutions to African problems,401 the AU may 
intervene in the affairs of a member state when authorised by the Assembly to address 
grave crimes. The Ezulwini Consensus report of 2005 further endorsed the R2P 
doctrine.402 In addition, article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act authorises the AU to decide 
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on threats and breaches of peace independent from the UNSC.403 The time has come 
for the ICC to take note that the UNSC does not have a monopoly on politically related 
issues. 
The initiatives of the AU caught the attention of the international community and 
persuaded the development of the R2P doctrine at an international level. The 
international process which translated into an agreed but not binding document in 2005 
started in 2001. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
produced a report – ῾The Responsibility to Protect᾽.404 The report stated that 
sovereignty requires states to take responsibility both to protect their citizens and 
punish violations. When a state fails in its protection mandate, sovereignty is waived 
to enable external actors to assume the responsibility.405 
The UN shuttles between peaceful resolution of disputes through allowing states to 
handle internal affairs on the one hand, and the need to take preventive and 
enforcement action on the other, to justify intervention in certain circumstances.406 To 
this end, the UN endorsed the R2P doctrine in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
document. While the document acknowledges the responsibility of states to protect 
their citizens and to prevent serious crimes, it mentions the need for collective action 
by states to remedy the inadequacies, inability or unwillingness of states to fulfil their 
primary responsibility.407 The document inspired several recent UNSC resolutions to 
include overarching aims of protecting the civilian population and to contribute to the 
understanding, acceptance and development of the doctrine.408 
6.8.2      Scope of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
The intervention by the AU or UN is multifaceted and not limited to prosecutions or 
military deployments.409 Interventions include the establishment of early warning 
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capabilities, building capacity among states, consideration of peaceful means, 
diplomatic pressures and prevention of crimes.410 Military intervention is an exceptional 
or extraordinary measure.411 The intervening power should consider both short- and 
long-term effects of intervention or preventing conflicts.412 Short-term interventions 
may be in the form of deploying the ASF,413 while long-term interventions aim to obtain 
lasting solutions to problems and these encompass measures to prevent recurrence 
of situations. 
The identification of prevention and adoption of peaceful means as methods of 
intervention supports the growing view that state action in response to international 
crimes does not always require prosecutions. Among the objectives of the AU PSC is 
to detect and prevent disputes and conflicts on the continent.414 When conflicts have 
broken out, the organ is empowered to undertake peace-making and peacebuilding 
activities.415 Interestingly, Kenya brought the likelihood of violence to the AU before it 
broke out in 2007. Kenya quoted several strands of previous electoral violence.416 
Since the AU was appraised on the direction of the situation from the early warning 
stage, it was expedient for the AU to play a role in post-violence resolution. Ideally, the 
ICC should have taken a back seat and intervened when both Kenya and the AU had 
manifestly failed to deal with the situation. 
Kenya correctly used its discretion to engage the AU to complement Kenyan efforts in 
the case of violence arising instead of giving the ICC a signal to prepare for possible 
investigations or prosecutions after the elections. The ICC needs to appreciate that 
states require assistance in various ways and that assistance does not necessarily 
result in the prosecution of international crimes and human rights violations. 
To protect state discretion and interests in the AU system, the Constitutive Act was 
carefully crafted to leave the decision to intervene to the Assembly, which is composed 
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of all member states. A member state may request the AU to intervene417 but cannot 
directly interfere with the internal affairs of another member state.418 The same applies 
to the AU PSC, which is only composed of 15 members.419 The objective is to promote 
multilateral, as opposed to unilateral or exclusive, action.420 A multilateral action 
provides for broader consultation and participation before deciding on the appropriate 
response.421 The affected state is also well appraised of the impeding action by virtue 
of its membership to the Assembly. 
Africa is determined to maintain sovereign equality and interdependence among its 
member states,422 as Africa is also committed to peaceful co-existence on the 
continent.423 The Prosecutor should use the comprehensive consultation mechanism 
as a best practice before deciding to take a case. Also, the Prosecutor should avoid 
reinventing the wheel when the AU is already seized with a case. The Court should 
adopt a complementarity approach that preserves co-operation and good relations with 
states. 
6.8.3     The failed Burundi experiment 
Burundi experienced a wave of violence in 2015 following a decision by President 
Nkurunziza to seek a third term in office. The government of Burundi unleashed brunt 
of violence on protestors. The government of Burundi rejected attempts of the AU to 
deploy a military force in Burundi.424 Mediation efforts and human rights monitoring 
efforts of the AU yielded little results.425 When the AU failed to diplomatically convince 
Burundi to co-operate with regional initiatives, the organisation issued a communiqué 
threatening intervention through the use of article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.426 Africa 
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found itself on the verge of invoking article 4(h) for the first time in its history. However, 
the Assembly refused to authorise intervention without Burundi’s consent.427 
The challenges faced by the AU in the Burundi scenario raise questions on the 
organisation’s ability to protect vulnerable populations on the continent when faced 
with the need to balance non-indifference and non-interference. The Assembly 
interpreted the intervention of the AU in a manner that does not exclude the 
participation of a state under examination. The interpretation minimises tensions 
between the AU and its member states. The patient facilitation of the AU in Burundi 
eventually led to a reduction in violence within a few months.428 
The Burundi scenario is a perfect example of how complementarity may be applied 
with due regard to state discretion without adversely affecting the need to assist a state 
in addressing serious violations of international law. However, the AU needs a formula 
to ensure that its approach to intervention in future cases does not compromise the 
rights of civilians to protection from violations. The AU member states have been 
criticised, and rightly so, for a lukewarm approach to international crimes that are 
prevalent on the African continent.429 Failure to translate strong provisions in the AU 
legal instruments into meaningful action on the ground has adversely affected the 
realisation of a criminal justice system that prioritises peace and justice on the 
continent. 
Notwithstanding the value of a consent-based approach, as demonstrated in the 
Burundi scenario, the political actors paid little attention to the need to establish a 
precedent that the commission of serious crimes was intolerable on the continent. 
During the AU summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2016, some AU 
member states agreed with Burundi that forcible intervention was unwarranted and 
emphasised the need to respect state sovereignty.430 The AU had to backtrack from 
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its earlier decision to invoke article 4(h) and opt for dialogue over accountability.431 In 
this regard, the political actors in the AU reverted to their neglect of victims and the 
protection of their political elites. While the ICC᾿s impact on the realisation of 
international criminal justice in Africa is still questionable, even of greater concern is 
that within Africa itself, this project is either lacking a sound basis or must still be 
thought through properly. For this reason, the ICC and African initiatives remain 
relevant if victims on the continent are to entertain hopes of peace and justice in the 
future. 
The complementarity project can only succeed if there are many hands on the deck 
and if states steer the ship. The ICC needs the political will of states and regional 
initiatives to advance justice and to realise the goals of the Rome Statute.432 The 
neglect of regional mechanisms by the ICC is already proving costly and adverse to 
the pursuit of justice because of Africa’s demonstrated ability to frustrate and paralyse 
the operations of the Court. On several occasions, Africa continuously and successfully 
defied the ICC on the matter of the arrest of the Al Bashir, when he was still the 
president of Sudan.433 The controversy caused by the Al Bashir case appears settled 
in the meantime, following him being ousted from power and subsequently being 
prosecuted by Sudan. The national courts are, however, prosecuting him for crimes 
allegedly committed in 1989 and not crimes under the Rome Statute.434 Crucially, 
Sudan stated in February 2020 that it is ready to hand him over to the ICC.435 It remains 
to be seen if Sudan will transfer him to the ICC once the domestic trial has been 
concluded.  
6.9   Conclusion 
This chapter revealed that the ICC can no longer exist as the sole alternative to national 
jurisdictions. The AU challenges the dominance of the Court and seeks recognition in 
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handling violations of international criminal law in Africa. The AU does not intend to 
raise the status of African institutions but to remind the international community that 
the Rome Statute did not abolish the sovereignty and discretion of states. Whereas 
external actors are propelled by the ceding of some sovereign rights by states, they 
cannot take actions that wantonly disregard the discretion of states in dealing with their 
internal affairs. 
The existence of the ICC as an effective international institution is threatened by the 
application of complementarity that yields much power to the Prosecutor. The growing 
resistance of African states and the AU explains the need to embrace a policy that 
favours states’ control of the judicial process.436 When regional mechanisms help in 
the endeavour to end impunity for atrocities, the ICC should allow them to complement 
states. 
African states have the benefit of developing strong complementarity frameworks. 
International criminal law437 is evolving fast in Africa; hence, the ICC needs to catch up 
to avoid an outdated approach to complementarity. Regional mechanisms agitate the 
exercise and guarantors of state discretion. The mechanisms share many 
commonalities with states in their grouping, thereby narrowing areas of contestation in 
different and complementary operations. African mechanisms were established by 
states for the benefit of states. Hence, states are involved in the decision-making 
processes of various mechanisms. 
However, the decorated appearance of African regional mechanisms has failed to 
sway the ICC to fully embrace them. The emergence of African regional mechanisms 
presents both challenges and opportunities for the ICC. The advantages and 
disadvantages will continue into the foreseeable future. The stage is set to pressure 
the ICC to consider the need to maintain relations with states and the AU, and to 
explore the feasibility of developing a policy that provides for the use of regional 
mechanisms to complement states. The overarching view is that state discretion 
remains the dominant element in any system that depends on complementarity. 
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This chapter highlighted the advantages of regional mechanisms. Arguably, regional 
mechanisms bring uniqueness that even the ICC will admire with close analysis. 
Regional mechanisms facilitate, expedite and lead to respect of actions by states.438 
The AU is developing a strong legal framework and is creating a good practice to 
prosecute and provide sustainable solutions to problems on the continent. The 
instruments and practices of African mechanisms reveal that the respect of state 
discretion is one of the core principles of the AU system. Unlike the ICC, Africa 
encourages states to manage internal affairs with the assistance of regional or 
international actors. In this regard, states use their discretion to choose prosecution or 
mediating forums. 
 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1   Introduction 
This study critically analysed the theoretical and practical application of the principle of 
complementarity. It used the Kenyatta case to demonstrate that while many scholars 
have focused on prosecutorial discretion, there is a need for an academic study on the 
extent to which the ICC allows states to exercise discretion over the handling of 
international crimes. The study established that the Rome Statute gives the Prosecutor 
widespread powers and that there is a need to develop a prosecutorial policy to unlock 
the implied provisions on state discretion. State discretion underpins complementarity. 
In this study, documents, legal instruments, reports and studies showed efforts by 
states and the AU to adopt an interpretation that preserves state discretion. 
7.2   The research question (s) 
The study put forward the central question, ῾Is there a need for statutory and normative 
(de)activations to ensure that the supremacy of state discretion is adequately 
considered in the exercise of power by the ICC Prosecutor?᾿ In the study, sub-
questions were also posed to address whether the ICC Prosecutor should be guided 
by contextual realities in responding to international crimes, how non-prosecutorial and 
prosecutorial approaches can be used simultaneously, and the extent to which regional 
mechanisms can enhance the realisation of effective international criminal justice. To 
answer the questions, this study analysed the Rome Statute and the approach of the 
Prosecutor to complementarity that often leads to tensions with states. It further 
highlighted the need to broadly interpret and apply provisions of the Rome Statute and 
other instruments to strengthen state discretion. It was found that states have other 
options beyond the ICC, which can equally complement their efforts in pursuit of peace 
and justice. In particular, efforts made in Africa were identified and discussed in the 





7.3   Overview of the study 
Chapter 1 gave an overview of the study. The first chapter established that 
complementarity heavily leans in favour of state discretion, the Prosecutor and the 
UNSC. While the Prosecutor appreciates the discretion of the UNSC on certain 
matters, there is a need for a full appreciation of state discretion. Controversy arises 
when the Prosecutor is required to merge the law with political considerations. The 
opening chapter discussed the main objectives of the ICC and the requirement for 
different actors to contribute to the prevention of international crimes, and that the 
requirement presents opportunities for the ICC to embrace mechanisms that address 
impunity and contribute to global peace and justice. 
Chapter 1 also established that when the Prosecutor intervened in Kenya, the 
Prosecutor wanted to take over the proceedings rather than to assist Kenya to retain 
jurisdiction. The Prosecutor disregarded legal reforms and other non-judicial steps that 
were underway in Kenya. The Kenyatta case widened the lack of guidance on 
complementarity. The case showed the need to address the question of state 
discretion to reduce friction between the Court and political actors. Therefore, the 
Kenyatta case is an important reference in the evolving complementarity practice of 
the Court. This study interpreted the Rome Statute together with the UN Charter, and 
demonstrated the rationale for resorting to alternative forms of justice and regional 
mechanisms. Alleged bias and selectivity of prosecution trigger negative African 
responses and revive calls to debate the prosecutorial exercise of power. 
The first chapter also started the discussion on the need for the development of a 
prosecutorial policy to enhance state discretion. The chapter indicated that the 
significance of this study lies in the ability of the Prosecutor to reflect innovative abilities 
of states in the complementarity project. States can use their discretion to address 
issues using national, regional and international mechanisms. While an amendment to 
the Rome Statute can enhance state discretion, the first chapter advanced the 
development of prosecutorial policy as a preferred approach. A policy would serve as 
a guiding instrument without creating legally binding obligations on states. A policy is 




7.4   The historical development of the International Criminal Court 
Chapter 2 traced the origins of a permanent international criminal court and established 
reasons for the delay in the establishment of the ICC. The chapter also showed that 
the principle of complementarity frequently featured in the developments that led to the 
establishment of the ICC. The chapter further revealed that although the desire for a 
global institution to prosecute international crimes started as early as the fifteenth 
century, the twentieth century was a turning point. Political considerations and 
interference throughout the centuries contributed to the reluctance to establish the 
court, and often led to questionable trials. The creation of the ICC depended on the 
ability of states to overcome political hurdles associated with state sovereignty. Hence, 
the second chapter demonstrated that the attainment of international criminal justice is 
a product of political will. To that end, the ICC should devise a way to balance law and 
politics. 
The developments before the creation of the ICC were examined in the second 
chapter. What was revealed was the need to counter the shortcomings of ad hoc 
tribunals, the establishment of a forum which is not motivated by revenge and that the 
adoption of a concerted effort to punish international crimes led to the creation of the 
ICC. Resultantly, co-operation and consultation are essential to the work of the ICC. 
Prosecutions and reconciliation efforts in conflict and post-conflict states emerge as 
available approaches. Also, the selection of cases should cover a wider geographical 
area and suspects from different contexts to address the perception that the ICC 
targets weaker states. 
The chapter further observed that national prosecutions of international crimes was the 
norm for time immemorial. In discussing the importance of paying due regard to state 
jurisdiction, the chapter noted that weaknesses in national systems motivated the 
international community to propose international criminal tribunals. However, the 
chapter concluded that states could overcome the weaknesses through the support of 
the ICC and the international community. 
7.5   Complementarity 
In the third chapter, the study embarked on a detailed examination of the evolution of 
complementarity in the history of international criminal justice and how 
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complementarity found its way into the Rome Statute. The principle of complementarity 
evolved at a snail’s pace. At the Rome Conference, a compromise among states led 
to acceptance of the principle. The principle was left undefined in the Rome Statute 
and thus augmented debates that the principle is not static but is adaptable to suit 
certain circumstances and state preferences. The basis for complementarity is the 
assistance external actors render to states to fill jurisdictional gaps. 
Since the Treaty of Versailles, there has been inconsistency in the application of 
complementarity. States and international criminal tribunals took turns to exercise 
primacy over international crimes. The third chapter further revealed that practical 
factors, existence of effective co-operation and sensitivity to local realities are often 
considered before activation of the jurisdiction of an international criminal tribunal. A 
holistic interpretation of the Rome Statute demonstrates that complementarity 
encourages state-centric prosecutions, enhanced scope of national prosecutions, 
supremacy of national criminal jurisdictions in internal affairs of states and commitment 
by states to undertake prosecutions. To achieve these goals, states require 
international co-operation. External actors should exercise due diligence and good 
judgment for crimes to remain within the jurisdiction of states. 
Complications which arise when the Prosecutor expands the interpretation of 
complementarity through the insertion of additional components such as ῾inactivity᾿ 
were further discussed in Chapter 3. The complications illustrate the tension between 
the static position purported in the Rome Statute and the evolving Court practice. As 
part of the evolving practice, the OTP has adopted prosecutorial policies to clarify the 
best approach to complementarity. The policies have done little to strengthen the 
discretion of states in the application of complementarity. The OTP needs to adjust its 
policy to fully capture context-tailored approaches. While the 2016 Policy Paper on 
Case Selection and Prioritisation is a move towards the OTP᾿s assistance to states, 
the current prosecutorial policy makes it difficult for the OTP to support states because 
the Prosecutor retains more supervisory than complementary powers. 
An analysis of cases before the ICC in the third chapter revealed that states could have 
retained jurisdiction in most of the cases. The Prosecutor weakened arguments for the 
inadmissibility of cases through the adoption of exceedingly high standards such as 
the same person and same conduct test, inactivity, ascertainment of a situation as too 
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complex for a state and consideration of the limited geographical scope of a national 
system. For example, the Court missed an opportunity to encourage the DRC to 
proceed with the investigation and prosecution of crimes in 2006. The intervention of 
the Court lowered the standard of accountability desired by the DRC. The chapter also 
considered the lowering of standard to be tantamount to shielding the accused from 
῾some᾿ responsibility. 
Given tensions between the ICC and the AU on the application of complementarity, 
the third chapter introduced the discussion in Chapter 6 on the role of regional 
mechanisms in the complementarity project. Chapter 3 went on to show that Africa 
aims to borrow and refine the complementarity principle of the ICC. State discretion is 
better strengthened under African regional instruments, as discussed in more detail in 
the penultimate chapter. 
7.6   An overview of the Kenyatta case and arising complementarity issues 
In Chapter 4, the study concentrated on identification of the plethora of legal issues in 
the Kenyatta case. The chapter established that the Kenyatta case exposed 
deficiencies on complementarity. It also established that difficulties arise on 
admissibility and preliminary examination in proprio motu cases. On this basis, the 
lacuna created by the Kenyatta case requires the OTP to develop a policy to cater for 
future cases. The fourth chapter demonstrated that state and UNSC referrals require 
the Prosecutor to seek guidance from states and the UN. 
The chapter examined the insistence by the Prosecutor to separate evidentiary 
standards in situations and cases and endorsed the need to keep the same standards 
in both stages to ensure consistency in the application of complementarity. The chapter 
argued that state discretion is better protected if the Prosecutor adopts a higher 
standard before launching an investigation. The chapter also adopted the view that 
investigations may commence when legislative and other reforms get underway. 
Preparatory steps will suffice as an investigation is done in good faith. The chapter 
argued against the same person requirement and implores the Court to use the 
῾substantially same persons᾿ test. The proposed test works better, particularly in cases 
of crimes against humanity, when persons advance a state or organisational policy. 
306 
 
The shifting of the burden of proof to a state as unprecedented, since a state need not 
establish inadmissibility given that the Rome Statute already presumes inadmissibility 
of cases before the ICC, was discussed in Chapter 4. The shifting of the burden also 
negatively affects the rights of accused persons to fair trials. Arguably, state discretion 
is preserved when the Prosecutor utilises every opportunity to assist a state which asks 
for assistance to conduct investigations. 
The Kenyatta case presented the first opportunity for the Court to apply positive 
complementarity at a case stage. The last part of the fourth chapter demonstrated the 
importance of a holistic consideration of article 17 of the Rome Statute in admissibility 
determinations. The neglect of the inability and unwillingness of Kenya to investigate 
and prosecute resulted in missed opportunities for both Kenya and the ICC. The 
consideration of inability could have kept the Kenyatta case in Kenya, while the 
consideration of unwillingness could have strengthened the Prosecutor’s arguments. 
7.7   Giving effect to state discretionary powers 
The Prosecutor has a key role in the complementarity project. As such, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion could be evaluated on the impact this exercise has on state 
discretion to retain jurisdiction. In this context, the fifth chapter examined the 
discretionary powers of states in the Rome Statute and how state discretion prevents 
unwarranted encroachment by the Prosecutor. This highlighted checks and balances 
to ensure that the Prosecutor does not unjustifiably encroach into state discretion. The 
unresolved discretionary boundaries led to tensions between Kenya and the ICC. The 
tensions are not surprising, given that the Rome Statute was drafted against the 
backdrop of balancing the independence and discretion of the Prosecutor on the one 
hand and the supremacy of state sovereignty on the other hand. The chapter 
additionally submitted that the ICC should be wary of how the broad prosecutorial 
discretion proved problematic for the ICTY and ICTR. In that regard, the focus of the 
Court should be to help states protect their national interests. 
Chapter 5 further established that disagreements between the Prosecutor and states 
on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are due to the blurred distinction between 
law and politics in the practice of the Court. The prosecutorial discretion was checked 
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in the Kenyatta case when political considerations dominated the case and suffocated 
all support or co-operation the Court hoped to get from Africa. 
Because of the setbacks suffered by the Prosecutor in the Kenyatta case, the fifth 
chapter outlined ways to strengthen co-operation between the Court and states. From 
the onset, there is a need to narrow prosecutorial discretion to a level understood and 
accepted by both the Prosecutor and states. In the exercise of discretion, the 
Prosecutor should explore opportunities to unlock state discretion and assist states to 
consider various options at their disposal. The use of several dormant provisions on 
state discretion will trigger the development of a policy by the OTP to reflect a more 
state-centred than prosecutorial-centred approach to investigations and prosecutions. 
The chapter also highlighted that the Prosecutor could use the ambiguity of ῾interests 
of justice᾿ to allow states to utilise non-prosecutorial options. In addition, the Prosecutor 
could justify the adaptation of a policy based on necessity and personal circumstances 
of victims. 
The chapter discussed how the use of soft law, such as the UN Guidelines for 
Prosecutors, could help the Court to adopt best practices from international norms and 
standards to regulate the discretion of the Prosecutor. The potential influence of the 
UN on prosecutorial discretion is not limited to soft law. The UNSC may trigger both 
the jurisdiction of the Court and the use of deferral or adjudication powers by states, 
since the Prosecutor has endorsed the UNSC᾿s political powers in the justice versus 
peace debate. 
The fifth chapter consolidated discussions on prosecutorial and state discretion and 
submitted that a system that operates on complementarity should give preference to a 
mechanism that enjoys primacy when faced with a conflict between mechanisms. The 
preferred mechanism should also be allowed to explore options beyond the 
prosecution of international crimes. Therefore, the Prosecutor must demonstrate that 
it is impractical for a state to undertake any form of sanction, including the use of 
alternative forms of justice, before extracting a case from a state. In that regard, the 
future intentions of a state should be considered because states are sensitive to the 
protection of their political, strategic and economic interests. The development of clear 




It was also noted in Chapter 5 that the UNSC was included in the Rome Statute to 
provide a multidimensional approach to issues of international concern, including the 
protection of legitimate interests of states from potential abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion. The Court should appreciate that all states have features of exceptionalism 
in their approach to international law. The Rome Statute also accommodates 
exceptionalism by being powerless on agreements entered into by states which 
exclude the ICC from their internal affairs. 
7.8   Enhancing state discretion using regional mechanisms 
Chapter 6 began with a discussion on how the Prosecutor’s application of 
complementarity causes opposition, mainly in Africa and in USA. The resistance calls 
for a policy which favours states in the control of judicial processes. In that regard, 
regional mechanisms are an option to complement the efforts of states. In Africa, the 
ICC is criticised for unwarranted intervention in national affairs, bias, imperialistic 
motives, insensitivity to African values, undermining state sovereignty, making 
politically motivated interventions and exacerbating conflicts on the continent. Since 
the Rome negotiations, USA has been an ardent supporter of a complementarity 
approach that encompasses negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, use of regional agencies and other means chosen by states. 
The sixth chapter examined the place of regional mechanisms in the complementarity 
project with a focus on Africa. It observed that the use of regional mechanisms is 
implied in the Rome Statute and that the UNSC has previously turned the implication 
into practice. For example, Resolution 1593 referred the Darfur conflict to the ICC. The 
UNSC encouraged the Court and the AU to consider a regional solution to the crisis. 
The chapter also observed that the operations of regional mechanisms show that 
states already function in established complementary relationships outside the ICC. 
Regional organisations are increasingly becoming defenders and promoters of 
international law. The diverse approach of regional organisations in the enforcement 
and application of international law makes them ideal forums to enhance national 
interests. Therefore, there is room to advocate for and convince the ICC to recognise 
regional mechanisms in the application of complementarity. The Rome Statute 
mentions the attainment of justice and peace; hence, the Prosecutor could use this 
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provision to align prosecutorial understanding of the two concepts to that of states and 
the AU. 
In relation to Africa, the chapter established that historical influences, contextual 
realities, cultural norms and the search for African solutions motivate the incorporation 
of regional mechanisms into the complementarity project. The present conflict 
environment in Africa requires stabilisation, conflict resolution and reconciliation 
among ethnic and religious groups. Africa is concerned about the neglect of the 
equality of states at the international level and the abuse of universal jurisdiction by 
Europe. The concerns inspired Africa to take proactive steps to promote judicial and 
non-judicial responses to conflicts and other situations of violence. As a consequence, 
efforts to capacitate domestic systems are sprouting up through guidance to states and 
assistance with legislative development. 
The penultimate chapter argued that Africa has the potential to do more than the ICC 
in the prevention and prosecution of crimes on the continent. The efforts of the AU to 
pierce the monopoly of the ICC are a step in the right direction and would allow states 
to identify forums of assistance with little or no hindrance from the ICC. The AU and 
states are also agreeable on the value, circumstances and priority accorded to justice 
or peace. Hence, a process of cautious and patient dialogue with states is regarded as 
the norm of African institutions. The institutions are motivated by preservation of state 
discretion to the greatest extent possible. The institutions appreciate that a desirable 
system for states is one that fully involves them and that considers state discretion. 
The African Charter ensures respect for state discretion by preferring amicable 
settlement of disputes between states before resorting to other options. This approach 
gives sovereign states more and suitable options to deal with internal affairs and is 
also reflected in the UN Charter. The African Commission and the African Court 
primarily share recommendations and guidance and leave states to deal with internal 
problems to preserve state discretion. Africa demonstrated in the Habré case, the 
ratification of the Constitutive Act and adoption of the Malabo Protocol, that the time is 
ripe for regional mechanisms to play a role in the complementarity project. Kenya 
intended to make use of AU institutions to complement national efforts. International 
support is welcome in this ῾Africanisation᾿ of international criminal justice. 
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7.9   Recommendations 
This study noted the procedural difficulty and disadvantages of amending the Rome 
Statute to cater for more recognition of state discretion in the exercise of prosecutorial 
powers. It also noted that the Rome Statute and the Rules of the Court contain 
sufficient provisions which support expansive state powers. Therefore, the researcher 
is of the view that the prosecutorial policy should be amended and developed to reflect 
the provisions of the Rome Statute on state discretion. 
The recommendations that follow start with an analysis of the existing prosecutorial 
policy and strategy. The discussion also considers interpretations and proposals to 
amend the Rome Statute to demonstrate that the interpretations and proposals are 
unnecessary because concerns could be addressed in a prosecutorial policy. The 
recommendations that follow fill gaps to help the Prosecutor to utilise the existing Rome 
Statute provisions and OTP documents to give more heed to state discretion. 
7.9.1      Recommendation: Enlarging the scope of dialogue 
The effectiveness of the OTP depends on consultation and co-operation with states 
and other stakeholders. The OTP is composed of three main divisions, namely, the 
Jurisdiction, Co-operation and Complementarity Division; the Investigation Division; 
and the Prosecution Division.1 The Jurisdiction, Co-operation and Complementarity 
Division is tasked with conducting preliminary examinations, providing advice on 
jurisdiction, admissibility and co-operation, and co-ordinating judicial co-operation and 
external relations. This Division is key in initiating dialogue on the concerns of states 
regarding the application of complementarity. 
As early as April 2003, the OTP foresaw the legal, policy and management implications 
of complementarity, and engaged a group of experts to dissect the practical application 
of complementarity.2 The group recommended, inter alia, proactiveness on the part of 
the Prosecutor to consult a state which intends to resort to an alternative approach to 
justice, the Prosecutor and a state to discuss issues pertaining to interests of justice, 
partnership and dialogue between the OTP and states with the intention of 
 
1 http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp (accessed 23 July 2019). 
2 OTP ῾Informal expert paper: the principle of complementarity in practice᾿ 2003 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2009_02250.PDF (accessed 23 July 2019) 2003. 
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encouraging national proceedings, OTP assistance and advice to states, graduated 
measures approach before the ICC intervenes, and the binding nature of UNSC orders 
to states.3 These recommendations demonstrated to the Prosecutor that dialogue with 
states and other stakeholders is vital for the achievement of the goals of the Rome 
Statute. 
In view of the foregoing, the OTP has consistently included the need for dialogue in its 
policy and strategy documents since the early days of the Court. The Prosecutor 
appreciates the need for effective co-operation in developing best practices for the 
OTP and awareness on sensitive issues in the operational environment.4 The OTP 
identified six external challenges, including the detrimental effect on ending impunity 
because of the lack of co-ordination among relevant actors.5 In practice, the OTP 
consults periodically with states, agencies of the UN, the UN, civil society 
organisations, regional organisations and other stakeholders to enhance the 
effectiveness of its work.6 
7.9.2      Recommendation: The Prosecutor 
The Prosecutor is commended for an open-door policy, since the policy allows dialogue 
on the prosecution of international crimes, the challenges faced and strategies for 
solutions. Notwithstanding, there is a need for the Prosecutor to devote more effort on 
issues that currently threaten the existence, popularity and effectiveness of the Court. 
The issues also have the potential to shape the OTP policy and align it to the objectives 
of the Rome Statute. The first step towards reducing tensions between African states 
and the ICC is for the Prosecutor to immediately engage the AU.7 
 
3 n 2 above, 4 - 24. 
4 See for example OTP ῾Policy on children᾿ (November 2016) 41 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/20161115_OTP_ICC_Policy-on-Children_Eng.PDF (accessed 25 July 2019) ; Office 
of the Prosecutor ῾Policy paper on victims᾿ participation᾿ (April 2010) 2 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9FF1EAA1-41C4-4A30-A202-
174B18DA923C/281751/PolicyPaperonVictimsParticipationApril2010.pdf (accessed 25 July 2019). 
5 Office of the Prosecutor ῾Strategic Plan 2016 - 2018᾿ (16 November 2015) 5 - 6 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/EN-OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf (accessed 25 July 2019). 
6 OTP ῾Policy paper on sexual and gender-based crimes᾿ (June 2014) http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes--June-2014.pdf (accessed 
25 July 2019). 
7 M Ibrahim ῾Call for the AU and ICC to engage in honest dialogue᾿ Business Day Live (15 October 
2013) http://www.bdlive.co.za/Africa/africanews/2013/10/15/call-for-au-and-icc-to-engage-in-honest-
dialogue   (accessed 25 July 2019). 
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The dialogue should be intended to establish regional perspectives on 
complementarity, the place of regional mechanisms in the complementarity ladder, 
common strategies on crimes specified by the Rome Statute and guarantees for the 
preservation of state discretion in the application of complementarity. Ultimately, the 
political and judicial organs of the AU and the ICC should consider a joint appointment 
of a team of experts to take stock on the complexities caused by the existing OTP 
strategy and policy. The objective is to unpack and bring to closure the outstanding 
question on the interface between law and politics. The two institutions should also 
develop and adopt a framework on the relationship between the ICC and the African 
Court when the latter assumes jurisdiction on international crimes. 
7.9.3      Recommendation: The Office of the Prosecutor  
The OTP should use proactive, flexible, creative and intelligent strategies to initiate 
dialogue with the AU.8 The OTP has a good track record of creating and managing 
partnerships which contribute to its work. On an annual basis, the OTP contributes to 
the Report of the Court to the ASP and the Report of the Court to the UNGA.9 The OTP 
should ride on the momentum created by the willingness of the AU to find sustainable 
solutions to contentious issues on the application of complementarity. Possibilities for 
the ICC include having an Office to the AU in Addis Ababa and the attainment of an 
Observer Status in the AU. In that regard, the OTP will gain valuable experience in the 
management of state-driven processes. 
7.9.4     Recommendation: The need for a state-centric agreement between the                                                         
African Union and the International Criminal Court 
An agreement on judicial co-operation between the ICC and AU is long overdue. When 
the ICC concluded agreements with the UN and the EU, the OTP predicted that an 
agreement with the AU was imminent.10 However, after more than a decade an 
 
8 n 5 above. 
9 OTP ῾Policy paper on preliminary examinations᾿ (November 2013) 22 http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/acb906/ (accessed 25 July 2019); OTP ῾Paper on interests of justice᾿ http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-
73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf (1 September 2007) 1 (accessed 27 July 2019). 
10 OTP ῾Report on the activities performed during the first three years (June 2003-June 2006)᾿ (12 
September 2006) 31 http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-FB64-47A9-9821-
725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport20060914_English.pdf (accessed 27 July 2019). 
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agreement between the ICC and AU is yet to be concluded. The proposed agreement 
could benefit from two developments. 
First, an existing agreement between the ICC and the EU provides a reference on the 
nature of ICC agreements with regional organisations. In addition, an agreement with 
the AU can explore gaps to develop a stronger framework which encompasses the 
concerns of the AU. Second, the AU is seized with ICC prosecutions in Africa, thereby 
raising the prospect of addressing the ICC perspectives, particularly on state discretion 
in the framework. 
The ICC-EU Agreement expressly states that co-operation and assistance is between 
the ICC and the EU, and not between the ICC and the member states of the EU.11 The 
Agreement also requires respect for the principles and objectives of the EU Treaty.12 
In addition, the Agreement leaves room for the recognition of privileges and immunities 
which conform to the interests of the EU Communities.13 Arguably, the AU will endorse 
the respect of the African values and approaches in a co-operation agreement with the 
ICC. 
The separation of the EU from its member states is a weakness in the ICC-EU 
Agreement. The weakness leaves EU member states vulnerable and with little backing 
from the EU when the ICC threatens their discretion on international crimes. In theory, 
the EU intends to protect its interests more than the interests of individual member 
states. The AU needs to carry states on its shoulders when it enters into an agreement 
with the ICC. The voice of a regional bloc is likely to be louder than that of a state when 
a state disagrees with the ICC. 
The resolutions of the AU on the ICC provide a prospective direction the AU may take 
in the agreement with the ICC. In a recent resolution,14 the AU Assembly discussed 
co-operation with the ICC and reiterated that its approach to international criminal 
justice is guided by the Constitutive Act and the Malabo Protocol (when it comes into 
 
11 Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and 
assistance (10 April 2006) L115 Preamble para 10. 
12 n 11 above, Preamble para 1. 
13 n 11 above, art 12. 
14 AU ῾Assembly of the Union Thirty Second Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia᾿ (10-11 February 
2019) para 2 http://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36461-assembly_au_dec_713_-_748_xxxii_e.pdf 
(accessed 27 July 2019). 
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force). The Constitutive Act contains several provisions which protect state discretion. 
The Assembly also undertook to continue engagements with the UNGA and the ICJ 
on the question of immunities of heads of states and government and other senior 
officials.15 Additionally, the Assembly requested the ICC to respect article 98 
agreements as well as clarification on the complementary relationship between article 
98 and article 27.16 Finally, the Assembly discussed the application of universal 
jurisdiction and the need to settle outstanding controversies surrounding the 
principle.17 
7.10   Further recommendations 
The ICC-AU Agreement should expressly require the co-operation of the AU and AU 
member states in all matters involving the ICC on the continent. 
7.10.1      Recommendation: International Criminal Court-European Union                   
                Agreement 
 
There is a need to insert the provision that allows privileges and immunities in the 
interest of European Communities in the ICC-EU Agreement with an emphasis on the 
interests of states and interests of victims (‘peoples᾿). The insertion will avoid blanket 
immunity for heads of states and senior government officials. At times, the prosecution 
of senior government officials may be in the interests of political and economic well-
being of a state. 
The contentious issue of immunity (article 27 of the Rome Statute) requires the ICC 
and the AU to make compromises. The ICC should convince the AU to limit the 
beneficiaries of immunity to heads of state and government. As other senior 
government officials usually serve in successive governments in their countries, 
including them as beneficiaries would see them enjoying immunity indefinitely. These 
officials, unlike a head of state or government, can easily be replaced should their court 
proceedings disrupt the proper functioning of a government. Furthermore, the ICC 
should encourage African states to preserve and improve on the gains made in the 
past few decades of limiting the number of years these officials are in office to a 
maximum of 10 years. The AU should rigorously implement the provision of 
 
15 n 14 above, paras 3 - 5. 
16 n 14 above, paras 7 - 8. 
17 n 14 above, para 9. 
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unconstitutional change of government to ensure that these officials do not amend the 
constitutions of their countries to stay in power beyond 10 years. This would enable 
the national courts, the ICC or the African Court to try them within 10 years of having 
committed international crimes. The proposal may seem as advocating for delayed 
justice for victims, but the reality is that even if immunity is prohibited, the ICC is unlikely 
to try the officials during their tenure of office. The challenges the ICC experienced with 
Al Bashir and Uhuru Kenyatta attest to that.  
Regarding article 98 agreements, the state of the accused should have the discretion 
to determine how to proceed in view of national interests. This is uncontroversial for 
the AU. The national interests may be discussed in a meeting of the Prosecutor, the 
AU and a state to agree on a common position. To give effect to this proposal, the 
following clause is proffered as an amending clause to article 46A bis of the Malabo 
Protocol: 
  Article 46A bis: Immunities 
1)  No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any 
serving AU Head of State or Government, based on their functions, during 
their tenure of office, provided that a determination has been made by the 
ICC, AU and the state concerned that the proceedings would be contrary to 
national interests. 
2) The immunity is waived when a determination has been made by the AU in 
terms of this Protocol that a government is in power following the 
commission of the crime of unconstitutional change of government in 
accordance with article 28 E of this Protocol. 
Since the above recommendation on immunities may not solve the dilemma of bringing 
to justice heads of states who constitutionally occupy office until death, the dilemma 
can be remedied through reading the issue of immunities through the lens of the 
concept of ‘peoples᾿ enshrined in the African legal system. The concept of peoples 
allows victims of crimes more participation in affairs which affect them. 
To avoid creating a system of communications or submissions that is weaker than the 
one provided by the Rome Statute, individuals and NGOs should be allowed under the 
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Protocol to submit cases to the African Court regardless of declarations by states. The 
interests of states in the African perspective encompass peoples᾿ rights. 
The proposed approach balances the rights of a leader who is ordinarily protected from 
prosecution against the rights of the community, which may waive the protection.18 For 
the waiver by the community to be universally recognised and enjoyed by the peoples 
in the continent, article 30(f) of the Protocol needs to be deleted and the following 
inserted: 
Amendment of article 30 of the Malabo Protocol: Other entities entitled to submit cases 
to the Court 
  30(f) African individuals or African Non-Governmental Organizations 
  with interest in the prosecution of crimes under the jurisdiction of 
  the African Court. 
 
7.10.2   Recommendation: International Criminal Court-African Union Agreement 
It is also recommended for the ICC-AU Agreement to recognise the AU Model Law on 
Universal Jurisdiction.19 The ICC and the AU should endorse the Model as a best 
practice and promote it among other regional organisations. 
Universal acceptance of the Model will solve many tensions between the ICC and 
states. The Model acknowledges the sovereign equality of states and outlines the 
framework for individual states to lead in the prosecution of international crimes.20 The 
Model also has provisions on immunity of high officials and thus highlights limitations 
imposed on foreign courts.21 Arguably, the Model is comprehensive in allowing states 
to exercise primary responsibility over international crimes. 
 
18 ῾Rapporteur’s Report, OAU Doc. CM/1149 (XXXVII), Ann. 1᾿ para 13 (1981). 
19 African Union (Draft) Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes (AU 
Model Law). 
20 A Dube ῾The AU Model on universal jurisdiction: an African response to western prosecutions based 
on the universality principle᾿ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 458. 
21 n 19 above, art 16(2). 
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7.10.3       Broadening the concept of ῾interests of justice᾿ 
The OTP previously conceded its dilemma and inability to offer a comprehensive 
clarification on the scope of the interests of justice, including the facts and 
circumstances for consideration of each case or situation.22 However, the last few 
years have seen the OTP considering assistance to states which prosecute serious 
crimes under national law. Crimes such as the illegal exploitation of natural resources, 
arms trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, financial crimes, land grabbing and the 
destruction of the environment have caught the attention of the Prosecutor.23 
The OTP is considerate of a comprehensive strategy which includes truth-seeking 
mechanisms, reparations programmes, institutional reforms and traditional justice 
mechanisms.24 The developments give hope that soon the Prosecutor would move 
from viewing justice only within the objects and purposes of the Rome Statute.25 The 
greatest undoing for the Prosecutor is a failure to discern that the Rome Statute allows 
the interplay of law and politics, and that discussion on politics transcends UNSC 
boundaries. The OTP largely views the objects and purposes of the Rome Statute as 
limited to prosecutions. 
7.10.4    Recommendation: Broader interpretation 
The OTP should refrain from a restrictive description of its operations because this 
ignores the broader interpretation of the objects and purposes of the Rome Statute. In 
addition to the Court, the broad interpretation acknowledges other institutions that are 
jurisprudentially sound and consistent in balancing law and politics. The Preamble of 
the Rome Statute advances the objects and purposes of the UN and states together 




22 OTP ῾Paper on interests of justice᾿ (1 September 2007) 1 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-policy-int-just (accessed 27 July 2019). 
23 OTP ῾Policy paper on case selection and prioritisation᾿ (15 September 2016) 5 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf (accessed 27 July 2019). 
24 n 23 above, 5. 
25 n 9 above, 17; n 22 above, 1. 
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7.10.5      Amendment of the Rome Statute to incorporate the United Nations   
                General Assembly and states in deferrals 
 
The failure by the UNSC to grant AU requests for deferrals in Sudan and Kenya led 
South Africa to propose an amendment to article 16 of the Rome Statute.26 The 
proposed amendment is aimed at giving states options when the UNSC fails to respond 
or responds negatively to requests for deferrals. When amended, article 16 could read 
as follows: 
  Article 16 
  Deferral of investigation or prosecution 
1) No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under 
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested 
the Court to that effect, that request may be renewed by the Council under the 
same conditions. 
2) A State with jurisdiction over a situation before the Court may request the UN 
Security Council to defer the matter before the Court as provided in (1) above. 
3) Where the UN Security Council fails to decide on the request by the state 
concerned within six (6) months of receipt of the request, the requesting Party 
may request the UN General Assembly to assume the Security Council’s 
responsibility under paragraph 1 consistent with Resolution 377(v) of the UN 
General Assembly. 
7.10.6      Recommendation: Provide clear guidance 
The proposed amendment of the Rome Statute is unnecessary for several reasons. 
First, the UNSC has no power to defer matters before the Court, since decisions of the 
UNSC are not binding on the Court. Article 16 of the Rome Statute allows the UNSC 
to ῾request᾿ and not ῾order᾿ the Court to defer a case. The provision also uses the word 
῾may᾿ to illustrate that the Court is not bound by the UNSC to defer a case. The decision 
to defer rests with the Court only. 
 
26 UN ῾South Africa: proposal of amendment᾿ 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2009/CN.851.2009-Eng.pdf (accessed on 27 July 2019). 
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Second, determinations on the crime of aggression reveal the limited powers of the 
UNSC in influencing the decision of the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation.27 
The Prosecutor seeks counsel from the UNSC to determine whether a crime of 
aggression has been committed. The failure by the UNSC to provide guidance does 
not prevent a prosecutor from seeking authorisation from the PTC to proceed with an 
investigation. Notably, the Prosecutor should proceed provided ῾the Security Council 
has not decided otherwise in accordance with article 16᾿.28 The provision gives the 
impression that the UNSC may defer a case to stop prosecutorial proceedings. 
However, article 16 is clear on the role of the UNSC concerning deferrals. Therefore, 
the statement should be understood to mean that the PTC must consider and decide 
on a request of the UNSC before authorising the Prosecutor to proceed. 
Third, the Rome Statute contains a presumption in favour of prosecutorial deferrals at 
the request of a state.29 Therefore, states need to deal directly with the Prosecutor on 
deferrals. To minimise conflicts between the Prosecutor and states on the 
circumstances under which the Prosecutor would grant states requests for deferral, 
the OTP policy should provide clear guidance to that effect. 
Last, allowing the UNGA to override the decisions of the UNSC may lead to a 
conflictual relationship between the UNGA and the UNSC. It may also create 
controversy on whether the UNGA can exercise the powers of the UNSC on matters 
of international peace and security. The conflict between the two organs would be 
averse to the ICC᾿s co-operation with the UN system. 
7.10.7     Recommendation: Assembly of State Parties 
Article 119 of the Rome Statute allows state parties to make use of the ASP to settle 
disputes among themselves. The article is silent on disputes involving the UNSC and 
non-state parties. However, since the ASP may invite non-state parties to participate 
in the work of the ASP, it is argued that the ASP can hear disputes from non-state 
parties.30 The ASP is given leverage to make recommendations to settle disputes. 
 
27 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) art 15 bis. 
28 n 27 above, art 15 bis (8). 




Therefore, a negative response from the UNSC is subject to consideration by the ASP 
at the request of states. 
When disputes are submitted to the ASP, it is recommended that the ASP adopt the 
approach it uses in its meetings, which encourages decisions to be reached by states 
on consensus. The ASP should seek the opinion of the ICJ as a last resort. The 
prioritisation of the perspectives of states on the way forward following the negative 
response from the UNSC is in conformity with the principle of complementarity. The 
ASP should consider the options available to a state to address the situation or case 
under the consideration of the Prosecutor. The application of complementarity in the 
absence of consensus has led to disputes between the ICC and African states. 
7.10.8     Proposed amendments to the OTP Strategy 2019 - 2021 
On 17 July 2019, the OTP released its Strategy for 2019 - 2021.31 The Strategy is the 
last for the current Prosecutor.32 The Prosecutor aims to fulfil the desire for an effective, 
efficient and widely embraced Court.33 The Prosecutor recognises the successes and 
failures of the ICC during her tenure of office.34 The Strategy notes that one challenge 
faced by the Court is the reduced support from states due to conflicting national and 
political interests.35 The OTP will develop strategies and dialogue to secure the 
required political and operational support.36 The Strategy proposes the narrowing of 
cases for the most responsible perpetrators to speed up prosecutions.37 Therefore, the 
Strategy signals a new direction for the OTP and aims to address the challenges 
encountered by the Court in the last decade.38 
The OTP᾿s six strategic goals for 2019 - 2021 are: (1) to achieve a high rate of success 
in Court; (2) to increase the speed, efficiency and effectiveness of preliminary 
examinations, investigations and prosecutions; (3) to develop with states enhanced 
 
31 OTP ῾Strategic plan 2019-2021᾿ (17 July 2019) http://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20190726-
strategic-plan-eng.pdf (accessed 30 August 2019) . 
32 n 31 above, 4. 
33 n 31 above, 4. 
34 n 31 above, 4. 
35 n 31 above, 11. 
36 n 31 above, 12. 
37 n 31 above, 19. 
38 A Whiting ῾ICC Prosecutor signals important strategy shift in new policy document᾿ (17 May 2019) 
http://www.justsecurity.org/64153/icc-prosecution-signals-important-strategy-shift-in-new-policy-
document/ (accessed 25 July 2019). 
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strategies and methodologies to increase the arrest rate of persons subject to 
outstanding ICC arrest warrants; (4) to refine and reinforce its approach to victims, in 
particular for victims of sexual and gender-based crimes and crimes against or 
affecting children; (5) to increase the Office’s ability to manage its resources in an 
effective, responsible and accountable manner; and (6) to strengthen the ability of the 
Office and of its partners to close the impunity gap.39 
The current prosecutorial strategy is progressive, as it foresees evolution in the future 
understanding and application of complementarity and ῾genuineness᾿ of national 
proceedings.40 In terms of the Strategy, consultations with stakeholders may result in 
an explanatory paper or amendment of existing policies to incorporate findings from 
stakeholders.41 Since the conditions are ripe to strengthen state discretion in 
prosecutorial policies and practice, the amendments that follow are proffered. 
7.10.9      Recommendation: Strategic goal 3 
Strategic goal 3 should be amended as follows: 
To develop, together with states, enhanced strategies and methodologies to increase 
the national ownership of cases and the arrest of persons who are subject to 
outstanding ICC arrest warrants. 
7.10.10    Recommendation: Strategic goals 6 and 7 
Strategic goal 6 should be amended as follows: 
To further strengthen the ability of the Office and of its partners to close the impunity 
gap without prejudice to the discretion of states to choose approaches and 
mechanisms which are otherwise not utilised by the Court. 
Alternatively, a new strategic goal should be added. 
    
 
 
39 n 31 above, 4 - 6. 
40 n 31 above, 17. 
41 n 31 above, 17. 
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Strategic goal 7 
To initiate discussions with relevant actors, particularly states and regional 
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